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THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF
ABSTRACT
This thesis is about the White House staff. Primarily it covers the 
period from the 1930's to the 1970's: from being first established to 
being well embedded in the American political system. Although the main 
body of research and writing relates to the White House staff of six 
Presidents - Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon - 
additional reference where appropriate or where the opportunity arose is 
made to their successors: Ford, Carter and Reagan.
The argument of this thesis can be very simply stated. The White House 
staff are a very large and influential part of the modern Presidency. They 
now occupy a pre-eminent position in the presidential decision-making 
process. An understanding of the White House staff is now absolutely 
essential to an understanding of the framework of advice that culminates in 
any presidential decision. The prime characteristics of the staff are 
unique proximity to the President and virtually complete accountability to 
him alone. These contribute to a mutual confidence between President and 
staff that sustains the basis of staff influence. Over five decades they 
have far outgrown and transformed their original purposes both in size and 
power irrespective of the differences, and emerging similarities, in the 
ways Presidents have organized them. This progress was virtually uninter­
rupted and was not properly monitored. Experience has shown and evidence 
does confirm that the White House staff long inhabited a constitutional 
vacuum where the normal operation of the system of checks and balances 
effectively ceased to apply. Despite dramatic revelations of manifest 
abuses of power the position has been improved only partially. Although 
the permanent need for a staff has been recognised and they are now firmly 
entrenched in the structure of the Presidency of the United States the 
potential for abuse remains.
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PRELIMINARY NOTE
Throughout this thesis the White House staff are referred to in the plural. 
As an official and definable entity "The White House Office" is consistently 
spelt with four capital letters. The more general term "the White House 
staff” embodies no official definition and is deliberately spelt with a 
lower case "t" and "s".
When referring to White House staff members individually or collectively 
without name the masculine pronoun has been used. The author wishes to 
make it clear that this practice has been adopted merely as a stylistic 
convenience as it reflects the historical and current imbalance between 
men and women on the White House staff.
1THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF
INTRODUCTION
Power attracts advice. Wherever the executive authority is vested in 
a single individual he or she will both need and find attracted to them 
those who give advice on how that power should be used. The Presidency 
of the United States is the supreme example of that principle. Presidents 
need advice and presidential power cannot be effectively exercised without 
it. The President needs help and thus he needs advisers. His power creates 
their power - which is sustained by a proximity to Presidents that is unique 
and all pervasive. The White House staff are those that best exemplify the 
attraction to and uses of his power but inevitably this brings the risk that 
power will be abused. In a Democracy this risk should not be run. In the 
United States it is.
This thesis is about the nature, origins, establishment, growth, development, 
organization, and accountability of the White House staff to the President. 
The staff were officially created five decades ago. What then began as a 
tiny group of personal assistants has since emerged as a major power centre 
at the very heart and at the very highest level of American politics.
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It is a transformation for which there is neither specific constitutional 
provision nor adequate constitutional safeguard. For far too long the 
staff escaped both serious notice and sustained criticism. This thesis 
addresses itself to hitherto untouched areas of research on the White House 
staff that are well overdue for academic study.
The American Presidency is arguably the single most powerful elective 
political office in the world. Given the fact that the United States is 
still the most powerful country in the world, and that the President formally 
exercises executive power on a scale greater than any other Head of State or 
political leader now or throughout human history, it is obviously of the 
highest importance that we should try to understand the framework of advice 
which culminates in any presidential decision. A President's entire poli­
tical existence is a continual process of decision. How he makes up his 
mind is often as crucial as what he decides to do or not to do. At his 
level, political and administrative decisions are no longer easily separable; 
they are often no more than two sides of the same coin.
The Presidency is by any normal standards an impossible job. In addition 
to the many (familiar and well documented) roles that he must fulfil - 
Head of State, Commander-in-Chief, Chief Executive, political leader, 
party leader, Leader of the Western World - there is now one other. Organi­
zing the Presidency has become a major and critical part of his job. The 
allocation of his time, and for what purposes, are vital questions to which 
he must immediately address himself. This begins on Day One. When a 
President walks into the Oval Office for the first time on the assumption 
of power what resources does he have at his command? Apart from the behemoth 
of the federal government itself, on whom can he call for help? Whom and 
what does he have at his personal direction to help him organize and manage 
this vast power? How does he use and utilize them? With what results?
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The difference in the answers that can be given to these questions over 
the past fifty years is nothing less than revolutionary. In 1933 incoming 
President Roosevelt was only able officially to call upon a tiny handful 
of personal assistants at an annual cost of a few tens of thousands of dollars. 
In 1983 incumbent President Reagan was able officially to call upon literally 
hundreds of persons working in various guises under his overall personal 
direction at a combined annual official cost of well over thirty million 
dollars (a mammoth increase even in real terms). Such a fundamental dif­
ference can only be accounted for by a fundamental reason. This is best 
reflected primarily by the growth in size and power of the White House 
staff to the President.
The size of the White House establishment at the disposal of a President is 
by any standards awesome to Western political eyes. No other political 
leader in a democracy comes remotely close in their ability personally to 
command such political resources as does the American President. Direct 
help numbers several hundred; indirect help even more. In the discharge of 
their work their most distinctive characteristic is a primary loyalty to 
the President as an individual rather than to the Presidency as an insti­
tution. That this is simultaneously their most distinctive strength and 
weakness is a fact whose consequences pervade this study.
The size and power of his White House staff can be expressed in practical, 
political and personal terms. In practical terms the staff surround the 
modern President 24 hours a day. They organize his schedule and appointments. 
They are more than his eyes and ears. They are his political life support 
machine. Their political power flows decisively from the regular direct 
access to the President that is their political lifeblood. A President's 
senior White House staff get to know on a daily basis more about what the 
President is thinking, and how his mind works, and how he approaches his
A
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power as President, than anyone else. This proximity in itself has now 
become political power of a substantial and valid kind. They also organize 
the machinery that keeps him informed, control the flow of paperwork on his 
behalf, and convey decisions to the world outside the Oval Office. In a 
very personal sense the President's own freedom over the organization of 
his staff goes virtually unchallenged. That they are so organized in a 
manner best suited to the President's own personal political style and 
working methods should not disguise the independent institutional influence 
they have perforce acquired in the process.
Undeniably there are few routes to the top in any political system as short 
as those of which the senior members of a President's White House staff can 
and have been capable. There are essentially three paths to the summit of 
political power in liberal Western democracies. Firstly, there is the long 
and hazardous path of elective office, ever subject to the external discip­
line of the ballot box. Few reach the very summit - there have been only 
nine Presidents in 50 years - and they have nearly all been decidedly 
middle-aged. Secondly, there is the equally long, though more secure, route 
upwards of the career bureaucracy, subject to the internal discipline of 
the professional structure. This is epitomised by a civil service whose 
senior figures emerge at the top similarly middle-aged. Generally these 
two are the dominant paths. But in the USA there is a third route to the 
heart of the highest levels of American politics: by way of appointment.
For those thus favoured the elevation can be as sudden as the rewards are 
great.
Among all appointees the White House staff stand out as a very special and 
superior case. Their resulting influence and power has both a collective 
and an individual dimension. As a collective entity the President's staff 
are entrusted with a part in policy and decision making that in no other
Vcountry can come to those who often are so relatively young. As individuals 
their range of responsibilities, whether in domestic or foreign affairs, 
has on occasion been vast; so too has their influence far outstripped that 
of many members of the Cabinet. Such men (and overwhelmingly they have 
been men) are subject to no external or official discipline at all save 
that of maintaining the confidence of their respective Presidents. They 
escape entirely from any constitutional provisions providing for the prior 
advice and consent of the Senate to their appointment - as is the case in 
respect of all other official presidential advisers or appointments. 
Accountable to no-one but the President they sometimes can achieve more 
influence than many if not most official advisers put together. History has 
clearly shown the heights which such men have reached. Equally, the depths 
are also now on record. If power attracts then no less has 'absolute' 
power attracted 'absolutely': with results that can in part be measured 
by the years of prison sentences meted out to those who too readily have 
mistaken loyalty to their 'king' for loyalty to their country.
One of the necessary features - and definitions - of a democratic political 
system is that the potential for abuse of power be minimized. It is the 
test of a democracy that political advisers should be accountable for the 
advice they give to the person or persons who have designated official 
political power. In Britain, for example, although the fiction is still 
maintained that the Monarch acts on the advice and consent of Privy 
Counsellors and Ministers, such advice as is received, from the Prime 
Minister and Government of the day through the Houses of Parliament, is 
binding. They in turn (with the notable exception of the House of Lords) 
are held accountable to the electorate. For official advice the Government 
largely relies upon a strong Civil Service that is held accountable as a
career bureaucracy.
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In the United States today this test is only partially upheld. Although 
the President's main official advisers remain, in constitutional terms, 
the individual members of his Cabinet (who are all accountable to Congress) 
this advisory relationship has degenerated into what Walter Bagehot would 
have correctly identified as the 'dignified' element of the Constitution. 
Collectively they have long been effectively superceded by a White House 
staff that has now taken on much of the 'efficient' element as the top 
power structure permeating presidential government.
That the White House staff are now an integral part of the Presidency is 
so unquestionably the case as no longer to be in dispute. Modern American 
political history, not least in the 1970's, has been decisively shaped by 
their presence. That history cannot now be written without a real under­
standing of the White House staff. They are the organized advisory system 
in which Presidents have come to have most confidence. There is no modern 
Presidency that can adequately be described, defended, analysed or criti­
cized without both an open acknowledgement of the political power that the 
President's White House staff have achieved in their own right and a sure 
knowledge of their role and organization.
Yet the issues raised in this study extend far beyond the times in which 
we live or the country upon which it is focused. They touch upon questions 
of political organization that have characterized many political systems 
down the ages.
In the analysis of any political system certain elementary questions 
remain as essential as they are eternal. What is the structure of power? 
How is power exercised? By whom? With what result? In the Western world, 
no less than in those many other countries and systems where there is an
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identifiable executive power, there are other questions equally of 
importance. From whom do those with executive power take advice? To 
what extent is that advice binding or advisory?
Whatever the political system there has always existed, and will always 
exist, advisers. They have been, and are, known by different names in 
different settings and in different ages. Throughout human history people 
have been interested in those to whom Pharaohs, Caesars, Emperors, Popes, 
Princes, Queens, Kings, Prime Ministers and Presidents have turned to for 
advice. Other questions have had equal fascination and importance. How 
was that advice given? What was the power of the adviser?
The theme of 'the power behind the throne' - so universal in its application 
has long exerted as strong a hold on the imagination of people without 
power as it has on the minds of those with power. Niccolo Machiavelli's 
famous dictum that "the first impression that one gets of a ruler and of 
his brains is from seeing the men that he has about him" remains (even with
its sexist bias) as true today as it was when it was written hundreds of
years ago. Why? Because it retains an essential validity that transcends
the age in which he lived and the political system about which he wrote.
This validity is nowhere better demonstrated than in the historical parallels 
one may draw between the ages. The White House staff resemble nothing so 
much as the courtiers of a Medieval court, entirely dependent upon their 
'Prince' for grace and favour, power and influence. Indeed their terms and 
conditions of employment bear striking similarities, as do some of the 
titles bestowed upon them. The bond of mutual confidence between President 
and adviser, if strong, can accomplish much; if weak, can accomplish 
little; if broken, can accomplish nothing.
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Nor is this the only point of similarity between the Medieval world of 
the Prince and the modern world of the Presidency. Where Medieval Princes 
were subject merely to the occasional individual scrutiny of a Machiavelli 
today’s Presidents are subject to the constant collective scrutiny of the 
mass media. As the White House is overwhelmingly the source of so much 
information about the President and the Government of the United States, 
and as the White House staff tend to be the prime purveyors of such 
information, it is not surprising that the Press and media cluster round to 
feed upon them. Indeed, the accreditation of so many hundreds of repre­
sentatives of the national and international Press and Newsmedia to the 
White House Press Office resembles nothing so much as the accreditation of 
foreign ambassadors in bygone centuries to the court of a Prince. They are 
ambassadors of news: both trivial and profound. Their ever-present watch­
fulness can occasionally yield rewarding fruit. No better harvest was 
there than the Watergate era.
Information is power - decicisvely so in the later part of the twentieth 
century. We are living through the Information Revolution. Not only does 
this affect every part of our daily lives it also poses clear challenges 
for any political system and can be a direct threat to its prevailing poli­
tical establishment. In so doing it has heightened our understanding of 
the political issues thrown up in its wake. 'Freedom of Information' is a 
cry as politically significant for our age as 'Universal Suffrage' or 'No 
Taxation Without Representation' was in past ages. Watergate was about the 
abuse of power precisely because it was about the abuse of information.
This greatest domestic political crisis of the modern American era was a 
crisis primarily about information: who did what to obtain it; who did 
what to cover it up; who did what to unravel it; and who did what to
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prevent its recurrence. The resolution of this crisis embraced every major 
component of the structure of American government and involved both a 
classic exposition of, and argument about, the extent of the political 
information and hence political power to which each component was entitled.
It should have come as no surprise (although to some extent, from past 
neglect, it did) that the role of the President's White House staff was 
absolutely central both to the origins, the course, and the meaning of 
Watergate.
To take but one example, it was no coincidence that the growth of the White 
House staff and the progressive claims made by successive Presidents for 
"executive prvilege" should have gone hand in hand. For a country which, 
unlike Britain, has no Official Secrets Act this doctrine always presented 
the possibility of unwarranted expansion. This reached a climax in 
President Nixon's breathtaking assertion that all present and former members 
of the staff were an extension of the President and thus immune from question­
ing - unless the President waived his rights and gave his approval. 
Information could be withheld, he argued, because only the President had the 
right to decide what the public had the right to know. In the famous 
Watergate Tapes case before the United States Supreme Court in 1974 this un- 
precented interpretation was developed into a modern equivalent of the 
Medieval theory of Divine Right.
Watergate engendered more general public interest in the White House staff 
than had any other single event in four decades. Yet over this period 
the position of the staff had gradually strengthened until its effortless 
superiority over its rivals for power was laid bare in successive congres­
sional hearings and Press investigative reports. President Nixon's 
resignation, despite its being a decisive defeat for him, did little
Xseriously to undermine the underlying dominance of the system he had 
both inherited and sustained. Roosevelt's Presidency, with its twin 
emergencies of Depression and World War, had already shifted the legis­
lative initiative from congressional offices and hearing rooms to the 
offices of the federal government. Subsequent Presidents, in varying 
degrees, encouraged further developments: such as the gradual transfer 
of the engine room of domestic and foreign policy-making and policy imple­
mentation from outlying Cabinet departments and federal offices to the 
powerhouse they created for themselves under the auspices and control of 
the White House.
The signs of such a fundamental shift in power are now never far from the 
surface of the daily process of presidential politics. The Press and TV, 
with a diversionary and unhealthy preoccupation that nevertheless comes 
naturally, constantly present and interpret political events in personal 
terms. The share of this coverage apportioned to the White House staff 
is as prominent as it is increasingly dominant. Much is trivial - but 
underneath there is one grain of truth. The people in government who 
matter are those closest to the President or those who most authoritatively 
speak on his behalf. In this, the staff enjoy several advantages over all 
rivals.
From the moment of election the President-Elect must begin to form his 
Administration. The new President is immediately faced with the need to 
select those with whom, through whom, and by whcm he means to exercise his 
presidential power. The first and overriding job to be tackled has now 
become the creation of his embryonic White House staff without whom he is 
paralysed. It is principally through this group (a 'transition staff' 
whose organizational roots now reach well back into the long presidential
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campaigns that precede electoral success) that a President sets about the 
serious business of organizing the transition and preparing for office. In 
the absence of any formal authority during this period the effective poli­
tical power of the President-Elect is transmitted through his staff. This 
pattern, once established, has in recent times proved to be a dominant if 
not decisive influence on the future structure of decision-making in that 
Presidency. If ever reasons were required for a study of the White House 
staff they manifestly begin to accumulate from a new President's first day.
To see the wood from the trees requires a broadly based approach - and such 
an one is offered here.
The course of this thesis follows a straightforward path. The method 
chosen is to explore first the difficulties of arriving at a workable 
definition of the White House staff and to build outwards from this essential 
starting point. Chapter I thus addresses itself to the question of defi­
nition. Chapter II takes the form of an analysis of the literature which, 
as a by-product, well elucidates the scope and nature of the vast gaps in 
research work on the White House staff - gaps which later chapters seek to 
fill> Chapter III traces the origins and establishment of the staff both 
in the wider historical context and, more particularly, in the immediate 
circumstances surrounding their creation. Chapter IV sets out the growth 
of the White House staff and exclusively tackles the job, in a simultaneously 
descriptive and investigatory manner, of constructing a comprehensive factual 
basis upon which the wider arguments of the thesis are founded. Chapter V 
surveys the development and organization of the staff, analysing both the 
general and specific political forces that have shaped their emergence, the 
manner in which successive Presidents have chosen to organize them, and 
those factors common to each Presidency which tend to Influence that organi­
zation in certain directions.
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Thereafter attention is turned specifically to one major theme of this 
study: the accountability of power. Chapter VI considers and explores 
the various ways in which the White House staff are held accountable to 
the President, taking in such diverse areas as executive privilege and 
ethical standards en route. Chapter VII, the final chapter, is entirely 
devoted to a detailed analysis of the accountability of the White House 
staff to the Congress. It is a chapter that, until the 1970's, could not 
conclusively be written because the agenda for reform was being actively 
pursued; yet now, in the 1980*s, looks unlikely to be rewritten because 
that agenda has fallen into dissuetude. Of the conclusions that will be 
drawn we can at least say here that the continuing attraction of the White 
House staff to students of the Presidency deserves at least to be directly 
proportional to the attraction of the staff to the Presidents they serve.

1INTRODUCTION
The question of definition arises because the White House staff pose 
unique problems as an object of comprehensive academic inquiry. These 
problems are interlinked. As such it embraces not one problem but several 
interlinked problems. Before we launch into the analysis of literature and 
the succeeding chapters these are important matters that need to be tackled 
first. A good deal of preliminary work must be done on defining the 
subject itself. This work has never been adequately done. As a result 
the field of inquiry is not clearly understood. Certainly it is more com­
plication than it appears at first sight and more extended than it is 
usually presented as being.
The problems begin with the very use of the term "The White House staff" 
itself. Except insofar as it first came into being to describe the 
original administrative assistants established with The White House 
Office in 1939 this term has never been employed with precisely the 
same meaning since. For many years "The White House staff" has been 
used ubiquitously by politicians, press, and public alike but in dif­
ferent senses and with no common understanding or knowledge of exactly 
whom were being so described. For the purposes of academic inquiry it 
is not enough to rely on vague general notions that the White House 
staff work in the White House (though they do) or are personal appointees 
of the President (though they are). We need to establish a valid and 
workable definition, or principles that will lead us to construct one, 
with which we can examine, describe and analyse the growth, development 
and organization of the White House staff.
2The difficulties that arise in pursuit of this aim, indeed their very 
existence, arise out of the secrecy that has surrounded this subject 
and the lack of critical attention devoted to it hitherto. Foremost 
among them is the question of primary source material and whether such 
sources are reliable. Problems of definition and source material are 
really two sides of the same coin. Different definitions must be examined 
together with the different bases of source material from which they arise.
This does not exhaust the preliminary ground that needs to be covered.
Our discussion must take us further. When we are more familiar with these 
problems we shall then be in a position to consider in greater depth the 
essential components of the White House staff that will have been identified 
This consideration will be undertaken with a view to ascertaining each such 
component’s historical basis together with a preliminary investigation into 
the presumed grounds of proper authority upon which each rested for so many 
years.
This chapter therefore falls into three interlocking parts. Firstly, we 
explore the problems involved in reaching a definition of who the White 
House staff are. Secondly, we examine the problems of primary source 
material concommitant upon various definition. Thirdly, we research 
the basis upon which the staff have rested for their proper authorization 
in the first forty years of their existence. These problem areas, once 
covered, will leave us freer to concentrate for the remainder of this 
study on the major questions of political importance posed by the White
House staff.
3 -
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION
Who exactly are the White House staff? To paraphrase Oscar Wilde the 
answer, like truth itself, is rarely pure and never simple. It is not 
possible to give a single all-embracing definition of the White House 
staff that is both technically precise and politically meaningful. This 
difficulty is compounded when comparing the White House staffs of dif­
ferent Presidents.
Broadly speaking the dilemma is this: to define as the complete White
House staff only those who can be objectively identified as such by what­
ever technical criteria exist would involve leaving out of account those 
who by other standards or by political criteria should equally be termed 
members of the staff. Conversely, any attempt at a political definition 
of the White House staff may at first glance entail curious, or apparently 
arbitrary, decisions as to whom to include and whom to leave out.
Such technical criteria as do exist are the product of historical and 
bureaucratic factors; such political criteria as can be found to exist 
are the product of men, institutions, and changing circumstances. The 
disadvantage of the latter in being not susceptible to precise measure­
ment is more than matched by that of the former in being but an imperfect 
representation of the real world.
There is no escape from the unique problems thus posed in our search for 
a valid and workable definition. There are no neutral criteria. In the 
absence of neutral criteria any definition may appear to be reduced to 
mere personal interpretation. Moreover whatever the criteria determined 
upon an added complication is their liability to vary from Presidency to 
Presidency.
4These points will emerge more clearly as we proceed. To inaugurate 
our discussion we can identify four categories of definition. First: 
the legal definition. Second: the physical definition. Third: the 
technical definition. Fourth: the political definition. On our brief 
tour d'horizon we should consider these as convenient starting points.
THE LEGAL DEFINITION
The legal definition of the White House staff could be put as follows: 
those positions to which the President is authorized by law to appoint 
persons to be known as his White House staff. The presumed advantage 
of a solidly based legal definition would be twofold. Firstly, it 
would convey a certainty of meaning, since the law would be precise as 
to which positions were White House staff positions. Secondly, such 
a definition would serve as a suitable base from which valid comparisons 
could be drawn between different presidencies.
But there are insurmountable drawbacks to this approach. The law has 
indeed been precise and for that reason it is clear just how precisely 
inaccurate it has been as a workable definition in this context. Such 
legal definition as can historically be said to have existed for the White 
House staff along these lines rapidly became completely out of date, 
verging on the bizarre, and for all practical purposes has been useless. 
Those positions on the staff that were properly authorized by law amounted 
only to a small and decidedly motley collection which bore virtually no 
relation whatsoever to the large modern White House staff. (This situation 
is considered in more detail in part three of this chapter.)
5Moreover, there is another drawback. In legal terminology, the term 
"the White House staff" by itself does not exist and never has. Although 
coined originally by the Brownlow Committee in its 1937 report, it has 
since been nowhere explicitly established in law. The nearest approach 
made to this term can be found in the budgetary classifications and 
legislative enactments which refer to those employed in "The White House 
Office". There they are variously described as "individuals" or
"employees" or "personnel" but not by the collective noun "the White 
House staff". Even wer'- "The White House Office staff" properly to com­
prise a legally defined group this would leave us a long way short of a 
realistic definition, as we shall shortly see.
Any definition of the White House staff, therefore, that resorted to the 
law can only have produced a legal irrelevance. This in itself has not 
been without significance. Neither has been its corollary. While the 
staff may not have been "illegal" (in the normally understood sense of 
that term), neither can they be said to have existed for their first forty 
years on any proper legal foundation. The full consequences we leave to 
a later chapter. Meanwhile this study proceeds on the basis that no legal 
definition of the White House staff could be of real value.
THE PHYSICAL DEFINITION
A definition of the White House staff based on their physical location 
rather than their legal position is not such an absurd idea. Above all 
it would convey the fact of physical access to the President which is a 
political advantage that the staff are uniquely able to exploit. A
V
6physical definition could take this form: all those persons who work 
in the West Wing of the White House. Not only would such a definition 
adequately reflect their proximity to the President, it would also be 
true as far as it goes. Apart from the household staff and security 
guards all those who work in the West Wing can indeed be counted as 
members of the White House staff.
But such a definition would not go far enough. The White House staff 
have long since grown so large (however one defines them) that it has 
been impossible to house them all in one place. Indeed, as early as 
1937, President Roosevelt confessed that the White House offices in the 
West Wing were already too small and would have to be expanded.1 Shortly 
thereafter the staff began to spill over to the adjacent State, War and 
Navy building, such that by the end of World War Two a sizeable number 
were situated there because office space in the West Wing had run out.2 
By 1958 that building had absorbed so many White House staff that special 
steps had to be taken to enlarge the jurisdiction of the White House
Police in order that their protection services be extended to cover those
3staff working across the street from the West Wing. Yet it was still 
possible at that time to distinguish between members of the White House 
staff and others at work in the same building employed by other entities 
in the Executive Office of the President (notably BoB personnel). The 
latter were still in the majority.
This balance, however, was soon to change as the White House staff con­
tinued to grow. By 1960 it was officially acknowledged that most of the 
White House staff paid out of the appropriations for "Special Projects"
4were in fact located in the Executive Office Building (the re-named 
State, War and Navy building). As more White House staff moved into
7the EOB throughout the 1960s more of the other EOP personnel were moved 
out to make way. By 1972 the White House staff numbered many hundreds.
A further physical expansion had consequently taken place, such that the 
Comptroller General then stated that his definition of the White House 
staff encompassed all those situated in "the Executive Mansion, the old 
and new Executive Office Buildings, and any other location in or out of 
Washington DC where services are performed for the White House".5 One 
might almost term this the 'octopus' definition, as the staff's 'tentacles' 
appeared to be reaching out in so many directions. Indeed a nascent 
awareness of such an implication subsequently obliged a senior 0MB official 
to submit a memorandum on this subject to a Senate appropriations sub-
g
committee. Two years later, at similar hearings, the then Nixon Admin­
istration revealed another, symbolic, development. Most of The White
7House Office staff, it was admitted, now worked in the old EOB. Only a 
minority were thus located in the West Wing itself - a far cry from 1939.
Our postulated definition has thus long been overtaken by events. Its 
value as a barometer of the size of the staff has been more than offset 
by its imprecision as a workable basis for research. Neither can any 
physical definition be successfully enlarged to include the old and new 
EOBs, despite the likely predominance of White House staff in those 
buildings. The exact number and kind of staff working in each location 
has never been made available. Moreover to some extent - with regard
g
to CIA and White House Communications personnel - it remains a secret.
For practical purposes, therefore, any definition of the staff based on 
its physical location, although interesting, is amorphous. A more 
specific definition is necessary.
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THE TECHNICAL DEFINITION
The technical definition relies for its force upon one, or a combination, 
of the varied official definitions of the staff which are available. But 
there are several problems. None of these official definitions are suf­
ficient in themselves to encompass the entire White House staff. They 
each suffer from serious deficiencies. Moreover, none are mutually exclu­
sive, for they overlap one with another in certain ways. These points 
are best illustrated by taking a closer look at some of the forms that a 
technical definition can take.
The first such definition that presents itself is as follows: those per­
sons listed as members of The White House Office staff by such official 
publications as the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL; or the 
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY; or by other regularly published but private 
sources such as the CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 
or NATIONAL JOURNAL. What are the advantages of such a definition? In 
these publications, and especially in the first two mentioned, a regular 
listing of those persons in The White House Office is published on an 
annual basis. Not only are their names given but also their staff title. 
They thus form an identifiable group. An official listing has appeared 
on a regular basis ever since The White House Office was officially est­
ablished in 1939, and for this reason it can be used to provide a basis 
for legitimate comparison between one President's staff and another. At 
first sight it would appear that the problem of definition is quite 
easily resolved.
But there are at least three grounds on which such a definition must fail. 
Firstly, despite the fact that these publications (excepting the
- 9 -
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY) all claim to receive their listings of White 
House staff from the same source, there are nevertheless many instances 
of discrepancies between them. These are only increased when the 
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY is also taken into account. The second ground 
raises a wider and more important question. However accurate these list­
ings they only record the number of senior, commissioned, members of the 
WHO staff (which range approximately from ten to fifty depending on the 
Presidency). But there is more to a full understanding of the White 
House staff than just its senior members. These listings do not, for 
example, give any indication of the number of middle-ranking staff, or 
the number of support staff, which have progressively come to play an 
important part in the ability of the senior staff to do its job. Thirdly, 
this definition would leave completely out of account many other persons 
and groups in respect of which it can be argued that they too were menbers 
of the White House staff (as we shall shortly see). In other words, 
using this definition, we restrict ourselves to the tip of the iceberg.
There is a second form that a technical definition might take: all 
those persons who have received a commission from the President to serve 
as members of his White House staff. The United States Constitution, in 
the course of describing the powers granted to the President in Article 
II Section 3, makes reference to the fact that the President "shall 
Commission all the Officers of the United States". Naturally there is 
nothing in the Constitution about the White House staff, (neither is 
there any mention of the Cabinet), but certain staff members are indeed 
commissioned by the President. (Like many presidential commissions 
these are often framed and proudly displayed on office walls). As with 
the first technical definition that we considered, a group of commissioned 
persons appears to form an identifiable group and thus affords a workable
10
basis for legitimate comparison between presidencies„ Moreover it 
would also seem to overcome the second objection raised above, for 
there is apparent reason to believe that a definition based on comis­
sioned staff does take into account middle-ranking personnel. For 
example, 81 persons were sworn in on 21st January 1969 as members of
9
the staff, whereas only 46 were listed in the GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 
MANUAL for that year.1®
However, there are clear and straightforward drawbacks to this definition. 
First, no list of the names and staff titles of commissioned staff has 
ever been made publicly available. Second, it clearly does not take into
account the full range of staff support. The rank of commissioned per-
10 asonnel can still exclude important middle-ranking staff. Third, this
too leaves largely out of account the majority of those on the White House 
staff employed elsewhere than in The White House Office. In short, any 
attempt at a definition based on the concept of commissioned staff has 
none of the real advantages, and all the disadvantages, of the first techni­
cal definition discussed. The question we are left with is whether any 
technical definition exists which can successfully embrace any wider group 
of White House staff. This leads us to consider the value of the United 
States Budgets.
The third form that a technical definition could take is the official 
budgetary definition: all those persons who are paid from that part of 
the US Budget which is entitled "The White House Office - Salaries and 
Expenses". This definition meets one of the criticisms we have just 
encountered. The US Budget provides annually figures of all personnel 
paid out of The White House Office appropriation - not just the top few
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dozen. These figures have for over thirty years numbered in the hundreds, 
and have undoubtedly included middle-ranking White House staff, as well as 
support staff (such as clerical and secretarial assistance). More signifi­
cant still seems to be such a definition's potential for expansion to in­
clude other categories for which figures have been published in US Budgets. 
Examples here would include "Special Projects", "The National Security 
Council - Salaries and Expenses" and "The Domestic Council - Salaries and 
Expenses". Finally, as US Budget figures are available for the whole 
period here under study they would seem suitable as the basis for valid 
comparisons between different presidencies.
But these apparent gains are matched, upon closer examination, by consider­
able disadvantages. Firstly, the names of White House staff have never 
been given in US Budgets. They are currently 'listed' only as an anonymous 
numerical total. (In earlier years the gross numbers of staff holding 
certain staff titles were given but this practice was phased out in the 
early 1960s). Secondly, in certain cases - such as Special Projects 
even the gross totals of staff employed have not been made available. 
Thirdly, the staff are not normally individually differentiated as regards 
salary levels. These such figures are often only crude averages rather 
than being individually precise. Fourthly, and most important, figures 
obtained from US Budgets can be very inaccurate. This has been officially 
acknowledged on two occasions during the past 40 years, in FY 1947 and 
FY 1971, which led to attempts to make US Budget figures reflect more 
honestly the true size and cost of the staff. This will be considered in 
more detail later. Suffice it to say here that, without prejudice to 
these partially successful attempts, the fact remains that US Budget 
figures must be treated with great caution.
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From our discussion so far it is clear that we have yet to formulate a 
workable definition of the White House staff that has political meaning. 
Certainly no single technical definition can by itself take us very far. 
The missing 'ingredient' is a political framework that enables us to 
piece together what we have already covered - and more besides - into a 
complete whole.
THE POLITICAL DEFINITION
A political definition of the White House staff need not be mutually 
exclusive of these other definitions. The reason for a political defi­
nition is simply that we must search beyond the limitations imposed on 
these others if we are to grasp the true political significance of the 
White House staff. Yet a political definition must still strive to be 
a practical one, based on the firm ground of ascertainable fact to the 
best extent possible. A combination of the two is not easy to obtain.
The question we are trying to answer here is this: what does a political
definition take into account that is excluded from other definitions? A
good way to begin answering this question is to give an example. Consider
President Nixon in 1972, at the height of his Presidency. What was the
size and cost of his White House staff? Who exactly were his White House
staff? The legal definition would have us believe that there were less
than 20 staff, 1 1 while the physical definition points to such a large
12number that they could not all be housed together. Neither is very
helpful. On the other hand some of the technical definitions at least 
give us a more concrete indication. There were 53 members of Nixon's 
senior commissioned White House Office staff, according to official
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13publications, while the US Budget put the number being paid from 
The White House Office appropriation at 544. 14 (This latter figure 
would include the former.) The budgeted cost of these staff was given 
as $9.5m (to the nearest $Jm) .
But this simply does not give us the complete picture. Two obvious 
omissions stand out. Firstly, no account has yet been taken of the 
National Security Council staff. This operated under the direction of 
Henry Kissinger, one of the most important members of the Nixon White 
House staff. The NSC staff officially numbered no less than 76 personnel 
in 1972. The fact that they were not classified under "The White House 
Office" heading in the US Budget should not detract from the necessity of 
including them in any political definition of the Nixon staff. The NSC 
staff may have been highly specialised when compared with those in The 
White House Office, but some of the latter were no less experts in other 
areas. The essential justification for including the NSC staff in any 
political definition is borne out by a simple comparison. The NSC staff 
provided staff support for Henry Kissinger in his capacity as Assistant 
for National Security Affairs in the same way that WHO staff provided 
staff support for Clark McGregor in his capacity as Counsel for Con­
gressional Relations; or staff support for H.R. Haldeman in his capacity 
as Assistant to the President.
The second obvious omission is that no account has yet been taken of the 
Domestic Council staff. In exactly the same sense as we have just des­
cribed they provided staff support for John Ehrlichman in his capacity as 
Assistant for Domestic Affairs. In 1972 the Domestic Council staff 
numbered 80 personnel. 16 Thus, adding this figure to that for the NSC 
staff total we find that no less than 156 persons should be added to the 
original total figure of 544 which we derived solely from the technical
14
definition of The White House Office«, Together with these extra per— 
sonne1 we must add over $4m to the total figure of the cost involved. 17
Yet there is still more that a political definition must take into account. 
Firstly, adjustments have to be made to take into account the number of 
persons that were "detailed" to work on'the White House staff. Most 
detailees, as they are called, work on a full-time basis and thus become 
de facto members of the White House staff. Such persons are never recorded 
in official figures for The White House Office, but occasionally their 
presence and extent of their presence is made known elsewhere. In 1972 
it can be inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that there were at least be­
tween 20 and 40 staff on detail to The White House Office. 18 But detail­
ing did not stop there. Figures released to a congressional appropriations 
subcommittee reveal that Kissinger's NSC personnel strength was consider­
ably supplemented by a further 53 personnel detailed to work on the NSC
19staff from other departments and agencies. Although comparable figures 
for the Domestic Council were never made available it is possible to con­
clude that overall we should add at least 75 extra personnel to our running 
total of White House staff.
Secondly, the reader should be aware that there were in 1972 various other
funds at the disposal of the President, which could be, and were, used for
his White House staff. These were all in addition to formal appropriations
for The White House Office. They included the fund for Special Projects,
20which in 1972 was authorized at $1.5m. Some of this money went directly
towards the employment of persons to serve on the White House staff. While
21exactly how much was not officially revealed in the US Budget, it was
admitted to Congress the following year that at least 14 additional staff
22were paid for by the Special Projects fund. Another potential source
of finance for his staff was the so-called "Emergency Fund", which in 1972
15
2 2made $lm available for use at the discretion of the President0 Moreover, 
one must also take into account the "Expense of Management Improvement" 
fund, which had frequently been used to finance staff activity in the past, 
and for which $700,000 was requested by the Nixon Administration in 1972.^
Thirdly, there is one more element of the Nixon White House staff that we
have not yet taken into account,. This was peculiar to the Nixon Presidency
because President Nixon chose to include it among his White House staff in 
251971. It was not otherwise so considered by any other President, (and
it is not clear how long Nixon himself continued to do so). The element in 
question was the Office of Science and Technology (0ST), which in 1972 
operated under the direction of the Science Advisor to the President,
Dr. Edward E. David Jr. Dr. David, like Dr. Kissinger, was listed by
the Nixon White House as a member of the White House staff. Where
Dr. Kissinger's staff were formally called the NSC staff, Dr. David's staff
were formally called the OST staff. They numbered in 1972 22 personnel
2fi(not counting support staff) at a budgeted cost of some $2 .3m.
We are now at last in a position to add together these multifarious parts
of the Nixon White House staff: firstly, in respect of its total cost.
The budgeted cost of the NSC and Domestic Council staffs was in 1972 over
$4.5m. To this we must add the well over $3m provided by the various
additional funds, and the well over $2m budgeted cost of the OST staff.
Together this amounted to over $10m annually in addition to the $9.5m
27appropriated for The White House Office. And what number of staff was
President Nixon able to maintain with this annual sum of over $19.5m? From 
The White House Office itself came 554, as given by the US Budget, to which 
some 20-40 additional staff were detailed. The NSC staff numbered 76, with 
a further 53 on detail. The Domestic Council staff were officially budgeted
16
at 80 personnel (to which we are unable to add possible extra detailees
for lack of information). The OST staff numbered over 20 staff. Special
Projects funded at least a dozen or more White House staff. In short, over
275 staff should be added to our preliminary total of 554, making the Nixon
White House staff in 1972 number well over 800 persons. (Even at this
stage we are not in a position to finally account for all the facilities
and back-up resources that enabled the White House to function as it did.
This indirect aid undoubtedly ran into many more millions of dollars and
28many more hundreds of personnel. ) At this point, however, we call a 
halt. Irrespective of such indirect aid (with which this study is not con­
cerned) , it is clear that a political definition of the Nixon White House 
staff in 1972 provides the necessary extra dimension that is lacking in all 
other definitions.
What holds this political definition together? Upon what principles rest 
our assertion that President Nixon's White House staff in 1972 comprised the 
elements which we have identified?
First, all these staff were the personal appointees of the President. This 
is certainly the position in theory. But such was the size of the White 
House staff by 1972 that it had become less true in the literal sense, even 
though it remained the basis of their existence. Most of Nixon's senior 
staff can be said to have been personally appointed by him. Those in 
receipt of a presidential commission were all officially presidential 
appointees. In other respects this was by no means always the case. In 
the Nixon White House a few senior staff had perforce acquired, in a 
presidentially approved delegation of power, the actual responsibility for 
the appointment of the vast majority of the political staff. Thus by 1972 
the actual responsibility for appointing members of the NSC staff lay with
17
Kissinger, while Ehrlichman undertook a comparable task vis-a-vis the 
Domestic Council staff. H.R. Haldeman, in addition to his having been 
bequeathed an overall supervisory role, took special responsibility for 
the employment of staff in The White House Office. In practice, there­
fore, the White House staff were either the personal appointees of the 
President or of his senior staff.
Second, none of the staff we have identified required confirmation by the 
US Senate as a condition of their appointment. This fact immediately dis­
tinguishes all presidential White House staff from other personal 
appointees of the President; whether in the Cabinet departments or other 
agencies or elsewhere.
Third, the staff were subject entirely to presidential discretion in all 
aspects of their employment, irrespective of the provisions of law that 
governed employment elsewhere in government (the only, partial, exception 
in 1972 being the status of NSC staff).
Fourth, the extra sources of financial support identified as available to 
the President were subject entirely to presdiential discretion. This fact 
distinguished them from other financial items in the EOP budget. This dis­
cretion extended to the Special Projects fund, the Emergency Fund, and the
Expenses of Management Improvement fund. In practice it was exercised in
291972 by H.R. Haldeman on behalf of President Nixon. All these funds
were used, in varying degrees, either to support existing White House staff 
or to finance the creation of new White House staff.
Fifth, the staff performed such personal and political work for the 
President as he alone determined. Although The White House Office and
18
the National Security Council are both statutory bodies, neither the staff 
employed under those headings nor any other part of the Nixon White House 
staff in 1972 had statutorily prescribed duties. President Nixon, like 
other Presidents, enjoyed complete control over the nature and purposes 
of the work undertaken by his White House staff.
Sixth, the staff served the personally preferred decision-making apparatus
of the President. They were used by the President to organize, prepare
and execute that category of decisions which it constitutionally falls to
the President to decide entirely in his own way. Established within the
EOP in 1972 were many advisory bodies to the Chief Executive. The White
House staff represented the "inner" advisory ring, designed to serve the
President. They were in this way distinguished from those comprising the
"outer" advisory ring, intended primarily to serve the Presidency. If and
when a President takes a direct personal interest in one of these "outer
ring" bodies, to the extent that he incorporates it completely within his
personally preferred decision-making apparatus, its staff thereupon are
30brought within the meaning of the term: the White House staff.
Seventh, the form and organization of the staff were entirely matters for 
the President alone to decide. This fact is in marked contrast to presi­
dential influence in all other areas of government. President Nixon in 
1972 had a completely free hand in regard to the structure of every part 
of his White House staff, beginning with The White House Office. This also 
applied to Special Projects staff, and to the Domestic Council and its staff, 
which owed its very creation to presidential fiat. Although the compo­
sition of the NSC is formally prescribed, the structure and organization of 
its staff are equally subject to presidential discretion.
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Eighth, the staff identified included all those who were described by the 
then White House itself as members of the White House staff. It has been 
very rare for any White House to promulgate its own definition of the staff, 
but where it can be said to exist then it must be taken into account. (In 
the case of the Nixon White House it must be noted that the Nixon definition 
was many months old by 1972.)
Finally, the staff were all ultimately accountable to the President alone: 
the man and not the office. This is the vital element in the relationship 
between every President and his White House staff. The corollary is no 
less important. Their loyalty to the President outweighs their loyalty to 
the Presidency. However, such was the size of the staff by 1972 that 
this principle of accountability had in practice undergone substantial 
modification. The relationship of complete dependence upon, and accounta­
bility to, the President remained strongest at the senior staff level, 
where it carried a powerful personal connotation. The remainder of the 
staff were in practice more accountable to whichever senior staff member 
carried responsibility for supervising their work. Their accountability 
to the President thus operated indirectly at one or more steps removed.
These are the underlying principles that have enabled us to identify the 
White House staff of President Nixon in 1972. In combination these 
principles lead us to a definition of what we may call the political White 
House staff. It remains to add one further ingredient. Any workable 
definition must also include the non-political support staff.
They are easily defined. They are the secretaries and clerical assistants, 
the records and files staff, the correspondence clerks, and even the White 
House switchboard operators (who enjoy a formidable reputation for their
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ability to track down whomsoever the President or his staff wish to speak 
to, no matter where around the globe they are to be found). By and large 
the support staff survive changes of Presidency for the very reason that 
they are non-political. Yet they are not without political significance. 
Their contribution is by no means confined to providing an institutional 
memory in regard to administrative procedure. On the contrary, the very 
fact that they number in the hundreds is itself one measure of their 
ability to greatly assist the work that the political staff are able to do.
Most of the White House support staff are carried on the payroll of The 
White House Office, and were thus included in the Budget totals for WHO 
staff in 1972 to which we have already referred. Likewise a proportion 
of the Budget personnel totals for the NSC and Domestic Council staffs 
(though not for Special Projects or OST staff) also reflected the presence 
of non-political support staff. Broadly speaking the technical budgetary 
definitions thus take their existence satisfactorily into account. The 
1972 figure of over 800 persons similarly does so. The point is worth 
making. The political definition of the White House staff used in this 
study therefore incorporates such non-political support staff as existed 
during the Presidency in question.
We are now able to make clear, by applying and translating these principles 
into successive historical contexts, whom we shall identify as "the White 
House staff" in the presidencies here under study. This can be done without 
unduly pre-empting an historical account of the growth of the staff.
When the White House staff were first established in 1939 by President 
Roosevelt they were all contained within the budgetary heading of The White 
House Office. For a short period the White House staff were synonymous
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with The White House Office staff. But this soon began to change. In 
consequence The White House Office staff by themselves became a progres­
sively smaller fraction of the White House staff. After 1940 the first 
expansion of the political definition of the staff occurred with the 
creation of the Emergency Fund, which by 1945 funded additional Roosevelt 
staff members.
The White House staff during the Truman Presidency continued to comprise
these two elements to which, in 1947, was added a third: the National
Security Council staff. Truman immediately made it clear that he intended
32the NSC to be a presidentially-run body. This was reflected in the
physical location of its staff, which were moved from the Pentagon to the
33West Wing. It was also signalled by Truman's initial decision that a
Special Consultant from his WHO should serve as Executive Secretary of the
34NSC staff, and the listing of a subsequent Executive Secretary as a mem-
35ber of The White House Office. Finally, the use of detailed personnel
36began to grow during the Truman years,, which counted as de facto staff.
President Eisenhower consolidated this hold on the NSC staff by appointing
37as its director a Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. The
use of detailed personnel also continued. But there were two new develop­
ments which enlarged the political definition of the White House staff. 
Firstly, there was the establishment in 1954 (in a supplemental appro­
priation act) of the Expenses of Management Improvement fund, which pro-
38vided among other things money for the study of staff organization. 
Secondly, Special Projects was established in 1956. This was a major 
development, which provided additional funds and additional personnel for
3qthe White House staff.
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The White House staff in the presidencies of both Kennedy and Johnson 
continued to comprise those elements bequeathed by President Eisenhower.
The staff thus consisted of those employed in The White House Office; by 
Special Projects (of which there were large numbers in these years40); on 
the National Security Council staff; and finally those personnel detailed 
in respect of each. This latter category grew substantially. In addition 
there was available the financial resources of Emergency Fund and the Ex­
penses of Management Improvement.
The political definition of the White House staff under President Nixon was 
expanded with the establishment in 1970 of the Domestic Council and its 
staff. They operated under the direction of the Assistant to the President 
for Domestic Affairs. All other elements of the staff continued in exist­
ence .
In the short period of the Ford Presidency the definition was contracted 
in two respects. Firstly, Special Projects was eliminated as a separate 
category (being subsumed within The White House Office). Secondly, the 
Expenses of Management Improvement fund similarly disappeared (into OMB).
By the time President Ford left office the White House staff consisted of 
those serving in The White House Office and on the NSC and Domestic Council 
staffs. They continued to have available extra financial resources in the 
fund for Unanticipated Needs (the renamed Emergency Fund).
With the arrival of President Carter in 1977 the political definition of 
the staff once again changed. In Carter's reorganization of the EOP in 
October 1977 the Domestic Council and its staff were abolished, and The 
White House Office readjusted. Apart from WHO and NSC staffs the Carter 
White House staff subsequently consisted of those in the newly-created
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Office of Administration and those working as members of the new Domestic 
Policy staff. The fund for Unanticipated Needs continued at Carter's 
disposal. President Reagan brought further changes in 1981 with the 
abolition of the Domestic Policy Staff and its (partial) replacement by 
a new Office of Policy Development. Within the White House in recent 
decades none have been subject to greater organizational mutation than 
the domestic affairs staff.
In conclusion, the problem of definition is not easily resolved. We have 
considered four different approaches to this question which we can summarize 
in this way. The legal definition may be academically interesting but has 
rarely had any practical relevance. The physical definition offers some­
thing to bear in mind but essentially amounts to no more than a curiosity.
The technical definitions have a great deal in their favour, incorporating 
invaluable statistical and other basic information, but in themselves they 
inadequately embrace our subject. Only the political definition that 
builds upon these technical definitions by widening their area of application 
offers the best way forward. This emphasizes the extent to which the staff 
exists primarily to serve the President, as distinct from the Presidency.
This enables us to take proper account of the growth, and diversity, of the 
White House staff that has taken place over the past forty years. Not sub­
ject to Senate confirmation, chosen only by the President or in his name, 
and working directly or indirectly for the presidential purpose, the White 
House staff inevitably work for the man first and the institution second.
Having thus argued the case for a political dimension in defining the 
White House staff, we can now re-consider in more detail what constitutes 
those technical definitions to whose existence we have already referred.
What primary source material do we have to hand? How reliable is it? What 
problems may be involved in its interpretation?
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THE PROBLEM OF PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL
There is a problem with primary source material on the White House staff,,
We have already discussed the question "who are the White House staff?" 
in our search for an adequate definition. We must now ask the same simple 
question in the context of primary source material. Who were the White 
House staff who worked for successive Presidents since 1939? What can we 
find out about them? What were their names? What were their staff titles? 
What work did they do? These are only the most elementary factual questions
Many a study of politics encounters difficulties in connexion with primary
source material, especially when the subject is American politics and the
work is undertaken at a distance. But the problem pertaining to a study
of the White House staff is of a different, and higher, order. One
important price to be paid for having neglected the staff for so long
has been simply that the most elementary information about them was never
recorded in the first place. The White House itself now readily acknow- 
41ledges this fact. In consequence there are considerable difficulties
involved in the process of compiling a record of each President's staff.
The research undertaken to this end in the present study represents the 
synthesis of all the available primary source material.
The problems encountered in handling this primary source material, being 
of the essence of this study, demand attention here. This examination is 
tackled in three self-explanatory stages. Firstly, we shall examine the 
general sources which are common to most presidencies. Secondly, we shall 
examine the more specific sources, which have a particular bearing on one 
Presidency only. Thirdly, under the heading of "Qualifications and
Reservations" we shall more precisely delineate their limitations and 
the difficulties in their interpretation.
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GENERAL SOURCES
There are several general sources of information available to aid the 
task of compiling as complete a record as possible of each President's 
White House staff. Some are of an official character; some semi-official 
or private. None are mutually exclusive, for they all overlap one with 
another in what they can tell us about the staff. This fact alone implies 
that none of these sources are definitive in themselves, which is indeed 
the case. However, they can be loosely divided into two groups: those
that contribute information on the senior staff, and those that contribute 
more general statistical information.
Firstly, there is the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL. The 
Foreword to this publication says it is "the official handbook of the 
Federal Government.... describing the agencies of the legislative, judicial, 
and executive branches. " 42 It is published annually, 43 usually in June 
or July, by the Office of the Federal Register (National Archives and 
Records Service, General Services Administration). Technically the MANUAL 
is a special edition of the FEDERAL REGISTER, pursuant to federal regu­
lations. The MANUAL provides the names and job titles of senior, commis­
sioned, White House Office staff. In personal correspondence with this 
writer the Deputy Director (Presidential and Legislative Division) of the 
Office of the Federal Register explained the basis on which their choice of 
names is made:
"The list of White House staff 
included in the US Government 
Manual is made available to the 
Manual staff by the White House 
Personnel Office.
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"Each of the Federal agencies 
included in the Manual makes 
the determination of which 
positions will be included 
in the top personnel listings 
submitted." 44
Secondly, there is the CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY,, This is another 
official publication, compiled under the direction of the US Congress 
Joint Committee on Printing, and is therefore congressionally sponsored.
It, too, is published annually, although not at the same time as the 
MANUAL, The DIRECTORY usually appears in March at the beginning of a new 
Congress, and in January at the beginning of a new session. The DIRECTORY 
also provides the names of the senior members of the White House staff to­
gether with their job titles. The following extract from a letter by the 
DIRECTORY'S Publications Director makes clear on what basis their selection 
is made:
"Specially, where White House 
personnel is concerned, this 
Committee deals directly with 
the White House personnel 
officer. That particular office 
decides the number of people 
who shall be listed. I do not 
know what criteria are used 
although I do know the list is 
composed principally of Presi­
dential appointments and those 
are the people closest to the 
President." 46
Thirdly, there is the CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY. Unlike the two pre­
ceding publications the STAFF DIRECTORY is privately published, and dates 
only from 1959. It contains a similar range of information to these two
others but is arranged in a different manner It is published annually
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most often in or around April of each year . 47 As to the principle for 
inclusion on which the STAFF DIRECTORY operates, the Editor-Publisher in 
answer to this writer replied that
"the listing of the White House, 
as many of the other listings 
in the book, are just as the 
Department or Agency furnishes 
them in view of the interest 
our users have in their respective 
unit." 48
Thus the position is clear. All three publications operate on exactly the 
same principles and methods in printing their lists of White House staff. 
They all print whatever names and titles are made available to them by the 
White House Personnel Office. And yet, as we shall shortly see, their res­
pective lists are by no means identical.
Fourthly, there are such publications as the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 
WEEKLY REPORT together with its annual counterpart, the CONGRESSIONAL 
QUARTERLY ALMANAC, and the NATIONAL JOURNAL. The WEEKLY REPORT, although 
privately published, is an authoritative guide to events and developments 
of various kinds. As its title implies, the WEEKLY REPORT concentrates 
mainly on Congress; yet periodical interest is taken in members of the 
President's White House staff, especially his congressional liaison staff. 
Occasionally it provides its own, rather haphazard, listing of the senior 
staff. The NATIONAL JOURNAL by contrast concentrates more on the adminis­
trative side of the Presidency. The CQ ALMANAC has since the 1960s devel­
oped an interest in, and provided crude statistics on, certain features of 
the White House staff; for example, on staff turnover. Generally speaking, 
however, its attention is limited to what it considers to be the most senior 
staff members, in which categorization it does not rely only on official 
White House sources. The resulting selectivity is unfortunately not
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matched by any clear and consistent guide to CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S 
own criteria in listing the senior staff; whom it includes and whom it 
leaves out. Neither does it adopt a straightforward approach to staff 
titles, which often tend to be invented by CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY to 
convey a better sense of staff members' responsibilities.
Fifthly, there is the United States Budget. This is a source of much 
detailed information on every Presidency. Although it has never provided 
the names of the White House staff nor (in recent years) their staff 
titles, it does provide crude figures for the overall size and cost of the 
White House staff. Published annually, the US Budget has progressively be­
come available in a variety of forms of which the US Budget Appendix is the 
most useful for the purposes of this study. Despite the caution with which 
US Budget figures should be treated (see infra) it is a source of information 
of a kind that is obtainable nowhere else.
In what major respects is this so? First, it provides an overall figure for 
the numbers of personnel employed under the appropriation for The White 
House Office, the National Security Council and the Domestic Council. Second, 
it provides a comparable figure for overall cost. Third, it provides a 
breakdown of salary levels for the senior and middle-level staff by giving 
salary grades and their accompanying salary ranges. Fourth, it provides on 
occasion the number of 'ungraded' personnel (which are political staff) 
although the relation to salary grades has never been given. Fifth, it 
provides a breakdown of costs by broad function. For example, this gives 
some clue to the amount spent on staff travel, on printing and reproduction 
costs, on supplies and materials, equipment, and several other items. Such 
information can on occasion be very useful. Separate from the Budget, but 
intimately connected with it, are the hearings held before the congressional 
appropriations subcommittees that supervise presidential requests for White
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House staff. Historically they have rarely produced any worthwhile addi­
tional information on the staff. However, partly as a result of Watergate, 
it must be said that recent such hearings have indeed become an occasion 
for the publication of hitherto unpublished material of great value.
This concludes the group of general sources. They have at least one merit: 
that of regular publication. This provides the researcher with at least 
the possibility of drawing legitimate comparisons between presidencies. The 
same cannot be said of more specific sources, although their merits may lie 
elsewhere.
SPECIFIC SOURCES
Specific sources of information on each President's White House staff are 
generally available but the quality of the information obtained varies 
greatly. Past neglect of the White House staff as an object of academic 
research has been well reflected in the general unavailability of infor­
mation from presidential libraries, despite the 20thC tendency for Presidents 
to establish these pyramid-like monuments expressly to house every scrap of 
paper relating to their presidential years ,48a
This pattern is set by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, whose Director 
wrote to this writer that "unfortunately, no complete list exists which 
would give you the names and positions of all those who worked on President 
Roosevelt's staff" . 49 Unlike some others, the Roosevelt Library has 
managed to produce two partial listings. Firstly, two detailed wall charts 
were compiled showing the organization of the White House: one depicting 
1937(50 and the other 1942. Together they show the impact of the
establishment of The White House Office in 1939. Secondly, a report was 
prepared in 1943, with the President's approval, entitled The White House 
Executive Office: Its Functions and Records? 1 This latter proved to be 
less a complete listing of White House staff than a guide to their papers 
and records as deposited in the Library.
The Harry S. Truman Library, by contrast, can be credited with the most 
serious attempt at listing the White House staff who served under President 
Truman. Two lists were in fact produced. First was a simple alphabetical 
listing of staff, whether political or clerical, who worked in The White 
House Office 1945 - 53. It listed their names, their staff titles, and their 
dates of service where appropriate. The second list issued related to the 
professional staff" only and was arranged functionally by job title. This 
is particularly useful because it not only gives the names of many middle- 
level White House staff but also reveals which were assigned to which senior 
staff. Furthermore it contains many names unaccountably missing from the 
other list, and provides invaluable information on the names of personnel 
detailed to work at the White House together with their department or agency 
of origin. Comparable information on other presidencies is not available 
until the Nixon years.
The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library has been unable to match the efforts of its 
predecessor. "We regret to inform you," wrote the Director, "that we have 
no complete compilation of these names (of White House staff) available" . 53 
In its place the Library has available a privately published publication 
entitled the White House Staff Book 1953-61. By no means a comprehensive 
guide to the White House staff under President Eisenhower, it contains 
brief biographical sketches of most senior staff members, which in some
cases reveals names and staff titles not previously listed elsewhere in 
official sources. But this list fails to include all the commissioned
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The impetus for the release of this one document derived from the paral­
lel attempt to rearrange the way in which the US Budget presented its own 
statistical figures on the same subject. But there was no follow-up by 
the Nixon White House, whose efforts began and ended in April 1971.
As of this writing the prospects of a Gerald R. Ford Library are uncer­
tain. However, irrespective of whatever information on Ford's White House 
staff that may or may not become available from such a quarter, the Ford 
White House does deserve credit for breaking new ground while in office.
In December 1974 the Office of the White House Press Secretary released a 
series of background press releases on President Ford's White House staff. 
This went several steps further than the only previous precedent of 1971. 
First, while containing the names and staff titles of staff members, it 
also included an outline of the general principles upon which the Ford 
staff were to operate. Second, the Ford White House released the trans­
cript of a briefing on this subject given by the Assistant to the President 
in overall charge of implementing such principles. This press briefing, 
for background use only, was nevertheless the first time that any President 
had allowed an open discussion on the role and purpose of his White House 
staff. It was with justification that the Staff Secretary stated in a 
letter to this writer: "To the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
time that information of this type has been released" . 56
In conclusion, such specific sources of primary information as have been 
outlined can in certain cases provide valuable additional information on 
the White House staff of a particular President. But its varying quality 
taken as a whole precludes its use as more than a supplementary back-up 
to the regular sources earlier outlined. It is to these that we now 
return as we discuss the caveats that must be entered here about their
usage.
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QUALIFICATIONS AND RESERVATIONS
The principal primary sources of information, of both general and 
specific application, that we have introduced are those upon which the 
student researching this subject is forced to rely. But it is the degree 
to which these sources are properly handled that determines the success 
of any attempt to construct a comprehensive and accurate picture of each 
President's White House staff. There are several pitfalls of interpre­
tation to be avoided in their handling. The reliability of some of these 
sources must therefore be further examined. They all will be found to 
suffer from an incompleteness, even within their own terms of reference. 
This is perhaps best illustrated by considering some of the many respects 
in which this is true.
Fi£st, the US GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL, CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, 
and CONGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY are all subject to the risk that their 
published lists will be incomplete. A member of the White House staff 
who serves for any length of time less than the (usually) one year interval 
between the dates of their successive publication could well escape in­
clusion in any published list. An important example of such an omission 
occurring can be found in the Nixon Administration. John Connally, who 
had served President Nixon as Secretary of the Treasury in 1971, returned 
in 1973 to serve on the White House staff as a Special Advisor. He did 
not, as it happened, stay very long: only a matter of months. However, 
the fact of his presence on the staff completely escaped mention in the 
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY. Another example can be found in the Kennedy 
Administration. No mention was ever made by any of these three publications 
of the fact that Chester Bowles served on the Kennedy staff in 1961-2 before 
leaving for India as Ambassador.^7 Another series of examples can be found
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in the period after the Kennedy assassination. For varying periods of 
up to several months most members of the former President's White House 
staff stayed on to help the new President. Some stayed longer than 
others, with those who had been closest to Kennedy not unnaturally among 
the first to leave. However, the ORGANIZATION MANUAL and the CONGRESSIONAL 
STAFF DIRECTORY make no mention of Sorensen, Schlesinger or even Salinger 
(the first of Johnson's four Press Secretaries) as ever having served on the 
Johnson White House staff at all.
Second, the ORGANIZATION MANUAL, DIRECTORY, and STAFF DIRECTORY lists 
draw only upon those members of the staff who are paid out of the official 
fund: "White House Office - Salaries and Expenses". They only provide
a list of WHO names, and leave out all those others whose source(s) of 
compensation may lie elsewhere. For example, we know that over a period 
of many years many members of the staff were in fact being paid by the
e  q
Special Projects fund or were listed as ungraded. Both the President's 
Science Advisor and his Water Resources Advisor, and their staffs, were 
paid out of Special Projects as far back as the Eisenhower Administration.
One prominent example of a Nixon staff member not listed in the 
ORGANIZATION MANUAL or its counterparts, but who in fact served on the 
staff from 1969 onwards, was Alexander Haig. He was chosen by Kissinger 
soon after January 1969 to act as his deputy, although not paid from 
White House Office funds.
Occasionally a person has been appointed by a President as an advisor - 
though not to The White House Office staff as such. One such example was 
the appointment of Dr. Eric F. Goldman by President Johnson as co-ordinator 
of a program "to channel the nation's best thinking"®^ to the President.
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For all practical purposes Goldman was for a while a member of the White
House staff (where he worked as Johnson's equivalent of Kennedy's
Schlesinger). As such, Goldman was accepted as a staff member by
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, which listed him more than once as a key member 
61of the staff. But neither the ORGANIZATION MANUAL, DIRECTORY, nor 
STAFF DIRECTORY make any mention of Goldman whatsoever.
Third, certain publications have on occasion listed as members of a 
President's White House staff persons who were not officially on the pay­
roll of The White House Office, but were paid from other funds. This is 
the reverse circumstance of the above, and it only emphasizes the fact 
that no definition of the staff can afford to depend entirely on any one 
source of information.
Examples can be drawn from the Nixon Presidency among others. In 1973 
the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and 
General Government asked for and received a list of the names and positions 
of personnel then currently being funded by the Special Projects fund.
This list was subsequently printed in the hearings. 62 Included were the 
following: Charles DiBona, a Special Consultant; Virginia Knauer, a 
Special Assistant; and Kenneth Cole Jr., the Executive Director of the 
Domestic Council, and John Ehrlichman's deputy. The first two, DiBona and 
Knauer, were both listed in the ORGANIZATION MANUAL, DIRECTORY and STAFF 
DIRECTORY as members of The White House Office staff. Technically neither 
should have been so listed as neither were paid from White House Office 
funds. And yet, in the political sense, it is true to say they were all 
members of the White House staff.
Fourth, it must be emphasized that information obtained from United States 
Budgets on the White House staff must be treated with considerable caution.
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It can present a considerably misleading impression of the true size and 
cost of the staff. We should first examine how this should be so before 
discussing the reasons why.
Consider that item in the US Budget entitled: "The White House Office - 
Salaries and Expenses". Over the years there were allowed to develop
considerable discrepancies between official figures as to its size and cost 
and actual fact. While The White House Office staff grew in size and cost 
most of this growth was concealed elsewhere than in the official figures 
given in successive US Budgets. At times such discrepancies became very 
large indeed. For example, by 1970 the official figures for the cost of 
The White House Office reflected only about two-fifths of the actual cost. 
This was because they only represented about two-fifths of the staff 
actually employed. According to the White House itself, of the 576 mem­
bers of The White House Office staff in 1970 only 208 were officially 
recorded under the appropriate heading in the US Budget for that year . 63
Twice since 1939, in FY 1947 and FY 1971, major attempts were made to 
make official US Budget figures reflect more honestly the actual numbers 
and cost of White House personnel. But it must be said that neither 
attempt was completely successful. Certainly, in the absence of a sus­
tained follow-through, in neither case did it take long for discrepancies 
once more to reappear. These discrepancies were due to several factors: 
Mo n g them the increased use of detailed personnel, who were carried on 
payrolls of a variety of departments and agencies; and the increased use 
°f the so-called 'ungraded' category for political staff.
But none of this exactly explains why such loopholes were allowed to 
characterize official US Budget accounts. The answer, when you dig deeper,
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is simply that the White House was never required either to keep precise 
records or to publish them. In the absence of pressure to do either it 
should not be surprising that there was an equal absence of pressure to 
prevent these many discrepancies from appearing. On the contrary they 
served a very useful purpose. They successfully helped to shield the staff 
from what otherwise might have been a greater interest in its rate of 
growth and the reasons for it. However unintentionally, successive Admin­
istrations acquiesced in the progressive distortion of official statistics 
as reported in US Budgets. The student in this field must be alert to the 
consequences of such acquiescence.
Fifth, no source of information on the staff has ever taken into regular 
consideration the practice known as "detailing". Although certain persons 
are carried officially on the payrolls of various government departments 
and agencies they can be detailed to work full-time for the White House, 
and thereby become de facto staff members. This practice has been so long 
established that it well predates the appearance of The White House Office 
itself. It gradually became more and more prevalent until by the end of 
the Johnson Administration approximately half those working on the 
President's staff were detailed personnel. Yet nowhere has there been 
available a list of those on detail. US Budget figures in this connexion 
mislead rather than inform. Only in the 1970s has there been any official 
divulging of the numbers detailed to work for the White House. The names 
of such persons have been produced by the Administration for the House and 
Senate appropriations subcommittees, although not on a regular basis. 64 
ft is from one such list that an example can be found of the kind of per­
son prone to be excluded except through these means. J. Fred Buzhardt, 65 
who served President Nixon in the Office of Special Counsel, was a prominent
I
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staff member during 1973-74. But as he was on detail to the White House 
his name did not, for some time, appear in the ORGANIZATION MANUAL or the 
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY. 66
Sixth, all published listings of the White House staff by name exclude 
those who are "ungraded personnel". These often remain the most anonymous 
part of a President's staff. Records of even the numbers of ungraded per­
sonnel are not regularly kept. This was made clear in correspondence 
between the Chairman of the US Civil Service Commission and the House Post 
Office and Civil Service Committee. In a letter from the Chairman, Robert 
E. Hampton, to congressman Morris K. Udall, a senior committee member, 
dated 15th February 1972, he admitted that "some of the information re­
quested (by Udall) is not available". He continued: "The information we 
maintain on these positions has been a function largely of our anticipated 
needs for data and our available resources. Although the records kept
have varied over the years....we have generally tried to keep our records 
6 7to a minimum".
Historically, the ungraded staff positions were restricted to, and used 
primarily for, the non-political housekeeping functions associated with 
the Executive Residence. But the advent of the Nixon Administration wit­
nessed a significant change in the use of ungraded positions. For the 
first time on a large scale many high-level policy employees were taken 
on board and classified anonymously as ungraded personnel. No better 
reflection of this anonymity was the surprise expressed by many political 
figures, and commentators, that so many of those involved in Watergate 
had at one time served on the White House staff. In the case of E, Howard
Hunt even the White House itself didn't realise that he had been on the 
6 8payroll. A more normal example of the kind of policy employee employed
*
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under the "ungraded" heading was Kenneth W. Clawson. He held the title 
of Executive Director of the Office of Communication (at a salary of 
$40,000 p.a . , 69 only slightly below the top salary rate) and was a signi­
ficant member of the middle-ranking Nixon White House staff.
Seventh, all regular sources leave out of account middle-ranking members 
of the staff. This applies both to the ORGANIZATION MANUAL on the one 
hand and the US Budgets on the other. Middle-ranking staff are neither 
the top few dozen, as named by the ORGANIZATION MANUAL, nor the general 
collection of clerical and secretarial support staff that predominate as 
nameless figures in the US Budget. The importance of these middle-ranking 
staff members has grown in proportion to the expanding size of presidential 
staffs. For this reason it is from the Johnson-Nixon period that the most 
prominent examples can be found of middle-ranking staff who normally 
escaped inclusion in an officially published list.
One such example is Larry Higby, who served under H.R. Haldeman as his 
principal deputy (and indeed was popularly known as "Haldeman's Haldeman") 
during the entire period 1969-73 that Haldeman himself was on the Nixon 
staff. Higby's name never once appeared on any list of the ORGANIZATION 
MANUAL during these years, while on the DIRECTORY or STAFF DIRECTORY lists 
his name did not finally appear until after Haldeman's departure in 1973.70 
Similar examples emerge from the Johnson years. Nowhere in any listing of 
President Johnson's staff will you find mention of the fact that Jim 
Moyers (brother of Bill) worked as an Administrative Assistant, 71 or that 
Hayes Redmon worked as an assistant to Bill Moyers.7^
The magnitude of this problem becomes more evident with further research. 
There have been many other middle-ranking staff whose "passion for 
anonymity" was not so much volunteered by them as enforced. For example,
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none of the following - Albert Cantril, William Blackburn, Charles 
Maguire, Jon Robson, James Gunther, Fred Bohen, William Graham, Martin 
Nimitz, Stan Ross, Ben Wattenberg, Ervin Duggan or Thomas Cronin - ever 
appeared in any listing of the Johnson White House. Yet they all served 
on the Johnson domestic policy staff. 73 All such persons were clearly 
involved in political work and should certainly be counted as proper 
members of the White House staff.
— -ght- ’ in a 1 1 sources there are other omissions, related to the above, 
which impede our understanding of the structure of a President's White 
House staff. No regular listing of any presidential staff has ever re­
vealed the names or the numbers of middle-ranking staff assigned to work 
for individual senior staff. These omissions have increased in relevance 
as the staff have grown in the 1960s and 1970s. They bear directly on the 
structure and organization of the staff. In the case of a White House 
staff system clearly organized on hierarchical lines, such as those of 
Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon, it is occasionally possible to infer, 
from the ORGANIZATION MANUAL lists, which middle-ranking staff may have 
been assigned to which senior staff. From this we can infer the relative 
importance with which certain functional areas of staff operations may 
thereby have been regarded. But such inferences fall short of unassailable 
judgement in the absence of corroborative evidence from elsewhere.
The White House staff lists prepared, retrospectively, by the Harry S . 
Truman Library are unique in providing clear indications on this score.
The fact remains, however, that such assignations of middle-ranking staff 
were never provided during the lifetime of the Truman Presidency itself.
It was in this respect that the Nixon Administration must be credited with 
breaking new ground. In the White House Staff List which it released in
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April 1971 it did reveal which middle-rank staff were apportioned among 
which senior staff offices. A comparable exercise by President Ford in 
December 1974 was more limited in this respect. We must conclude that 
these examples of enlightenment have been isolated cases and exceptions 
to the rule.
The rule has been that such matters are covered by a veil of secrecy. For 
example, in the case of those above referred to who worked on the Johnson 
domestic policy staff, it was never officially acknowledged which of them 
worked principally for Bill Moyers, Harry McPherson, Joseph Califano, or 
Douglass Cater. Similar omissions characterized the Nixon years. For 
example, in January 1969 President Nixon appointed Arthur Burns to his 
White House staff as a Counsellor (a brand new staff title with hitherto un­
precedented Cabinet rank), and Robert Ellsworth as an Assistant to the 
President. These two appointments occupied the first two positions in 
the official rankings and were published as such by the CONGRESSIONAL 
DIRECTORY. But no mention was made of the fact that Burns was assisted 
by Wesley McCain; nor that Ellsworth was likewise assisted by Daniel 
Hofgren and Jonathan Rose . 74 They escaped official mention. But the 
confusion is only enhanced by the fact that other middle-level staff 
assistants to these two men were published. 75 Eventually, in the case of 
Rose, his existence did surface. 76 But more often than not this never 
happened: for example, in the case of Patrick Anderson, who worked as a 
junior-level speechwriter in the Kennedy White House; 77 or Tex Lazar, 
who worked for one of Nixon's top speechwriters Ray Price. 76
— inth, and finally, there can be no guarantee whatsoever that any primary 
source of information of any kind or in any combination can yield an
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absolutely accurate guide to the White House staff of any President in 
the years 1939-77. Accurate records were never required to be kept 
and as a result none ever were. It cannot be emphasized enough that 
no White House has ever published a complete list of the names, titles. 
job descriptions, or salaries of all persons serving on the White House 
staff. In this connexion, as the Publications Director of the
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY pointed out, "I have inquired at various times 
whether or not the White House Press Office publishes a list of all White 
House staff. At all times I have been advised that they do not" . 79 In 
this respect at least, a large part of the staff have had their passion 
for anonymity successfully retained.
THE PROBLEM OF PROPER AUTHORITY
In this third part we turn to consider the problem of proper authority 
for the White House staff. We have seen that a political definition of 
the staff leads us to a better understanding of how extensive that staff 
have become. One question that now arises is the basis upon which its 
multifarious aspects have come into existence. Upon what claim to 
proper authority has each part of the White House staff relied?
This has hitherto been a completely neglected area of concern in writings 
on the White House staff. So far we have but lightly touched upon it 
during our consideration of the legal definition. Have the staff grown 
on a sound legal basis? The evidence suggests quite the reverse. For 
nearly forty years the staff's growth was a legal hotchpotch of amalgamated
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parts. In the following pages we illustrate their variety and trace 
their historical origins and usage. The problem of proper authority 
is inextricably bound up with a major theme of this study: the accounta­
bility of power. By here considering the staff in the context of their 
supposed proper authority we lay essential groundwork for our later 
discussion.
The White House staff have historically drawn upon several different 
kinds of authority for their collective existence. This final section 
of the chapter (which was written from the perspective of 1978) concen­
trates on the near forty-year period between Roosevelt's creation of the 
staff in the late 1930's and Jimmy Carter's arrival in the later 1970's. 
During that period we can identify four kinds of authorization that had 
been used to sustain the White House staff.
Firstly, we shall examine the permanent statutory authority that remained 
in force throughout the whole of this period. Secondly, we shall consider 
such other pertinent authority as has existed with a bearing on the staff. 
Thirdly, we shall itemize the annual legislatively-based authorizations 
under the auspices of which the vast majority of the staff were routinely 
authorized en bloc and which remained the presumed and accepted basis of 
authorization until well into the Carter Presidency. Fourthly, we will 
briefly examine and evaluate proposals that had emerged by 1978 for con­
ferring a proper new authorization for the White House staff. We begin, 
however, with an examination of the permanent statutory authority that 
accumulated over the years since the formal establishment of the White 
House staff in 1939.
*
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PERMANENT STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Permanent statutory authority for The White House Office staff is princi­
pally to be found in Title 3 of the United States Code, under the generic 
heading "Office and Compensation of the President. " 80 Three subsections 
from this title constitute the main provisions currently governing the 
employment of staff. The first of these is headed "Compensation of 
secretaries and executive, administrative, and staff assistants to 
President". It reads thus:
3 USC 105
The President is authorized to 
fix the compensation of the six 
administrative assistants autho­
rized to be appointed under 
section 106 of this title, of 
the Executive Secretary of the 
National Security Council, of 
the Executive Secretary of the 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Council, of the Executive Sec­
retary of the Economic Opport­
unity Council, and of eight 
other secretaries or immediate 
staff assistants in the White 
House Office at rates of basic 
compensation not to exceed that 
of level II of the Federal Exec­
utive Salary Schedule.®1
The President is therefore authorized to employ a total of 17 assistants, 
9 of which are designated by title (including the 6 Administrative 
Assistants). This motley collection of staff assistants, singled out 
for what seems like special attention, in fact reflects nothing more 
than the last date upon which this subsection was (somewhat haphazardly) 
updated during the Johnson Presidency. In 1964 Johnson sponsored a 
measure (Public Law 88-426) which repealed pay distinctions among the 
top fourteen staff positions. 82 In so doing, permanent authorization
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was also given for one or two other staff positions that just happened 
to be extant at that time, such as the Executive Secretary of the 
Economic Opportunity Council. Subsequently, however, this subsection 
was not updated to take into account the enormously changed nature of 
White House staff positions. For example, some of the staff positions 
here referred to had completely disappeared by the Nixon Administration 
in the 1970s. Countless more had been invented.
The second subsection is headed "Administrative Assistants". This first 
appeared back in 1939 and refers to the original Administrative Assistants 
granted to President Roosevelt. It reads:
3 USC 106
The President is authorized 
to appoint not to exceed six 
administrative assistants 
and to fix their compensation 
in accordance with section 
105 of this title. Each such 
administrative assistant shall 
perform such duties as the 
President may prescribe.83
Like the previous subsection (with which there is a degree of overlap), 
this one too was completely out of touch with reality by the 1970s. The 
staff position of Administrative Assistant was last used regularly by 
President Johnson, 84 while this last direct link with the nomenclature 
of the original White House Office staff of 1939 was finally broken when 
President Nixon discontinued this title for his senior staff. 85
The third subsection refers to a practice which has certainly not been 
discontinued. It is headed "Detail of employees of executive departments 
to office of President" and reads as follows:
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3 USC 107
Employees of the executive 
departments and independent 
establishments of the exec­
utive branch of the Govern­
ment may be detailed from 
time to time to the White 
House Office for temporary 
assistance.86
This subsection stands out, alone among the others, in having retained 
its relevance throughout these last forty years. Despite occasional 
attempts, of varying intensity, to reduce the numbers of detailed per­
sonnel, every single President has made use of them. In so doing all 
Presidents have invoked 3 USC 107 as sufficient justification. However, 
we shall later discuss the degree to which the authorization provided 
here has been breached, in spirit if not in practice.
Apart from these three principal subsections there are in addition several 
others of subsidiary relevance. For example, a related provision to 
3 USC 107, to be found under Title 5, confers the right of cabinet and 
agency heads to retain the services of experts or consultants for govern- 
ment purposes. This includes any subsequent detail to the White House. 
The relevant part of the US Code, under the heading "Employment of experts 
and consultants: temporary or intermittent", is as follows:
5 USC 3109
(b) When authorized by an 
appropriation or other 
statute, the head of an agency 
may procure by contract the 
temporary (not in excess of 1 
year) or intermittent services 
of experts or consultants or 
an organization thereof, in­
cluding stenographic reporting 
services.
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However, an agency.... may pay
a rate for services under this 
section in excess of the high­
est rate payable....only when 
specifically authorized by the 
appropriation or other statute 
authorizing the procurement of
the services.87
5 USC 3109 was included among a listing of the statutory authority that
the Nixon Administration considered applicable to the authorization of
88The White House Office. Consultants appointed under this subsection
have in turn been detailed to work for the White House. One interesting 
feature of this subsection is that the restrictions placed on cabinet and 
agency heads in the matter of hiring consultants appear to be stricter 
than those that apply to the White House. The provisions of 3 USC 107, 
as noted, confer a wider measure of discretion upon the President or his 
staff. For example, 3 USC 107 has no one-year time limit, as there is 
here, on the procurement of consultants to the White House staff.
One subsection of Title 3 relating to the President which does not, on 
the surface, appear to apply to the White House staff is that entitled 
"Travelling Expenses". The wording is as follows:
3 USC 103
There may be expended for or 
on account of the travelling 
expenses of the President of 
the United States such sum as 
Congress may from time to time 
appropriate, not exceeding 
$100,000 per annum, such sum 
when appropriated to be expen­
ded in the discretion of the 
President and accounted for on 
his certificate solely.89 
(author's emphasis)
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Any President does of course travel a great deal, irrespective of the 
year in question. How exactly such travel should be, or is, paid for
has always been a matter for discussion, and, in campaign years, for
90argument. The figure of $100,000 p.a. here referred to is certainly
91notional, in that the true costs (which themselves can never be accu­
rately determined) are far greater. The constitutional position of the 
President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces guarantees that, in 
theory as well as in practice, the costs as well as the practical arrange­
ments of presidential travel should primarily be borne, directly or in­
directly, by the Department of Defense. In such circumstances the rele­
vance of the underlined phrase is that 3 USC 103 has been taken by recent 
Administrations to justify the provision of travelling expenses for the 
President’s White House staff. This was the position implicitly taken
by the Nixon Administration before a congressional appropriations sub-
92committee of the House of Representatives in 1974.
The Ford Administration took the same view. In a similar hearing before 
the equivalent subcommittee on the Senate side in 1975, the Administration 
witness asserted that the fund for presidential travel was actually 
intended to cover "the expenses of staff members travelling with the 
President in their official duties as s t a f f . Y e t  it is of interest 
to note that elsewhere, in the detailed provisions for The White House 
Office in successive US Budgets, there are to be found two other items 
relating to staff travel. These are entitled "Travel and Transportation 
of Persons" and "Transportation of Things". In FY 1977 these two accounted 
for $195,00094 - nearly double that of the euphemistically termed
"President's Travel". This latter's new interpretation well illustrates 
the way in which authority for the staff has been surreptiously expanded; 
in this case, in the absence of a properly defined statutory provision for 
staff travelling expenses.
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We turn now to sections of the US Code of more marginal relevance. That 
headed "Restrictions on purchase, operation, use and maintenance of pass­
enger motor vehicles and aircraft" is included here in view of President 
Carter's new guidelines to his own staff upon his arrival in office. 95 
The subsection reads thus:
31 USC 638a
(a) Purchase or hire of vehicles 
Unless specifically authorized by 
the appropriation concerned or 
other law, no appropriation shall 
be expended to purchase or hire 
passenger motor vehicles for any 
branch of the Government other 
than those for the use of the 
President of the United States, 
the secretaries to the President, 
or the heads of the executive 
departments enumerated in section 
101 of Title 5. 96
The exact date of the drafting of this subsection is not known, but its 
reference to "the secretaries to the President" would appear to make it 
at least twenty-five years old. The staff position of Secretary to the 
President did survive into the Eisenhower Administration, but the last 
time there were several "secretaries" was further back still, in the 
Truman Presidency. The relevance of this subsection to modern experience 
is simply this: in terms of proper authorization, most if not all of the 
White House staff who have enjoyed the benefits of chauffer-driven cars 
during the last two decades have done so improperly. This practice 
reached its height in the Nixon years, with more staff being chauffeur- 
driven than ever before, and sheer force of momentum carried it on through 
the Ford Presidency. However improper, it still persists. Although 
President Carter made it one of his earliest directives that no member of 
his White House staff should have the services of a limousine, 97 
rule has since been relaxed.
this
50 -
This exhausts those parts of the US Code that pertain to the permanent 
statutory authority of the White House staff. Yet there is one further 
item that we should not overlook. Section 3101 of Title 5 does contain 
permanent legislation conferring general authorization for all executive 
agencies to employ such number of employees as the Congress may appro­
priate from year to year. Such employees are subject to the provisions 
of Title 5 relating to the classification of positions and the fixing 
of pay under the General Schedule. 98
At first glance it might be thought that Section 3101 does in fact provide 
all the necessary permanent authorization for staff in The White House 
Office, if considered as an executive agency. But there are three argu­
ments which refute this impression. First, the classification of positions 
for the staff is, as we have seen, completely out of date. Senior members 
of the staff are anyway not subject to the General Schedule but to the 
Executive Schedule. Add to that the fact that Section 3101 does not in 
any case cover those staff currently listed as 'ungraded' (see infra), 
and it is clear that this section cannot suffice as overall permanent auth­
ority. Second, no President has ever sought to justify the status of The 
White House Office, or other staff bodies, under the provisions of 
Section 3101 of Title 5. Third, recent Administrations have in fact 
admitted that the current position as regards authorization is untenable 
311 d quite inadequate. 99 In these circumstances, therefore, no serious 
case can be made for Section 3101 as embodying permanent statutory 
authority for the White House staff.
On the contrary, it does nothing to remedy the problem of proper authori­
zation. The extent of this problem is by now becoming more clear. The
authority for the staff that we have already examined is far from
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comprehensive and mostly out of date. Obviously the White House staff 
must have been able, somehow or other, to grow and develop despite its 
inadequate basis in statutory law. We now turn to consider what other
authority existed and whether or not it has been sufficient.
OTHER PERTINENT AUTHORITY
What other pertinent authority exists, or has existed, for the White House 
staff? The answer appears not, at first sight, to be a great deal. Apart 
from the position of the NSC staff, such authority in relation to the staff 
bears less on their justification for existence than on their behaviour. In 
this latter context we will consider the permissible political activity of 
staff, and the delegation of powers to the staff.
We begin this section, however, with what can only be described as an 
historical curiosity in the life of the White House staff. It arose from 
a presidential Executive Order issued by President Nixon early in 1969.
The text ran as follows:
EO 11456
Section 1 There shall be in the 
White House Office a 
Special Assistant to the President 
for Liaison with former Presidents.
Section 6 (a) The compensation and
expenses of the Special 
Assistant and members of his staff 
shall be paid from the appropriation 
under the heading "Special" in the 
Executive Office Appropriation Act 
1969, or any corresponding approp­
riation which may be made for sub­
sequent fiscal years, or from such 
other appropriated funds as may be 
available under law. 100
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On no other occasion has one position on the White House staff been 
established in this way. Although also created by Executive Order,
The White House Office and the Domestic Council were, by contrast, groups 
of persons. This particular authorization for a Special Assistant first 
lapsed with the death of former President Johnson in January 1973. It 
was resurrected with Nixon's resignation in 1974 and strengthened with 
Ford's defeat in 1976.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
The position of the National Security Council and its staff has always 
differed from other parts of the White House staff. This stems from 
the fact that the NSC was first established by congressional legislation 
rather than by administrative enactment. The NSC was formally established 
pursuant to Public Law 253 in July 1947.101 By virtue of Reorganization 
Plan No. 4, effective on August 20th 1949, the NSC was placed in the 
Executive Office of the President. 1*^ 2 Appropriations for the NSC have 
been straightforward. For example: "For expenses necessary for the
103National Security Council, including services authorized by 5 USC 3109..."
The NSC staff have therefore derived their authorization directly from 
statute, unlike the rest of the White House staff.
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The extent to which the White House staff are authorized to become in­
volved in political activity has always been an unresolved question.
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Obviously their very existence is a political fact and their work is 
political whatever task they perform for their President. Yet there 
are, predictably enough, arguments over the staff's proper political 
role in election years, especially in presidential election years. The 
most recent round was fought out in 1976.
An important step in the direction of an impartial civil service was the 
passage of the Hatch Act in 1939 (co-incidentally the year of the official 
establishment of the White House staff). This act restricted the rights 
of federal employees to fully engage in partisan politics. The Supreme 
Court ruled in 1973 that "the political influence of federal employ ees on 
others and on the electoral process should be limited. " 104 Because of 
the special nature of the White House staff the exact applicability of 
those parts of the Hatch Act which limit political involvement has never 
been entirely clear. Some participation in limited political activities 
has been generally accepted and allowed. For example, employees "paid 
from the appropriation for the office of the President" are exempted by 
5 USC 7324(d)(1) from the general prohibition contained in 5 USC 7324(a)(2) 
against executive branch employees participating in "political management 
or in political campaigns". The Counsel to President Ford, Philip W. 
Buchen, interpreted this to mean that it "effectively places the White 
House staff in a position comparable to that of the personal staffs of 
members of Congress. " 105
Yet the fact remains that no precise dividing line now exists even for 
senatorial staff. As to presidential staff, no such line is likely to 
be drawn which clearly indicates when such employees are performing 
°fficial duties and when those duties are political.
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This problem has now been heightened by the new campaign spending legis­
lation which governs presidential elections. For example, how is one 
to apportion the costs of presidential travel during a presidential 
election campaign year? Whenever a President travels, and regardless 
of the purpose of any particular trip, he is accompanied by a number of 
persons. These include political aides from the White House staff, to­
gether with speechwriters, operations staff and others. The most recent 
instance of such a situation, in 1976, produced a ruling from the General 
Counsel of the FEC to the effect that "expenses for accompanying staff 
personnel will be charged....(to the appropriate political committee).... 
only if such staff personnel serve primarily as advance persons or other 
campaign staff members and do not provide support services to the Office 
of the President." The loophole in this language was subtle. The
term "Office of the President" has no statutory meaning except insofar as 
it relates to the person of the President alone. Although its use here 
obviously implied more than that, it laid down no clear dividing line 
between White House staff who were necessary to support the "Office of 
the President" and those who were not.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
The statutory authority of the White House staff should be placed in the 
wider context of the statutory powers to which they are entitled. Such 
powers are in theory strictly limited. Under the provisions of the 
McCormack Act (1951) the President is implicitly debarred from making 
formal delegations of responsibility for his statutory functions to 
members of his White House staff. The McCormack Act authorizes the
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President to delegate statutory functions, without relieving himself 
of responsibility for their proper performance, to the head of a 
department or agency, or any other official of the executive branch 
whose appointment is confirmed by the Senate. Such delegations must 
be in writing and published in the Federal Register. 107
The Act was passed primarily because no-one wanted the burden of the 
Presidency to be one of clerical tasks and paper shuffling. The auth­
ority conferred by the McCormack Act was intended to apply to routine 
functions and provides no authority to delegate what can be termed 
constitutional functions. The legislative history clearly indicated
that the bill was designed to relieve the President from performing
functions which did not have "any reasonable claim upon his time or 
108attention". Whatever the nature of the relief thus afforded the
President, his White House staff were to play no official part in its 
execution.
We have now covered the permanent statutory authority currently in force 
for the White House staff. The problem that we have immediately identi­
fied is simple. This authority is quite obviously insufficient to 
support the modern White House staff of today. This leads us to an 
equally simple question. How was the staff able to grow and develop 
for forty years in the absence of permanent statutory authority for the 
vast majority of its members? It cannot be pretended that this growth 
went magically unnoticed. It did not. But on what grounds was it 
justified? Such grounds must have been based on another form of auth­
ority to that hitherto considered. This alternative legitimacy merits
full investigation.
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ANNUAL LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
The principal grounds on which authority for the White House staff was 
historically based, or what until at least the 1970's were presumed to 
be the legitimate grounds, derived from the language of annual appropriation 
acts encompassing the staff. In such legislation the White House staff were 
not dealt with en bloc but in separate parts (all contained under the 
umbrella heading of the Executive Office of the President). Those parts 
which concern us here are those which, over time, together made up (or con­
tributed towards) our political definition of the White House staff. Certain 
of these constituent elements of the staff repay closer examination as to 
their historical background, statutory basis, or habitual usage. While we 
will not at this stage delve into the historical background of The White 
House Office itself (which is dealtwith in Chapter III) this is an appro­
priate opportunity to consider in some detail the antecedents of those 
elements of the White House staff that emerged and flourished in the statu­
tory no-man's land that lasted for nearly forty years. For example, as we 
shall see, the habit of detailing had origins that well predated the creation 
of the staff; while other parts of the staff far outgrew the limited basis 
upon which they were first established.
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
The language contained in successive appropriation acts providing legis­
lative authorization for The White House Office was not substantially 
altered in decades. It was presumed to confer the authority necessary to 
embrace the constantly growing numbers of WHO personnel. The following 
extract, which contains the key wording, has been taken from the Executive 
Office Appropriation Act, 1974, and was representative of the practice of 
the previous thirty years;
57
The White House Office - 
Salaries and Expenses
For expenses necessary for
the White House Office....
at such per diem rates for
individuals as the President
may specify and other personal
services without regard to the
provisions of law regulating
the employment and compensation
of persons in the Government
service....  to be accounted—— —— — 1 OQfor solely on his certificate, 
(author's emphasis)
Similar language has applied, as we shall shortly see, to other White 
House staff items. The underlined passage emphasized the enormous dis­
cretion that the President enjoys over the terms of pay and employment 
of his regular White House Office staff. (This simple fact appears to 
have finally dawned on public consciousness with the publication by NEWS­
WEEK magazine, in May 1977, of an article on White House staff salaries.110) 
It is hard to refute the proposition that the language of this annual appro­
priation act confers a carte blanche on the President.
DETAILING
As we have seen, the practice of detailing personnel from other govern­
ment departments and agencies to the White House staff has been officially 
justified by 3 USC 107. However, this practice has proved such an 
important feature of the staff that its historical background needs to be 
covered in greater depth, and its statutory authority further explored.
A thorough understanding of detailing is essential to any study of the 
staff.
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The importance of detailing to the White House staff was well illustrated 
by the testimony of James Schlesinger before the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and Executive Office, during 
hearings held in May 1970. The then Deputy Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget explained:
"For many years, White House Office 
staff costs have been only partially 
financed by the appropriation 
'Salaries and Expenses, The White 
House Office'. Many staff personnel 
have been paid from appropriations 
to other Federal agencies under the 
statutory provision authorizing 
temporary detailing to the White 
House Office." <3 USC 107) . H I
Another exchange at the same hearings emphasized that the detailing of 
personnel was by no means a practice of recent origin. When the Chairman, 
Senator Yarborough, asked: "Has this practice been going on for years - 
the practice of employees in the White House being paid by other depart­
ments?" he received the reply from James Schlesinger: "That practice has 
been going on at least since the Truman administration and may have ante­
dated that. " 112
Indeed it did. In the 1930s, for example, it was legitimized by no less 
an authority than the Brownlow Committee in its 1937 report. The key 
passage in this connexion was this:
"In the selection of these aides 
the President should be free to 
call on departments from time 
to time for the assignment of 
persons who, after a tour of 
duty as his aides, might be 
restored to their old positions."
m
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This was one of the provisions of the Brownlow report that Roosevelt 
was informed of, and agreed to, in advance. 114 No doubt this sentence 
was drafted with a view to the experience of the previous five years, 
during which many of the so-called Brains Trusters who surrounded 
President Roosevelt were in fact on the payroll of a department or 
agency. No doubt, too, the procedure which was implied in the report 
was intended to facilitate the best possible choice of the aides that 
the President wanted to work with him. It was always envisaged that
such detailees could be sent back to the departments if necessary. 115
The experience of the Roosevelt years thus gave the practice of detail­
ing a significant boost. Of its practical importance to the subsequent 
development of the White House staff there can be no doubt. But in 
order to more precisely determine its proper authority we must search 
even farther back for its legal origins.
These origins antedate both the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations. 
President Grant, for example, detailed generals from the War Department116 
to work in the White House, as did President Arthur. 117 The first pro­
vision of law relating to detailing was enacted in the Legislative, 
Executive, and Judicial Expenses Appropriations Act, 1906.116 While 
nothing has been found in the legislative history of that act to explain 
the purpose of its enactment, it seems most likely that it was prompted, 
at least in part, by a ruling of the then Attorney General of December 
22nd 1904. This held in effect that the Postmaster General had no 
authority to detail a registry clerk to the White House because of a lack 
of statutory authority for such a detail. According to a more recent
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Comptroller General, nothing has been found in the legislative history 
of the language of 3 USC 107 that would suggest any limitation on the 
expressed detail authority provided therein. Neither did the lack of 
authorizing legislation for the original language suggest a limitation. 
This Comptroller General took the following view, according to testimony 
presented to the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service in 
May 1974:
"While the lack of authorizing 
language for a legislative 
item in an appropriation bill 
would under the rules of the 
House and Senate furnish basis 
for a point of order during 
debate, once the language is 
enacted it becomes law and 
entitled to the same force 
and dignity as any other duly 
enacted measure." 120
It was his opinion that the language of the specific provisions of 
3 USC 107 was positively enacted into law by the codification of Title 3 
of the USC by an Act of 25th June 1948. In practice, every President
has had complete discretion to do as he chooses in regard to detailing.
There are five major respects in which this degree of discretion is 
confirmed. Firstly. the language of 3 USC 107 does not require any 
specific presidential or executive actions to institute or continue a 
detail, in other words it can all be arranged very easily. Secondly, 
although 3 USC 107 only constitutes authority for temporary details, 
there is no stated maximum limitation. Whether or not a detail is 
temporary' within the meaning of 3 USC 107 would depend upon the indi­
vidual circumstances of each detail. For the time being, however, the 
definition of 'temporary' is currently at the disposal of the 
President. 122 That is to say staff can be (and indeed have been)
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retained on a permanently 'temporary' basis ad infinitum. Thirdly, 
there is no requirement that the detail must be documented in writing, 
or indeed made public in any way. It can be arranged quite informally 
and, if necessary, kept secret from public view. Fourthly, the auth­
ority of 3 USC 107 is not limited to details of permanent employees. 
There are no real restrictions on whom may be considered; the President 
has a free hand. Fifthly, the provision of 3 USC 107 does not require 
reimbursement for any detail. This removes completely any sense of 
financial limitation, because the funding of details can be carried on 
other parts of the government budget and not be made to accrue to The 
White House Office or any other closely related staff budget.
The President is thus given carte blanche vis-a-vis detailing. The 
language of 3 USC 107 is vague enough to permit a considerable degree 
of evasion of its general intent, and provides no remedy in such circum­
stances. Lest anyone think this a minor matter it should be recalled
that in 1970 there were no less than 273 detailees to The White House 
12 3Office alone. Since then, it is true, the numbers have been greatly
reduced but the practice of detailing remains widespread.
Indeed, the great difficulty comes less in trying to pinpoint its his­
torical origin than in trying to estimate its contemporary prevalence. 
Concern that the officially published figures for the numbers of White 
House staff, as prepared for the US Budget, have not been accurate has 
only been expressed relatively recently. Both as a cause and a conse­
quence of this, no effort was made by any Administration, prior to 
President Nixon's, to estimate the full extent of detailing. The follow­
ing exchange, which occurred in 1970, well illustrates the point.
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Senator Yarborough, during Senate appropriations hearings, asked 
these questions: "What was the quantum of it (detailing) for the 
past five years? Has it doubled this past year or two? What has 
been the number and cost over a five-year period?" The Administration 
witness replied:
"I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, 
there has been a substantial 
increase in the last year, but 
there are no records available 
on agency details for those 
years prior to this administ­
ration ." 124 (author's emphasis)
Since then it has been the occasional practice to provide congressional
appropriations subcommittees with information on the detailing of staff
to the White House. For example, during hearings before the House for
FY 1975, the Administration produced a listing of detailees for the
subcommittee. Interest in the White House was at its height at
that time (May 1974) because of Watergate. By contrast, no list was
provided the following year. As if to emphasize the irregularity
of the Nixon and Ford Administrations' bookkeeping, a list of detailees
127was once more provided in hearings for FY 1977. In 1972 the Nixon
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t r i e d  t o  c l a i m  t h a t  i t  had  e l i m i n a t e d  th e  b o r r o w i n g  o f
128personnel from other departments, although it was eventually shown
that 22 were then currently on detail. 1 “29 No other Administration has
been so rash as to boast the elimination of detailing. In 1974 the
Director of OMB testified that "we have a continual inventory in effect
of details, particularly those that come into the White House.... and we
130continue to watch over them to determine their justification."
Whether o r  n o t  s u c h  a  " c o n t i n u a l  i n v e n t o r y "  i s  now r e a l l y  m a i n t a i n e d ,  
Con gress  h a s  y e t  t o  b e  s u p p l i e d  w i t h  i t  on a r e g u l a r  b a s i s .131
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The final point to consider here is the interpretation by recent 
Administrations of the authority of 3 USC 107 as put into practice.
This is one of the questions central to the current debate about the 
proper authorization of the White House staff. Right up until the 
Nixon Administration, and especially during the 1960s, detailing went 
completely unchecked. It was so prevalent that by 1968 only half the 
actual complement of White House Office staff were listed as such - 
the rest were on detail. By 1970, there were 273 detailees compared 
to only 208 staff officially on The White House Office payroll. 132 
This amounted to a serious abuse of the authority to detail.
The budget for FY 1971 introduced a new attempt at honesty. A determined 
effort was made to record all those staff actually working at the White 
House under one heading. Tom Steed, Chairman of the House appropri­
ations subcommittee with jurisdiction over the White House, claimed the 
credit for having spurred the Johnson Administration into preparing 
this new budgetary approach, although it was not completed by the time 
Johnson left office. 122 However, the Nixon Administration certainly 
deserves its share of the credit for having supported this proposed 
change and actually implementing it. From FY 1971 onwards the number 
of detailees did drop substantially, although, as we have just noted, 
records of detailees were supplied only haphazardly.
The new approach towards detailing was formally outlined by Roy Ash, 
the Director of 0MB in 1974 when he testified as follows:
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"Detailing services a purpose, 
but it should be consistent 
with the policies that we 
have applied within the White 
House, We have also expressed 
that policy to the departments 
and agencies, that it should be 
used sparingly and for a good 
reason rather than as a general 
rule,,,„and in doing so, we 
provide full motivation to a 
department giving up somebody 
in a detail, for a detailing 
job, to be very interested in 
getting that person back when 
he serves that purpose because 
he counts against that depart­
ment’s or agency's total man­
power." 134
Later that year, after the Ford Administration had taken over, the 
Chief of Staff at the White House, Assistant to the President Donald 
Rumsfeld, told a White House Press Corps briefing that "as I recall 
the rule now is that we should not have detailees here for more than 
six months. That is to say, if a person is really going to be working 
in the White House he should be put on the White House rolls, other­
wise he ought to be detailed back to the place from which he was 
X35detailed," But figures released by the White House earlier that
year (1974) showed that several of the staff detailed to the White 
House had been serving for at least ten months, and possibly even 
longer. 136
good example of the convoluted way detailing can operate was 
afforded by the case of Bradley Patterson. He served as a Staff 
Assistant to Len Garment, a Special Consultant (later Counsel, and then 
Assistant to the President) on the Nixon staff. For at least four 
years (1970-4) Patterson was technically on detail from the National 
Advisory Council for Economic Opportunity, 137 Yet for all intents and
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purposes he was a member of the White House staff. The extra twist, 
however, is that Patterson was technically detailed not to The White House 
Office but to the Domestic Council. This illustrates the political inter­
changeability of staff, a point which was confirmed by the Comptroller 
General in a letter to H.R. Haldeman, dated 13th December 1972, which 
stated that "A detailed individual is considered to be any individual per­
forming services for the White House.... and not directly paid from the 
White House", "Special Projects" or "Domestic Council" appropriations."1®®
Detailing is one of those grey areas as far as the White House staff are 
concerned. It seems likely that it will always remain so. It is arguable 
that its use has in practice overreached its proper statutory authority, 
despite signs in recent years that the presumption in favour of using 
detailees has been gradually converted into a presumption against using 
them. The Carter Administration has emphasized this trend. Nevertheless, 
the record clearly shows that the statutory authorization for detailing 
personnel to the White House staff has been so wide-ranging that reliance 
against abuses of that authority depends only on an Administration's 
honesty and vigilance and not on proper oversight of the law as it presently 
stands. The problem of proper statutory authority for detailing is simply 
that it is inadequate and does nothing to prevent its abuse.
CONSULTANTS
The major difference between a consultant on the White House staff and a 
regular staff member is that the consultant is envisaged as being only
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temporary, or a part-time staff member, and is therefore paid per diem 
for the work he or she does. The authorization language in the ^ .. ,1  
appropriation acts implicitly covers consultants in that part which reads:
"....(employment for consultants) 
at such per diem rates for indi­
viduals as the President may specify 
....without regard to the provisions 
of law regulating the employment and 
compensation of persons in the Govern­
ment service." 139
The discretion given to the President over their pay has effectively been 
absolute. Indeed it is also extended to the mode of appointment of con­
sultants. For example, the Executive Director of the Domestic Council
disclosed in April 1975 that consultants employed to work on the Domestic 
Council staff were in fact being paid from funds specifically set aside 
for the Vice President. "The reason", he explained, was because "our
budget is rather strained at this time and his was in somewhat better 
140shape." Among other things, this episode emphasizes the extent to
which staff support for the Vice President can where necessary be inter­
preted as another means of increasing the size of the overall White House 
staff, it also throws into greater relief the fact that staffing in the 
White House can be arranged quite without regard even for the meagre and 
inadequate statutory authority as does exist.
The only respect in which it may be said that the President does not have 
a completely free hand is that he is bound by an overall dollar limitation, 
°r ceiling. But even this potential restriction was greatly eased in 
recent years. The Nixon Administration's FY 1971 Budget asked for and 
received a change in the appropriation language governing the dollar 
limitation. 141 Until then it had stood at $250,000 p.a. on the use of 
consultant services and other personal services. This was raised by no
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less than $2m to $2,250,000, and the carte blanche language was retained
UNGRADED PERSONNEL
The White House Office staff can be divided into various categories for 
the purposes of more easily identifying the statutory authority applicable. 
Among these are that group whose positions are recorded in the US Budgets 
as being paid according to General Schedule rates of pay or Executive 
Level pay grades; those who are detailed; and those who are listed as 
ungraded" staff. As to the latter, whose names do not normally appear 
in any published listing, they depend upon the following definition in 
the US Code as authority for their position:
5 USC 2103
(a) For the purpose of this 
title, the 'excepted
service' consists of those 
civil service positions 
which are not in the compet­
itive service.
(b) As used in other Acts of 
Congress, 'unclassified
civil service' or 'unclassi­
fied service' means the 
'excepted service'. 142
Thus the 'excepted service' has come to mean all employees not in the 
competitive service, for whatever reason. Figures for the number of un­
graded personnel have not always been regularly available,14"* but they 
have included some prominent members of the staff. This is confirmed by 
the salaries some of them have received. For example, it was calculated
in 1974 that no less than one quarter of the ungraded positions on the
144staff were paid at rates in excess of $36,000 p.a.
*
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Funds for these ungraded positions are included in the annual appro­
priations of the Executive Office of the President but do not necessarily 
all appear under The White House Office heading. The importance of un­
graded personnel in this study is that these positions were used by recent 
Administrations to employ an increasing number of political staff in a 
manner which would otherwise have had to have been openly reported as 
further growth in the numbers of White House Office staff (as listed in 
the GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL) . In short, the use of ungraded per­
sonnel was a convenient disguise for staff expansion. This was confirmed 
by a report prepared for the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, 
from which the following extract is taken:
"Long ago Congress gave the 
President authority to employ 
personnel notwithstanding 
civil service regulations 
governing qualifications, 
pay, etc...These positions 
have been described or labelled 
as 'ungraded'....The current 
Administration (President Nixon's) 
has made a basic policy change in 
the use of this authority. Now, 
many high-level policy employees 
are being employed without regard 
to civil service regulations."145
A pertinent example of the kind of high-level policy employee thus labelled 
as "ungraded" was Kenneth W. Clawson. As we have already noted, he held 
the title of Executive Director of the Office of Communication. This was 
in effect a middle-ranking position in the Nixon White House staff organi­
zation.
p 1 4 7Exemption of the White House staff from both the Classification Act
and the General Schedule148 technically allows for the appointment of
an unlimited number of ungraded personnel; the only proviso being that
their rates of pay not exceed the maximum allowable. 149 Thus it was
Possible for President Nixon, in his FY 1975 Budget, to add thirty
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ungraded personnel to his staff without worrying that such an increase 
150could be refused. This statutory ability to so easily swell the
size of the staff well illustrates the extent of presidential discretion 
in action. Such discretion was also a salient feature of what was called 
"Special Projects".
SPECIAL PROJECTS
Although Special Projects, as a separate fund, was finally abolished in
1974 during Watergate it merits attention both as to its past history and
the statutory authority under which it operated. The fund for Special
Projects was added to the general store of White House resources by
President Eisenhower in 1956. (However, such a fund had been advocated
152by the Brownlow Committee ). He intended it to be used to bring assorted 
special staffs with special purposes into the White House, and for provid­
ing status-recognition for an interest group or programme. However, 
despite what may well have been a genuine intention to call upon Special 
Projects staff only for special purposes, it was not long before they came 
to be considered synonymous with The White House Office staff.
This was confirmed as early as 1960. On March 3rd of that year the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee on General Government Matters (which at that 
time had jurisdiction over the White House and Executive Office) held its 
annual hearings on the appropriation requests for FY 1961. During testi­
mony on Special Projects, congressman George W. Andrews, the Subcommittee 
Chairman, asked Elmer B. Staats, then Deputy Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget, whether "for all practical purposes the employees in this 
activity, known as special projects, are actually members of the President's
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White House staff?" "That is correct", came the reply. 154 When the 
Chairman pressed a related question, concerning a requested 46% increase 
over the previous year for supplies and materials, and asked: "What is 
the difference between supplies and materials under this request and 
supplies and materials for The White House Office?", Mr. Staats replied, 
"I do not know of any difference" . 155 Then again, when discussion moved 
to the location of these Special Projects employees, it was admitted that 
"some of them are in the White House itself, " 156 while the rest worked in 
the Executive Office Building across the street.
Considering this synonymity of purpose and practice it was not surprising 
that the Chairman should have wondered why all these separate funds were 
simply not amalgamated. In a candid reply, the Deputy Director explained 
that the device of a separate fund had resulted from the need "for more 
funds to expand his (the President's) own staff and in that sense it is 
really an extension of the White House staff. " 1 5 7 The Subcommittee 
appeared to be satisfied with this knowledge. Certainly no action was 
ever taken by Congress to merge the two together. Special Projects 
thus stayed as it was, while its own appropriation language conferred a 
greater freedom"15^ than that of The White House Office proper.
Special Projects operated only with the legislative authorization provided 
in successive annual appropriation acts of Congress. The wording re­
mained standard:
"The fund is used by the President 
for staff assistance on special 
problems which arise from time to 
time but cannot be considered 
the responsibility of an existing 
agency....
71
"....For expenses necessary to provide 
staff assistance for the President in 
connexion with special projects, to 
be expended in his discretion and 
without regard to such provisions of 
law regarding expenditure of Govern­
ment funds or the compensation and 
employment of persons in the Govern­
ment service as he may specify....
Provided, That not to exceed 20 per 
centum of this appropriation may be 
used to re-imburse the appropriation 
for 'Salaries and Expenses, The White 
House Office' for administrative 
services." 160
Two points stand out: firstly, the ceiling of 20% on reimbursing The 
White House Office. This was justified on the grounds that since 1956 
the Special Projects appropriation was only meant "to augment the White 
House Office staff complement in new areas of activity" . 161 This pro­
vision was therefore designed more to perpetuate the illusion that Special 
Projects was a separate entity than to reflect the reality of its use.
The second notable feature of this language was the absence of any dollar 
limitation on the per diem rates of pay, or other pay arrangements, for 
the staff employed. The Nixon Administration, using an argument that was 
shared by its predecessors, went on record that this language provided an 
essential degree of flexibility in hiring staff personnel. 163
The Nixon Administration certainly made use of this flexibility. Firstly, 
as congressman Roybal (D-Calif.) determined, "one of these White House 
special project funds actually paid the air fare and salary for a man to 
6o to Los Angeles to commit a burglary. " 163 This was the Ellsberg break- 
in. Secondly, several important middle-level members of the Nixon White 
House staff were in fact employed, or funded, from the Special Projects 
account. These included (as we have already noted) Kenneth R. Cole Jr., a 
Special Assistant later to become Assistant for Domestic Affairs and
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Executive Director of the Domestic Council; Charles DiBona, a Special 
Consultant; and Virginia H. Knauer, a Special Assistant for Consumer 
Affairs. The names of those funded from Special Projects were not 
made publicly available until Congress finally made inquiries as a 
result of the Watergate affair. 164
It is also pertinent to record that by funding these staff members the 
Nixon Administration directly contravened the pledge it had given Congress 
only a few years previously. In presenting the official requests for 
Special Projects in FY 1971, James R. Schlesinger, the then Director of 
OMB, had specifically stated to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Treasury, Post Office, and Executive Office that:
"We intend to utilize the 
special projects fund for 
the purpose originally 
intended: that is, to deal
with unanticipated needs 
that may arise, which are 
not covered by the emerg­
ency fund. The special 
projects appropriation 
will not be used to comp­
ensate regular White House 
personnel."165 
(author's emphasis)
On the contrary, it continued to be used precisely for that purpose.
The annual dollar amount appropriated under Special Projects during its 
two decades of existence was $1.5m. The exception was 1970 when it was
raised by a further million to accommodate the presidential transition, and 
no less than 95 staff were funded from this account during FY 1970. When 
the fund was abolished in 1974 this not inconsiderable sum was not actually 
lost to the President and his staff. Instead it was completely merged with 
The White House Office item in the US Budget. When challenged by a House
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appropriations subcommittee that this action nullified the difference
between a fund that Congress now considered to have been improperly
used (Special Projects) and The White House Office fund, Roy Ash, the
Director of OMB replied: "This combines them all into one. There is
no distinction. In effect it is a fungible commodity. Because it is
fungible there is no way to distinguish which ones might have been in 
167Special Projects." In other words the statutory authority for Special
Projects was merged with that for The White House Office. After nearly 
twenty years of artificial separation they were appropriately reunited.
UNANTICIPATED NEEDS
Like other items of staff support for the President the fund for Unantici­
pated Needs, the renamed Emergency Fund, historically relied for proper 
authority only on the legislative language included in annual appropri­
ation acts. However, when the title of this fund was changed in the 
1970s the basis of its authority was affected to a certain extent. The 
appropriation language that is currently applicable reads as follows:
"For expenses necessary to enable 
the President to meet unantici­
pated needs, in furtherance of 
the national interest, security, 
or defense which may arise at 
home or abroad during the current 
fiscal year, and to pay administra­
tive expenses (including personnel, 
in his discretion and without 
regard to any provision of law 
regulating employment and pay of 
persons in the government service 
or regulating expenditures of 
government funds).... "168
The origin of this fund can be traced back to 1940 when Congress recog­
nised the need for the President to have limited funding available to meet
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unplanned and therefore unbudgeted exigencies. 169 It was then called 
170the Emergency Fund. The history of many of the activities funded
from this appropriation shows this intention to have been generally 
carried out. Either the staff activities funded were themselves of short­
term duration, such as the funds needed for the presidential transition of 
1974, or the fund was used to get something going on an emergency basis 
with the intention of going to Congress and asking for a permanent authori­
zation and allocation of funds. Examples of the latter included the 
establishment, during 1973-74, of the Energy Policy Office and the Federal 
Energy Office within the EOP . 1 7 1
From 1940 until 1974 a regular annual appropriation of $lm was made under 
the heading of "Emergency Fund for the President". In 1974 under the 
general influence of Watergate Congress halved this appropriation and 
effected a basic change in the appropriation language under the new head­
ing of "Unanticipated Personnel Needs".17“* The following year, in prepar­
ing the US Budget for FY 1976, the language was slightly changed yet again 
(this time by the Administration) to its present form as given above. 176 
The word "Personnel" was removed from the title, according to testimony 
before a House appropriations subcommittee, because it sounded as if it 
implied a limitation on collateral expenses.17^
The irony of this fund's recent history lies therefore in the fact that 
the 1974 appropriation language conferred a wider measure of discretion 
on the President than did the old pre-1974 language which related to the 
Emergency Fund. Yet this change came about (during the height of the 
Watergate affair) at the very time that Congress was supposedly anxious 
to check presidential authority. This can best be appreciated from a read­
ing of the Emergency Fund language as it existed during most of the period 
covered by this study:
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"For expenses necessary to enable 
the President, through such offices 
or agencies of the Government as he 
may designate, and without regard 
to such provisions of law regarding 
the expenditure of Government funds 
or the compensation of persons in 
the Government service as he may 
specify, to provide in his discretion 
for emergencies affecting the national 
interest, security, or defense which 
may arise at home or abroad during the 
current fiscal year, $1 ,000,000:
Provided, That no part of this approp­
riation shall be available for allocat­
ion to finance a function or project for 
which function or project a budget est­
imate of appropriation was transmitted 
pursuant to law during the (previous) 
Congress or the first session of the 
(current) Congress and such appropriat­
ion denied after consideration thereof 
by the Senate or House of Represent­
atives or by the Committee on Appro­
priations of either body."175
This pre-1974 authority was thus stricter in two respects. First, the 
entire second half of the above was dropped in 1974. Second, the wording 
for Unanticipated Needs omitted the reference to "agencies of the 
Government". It was to the White House staff, rather than to any official 
government agency, that the President was thenceforth expected to turn when 
utilising this fund.
THE DOMESTIC COUNCIL
Unlike the National Security Council, the Domestic Council was established 
by presidential fiat and not by congressional statute. President Nixon, 
in March 1970, acted on the recommendations of the Ash Council on Execu­
tive Organization and proposed his Reorganization Plan No. 2 which included
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the creation of a Domestic Council. His presidential message to Congress
announced that the Council would be supported by a staff under an Executive
Director who would also be a member of the President's White House staff.
"Like the National Security Council staff", the Nixon statement ran, "this
staff will work in close coordination with the President's personal staff
176but will have its own institutional identity."
The Domestic Council came into existence by Executive Order 11541 on 
177July 1st 1970. This was too late to enable it to qualify for regular
appropriations in FY 1971. Nevertheless, to illustrate the way in which 
strict legality is rarely observed in such matters, the Domestic Council 
staff was initially provided with White House staff using White House 
Office funds even though there was no legal statutory authority to do so. 
Later in the year, in the Supplemental Appropriations Act FY 1971, the 
Council received its first direct appropriation of funds, and authorization 
for its staff was written into the appropriation language. In FY 1972 the 
Domestic Council was considered alongside other standard White House items 
in the appropriations process for the Executive Office. The wording of 
the appropriation language which served as its legislative authority was 
as follows:
"For necessary expenses of the 
Domestic Council, including 
services as authorized by title 
5, United States Code, section 
3109, but at rates for individ­
uals not to exceed the per diem 
equivalent of the rate for grade 
GS-18; and other personal services 
without regard to the provisions of 
law regulating the employment and 
compensation of persons in the 
Government service;" 17®
This language remained in force until the Domestic Council's abolition in
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the Carter Presidency. The reference to 5 USC 3109 related to the 
employment of experts and consultants, while that to GS-18 related to the 
highest pay levels in the government service below the Executive Level 
grades.
EXPENSES OF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT
In 1954 Congress approved the establishment of a fund entitled Expenses
of Management Improvement in the supplemental appropriations act of that
year. It remained in existence as a separate item for twenty years until 
1791974. However, by the time Congress considered the FY 1976 Budget
this fund had disappeared as a separate entity. Despite its non-political 
title the reason for its inclusion here is that this fund was on many 
occasions used to finance the White House staff, or to finance activities 
of direct relevance to their work. In this way it formed yet another part 
of the iceberg beneath the surface. During this 20-year span the fund at 
no time enjoyed permanent statutory authority, but rather relied on the 
legislative authority of its appropriation language, which was as follows:
"For expenses necessary to assist 
the President in improving the 
management of executive agencies 
and in obtaining greater economy 
and efficiency through the estab­
lishment of more efficient business 
methods in Government operations, 
including services as authorized by 
title 5, United States Code, section 
3109, by allocation to any agency or 
office in the executive branch for
the conduct..... or examinations
and appraisals of, and the develop­
ment and installation of improvements 
in, the organization and operations 
of such agency or of other agencies
in the executive branch...."180
(author's emphasis)
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It is worth noting that unobligated funds at the end of each fiscal 
year were carried over to the next year and did not lapse to the 
Treasury (as was the case with other funds for the staff). To a certain 
extent this sidestepped the normal concern, which tends to be a bureau­
cratic fact of life, that all the allocated funds in any one year should
. * 181 be spent.
The nature of this fund obviously prevented any Administration from being 
able to say in advance for what purposes the fund would be used in any 
given year. It was regularly asserted, however, that before any project 
request for funds was approved "we assure ourselves that we don't have 
any other way of financing it". From 1954 until 1971 the administration 
of this fund was directly under the control of the President, who operated 
it with the help of his staff. But on 22nd July 1971, by means of Executive 
Order 11609, President Nixon took the step of formally transferring res­
ponsibility for administering the fund to the Office of Management and 
Budget. (This order did not preclude the ability of the President to
regain his authority to allocate the funds any time he chose to.184) This 
action effectively changed the nature of the fund, and Congress eventually 
tumbled to the fact. Three years later, during hearings before the House 
appropriations subcommittee that covered the EOP budget requests, it dawned 
on the ranking Republican "that we have here, Mr. Chairman, a sort of 
emergency fund" for OMB . " 188 He argued that this fund could therefore be 
dropped as a separate item and added to 0MB's regular appropriation. This 
suggestion was argued against very strongly by the Administration, but 
the congressman's argument won the day. There was no sign of this fund in 
the FY 1976 Budget. 187
During its 20-year existence this fund was used to finance many management 
studies. Altogether there were 109 allocations from the fund, according
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to the last available statistics provided in 1974 to both houses of 
188
Congress. Many were of direct relevance to the operation of the
White House and the White House staff. Among these were numerous allo­
cations provided for the "Presidential Advisers on Basic Organization 
and Administrative Improvement", which first received funds in January 
1961 at the very end of the Eisenhower Administration. 189 Subsequent 
Presidents authorized further allocations ranging from $15,000 to $100,000, 
in each of the years 1962-4, 1966-7, and 1969.190 The original study 
had recommended the use of experts and consultants to improve the advice 
available to the President. The subsequent studies acted upon that rec­
ommendation. For example, allocations from this fund were used by 
President Kennedy to finance several important presidential Special 
Consultants such as Robert Lovett and Richard Neustadt. 191
Other uses of this fund included a study of the handling of foreign
affairs operational information in 1964, which was designed to mod-
ernize the flow and analysis of information coming to the White House
National Security staff from other agencies. On the domestic side came
193a study entitled the "Management Information System" for the E0P, 
which received allocations from this fund under Presidents Johnson and 
Nixon totalling more than half-a-million dollars, and was designed to 
benefit The White House Office.
In July 1970, directly after the establishment of the Domestic Council, 
President Nixon authorized the "President's Advisory Council on Management 
Improvement" . 194 This was allocated considerable sums of money "to pro­
vide for an interchange of ideas with responsible operating officials 
throughout the executive branch, and prepare and submit reports to the 
President containing recommendations for improving specific Government 
operations." 95 $150,000 in July 1970 was followed by $130,000 in
Â
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October of the same year, $74,000 in May 1971, $170,000 in August,
$30,000 in December, $25,000 and $30,000 in June and July 1972, to be 
followed by a massive $325,000 in August 1972196 - the last such
allocation. The work done by this Advisory Council directly prepared 
the way for Nixon's reorganization plans; especially the far-reaching one 
of January 1973 which involved a major increase in the power of the
_  1 Q 7President's domestic affairs staff.
Finally, this fund was used by President Nixon to be of direct benefit 
to his most trusted White House staff. After the first reshuffle of 
his staff in the autumn of 1969 he commissioned a "Study of Administrative 
support operations of the White House Office" with funds from Expenses of 
Management Improvement. H.R. Hal deman, Nixon's Chief of Staff, had 
already assumed a position of administrative superiority by this time and 
Nixon's study was designed directly to further Haldeman’s control over day- 
to-day White House operations. The avowed aim was to conduct affairs "in 
the most businesslike manner possible" : ^ 99 namely, "to review the existing 
administrative support organization, administrative procedures, communi­
cations control mechanisms, project and assignment control and identifi­
cation mechanisms, use of office equipment, and the use of support
personnel of The White House Office to make sure that the most responsive,
199economical, and effective administrative support is provided." Haldeman 
would not have been able to organize the Nixon White House as he did with­
out help from, and the ability to commission, studies on organization from 
a fund of this kind.
Expenses of Management Improvement was finally abolished in 1974, on the 
initiative of the House of Representatives, whose Appropriations Sub­
committee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government decreed in
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a report on June 20th 1974 that "the appropriation request of $500,000 
be denied in its entirety. " 200
EXECUTIVE RESIDENCE
The authority under which funds have been appropriated for the White House, 
as a building, should briefly be dealt with here. Its relevance in this 
context lies in its bearing on office space for the White House staff.
Funds under this heading, which was formerly known as the Executive Mansion 
until Watergate prompted a downgrading of its title, were traditionally 
appropriated with the force only of the annual legislative language written 
into each E0P appropriation act. This language, to take a recent example 
from FY 1975, read as follows:
"For the care, maintenance, repair 
and alteration, refurnishing, 
improvement, heating and lighting, 
including electric power and 
fixtures, of the Executive Residence, 
and official entertainment expenses 
of the President." 201
Although there is no mention the White House staff per se it is clear 
rom other sources that this fund has provided for the maintenance of the 
White House offices (with a small ’o'). Like painting the Firth of 
Forth bridge, this has often involved constant activity. For example,
John Dean records that when he initially joined the White House staff he 
Was struck by the extent of the alteration work that appeared to go on.
The White House", he wrote, "far more than any other government office,
Was in a state of perpetual internal flux. Offices were constantly ex­
changed and altered. " 202 Indeed, in the Nixon White House, such matters
were taken very seriously. Dean again: "Success and failure could be
seen in the size, decor and location of offices....Every day, workmen
crawled over the White House complex like ants. Movers busied themselves
with the continuous shuffling of furniture from one office to another as
203people moved in, up, down or out." Dean, like all other staff mem­
bers, learned to read office changes as an index of their internal power 
struggles.
In view of the cost of this activity the question of whether such auth­
ority was sufficient is no moot point. Dean recorded that "the expense 
was irrelevant to Haldeman" 04 and that they discussed, and discarded, 
the idea of revealing the expense incurred. Moreover, one clue that 
Haldeman did not believe this expenditure to be legally justified was 
reflected in the fact that he sought to have the appropriation language 
reworded to provide the President with even broader and more sweeping 
authority. The preferred language would have provided authority to 
procure goods and administrative services in connection with the perfor­
mance of his official duties."20'* This proposed change was not effected 
during Haldeman's reign.206
In conclusion we have seen from this examination that most of the White 
House staff have claimed as authority for their existence and funding the 
legislative language included in annual appropriations acts. But was 
this sufficient authority? In practice, the answer has been 'yes’ for 
fflany years. Funds were appropriated without difficulty. The staff grew 
and developed in its different forms. In theory, however, it is now apparent 
that this supposed authority has been far from sufficient. The majority of 
the White House staff have for years existed in a kind of statutory vacuum.
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were taken very seriously. Dean again: "Success and failure could be
seen in the size, decor and location of offices....Every day, workmen
crawled over the White House complex like ants. Movers busied themselves
with the continuous shuffling of furniture from one office to another as
203people moved in, up, down or out." Dean, like all other staff mem­
bers, learned to read office changes as an index of their internal power 
struggles.
In view of the cost of this activity the question of whether such auth­
ority was sufficient is no moot point. Dean recorded that "the expense 
was irrelevant to Haldeman" 0 and that they discussed, and discarded, 
the idea of revealing the expense incurred. Moreover, one clue that 
Haldeman did not believe this expenditure to be legally justified was 
reflected in the fact that he sought to have the appropriation language 
reworded to provide the President with even broader and more sweeping 
authority. The preferred language would have provided authority to 
procure goods and administrative services in connection with the perfor­
mance of his official duties."205 This proposed change was not effected 
during Haldeman's reign.206
In conclusion we have seen from this examination that most of the White 
House staff have claimed as authority for their existence and funding the 
legislative language included in annual appropriations acts. But was 
this sufficient authority? In practice, the answer has been 'yes' for 
many years. Funds were appropriated without difficulty. The staff grew 
and developed in its different forms. In theory, however, it is now apparent 
that this supposed authority has been far from sufficient. The majority of 
the White House staff have for years existed in a kind of statutory vacuum.
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Moreover, this went quite unchallenged. As we explore the reasons 
for this extremely significant but simple fact we will come to under­
stand that the problem of proper authority has been invested with a 
new dimension.
Why has there not been sufficient authority? The short answer is that 
appropriations by the House of Representatives for the White House staff 
were for years handled on an improper basis which broke House rules. In 
1973 it was discovered that legislative authority had been included in
the annual appropriation acts authorizing the employment of White House 
staff. Such language, or the lack of proper authorization, broke House 
Rule XXI, clause 2, which provided in part that no appropriation shall 
be reported in any general appropriation bill for any expenditure not 
previously authorized by law. 207 Most of the White House staff, as we 
have already seen, were not previously authorized by law. Those that 
were only amounted to less than 20 in The White House Office, an uncertain 
number of detailees (whose authority under 3 USC 107 was open to challenge), 
and members of the National Security Council staff. In pursuance of this 
rule points of order were therefore raised against those specific items in 
the bill providing appropriations for the White House staff. Those items 
included The White House Office, the Domestic Council, and Special 
Projects. These points of order were sustained and funds for the
staff struck from the bill. Points of order were raised again the 
following year and again in the years 1975-7.209 In each case funds for 
the staff were denied by the House.
Prom 1973, therefore, the problem of proper authority suddenly became 
a Practical problem. Suffice it to say here that, in the short term, 
was resolved by technical means quite unsatisfactory as a long-term
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solution. (An analysis of successive attempts at the latter forms 
the substance of a later chapter.) But it behoves us here to briefly 
consider the substance of the proposed reform of the statutory authority 
of the White House staff.
PROPOSED NEW AUTHORITY FOR THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF
Congress has had before it draft legislation, which it has considered in 
every year from 1974-8, to completely rewrite and update proper authority 
for the White House staff. Such legislation has been designed to super­
cede all forms of authority for the staff that we have examined here 
(save that for the NSC staff) . In so doing it would produce a by-product 
of some interest: a more precise definition of the White House staff than
has hitherto officially existed.
The most recent version of White House authorization legislation (as of 
this writing) was embodied in H.R. 11003, which passed the House of 
Representatives on 13th April 1978 by a vote of 265-134.210 The bill 
was divided into several major sections. These will be briefly examined 
in turn.
The first major section of the proposed new authority was included under 
the heading "Assistance and Services for the President", whose provisions 
were mirrored in the second major section headed "Assistance and Services 
f°r the Vice President". In both cases the employment of personnel was 
suitably authorized, free from any other legal constraints (such as 
obtain in the Civil Service211). The pattern of both sections was 
similar. Firstly, the legislation provided for a series of limits on
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the staff able to be employed at certain salary levels. For example, 
the President was restricted (in descending order of salary grade) to 
25 staff at Level II, 25 at Level III, 50 at level GS-18, and "such 
number of other employees as he may determine to be appropriate" 212 at 
lower levels; (thus preserving an important measure of presidential 
discretion). Secondly, the President was authorized to procure the 
"temporary or intermittent services of experts and consultants" , 213 on 
the condition that their per diem salary rates did not exceed those 
comparable for Level II. Ostensibly to be employed only for periods up 
to one year, the President was nevertheless allowed to extend this period 
at his discretion. Thirdly, the President was authorized to incur ex­
penditure for the official expenses of The White House Office; enter­
tainment expenses; and the costs of White House staff while travelling 
with the President. However, all such expenditure was made subject to 
the right of the Comptroller General to provide an external check if and 
when it was thought necessary.
The third part of the legislation related to the Domestic Policy Staff 
511(1 tfle 0ffice of Administration, both newly created by President Carter; 
the former having superceded The Domestic Council upon its formal aboli- 
tion. Here too the pattern was similar. Firstly, various limitations 
were placed on the staff to be employed at certain salary grades. For 
example, the Domestic Policy Staff was authorized no more than 6 staff at 
Level III, 18 at level GS-18, and an unlimited number at GS-16 or below. 
Secondly, both staff bodies were authorized to procure their own experts 
5il* consultants. Thirdly, official expenses were sanctioned, where
appropriate.
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The fourth part dealt with the old Emergency Fund, since 1975 renamed 
(in full) "Assistance to the President for Unanticipated Needs", The 
authorization took the form of a dollar ceiling (currently $lm) on ex­
penditure "for the furtherance of the national interest, security, or 
defense, including personnel needs" . 215 An added feature of the legis­
lation (contrasting with habitual usage since 1940) was the obligation 
placed on the President to submit a yearly report to Congress setting 
out the expenditure from this fund and the purpose(s) for which it was 
spent.
The fifth part authorized detailing but on condition that all detailees 
remaining with the White House staff in excess of 180 days should have their 
departments or agency of origin reimbursed by that part of the White House 
staff to which they had been detailed. The sixth part of the legislation 
introduced a brand new feature of the proposed new authority (which had been 
subject to additional amendment on the House floor216). The President was 
to submit an annual "Personnel Report" to both houses of Congress (and made 
public) containing essential information on the White House staff. This was 
to include the names, salaries, job titles and job descriptions of all staff 
together with those on detail and those employed as temporary experts or 
consultants.* Finally, the legislation incorporated a "General Pay 
Limitation" to prohibit the employment of staff at salary levels in excess 
°f GS-16 which is the middle- to junior-level staff salary grade.
Le significance of this proposed new authority for the White House staff is 
threefold. Firstly, it would contribute towards an accepted and improved 
efinition of the staff which would enhance the general level of present 
nderstanding. At the bare minimum it would clearly embrace more than merel;
See Appendix 1 . 1 for the first such report submitted, although the range 
°f information eventually provided was strictly limited.
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The White House Office. Secondly, it would a priori provide a proper 
statutory basis for a staff for whose present position there is patently 
a non-existent or insufficient basis today. Thirdly, the publicly 
available Personnel Report to Congress effectively offers the prospect 
of a comprehensive record of the staff for the first time in decades. 
Until the Bill becomes an Act its full impact in these areas cannot 
finally be judged.
POSTSCRIPT
At the time this chapter was written the final outcome of the passage of 
White House staff authorization legislation was unknown. It finally 
reached the statute book in November 1978. (Chapter VII is specifi­
cally addressed to its progress over a number of years.) This Postscript 
briefly re-considers the tentative conclusion reached above as to the 
legislation's possible significance in the context of this chapter's dis­
cussion.
White House staff authorization legislation did indeed make a contribution 
towards an accepted definition of the White House staff; but it fell 
short of comprehensively identifying all those staff whom we have argued 
in this chapter should be included. White House "personnel" were defined 
only as those employed under five "Reporting Offices" which included: The 
hite House Office; the Office of the Vice President; the Domestic 
olicy Staff; and the Office of Administration. Apart from the fact 
that recent Presidents have tended to reorganize staff units (e.g. Reagan's 
a olition of the Domestic Policy Staff and its replacement by a new Office 
0 Policy Development) this still left out of account White House staff 
employed under the NSC or Unanticipated Needs budgetary headings (among 
others).
The new legislation did at least provide for the first time a proper statu- 
ory basis for the employment of White House staff; replacing and up- 
ating most of the inadequate authorization on which this chapter had 
at its time of writing) been largely based. This was the minimum 
improvement required by Congress.
Finally, the legislation proved to be a severely limited step forward in 
erms of the information made publicly available about the staff. (See:
— VII.) The President's obligation to furnish Congress with an 
annual "Aggregate Report on Personnel" does not extend to revealing 
a ther the names, salaries, job titles or job descriptions of his staff, 
acsimile of the first historic report is given as Appendix 1.1.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has covered a good deal of the preliminary ground on our sub­
ject and uncovered some of its major problem areas. Firstly, we have 
argued for a political definition of the White House staff, albeit incor­
porating as firm a foundation as possible of all available factual infor­
mation, This ensures the realistic and academic approach best suited 
for this field of study. Any other approach would be too narrow. Secondly, 
we have reviewed the primary source material and examined in detail those 
elements of it that provide us with most of our hard-core factual infor­
mation. The ensuring critique has clearly demonstrated the nature and 
extent of the limitations imposed by these sources upon the researcher in 
this field. Thirdly, we have considered the basis upon which the White 
House staff are established today. In accordance with our broadly-based 
political definition this has involved an examination of the many different 
aspects of the staff's existence that lie outside The White House Office 
alone. What conclusions can we reach at this stage?
— -rst. the White House staff are much more extensive than is commonly 
supposed or officially indicated. They certainly comprise far more 
than merely those employed in The White House Office. There is a myriad 
of different staff entities and of funds available for the staff. In 
addition, a supplementary supply of staff from elsewhere in government, 
detailed to the White House, is readily available.
— C0Pd the true size and cost of the White House staff are still unknown. 
This is either because of deliberate official secrecy or inadvertent 
official ignorance. We do not yet know who they all are. A complete list 
of all White House staff has never been made regularly available. For 
years many such pertinent records were simply not kept. Official sources 
ly release certain, and in themselves incomplete, information on the staff.
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Third the White House staff progressively ceased to have any proper statu­
tory basis in law. That this should have amounted to illegality was less 
of practical importance than it was politically significant. Nevertheless, 
such was the accumulative illegality by 1978 that the transition staff 
which served President-Elect Carter between November 1976 and January 1977 
actually had far more legal basis for its existence (under the terms of 
the Presidential Transition Act 1963 217) than both the outgoing Ford staff 
that they replaced and the incoming Carter staff that they became.
Fourth Presidents have historically enjoyed virtually absolute discretion 
in all matters relating to the White House staff: their terms of employ­
ment, hiring and firing, salary, job title, and function. Until 1978 the 
only restrictions that operated upon a President were the upper limit on 
the top salary grade for his most senior staff, and the overall dollar 
limitation affixed to the various staff budgets. But even these budget 
constraints could be, and have been, effectively circumvented by using 
detailees. Since 1978 the President's carte blanche has only lightly 
been circumscribed.
The subject of the White House staff is thus a complex one; more so than 
might have at first been thought. This chapter has sought to tackle 
several of the immediate problems encountered by the student in this field. 
Together these comprise a single question of definition that in some degree 
still defies final resolution. But we have emerged with an enhanced 
understanding of the question that will prove of lasting value throughout 
bis study. The most remarkable aspect of other literature on the White 
bouse staff has been its lack of such an understanding. Indeed the 
ttempt has all too often simply not been made. The question of definition, 
its forms, has therefore been almost totally ignored. This omission 
ill become apparent as we turn to our analysis of the literature.
CHAPTKK II
ANALYSIS OF THE LITEEATDHE
90 -
INTRODUCTION
The White House staff may have progressively escaped from the restrictions 
that the term "a passion for anonymity" was designed to impose upon them, 
but the same cannot be said of their place in the extensive literature on 
American politics. By any standards that place is quite inadequate. For 
too long the growth and development of the White House staff escaped 
serious and sustained attention. For a far longer period its development 
and operation escaped serious and sustained criticism. It has now become 
widely accepted that the White House staff can occupy a powerful position 
in any Presidency, but this has not been reflected in political writing to 
a degree commensurate with this new-found understanding. To date there 
have been few contributions specifically aimed at improving the debate on 
the purpose and effect of the White House staff.
Whether or not this state of affairs owes more to their anomalous position 
in law or their unique political relationship to the rest of the structure 
°f government is an open question. Certainly it owes not a little to the 
difficulties of obtaining what solid information about them exists, and in 
constructing some measure by which one President's staff can be compared 
with another. This, in turn, is partly derived from their real but 
nevertheless, to outsiders, intangible situation inside the White House.
But the real reasons go deeper still. The academic community, in parti­
cular, bears a heavy responsibility for not, until recently, treating the 
White House staff as seriously as they deserved to be. This negligence 
SS the Pr*-Ce paid for a generation of political scientists who pinned 
their collective faith in, and built their collective political analysis 
uPon, a "strong" Presidency. The Press and media, by and large, reflected 
this majority view, which, moreover, was well suited to their own natural
Preference.
0!
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Various excuses have been offered for this neglect, including the passage 
of sufficient time for adequate comparison and the accumulation of basic 
evidence. It is perfectly valid to argue that only with the passage of a 
sufficient period of time, and number of presidencies, could observers 
reasonably attempt the analysis of the growth in importance of the staff 
and of the differing methods of organization employed by different 
Presidents. But this argument begins to lose its force with the onset of 
the 1960s and the contrast between the incoming Kennedy Administration 
with its predecessor. To the discerning eye it is weakened still further 
during the Johnson years by the tendency to conduct government from the 
White House. And finally, quite irrespective of Watergate, it is 
demolished by the experience of the first term of the Nixon Administration 
when centralised White House power reached unprecedented administrative 
heights. The deteriorating applicability of this line of argument should, 
in and of itself, have prompted full-scale studies of the White House 
staff. But it didn't. Rather it seems more likely that Watergate alone 
finally brought the White House staff to the forefront of the agenda of 
political discussion and writing on the Presidency.
This chapter deals with the wide range of literature from which can be 
garnered information of some kind on the White House staff. What follows 
is designed, firstly, to bring this unwieldy array of political literature 
into some workable order; secondly, to identify for our purposes the 
principal categories of writing which bear on the staff; and thirdly, to 
analyse the kind of information that each of these categories tends to 
produce and the value we can place upon it in the present study. The 
first of these tasks is best explained in conjunction with the second; 
and to some degree the second is implicit in the third.
In ®ost research enterprises there is a primary division to be made
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between raw material on the one hand and secondary source material on the 
other. Broadly speaking, such a division can here be maintained but with 
the proviso that a number of subtle distinctions can also be brought into 
play. The first such distinction concerns what may be termed the pro­
gression of immediacy. This can perhaps best be described by reference 
to the diagrammatic device of a series of concentric rings around a cen­
tral point. At the centre stands the President and his White House staff. 
The first ring around them consists of those others most immediately in 
contact with them: Cabinet officers and other government officials of 
various kinds. The next ring outward would contain the Press and the 
media. They are in frequent contact with the President and especially 
his staff but usually at a greater distance than some government officials. 
This progression away from the scene of the action next takes in those 
observers and writers on the Presidency from the academic community, 
whether students of political science, of public administration or, 
further away still, historians and biographers who write with both the 
advantages and disadvantages of dealing with their subject at a certain 
distance. Together they all form the last such concentric ring.
But this analysis would not be complete were it to ignore certain other 
kinds of writing. Although, taken as a whole, they do not fall cleanly 
into our pattern of concentric rings, in their own way these other 
writings represent another step in our progression away from the immediacy 
of the White House. These writings include political writing about the 
man before he became President; personal writing of one kind or another; 
sociological and psychological literature of interest; literature on the 
Medieval age (of great relevance as well as of great interest) ; and 
finally even includes works of political fiction which shed their own 
hnd of light on what goes on in the West Wing.
Breaking the literature down in this way does not exhaust the subtleties 
with which we must deal. For example, as we shall see, it is sometimes 
necessary to distinguish between the literature relating to senior and 
middle-ranking levels of the White House staff itself. As would be ex­
pected, this necessity increases in rough proportion to the growth of the 
staff in terms of its sheer physical size. Other distinctions can be made 
elsewhere, in other rings, as for example that between the White House 
Press Corps and other sections of the Press. Prestige aside, the former 
is in more frequent contact with the White House staff than the latter, 
and indeed may be considered to produce some of the best secondary source 
material available.
This leads us to consider the kinds of information that each of the groups 
that occupy our concentric rings tends to produce. As a general rule of 
thumb, even if it borders on a truism to say so, each group suffers to 
some extent from the disadvantages inherent in the advantages it has to 
begin with. Take, for example, the position of the political science 
community (irrespective of its predisposition to support, and reluctance 
to criticize, the growth of the 'strong' Presidency). The ability of the 
political scientist to take a more objective view of the organization of 
a President's White House staff and to gather differing interpretations 
together into a cohesive whole is more than matched by the inability to 
neasure at first hand, or even to recognise, all the factors at work 
influencing the operation and behaviour of that staff. Then again, 
although the Press are a good and useful source of information on the 
day-to-day activities and attitudes of the staff, the Press still lacks 
the time (and/or inclination) to sift through and analyse this constant 
stream of information bombarding them, and to weigh what they receive in 
the wider context. This the historian is most easily able to do. This 
tine of argument will be discussed in more detail in the pages that follow.
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Before we begin our analysis one question presents itself. What counts as 
raw material or primary evidence for the purposes of this study? Insofar as 
it is about the President's White House staff the answer therefore jointly 
consists of what the Presidents and the staff themselves have to say. Any­
thing originating elsewhere must be considered, in some degree, as a contri­
bution to the general store of secondary source material. The progression 
of immediacy relates both to the intrinsic value that can be placed upon 
whatever writing is being considered and to its use in analysing the organi­
zation of a particular staff. The value that can be ascribed to each such 
contribution is not precisely proportionate to its proximity to the scene of 
the action. Proximity is a guide to its value; not an ironclad rule.
There is another subtlety that comes into play: the distinction between what 
is on and off the record. What Presidents and staff have had to say has 
often varied considerably when speaking off the record as against speaking 
on the record. Unsurprisingly, the former has usually been far more revealing 
than the latter because people naturally feel they have a greater freedom in 
saying what they think when not so strictly held accountable for what they 
say. But this presents a unique difficulty in the case of Presidents. 
Everything a President thinks, says, (tapes), or does can have a political 
impact. Presidents thus have a greater proportion of their views on the 
record than anyone else. Moreover this persists after a President has left 
office when, for reasons of self-justification, he is still likely to pre­
serve previous on-the-record opinions. To some extent, therefore, any study 
°f the President's White House staff will suffer from the imbalance of not 
sdequately knowing what the President really thought about it all.
owever, it is with the Presidents and staff themselves that this analysis
begins, it primarily covers the period from Roosevelt to Ford and is divided,
88 alre»dy indicated, into four main categories. The second will deal with
the Press and media; the third with the academic community; and the fourth 
wi 1 1 cover a wide range of other pertinent writings.
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PARTICIPANTS
This category, unlike any other, does not consist of secondary source 
material. Rather, by definition, the body of literature that has been 
produced by participants should be regarded not only as raw material but 
as prime evidence for the purposes of this study. It uniquely draws upon 
and explains, direct personal experience of the subject.
The primary division in this category must be that between the Presidents 
themselves on the one hand, and the members of the White House staff on 
the other. They constitute between them the two most intimate sides of 
the story. Yet we should not overlook a third important subdivision: 
namely, the literature emanating from Cabinet and Congress. Both partici­
pate in decision-making at the White House and are often in a position to 
observe at first hand, and be affected by, the relationship between a 
President and his staff. These three subdivisions do not entirely pre­
empt or exhaust the full range of this category as further discussion will 
make clear.
PRESIDENTS
Turning first to the Presidents themselves it will be a responsibility of
the present study to compile and analyse and discuss the views and
Pinions held by the Presidents on all aspects of their White House staffs. 
Th© process of compilation need not be here considered. It is unnecessary.
Th© analysis, however, is more interesting. Presidential opinions come in 
variety or forms at a variety of times and for a variety of reasons, 
is provides us with a convenient and simple means of analysis.
w© can postulate four 'dimensions* with which to consider the body of 
terature produced by Presidents. The form dimension deals with the
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various forms in which presidential opinions have been expressed. The 
main 'axis' of this form dimension runs from the formal expression of 
views to the informal. The time dimension distinguishes between 
presidential opinions on the basis of the differing times they were 
offered. The 'axis' associated with this time dimension covers the 
period from well before the Presidency to well after it. The event 
dimension seeks to distinguish presidential statements about their staff 
according to the different events that may have prompted such statements. 
Here the 'axis' may be considered to run from the individual to the mass 
event. The motive dimension attempts to differentiate between the vary­
ing motives behind presidential statements on the staff. The 'axis' can 
be considered to run from the general to the specific motive. These four 
dimensions will be taken in turn as vehicles for discussing the presidential 
perspective of the White House staff.
It is both remarkable and revealing that this perspective should have 
changed so little and deepened so much. For in examining different 
presidencies we are not always comparing like with like. For example, 
certain factors have permeated the history of the Presidency over the last 
forty years with markedly increasing effect. These factors include the 
enlarged power of the United States since the Second World War and the 
influence of foreign policy on the decisions of government. No less 
important has been the growing complexity of domestic government since 
the Depression in the 1930's forced its increased role in, and responsi- 
bility for, the lives of its citizens. These factors themselves have 
combined to produce a growing strain on the machinery of government, with 
a Proportionately greater strain accruing to the Office of President. 
Presidents from Roosevelt onwards have faced the ever more complex two- 
&ided equation of unchanging human nature and human problems on the one 
hand 81111 ever changing political problems on the other - the whole bundle
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itself being a continuously changing mixture. It is just this changing 
frame of reference which these four dimensions encompass.
Taking first what we have termed the form dimension, we find a variety of 
forms through which Presidents have been known to express their view or 
opinions on the White House staff. These range from Executive Orders to 
other presidential statements such as Messages to Congress, Press 
Conferences, writings of one kind or another, and direct quotations found 
in other sources. On top of these come memoirs.
Certainly, if we had to rely exclusively on presidential memoirs for our 
understanding of presidential views on the White House staff then we could 
not pursue this line of inquiry very far or with much result. Of the 
Presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt only Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, 
Johnson and Nixon have written memoirs. None has ever devoted even so 
much as a small section directly to a description of their White House 
Office: whom it comprised and how it operated.
The advantage of memoirs lies in part in the very freedom they accord, by 
definition, for a considered judgement by a President examining and 
summing-up his own experience. Unhappily this has not necessarily pre­
vented Presidents from producing work that is either uninformative or bland. 
Tor example, President Johnson never once addressed himself to the subject 
°f his own White House staff in his memoirs The Vantage Point: Perspectives 
°f_ the Presi ricnry 1 Indeed his only reference to the staff at all was 
briefly in connexion with the changeover from Kennedy to himself and the 
impossibility of most of the former's staff to transfer their loyalties 
accordingly, "i could understand this", wrote Johnson, "although it com- 
Piicated my task. " 2 While he did not go on to explain why and how at 
6 eater length, it was enough, perhaps, that he had thus identified
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"loyalty" as the staff's most pertinent quality.
President Eisenhower, by contrast, did devote a few paragraphs to his 
immediate staff assistance in his memoirs Mandate for Change3 and
4
Waging Peace. However, the element of self-justification which is
bound to be present in all such memoirs is especially brought to bear on
the subject of the White House Office - a feature which will receive further
attention below. Perhaps the best Presidential memoirs of recent times are
the two volumes by President Truman, Year of Decisions5 and Years of Trial 
0
and Hope, but they are not as informative a source of his views of the 
White House staff as are to be found elsewhere.
While in office Presidents issue a vast number of official statements and 
these can take various forms. One of these, for example, is the Executive 
Order. It was through the medium of the Executive Order that the White 
House Office was actually established. This was Executive Order No. 8248 
issued on September 8th 1939 and entitled The Reorganization of the 
Executive Office of the President. 7 In itself it was not a very long 
statement, and simply set out briefly the duties of the White House Office, 
the Secretaries to the President, the Executive Clerk and the Administrative 
Assistants to the President. Its purpose was merely to give the official 
Roosevelt explanation of how it was supposed to operate.
Another example of an Executive Order, although this time affecting only 
a single member of the staff rather than the whole entity, is provided by 
President Nixon's Executive Order No. 11456. Its title, Special Assistant 
President for Liaison with Former Presidents, 8 is self-explanatory. 
Rare among official presidential statements on the White House staff it 
set out in some detail the duties that this post would entail. Yet another 
example of the use of an Executive Order as a means of reflecting
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presidential views on the White House staff and how it should operate is 
provided, again, by President Nixon. After his re-election he promul­
gated Executive Order No. 26815 entitled Delegation of Functions to 
Executive .Director of Domestic Council. 9 it should be remembered that 
whoever served in this capacity was also considered a senior member of 
the White House staff, and so this order stands as a good example of the 
way in which a President's views on the staff are contained in official 
statements. Again, good but uncommon. The overwhelming majority of the 
staff are accorded no such job description.
Another type of official presidential statement which was used as a 
vehicle for the expression of presidential views on the organization of 
the presidency has been the presidential Message. Once more, President 
Nixon provides an example of this in action. In February 1972 he sent his 
revised Departmental Reorganization Program to Capitol Hill for consi­
deration, accompanied by a President's Message to Congress.10 President 
Nixon dwelt at length on the need to make "a concerted and sustained 
effort to reorganize the Executive Branch according to a coherent, compre­
hensive view", and in the course of his analysis there can be discerned 
valuable clues and references to his thinking on the proper state of 
decision-making at the White House. This thinking has in turn a direct 
bearing on the condition of his White House staff.
11 presidential statements in public must of course be considered official, 
Ut ttle form in which presidential views on the White House staff can be 
°st pointedly expressed occurs in the Press Conference situation. It has 
en a remarkable feature over the years how little interest has apparently 
®n l^dn by the Press and media in the operation of the President’s 
e House Office, as measured in terms of questions asked at Press 
°nferences. However, in the case of President Eisenhower, for example,
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there were two occasions in 1958 12 when questions directly centering on 
the staff elicited forthright answers by the President and moreover in a 
manner which was not to be found later in his memoirs. This may perhaps 
be accounted for by the fact that the President was notably irritated at 
the questions even being put. But the fact remains that in answer to 
questions about "your general concept about the functioning of the White 
House staff, as you have organized it" 13 and the "p-ecautions" taken 
against a "palace guard" 14 President Eisenhower offered perhaps the most 
heartfelt opinions he ever delivered on the subject. Other examples of 
Presidents at Press Conferences would include President Roosevelt's 
elusive description of staff aide Harry Hopkins in 1941,15 and President 
Nixon's response to a specific question on the proper role of staff mem­
bers when dealing with regulatory agencies.1®
Occasionally a glimpse of the Presidential mind as it relates in a general 
sense to the problems of a White House Office can come in the form of 
other Presidential writings, besides memoirs. Two such examples of this 
can be found with Presidents Kennedy and Carter. President Kennedy, in 
1963, wrote a Foreword to a slim volume entitled Decision-Making in the 
White House ^ written by his Special Counsel Theodore C. Sorensen, who 
was in some ways Kennedy's closest staff member. Kennedy's remarks were 
brief but he nevertheless managed to emphasize that "the essence of 
ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer - often, indeed, 
to the decider himself."1® A tell-tale sign, perhaps, that even 
Presidents don't always know exactly how they organize their decisions - 
and their staff. In President Carter’s case he wrote what one might term 
a campaigning autobiography' in which he set out his general thoughts on 
Betting the best out of government. Although it is still too early to say 
exactly how one might relate the thoughts expressed in his book Why Not 
^_§est ? 19 to his actual performance in office, 20 this provided telling
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indicators of his desire for reorganization and his general approach to 
bureaucracy and its reform. For example, he described the changes that 
he sought to introduce as Governor and observed that "there was intense 
opposition from the bureaucrats who thrived on confusion, from special 
interests who preferred to work in the dark, and from a few legislative 
leaders who did not want to see their fiefdoms endangered. " 21 As it 
can be argued that his experience as Governor will greatly shape his 
Presidential attempts at reform, so too it can be argued that his 
experience of the bureaucracy will have an influence on the way he decides 
to organize his White House Office.
Yet another form in which Presidential views can emerge is that of the 
Press or Media interview. Generally speaking the occasions for exclusive 
wide-ranging interviews during a Presidency are few and far between, and 
anyway tend to concentrate on the issues and problems and successes of the 
day rather than on the machinery of government. 22 For example, the 
interview given by President Kennedy entitled "Mid-Term Television 
Conversation on the Presidency" . ^  A somewhat different example was 
furnished by a book published ten years earlier entitled simply Mr. 
¿resident . its subtitle referred to its being based on "revealing
interviews" with President Truman, and as regards the White House staff 
he certainly delivered his opinions in the straightforward manner for 
which he is especially remembered. "To make sure that I get the facts I 
need, said Truman, "I also had to reorganize the office and staff of the 
President."2® He went on to describe the broad outlines of his staff 
^d way he wanted things run - all very useful evidence of one
President's methods.
iegitimate offshoot of the press interview can be the directly attri­
butable quotation. Although this would give by definition the merest
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glimpse into the Presidential mind it can be none the less informative
for that; or colourful. In President Johnson1s case the two qualities
were typically combined in a remark which David Halberstam included in his
book The Best and the Brightest.26 Here President Johnson elucidated
what he meant by 'loyalty' in his White House staff. "I don't just want
loyalty," said Johnson. "I want loyalty. I want him to kiss my ass in
Macy's window and tell me it smells like roses. I want his pecker in
27my pocket." The language may be crude but the meaning is clear, not 
least the emphasis that Johnson placed on this particular quality.
Certainly it tells us something of importance about the way Johnson 
wanted his White House Office to work which is not available from a reading 
of his memoirs alone.
To recap briefly, thus far we have seen that the prime evidence produced 
by Presidents on the subject of their White House Office and staff has 
come in about six principal forms, which we have together termed the form 
dimension. These six have been presidential memoirs, official statements 
such as Executive Orders, or Messages, answers given in Press Conferences, 
other writings of one kind or another, Press or media interviews and other 
directly attributable quotations of some kind. We should now turn to 
consider any ramifications ensuing from the differing times that 
presidential opinions have been proferred.
Presidential views on the White House Office can be distinguished one from 
another by reference to the time at which they were expressed. These 
Possible variations together make up what we have termed the time dimension. 
Five Principal distinctions come to mind. Firstly, there is anything the 
President might have said well before the time he became President. Second- 
ly' there may be opinions expressed during the presidential campaign.
Thirdly, we can distinguish the views of a President newly immersed in his
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opening months of office from, fourthly, anything he may have to say during 
the rest of his presidency when he has settled down in the job. And finally 
there are those views which are the product of a man who has left the 
Presidency behind him. This is not to say that all Presidents have changed 
their views of the White House staff five times in their life. Neverthe­
less, on occasion, a certain shift in emphasis can be detected between what 
a President may have had to say at one time and at another. It might be 
thought that these distinctions are too fine: sometimes, it is true, they 
do indeed merge. But they remain defensible as major stages in a 
Presidential life, each of which brings with it its own special perspective.
The political background of Presidents in recent times has tended to spring 
from service in Congress, though not exclusively so. President Eisenhower 
is the most notable exception. Both President Franklin Roosevelt and 
President Jimmy Carter were Governors prior to their presidencies; and 
three Presidents served first as Vice President. But for those who did 
hold prior political positions, of whatever kind, this has also brought 
some experience of a political staff and how to organize it. Where appro­
priate this can give us clues as to his later treatment of a White House 
staff. For example, the obvious importance which President Johnson placed 
on loyalty in his staff can be traced back directly to a similar emphasis 
hy Senate Majority Leader Johnson.2® Even in the case of the one 
President who did not have any specific political background, President 
Eisenhower, this did not prevent him from holding certain strong views 
on the way a staff should be organized well before his assumption of the 
office. "For years", wrote Eisenhower, "I had been in frequent contact 
with the Executive Office of the White House and I had certain ideas about 
ihe system, or lack of system, under which it operated."2® This is a 
very different tone from later remarks he made, as will be apparent 
helow.
As regards anything a presidential candidate may have had to say during 
the course of the presidential election campaign there is a natural 
tendency to treat it with caution. As it happens, no presidential candi­
date - with the exception of Carter - has ever had occasion openly to say 
anything at all about either The White House Office or the ways in which
the presidency should be organized. Any such opinions must be deduced in 
30other ways. That President Carter should be that exception says a good 
deal about the imprint of Watergate and the Nixon Presidency upon the 
public mind. But the fact remains that Candidate Carter made a point of 
singling out The White House Office and staff as an aspect of the 
presidency to which he would devote priority attention and for which he 
would introduce much needed reforms.31 What was true for Candidate Carter 
remained true for President-Elect Carter during the transition.32 Another 
example of a President addressing the subject of the staff during the 
transition period occurred with President-Elect Nixon late in 1968, when 
he talked about the advantages of a young energetic staff33 who learn 
awfully fast." These are words to weigh against subsequent experience.
Although Presidents have taken office in January since 1937, it can be 
argued that it takes a number of months before they come to feel comfort­
able and in full command. It is for this reason what we may set apart 
remarks made about the White House staff in this initial period from 
others rendered at a later stage. For there is a legitimate difference 
between a President's initial intentions and his more mature view derived 
from greater experience. One of the more well-known instances of this 
difference in operation concerns President Kennedy. For example, in an 
interview given in April 1961, only three months after assuming office, he 
remarked that "I think we sometimes overstate the administerial difficul­
ties of the Presidency."3'* Before the month was out he had good reason
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to reappraise that statement, together with his other thoughts on the 
management of the presidency, as a result of the Bay of Pigs adventure. 
Both Kennedy himself, and members of his staff around him, have testified 
to the impact made by that event and its effect in removing their comfort­
able illusions about the way things should be run, especially as regards 
the role of the staff in national security. To take other examples,
there is evidence that President Nixon took even longer than four months 
36to settle down. President Carter too, by the end of his first year,
was also taking steps to re-fashion his staff organization.37
Once Presidents are firmly in command of their job and The White House
Office their comments on the latter are invested with a certainty that is
usually free from self-justification of the kind occasionally found in
memoirs. It is more straightforward. For example, when President
Franklin Roosevelt was visited by Wendell Wilkie, whom he had defeated
in the presidential election of 1940, he was asked by Wilkie why Rossevelt
kept Harry Hopkins (who was a member of his staff) so close to him.
Roosevelt replied quite openly that Hopkins was necessary in a classic
reply that has maintained its relevance to subsequent Presidents and
presidencies. In a similar open vein are the remarks made by President
Johnson, quoted above, on the need for loyalty. President Truman also
had some blunt things to say about his White House staff while in the
presidency, as when he referred to the fact that "I have had some men
39round here with the itch for power or self-aggrandizement." If
Presidents choose to they can be either revealingly candid or unerringly 
uninformative in what they say about the staff during this time period 
°f their presidency. Even President Nixon was capable of the former, as 
in his statement of January 5th 1973 concerning Executive Reorganization 
where he revealed the functions that his staff of Assistants would
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perform. But one would expect him also to have been capable of the 
latter, and a case in point was the non-answer he once gave to an inquiry 
about the 'proper role of staff members.'41
Finally, what can we say about the kind of opinions a President expresses 
after he has ceased to be President? This subdivision is really very 
similar to that of presidential memoirs discussed above. But it can in­
clude other things besides. For example, Mr. Truman published a book in 
I960 entitled jfr. Citizen in which he had certain criticisms to make of 
The White House Office which he would not have been capable of making 
while he himself had been in office. In particular he took exception to 
what he termed "this present trend toward a huge White House staff."43 
His subsequent remarks about the insulation of the President undoubtedly 
derive from his opinion of the Eisenhower Presidency, which by then had 
nearly run its full course. Presidential opinions of other Presidents 
always shed light both ways and are useful for that reason. There is also 
a shift of emphasis at work affecting both the reason for, and form of, 
presidential memoirs among other writings. There is a much greater empha­
sis on self-justification and the re-correction of Press and media inter­
pretations. Because these latter can be propagated so easily and so 
comprehensively the motive for memoir-writing has been given an added 
urgency.
come now to consider presidential opinions and views in the context of 
the events that prompted them. This we have termed the event dimension.
tarting on the individual level, there have occasionally arisen special 
ircumstances which concerned a single member of the White House staff 
nd wtltch have afforded Presidents the opportunity to make statements on
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the way they organize their White House Office. Not that they always take
that opportunity. When Wally Jenkins, for example, who was a member of
President Johnson's staff, was arrested and charged early in 1964, Johnson
kept as silent as he could about the whole matter. By contrast, when
President Carter's adviser on drugs, Dr. Peter Bourne, was obliged to hand
in his resignation from the White House staff in July 1978, the President
spoke openly about the matter at a Press Conference. In the most well-
known example of this type of event, when Sherman Adams, who was President
Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff in the White House, was charged with improper
conduct, Eisenhower could not avoid the need to make public statements
about the matter. Apart from defending Sherman Adams personally, Eisenhower
44also addressed himself, during his Press Conferences, to the question of 
the running of the White House staff.
On the general level, Presidents have usually been obliged to make a 
reference to their staff whenever they have proposed some serious reorgani­
zation of government. This was certainly the case with President Franklin 
Roosevelt, whose Executive Order setting up The White House Office has 
already been described. So too has the statement on reorganization which 
accompanied President Nixon's reorganization proposals issued on January 
5th 1973. In President Nixon's case, given his tendency to resort to as 
few Press Conferences and other forms of access as possible, any clues as 
to his thinking on the way he wanted to organize his White House were 
welcome. President Carter, currently engaged (as of this writing) in a 
reorganization of the Executive Branch, has also been obliged to refer 
to the position of the White House staff.
prior to President Nixon's presidency one might have thought that the 
Rinds of event to precipitate Presidential views on the White House staff
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would have been restricted to the two kinds just discussed. But a third 
level of event must be brought into existence to take account of Watergate. 
It might be termed the 'crisis level'. Other crises of one kind or 
another, such as the Cuban missile crisis, or Korea, or the events of the 
summer of 1968, were not as susceptible of triggering such widespread dis­
cussion of the White House staff. Watergate, however, provoked the widest 
and deepest public discussion of the President's White House Office that 
had ever been known. The relevant point here is that President Nixon was 
obliged to respond, however unwillingly, as the full scope of Watergate 
was unravelled, and was obliged to talk about his White House staff. For 
example, when he was obliged to accept the resignations of his two senior 
aides Haldeman and Ehrlichman President Nixon went out of his way to annnnn« 
on prime time TV that they were "two of the finest public servants it has 
ever been my privilege to know." As an indication of the value President 
Nixon placed upon senior figures in his Administration it must count as 
primary evidence for this study.
The effect of Watergate has been to supercede the need for there to be any 
particular 'event' necessitating special presidential statements on The 
White House Office. This subject has now been elevated by the Press and 
media into a legitimate and necessary subject for regular inquiry. To give 
an example; due partly to President Ford's initiative and partly to Press 
emand, the White House Press Corps were given a full briefing on the 
organization of The White House Office by Ford's then Chief of Staff.47 
This was the very first time that such a briefing had ever taken place and
serves as an indication of the higher level of interest that such matters 
now have.
mplicit in the drawing of distinctions between the different categories
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of presidential opinion on the staff are two additional factors with which 
we have not, so far, dealt. Firstly, that of motive; and secondly, that 
of prior experience. These latter two 'dimensions* are largely self- 
evident .
We have already noted that concerns of self-justification are at their 
strongest in presidential memoirs and other writings after the fact. These 
are more likely to be general statements, as are President Johnson's.
During the Presidency, by contrast, they are more likely to be specific 
statements defending a particular action involving a member of the staff: 
for example, President Truman's defence of Harry Vaughn.48 Prior to the 
Presidency one encounters another motive - that of regular partisan attack. 
The 1970s have indeed provided many examples of leading presidential candi­
dates expressing their opinion on the grave defects of the Nixon White 
House Office. These must, in part, be judged against the political back­
ground of the time. However, none were so serious in bringing this issue 
to the forefront than Candidate Carter and his running-mate.49 It will be 
especially interesting to ascertain to what extent his presidential actions 
will prove to have been influenced by his campaign rhetoric.
A President's previous political experience has, naturally, a pervading 
influence on what he says about his staff. From Truman to Ford the domi­
nant prior political experience of Presidents was that gained in the 
Legislature (and the Vice Presidency) - Eisenhower being the sole exception. 
This common factor links their attitude to political staff, and puts them 
into one category. President Carter has now broken this 'tradition': his 
Prior political experience, like Franklin Roosevelt's, being Executive, in 
the form of a Governorship. Yet Carter does share one other emerging 
common factor in the political backgrounds of recent Presidents: campaigning.
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This is becoming more extensive than ever before. Both Nixon and Carter 
came to office after a period of prolonged campaigning as a private citi­
zen. In Carter's case, this campaigning, together with his non- 
Washingtonian and Governorship background, amounts to a unique perspective 
which may well influence his attitude to his staff in a way which has not 
been seen in previous Presidencies. For example, Carter had firmer pre­
set views on executive reorganization than Presidents with primarily
50legislative backgrounds .
CONCLUSION
We have raised some of the factors involved in assessing Presidential 
opinions on the White House staff. It remains to be said that the sum 
total of any President's recorded views on his White House Office and its 
organization is relatively meagre. The natural question is why? Apart 
from a possible genuine reluctance by Presidents to discuss their staff, 
the answer lies mostly in other people's neglect.
To a certain extent, for the earlier Presidencies of Roosevelt and Truman, 
this may be reasonable given that their staff were relatively small and 
the development of their functions still in its early stages. But it is 
also true that for a much longer time the White House staff were not con­
sidered a subject on which Presidents either habitually made, or were 
required to make, their views known. The Press, Congress, and the 
academic community must share the blame for that.
For the Press, the organization of The White House Office per se was not 
considered either a necessary or important enough topic to raise directly 
with Presidents. Although individual members of the Press naturally took
Ill
an interest in establishing and maintaining good contacts with indi­
vidual members of the White House staff it was not a topic for regular 
or on-the-record Press inquiry. Thus, for example, few Presidential 
views were ever made known through the medium of Press Conferences.
In Congress, any interest in these matters was neutralised by the prevail­
ing sentiment that they had no more right (or need) to know how the 
President chose to organize his staff than the President had the right to 
know how they organized their Congressional staffs. (This is discussed in 
detail elsewhere).
In the academic community the White House Office escaped serious scrutiny 
primarily because it was accepted as a logically necessary part of the 
post-war "strong" Presidency which that community, by and large, supported. 
Only when that conception of the Presidency finally came under attack in 
the late 1960s and 1970s was the extent to which the White House staff 
played a major role fully realised. Fortunately for this study, members 
of the White House staff have at least left us a better record of their 
opinions and experiences than have their respective former employers, 
which we shall now consider.
IP  WHITE HOUSE STAFF
The proportion of members of the White House staff who have written about 
their work or experiences on the staff, or about the President they served, 
oust by any reckoning be considered comparatively small. Over the years 
since 1939 several hundreds of people have served on the successive White 
House staffs of eight Presidents and yet only a relative handful have left 
behind them some record of their experience. Those that have provided an
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account have done so in various ways, not always by writing a book - 
although many have - and not always seeking as their first priority to 
describe or analyse the particular White House staff of which they were 
members. As with Presidents, their motives for writing have varied 
widely; indeed, in some cases, their contribution has not been voluntarily 
given. The quality of the literature produced has also varied, and its 
relevance to the present study will be central to this analysis.
Two general points can be made at the outset. Firstly, the rate at which 
the literature has been produced has grown over the years since the 1930s. 
This simply parallels their growth in numbers and their growth in import­
ance. Secondly, the quality of the literature has progressively become 
less descriptive and more analytical. This, too, is a natural consequence 
of there being more to be analytical about, coupled with a greater demand 
for such analysis.
To illustrate these two points we can make some rough and ready calcu­
lations of the numbers of staff of successive Presidents who have chosen 
to leave some record of their experiences, in whatever form. Starting 
with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, we find that some seven members of 
his staff wrote about their service under him.51 Only four former staff 
members can be considered to have provided any serious thoughts on their 
time under President Truman. Relatively few can be discerned from the 
Eisenhower presidency as the number only amounts to five. The situation 
begins to change radically when one considers the Kennedy Presidency.
There we find that nearly a dozen former members of his staff have com­
mitted themselves to print in one form or another to deal with their 
experiences during the years 1961-63. A similar figure can be counted 
for the Period of the Johnson presidency. Another rise in the number comes
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with the Nixon Administration: so far this amounts to about sixteen.
The number is still rising (as of this writing) for the same obvious 
reason that also applies to the staff who served under President Ford: 
namely, that these presidencies are still recent.52
The quality of the contributions over the years has greatly changed. As 
the staff have grown in size and power they have themselves come to realise 
what special contribution they can make to writings on politics at the 
White House level. For example, in the case of three former members of 
President Truman's staff, it is significant that it was not until 1973 
that what they had to say was committed to print. Not only is this a con­
sequence of the rising interest in the staff: the analyses of former 
presidencies are being revised from the perspective of the White House 
staffs which served under them.
Another reason for the improving quality is quite simply that the White 
House staffer's unique perspective has increasingly conferred greater and 
greater authority on the writer. For example, a Samuel Rosenman (in the 
Roosevelt 1930s) cannot match a Theodore C. Sorensen (in the Kennedy 
1960s) for the amount and quality of information and analysis on their 
respective Presidents' Administrations. Perhaps they, in turn, cannot 
match the authority of an H.R. Haldeman or a Henry Kissinger (in the Nixon 
1970s).
In analysing the body of literature produced over the last forty years by 
members of the White House staff we can identify several different cate­
gories. This parallels our treatment of the Presidents themselves, although 
these categories do not exactly match those of the former group. For 
example, one can distinguish political writings, primarily about a
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particular President or presidency, from those written essentially as a 
personal account - perhaps in the form of an autobiography. Then there 
may be those who have written about a particular political issue as they 
saw or experienced it from their position on the staff. In addition, 
some have set out to write a work of general political analysis in which 
they seek to present their view of American politics or the political 
system in general. Naturally enough, these tend to revolve around the 
institution of the presidency.
Another important distinction that can and should be drawn between dif­
ferent contributions emerges from a general appreciation of the concept 
of staff seniority. There are no standard guidelines to distinguish 
senior members of the staff from middle-ranking members or junior members, 
but prima facie judgements can nevertheless be made. For example, one can 
distinguish between Theodore Sorensen and Mrs. Evelyn Lincoln in this res­
pect, both of whom wrote books on the Kennedy presidency. Apropos the 
Johnson presidency, we can likewise distinguish between Joseph Califano, 
who was a senior staff member, and Harry McPherson, who counted as middle- 
rank. Such distinctions can even be observed in the career of an indi­
vidual. To take but one example from the Nixon years we can distinguish 
between the earlier and later phases of the White House career of John W.
Dean HI: from being middle-rank to being, all but briefly, decidedly 
senior.
As certain Presidents, some members of the staff have written at
widely-spaced intervals on the same subject. This in turn has generally 
betrayed a change of motive. A good example is furnished by Theodore C. 
Sorensen, about whom more later. Members of the staff may also be 
impelled or prompted to write about a particular event. The outstanding 
example here is of course Watergate.
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That dispenses with the preliminary remarks. The best way to introduce 
the literature produced by members of the staff is to take the presiden­
cies in turn and discuss what emanated from each. We begin with those 
assistants who wrote political memoirs of their time with President 
Roosevelt. Perhaps the best of these was by Samuel X. Rosenman, a jurist 
and long-time adviser to Roosevelt, who later served as Special Counsel, 
and who wrote Working with Roosevelt.53 There is much in the book which 
shed light on the working methods of Roosevelt and the way in which the 
advisers and staff around the President operated at the President's 
discretion. This was written in 1952, although twenty-one years later he
offered revised judgements on these matters in The Presidency as I have 
54
Seen_It. Another kind of tribute was that by William D. Hassett, one
of the Secretaries to the President, who published what was essentially a
diary record of his experiences entitled Off The Record with F.D.R. 1942- 
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with an Introduction by a former Administrative Assistant, 
Jonathan Daniels. On a more personal level comes F.D.R. , My Boss56 by 
Grace Tully, who served as the President's personal Secretary.
Much more political are the books by Rexford G. Tugwell, who has been a 
prolific writer since the 1930s. The most relevant of his books are 
The Brains Trust.57 The Enlargement of the Presidency,58 and The 
Residency Reappraised5^ (with Thomas Cronin), although Off Course: From 
.Truman to Nixon ® does not especially refer to his days under President 
Roosevelt. All these books are based more on analytical re-evaluation 
than actual experience - an important distinction. Another New Dealer, 
Benjamin V. Cohen, has written on his time with Roosevelt in The Presidency 
Have Seen Tf Like Tugwell, Cohen was never an official member of 
the White House staff proper but he was part of the advisory group that pre- 
eeded and foreshadowed the formal establishment of the White House Office in
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1939. One or two glimpses of the work of an assistant under Roosevelt
appear in various other writings on this period. Even the book by the
President's physician Ross T. Mclntire, entitled White House Physician.62
has something useful to say about the battle for the President's attention.
The man who enjoyed the President's confidence in later years to the
greatest extent, Harry L. Hopkins, died before there was any chance of his
writing about his service to Roosevelt. However, there is much first hand
evidence available in the study by Robert E. Sherwood, The White House
6 3Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, which is devoted to the relationship between 
the two men. Sherwood himself was a leading member of President Roosevelt’s 
speech-writing team.
The most interesting feature of the record left by former members of the 
White House staff under President Truman is that not a single one of them 
wrote a single book. Furthermore the only ’literature’ which was produced 
has been written years after the Truman presidency ended. Three former 
staff members, none of whom served the whole period 1945 - 1953, have 
written on the subject of the President and his staff under the heading 
jhe Presidency as I Have Seen It. These were Clark M. Clifford,65 
Clayton Fritchey, and W. Averell Harriman.6 Two of these men served in 
advisory positions to more than one President but were no more disposed to 
write of that experience either. There was only one staff member to have 
served a significant time in the Truman White House who analysed his own 
exPerience in print. This was John R. Steelman, the Assistant to the 
President, whose reflections were given expression in an article he co­
authored with H. Dewayne Kraeger entitled "The Executive Office as 
Agglnistrative Coordinator" .68
As regards the Eisenhower Presidency the record is similarly bare. The
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most prominent exception, and the most easily explained, was provided by 
Sherman Adams. He served President Eisenhower for six years, endowed with 
the title of "The Assistant to the President", and wrote a political record
of the staff, Emmet John Hughes, who served as an Administrative Assistant 
and later as a Consultant, wrote The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir
rather than their own personal political lives. Further reminiscences and 
thoughts have come from Bryce Harlow and Nelson Rockefeller as published 
under the heading The Presidency As I Have Seen It.72 Rockefeller was a 
Special Assistant, while Harlow served first as a Special Assistant in the 
White House Office, then as an Administrative Assistant, and finally as a 
Deputy Assistant for Congressional Affairs. Emmet John Hughes himself, 
while not a leading staff member in the 1950s nevertheless later produced 
one of the most thoughtful books ever to appear on the Presidency and the 
White House staff. His book, The Living Presidency73 (which he subtitled 
The Resources and Dilemmas of the American Presidential Office") was one 
of the first attempts at an analytical work by a former member of a White 
House staff. He summarized his views in The Presidency After Watergate. ^
The explosion of literature on the White House, including the White House 
staff, begins at the hands of those who served under President Kennedy.
This great outpouring of books can partly be explained by the need to pre­
serve and defend the reputation of a man who had not yet had sufficient 
time to achieve the fulfilment of his political hopes, promises and pro-
69of those years called First-hand Report. Arthur Larson, who served as a 
Special Assistant and Special Consultant, wrote an account of the 
Eisenhower presidency which he titled Eisenhower.70 Another former member
Both were books primarily about the President
8 amine. Partly, too, it owed to the aura of martyrdom that surrounded 
the Kennedy years. Another factor was the greater Press and media
A
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attention given to the White House staff who worked under Kennedy. This 
combined with a greater desire on their own part to write about their 
experience. However, the single most important spur to this increased 
volume of literature was political in nature. President Kennedy was the 
first President in the modern era to use his White House staff signifi­
cantly, as a means to help him organize his Presidency. The Kennedy staff 
became very influential, and were known to be very influential. Conse­
quently, much that was later written by his staff betrayed the need to 
mark their claim to that special influence.
The first category of literature by the Kennedy White House staff to appear
was of the ’political record' kind. These were relatively straightforward
accounts of the Kennedy years, although the angle of approach varied
slightly depending on the writer. The acknowledged historian on the staff
m  the Kennedy White House was Arthur J. Schlesinger Jr. whose book 
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— 0° Days stands as one of the more authoritative accounts of the Kennedy 
presidency. Equally authoritative, if not more so in certain respects, but 
written from a more personal angle, is Kennedy76 by Theodore C. Sorensen.
He was Kennedy's Special Counsel and enjoyed a much closer personal 
relationship with the President than did Schlesinger, who served as a 
Special Assistant during these years.
Other books by staff members did not so much purport to be complete 
records of a presidency as personal accounts of their relationship with 
the President. Opinions may vary, and did within the Kennedy staff, as to 
which staff were closest to the President, but it is generally acknowledged 
that a man like Pierre Salinger, for example, who wrote With Kennedy,77 
Was not among the most senior policy advisers. He was Kennedy's Press 
Secretary. By contrast, General Maxwell D. Taylor's book Swords and
*■
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Ploughshares reveals that he was a trusted senior adviser but one who
only operated in a limited sphere. Middle-ranking members of the staff
were not to be outdone in reflections on the Kennedy years. The
President's former personal secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, wrote My Twelve
79Years With John F. Kennedy, which, as the title suggests, is very much 
a personal story. In the same vein, but with a more wide-ranging and 
substantial political content, is "Johnny. We Yardlv Knew Ye" .80 This 
was the joint product of two of Kennedy's political staff. Kenneth P. 
O'Donnell and Dave Powers, both Special Assistants in the White House 
and both from his home state. One significant point about this book is 
its date of publication, 1973, which was decidedly much later than most 
of the works produced by the Kennedy staff. In that same year, however, 
were published the (in some cases further) reflections of former Kennedy 
staff members under the heading of The Presidency As I have Seen It.81 
These included Ralph A. Dungan,82 who was a Special Assistant, and 
Theodore C. Sorensen,83 Special Counsel.
Sorensen's output has proved an interesting case over the years since 
Kennedy’s assassination. Taken together his writings reveal a marked 
change of view in his judgement of the White House staff itself. His 
first book, Kennedy. was the most eulogistic piece of work on the former 
President. Some re-evaluation was evident in his later book entitled 
The Kennedy Legacy84 in which the attention he devotes to Kennedy's style 
°f government and working methods vis-a-vis his staff is notable. In 1973, 
during the Nixon Administration, his latest thoughts had appeared under 
the heading of The Presidency As I have Seen It.85 Although still in 
favour of a strong Presidency, as in The Case For A Strong Presidency.86 
by this time he had certain reservations on the size of the White House 
staff and tlle way in wjjiCh it was organized. These became much more
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strongly stated in a book he wrote two years later in 1975 which was
87
entitled Watchmen In The Night. More revealing was its subtitle, 
"Presidential Accountability After Watergate". Sorensen argued that the 
problems of accountability had grown considerably more acute since the 
Kennedy years when he had written his first and somewhat idealised analy­
sis of presidential power entitled Decision Making In The White House.88 
In his later book he singled out the White House staff for special criti­
cism and had the honesty to admit that the faults lay deeper than the 
Nixon Administration alone.
The example of Sorensen illustrates an important general point in the 
analysis of the literature produced by the White House staff: the effect 
of the Watergate years on the judgement of earlier presidencies. Even a 
man like Sorensen, whose career as an adviser to Kennedy naturally led him 
to defend the concept of an influential staff, eventually recognised 
dangers independent of the particular staff serving a particular President. 
Admittedly, Sorensen never conceded that the Kennedy style and method of 
organization was anything but well suited to the Office of President, but 
the passage of time and force of events did demand some rethinking.
Sorensen also illustrates the progression from writing a particular politi­
cal record of a particular presidency to more general works of political 
“ ‘‘lysis. We have noted a similar progression with Emmet John Hughes, and 
We can point to others, such as Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. He wrote The 
iBEgrial Presidency.**9 whose title has at least served as a telling 
ePithet on the Nixon years if not on the last 40 years overall. Schlesii^er 
Was a trained historian before entering the Kennedy White House so it is 
less surprising that he should have produced analytical contributions in 
Edition to his historical summary 1000 Days. Neither should it be
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surprising to find that McGeorge Bundy - the archtype 'best and b^htest'
also contributed, in the shape of his unapologetic stand for a strong
90executive power: The Strength of Government. His argument ran more
widely than the position and use of the White House staff, although like
many books of the 1960s it argued for a balance of executive-legislative-
administrative power that found itself under considerable attack during
the Nixon years. Yet even Bundy was not immune to second thoughts, as
91Toward An Open Foreign Policy - The Opportunity And The Problem 
indicated.
The momentum established by the Kennedy staff was continued in the volume 
of literature produced by President Johnson's White House staff. Many of 
those who worked closely with him have left us a record of some kind, 
whether in the form of books or interviews, of the Johnson presidency.
The nearest equivalent of a Schlesinger in the Johnson White House was
Eric Goldman, an historian and academic by background, who left the staff
92in 1966, where he had been an Adviser, to write The Tragedy of LBJ.
This was one of the more scholarly accounts of the early years of the
Johnson Presidency but cannot rival others written by those with a much
closer exposure to the style and working methods of the President. In
contrast to Kennedy, there was no devoted staff person to labour over a
complete record of the Johnson years, if only because no senior adviser
really lasted the entire course under such a demanding man and President.
One who was close to him in a personal rather than a political sense was
Jack Valenti, a Special Assistant and Special Consultant handling his
93
appointments and scheduling, who wrote A Very Human President, in which 
considerable attention was devoted to daily life in the West Wing where 
the White House staff are physically located.
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A good example of the combined personal and political autobiography is
furnished by Harry McPherson's book A Political Education.94 This too
has an explanatory subtitle: "A Journal of Life with Senators, Generals,
Cabinet Members and Presidents". At a later date he also had published
95National Security versus Civil Liberties. McPherson, who served as a 
Special Assistant and Special Counsel, was not the most senior of Johnson's 
aides. Indeed he well illustrates a distinction we should make between 
staff on the basis of their rank. Unfortunately, such distinctions - more 
necessary from the 1960s onwards - can never be susceptible of precise 
measurement. Sometimes the distinction between a top-level member of the 
staff and a middle-ranking or junior member could and did sometimes merge. 
This is not to deny the validity of the contribution that McPherson can 
make, merely to point out the perspective from which he wrote.
President Johnson had a number of journalists on his staff, and some of 
them have written interesting accounts of those years. George Christian,
, Q C
ior example, wrote The President Steps Down. Douglass Cater, a dis­
tinguished journalist, has written several books. One written during the 
Johnson years was Power In Washington^  in which he devoted some attention 
to the styles of successive Presidents since Roosevelt. Perhaps the best 
of the journalistic contributions came from George E. Reedy, who, like 
George Christian, served as Johnson's Press Secretary for a time. His 
book> The Twilight of the Presidency,98 made its mark by approaching the 
presidency from a practical 'inside' viewpoint to which outsiders, of 
whatever kind, can rarely if ever aspire. Although he naturally took the 
Johnson years as the basis of his book, much of what he had to say was 
applicable to other presidencies, and he thereby helped provide criteria 
by which to judge them afresh. Although Reedy sought to produce a work of 
more general analysis in his later book The Presidency in Flux, and
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wrote in more detail about his job as Press Secretary in Speaking For 
100The President, it is The Twilight of the Presidency that will stand as 
his most lasting contribution.
Yet another former Press Secretary (they -enjoyed- a high rate of turnover 
under Johnson) to have relayed his experiences on the White House staff is 
Bill Moyers. In an interview entitled The White House Staff vs. The 
Cabinet, which was published in a wide-ranging study of political life 
C3lled ln-S-lde The System, Moyers identified many of the factors that 
determine the relationship between the two bodies and thereby the criteria 
with which Presidents judge the usefulness to him of each. Another import­
ant staff figure of the Johnson years was Joseph A. Califano Jr. In his 
book —  Presidential Nation, published some years after the end of the 
Johnson era, we find another attempt at general political analysis by a 
member of the White House staff. He had already turned his mind to the 
subject in The White House Staff: How Many Speak For The President?104 
While neither may be an academic work in the strict sense of the term, by 
drawing on his own considerable experience in being so close to the centre, 
they have a political validity of some force.
The Nixon presidency has only recently ended and under normal circumstances 
one might expect that writings by former members of the staff would only now 
just begin to emerge. However no circumstances for the end of any presi­
dency could have been less normal. The result is that much that has been 
Produced by staff members owes almost entirely to the effect of Watergate. 
This is by no means unfortunate. On the contrary, some absorbing and highly 
authoritative accounts of the Nixon presidency have been produced by those 
who were uniquely in a position to know how the staff was organized.
The forms in which the Nixon White House staff have expressed their views
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and opinions on the staff itself have been varied - and not always 
volunteered. Some have written generalised accounts; others specifically 
about Watergate; and several more have provided valuable information 
through the medium of testimony before various committees. We can take 
these in turn.
One of the few books to be written by a member of Nixon's staff which was 
not designed to deal with the Watergate affair but with the general run of 
the Nixon presidency was that by William Safire, whose official title of 
Special Assistant does not immediately make clear that he served on the 
speech-writing staff. He wrote Before The Fall.105 with an explanatory 
subtitle, "An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House". Despite the 
fact that Safire at no time counted among the most senior of the staff he 
provides an invaluable service in casting a dispassionately critical eye 
on the Nixon White House Office. He also provided interesting obser­
vations in writing the text for what was essentially a photographic publi­
cation entitled Eye On Nixon: A Photographic Study, but one which had 
much to offer on the routine and working methods of the President. One of 
his former speech-writing colleagues, Raymond Price, has also written 
about his experience and interpretation of the Nixon years. His book, 
entitled simply With Nixon107 (echoes of Salinger's book about Kennedy) 
was published in 1978, and was essentially a political and personal defenoe 
of his former chief. Another book dating from before the Watergate affair 
was Courage And Hesitation.10^ Although authored by someone not actually 
himself a member of the staff, Allen Drury, it nevertheless mostly con­
tained a series of interviews with the staff about their work and how they 
operated: among them, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Price and Haig. Yet another 
speech-writer, Patrick Buchanan, was responsible for another glimpse of the 
Nixon Presidency with the publication of The New Majority: President
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Mixon At Mid-Passage. Until the publication of Kissinger's memoirs,
a "glimpse" is all we have so far received, as in Kissinger on 
. , 110 ,Kissinger, of his work as Assistant for National Security Affairs.
The list of what might be termed 'Watergate' books books is already ex­
tensive and not by any means complete. One of the more recently published 
has been that by one of the most important figures of the Nixon years - 
H.R. Hal deman. To the extent that his book The Ends of Power111 ranges 
more widely than Watergate alone it will retain its relevance and interest. 
Perhaps the most common type of 'Watergate' book has been the personal
autobiography. For example, Jeb Stuart Magruder's An American Life:
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One Man's Road to Watergate, included a resume of his early life before 
devoting most of its attention to his work in the Nixon Administration, 
with particular emphasis on his role in Watergate. The tone was one of 
mea culpa as he sought to explain how the Nixon Administration came to 
behave as it did. This tone was also prominent in a discussion with his 
former professor at Williams College which was later published under the 
tltle Reflections on a Course in Ethics.113
Where Magruder's book intended to account for his personal development,
John W. Dean III, by contrast, sought to give only a political account 
°f his years in the Nixon Administration, mostly spent as Counsel to the 
President. This he called Blind Ambition: The White House Years.
Although orientated towards Watergate Dean nevertheless provided much 
valuable information about the operation of the Nixon White House staff.
Re was certainly in a position to view at close hand both the middle­
ranking and top level as his career carried him 'upwards' from one to the 
other.
Unique among presidential administrations was the role played by testimony
126 -
in the Nixon years. This took various forms. Firstly, there was the 
regular run-of-the-mill testimony before congressional committees which 
is a standard feature of political life in any Administration. Of 
especial interest to the present study, for example were the congressional 
Hearings held on President Nixon’s Reorganization Proposals which were 
submitted in 1971. These included testimony given by Roy Ash, who had 
supervised the preparation of the reorganization proposals, before a sub­
committee of the Committee on Government Operations. Ash later became a 
senior Assistant to the President. Such testimony covered many of the 
problems a President faces in administering the Executive Branch and how 
he could best organize his White House staff. These Hearings116 consti­
tute prime evidence of its own legitimate kind.
The distinctive aspect of testimony as a way of acquiring knowledge about 
the White House staff from the staff itself was most prominently displayed 
during Watergate. Two congressional committees in particular were 
responsible: firstly, the Ervin Committee (or Watergate Committee); and
secondly the Judiciary Committee. They operated in 1973 and 1974 res­
pectively and were both very fruitful in eliciting information. To give 
examples, both H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman appeared before Senator 
Ervin s Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. In both cases 
they were questioned about their regular work in the White House as well 
38 their Part in the Watergate affair. These Hearings117 can be con­
sidered substitutes for the in-depth interviews which these two men never 
gave while they actually worked in the White House. Other members of the 
taff called to give evidence were John W. Dean III116 and Alexander P. 
utterfield, together with a host of other figures involved in the
Watergate affair.
One year after the Ervin Committee had conducted the most publicized part
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of its investigations the House Judiciary Committee was preparing its case 
for impeachment. It held extensive Hearings.119 preliminary to its final 
deliberations, which were devoted to collecting the testimony of certain 
witnesses. Among these were former members of the Nixon White House staff 
such as John Dean,120 Alexander Butterfield,121 and Charles Colson.122 
Never before had Congress directed such detailed questions as to the 
organization and operation of the White House, and the information obtained 
was greatly illuminating.
There remain certain other modes of expression in which the Nixon White 
House staff have indulged. Firstly, some have occasionally given inter­
views to the Press; for example, Alexander M. Haig Jr.,123 Kenneth R.
Cole Jr., or William Timmons.125 Secondly, others have penned short
critiques, such as Clark Mollenhoff’s Reflections of a Muckraker126 or
127Cole's Should Departments and Agencies Be More Independent? Thirdly, 
the present writer has been able to conduct a number of interviews.128
Turning finally to the Ford White House staff, it would be unrealistic 
(at the time of writing) to expect much as yet in the way of reminiscence. 
But the record while in office was creditable. During Ford’s early days 
as President, interviews held with his senior staff discussed how he 
Planned to operate his White House staff. For example, three of Ford's 
most senior aides, Robert Hartmann, Philip Buchen and John Marsh, were 
interviewed on the subject in How Ford Runs The White House,128a An 
interesting statement was made by Ford's original Press Secretary, Jerry 
terHorst, in his article entitled Where Team Loyalty Stops.129 Without 
doubt, however, the most significant development to emerge from the Ford 
White House in this connexion was the holding of a Press Conference130
given by an Assistant to the President, Donald H. Rumsfeld, specifically
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on the subject of "White House Organization". This was the first time 
anything like it had been attempted. It was certainly an authoritative 
briefing on the subject, as Rumsfeld was at that time serving as Ford's 
Chief of Staff. As such, it can be classified as prime evidence for our 
purposes, of presidential intentions.
CONCLUSIONS
This concludes our analysis of the body of literature that has been pro­
duced over the years by the members of the White House staff themselves.
It remains merely to emphasize a few general points. Firstly, certain 
distinctions should always be borne in mind between the senior staff of 
a President and those who served at the middle-rank or junior-rank level. 
Although these distinctions cannot be appropriate for every President’s 
staff, for the simple reason that The White House Office in its early 
days was too small a body to be susceptible to distinctions of this kind, 
they nevertheless began to emerge under Eisenhower. Subsiding somewhat 
under Kennedy, they came to the fore again by the end of the 1960s, where­
upon they became one of the dominant characteristics of the Nixon and Ford 
White House staffs. Neither have they by any means disappeared under 
Carter.
Secondly, we should recognise that each staff contribution should primarily 
he judged according to the position he or she held and the President served 
under. This is only to state the obvious . Our judgement must be based not 
°nly on what he or she may have been expected to know (which would depend 
on his or her job) but also on what the President wanted him or her to do 
(which would depend on how he organized his staff) .
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Thirdly, we must make due allowance for the length of time the staff mem­
ber served on the staff. This, too, is a straightforward point. The most 
authoritative staff judgements are concomitant upon having gained suffi­
cient experience. This generally means they have served a reasonable 
length of time. Turnover among staff members is often high and it can 
be difficult to assign a definitive meaning to the phrase 'reasonable 
length of time'. What is not in dispute is that any staff member who has 
worked closely with a President for many years, (and this may well predate 
his presidency) , is in a superior position to judge the interaction be­
tween the President's ideas, his style, working methods, and organization 
of his staff.
Fourthly, another obvious point which should be spelt out is that any staff 
member's writing is bound to reflect his or her own background. These 
backgrounds have varied considerably. It is only natural, therefore, that 
Reedy's Twilight of the Presidency should betray his journalistic back­
ground and training, while Schlesinger's 1000 Days should reflect his 
academic and historical credentials. This is not necessarily to prejudge 
what they have to offer, for it is not their backgrounds alone that deter­
mine what they are likely to tell us about the nature of the White House 
staff. But it helps to explain the different approach each may take.
Before turning to the journalistic or academic approach we have yet to deal 
with two other groups which can be classified as participant, albeit 
obliquely: members of the Cabinet and members of Congress. Both groups 
®re in a position to observe the staff in operation at first hand.
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CABINET
The rise in volume of literature emanating from the White House staff has 
been in marked contrast to the dearth of such writings from Cabinet officers 
and other government officials. The question is: why? Cabinet memoirs 
have never, at the best of times, been as regular a feature of the corpus 
of American political literature as has been the case, for example, in 
Britain. But any explanation for this difference must go deeper than 
simple comparisons of this kind. The truth appears broadly to be that 
the rise in White House staff 'publishability' has been accompanied by a 
corresponding decline in the 'publishability' of Cabinet members. The 
sole exception here would appear to be the writings of former Secretaries 
of State. To this extent it reflects the rise of the White House staff 
and decline of the Cabinet as instruments of Presidential Government.
The Cabinet was still the dominant force in President Roosevelt’s Adminis­
tration, even if only considered as a collection of individuals rather 
than as a coherent group. Forty years on, in President Nixon's 
Administration, another collection of individuals had by and large sup­
planted the Cabinet officers in terms of influence, in terms of their 
place in the decision-making process, and in terms of their closeness 
to the President. Moreover, as the White House staff, they functioned 
far more as a coherent group than did the Cabinet. As Cabinet officers 
moved towards the outer orbit of Presidential decision-making their indi­
vidual perspective inevitably became more compartmentalised, more bureau­
cratic; in short, more parochial. Many factors were responsible for 
this supplanting of the one group by the other, which we discuss else­
where. For the moment we are concerned only with its effect on the
literature.
The instances of books by Cabinet officers or other government officials
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11)6 * "stances of books by Cabinet officers or other government officials
131
on the workings of the Presidency are sparse. Such books as have 
appeared since the 1930s have progressively had less to offer on the 
organization of the White House and on presidential decision-making in 
proportion to the greater distance of their authors from the subject. In 
addition, much of the glamour of involvement in a Presidential Adminis­
tration has been transferred from members of the Cabinet to members of 
the President's staff. The latter's closer proximity to the President 
has enormously enhanced their own 'publishability'. This should not of 
itself have diminished the appeal or relevance of writings by Cabinet 
officers. But it may well not be a coincidence that this dearth is a 
consequence of a declining ability to leaven the details of implementing 
presidential policy with a valid claim to the presidential perspective.
It should not be surprising, therefore, to discover that, for our purposes, 
such writing as does exist tends to date from the beginning of our period. 
For example, one of the best books written by a Cabinet officer is that by 
Frances Perkins entitled The Roosevelt I Knew.131 She served as President 
Roosevelt's Secretary of Labor for the entire duration of his presidency. 
What she can tell us about Roosevelt's personal life-style, his liking 
for people of all kinds, his political techniques, his methods of speech­
writing, and even such personal facets as his memory, all have a bearing 
on Roosevelt's approach to his staff. In some ways she is unique in having 
enjoyed the confidence of the President for so long a period and having 
Sot to know him as a person as well as a political figure.
a very different vein comes the book by Walter J. Hickel called 
jifeLPwns America?132 Until his much publicized "resignation in the 
summer of 1970 he was President Nixon’s Secretary of the Interior. It 
Ruickly became clear, and was confirmed in his book, that he certa y
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. ,ov the confidence of the President and that the feeling was did not enjuy
mutual For his part, Hickel has much to say on the way he feels 
government should be conducted at the centre and he argues strongly for 
a strengthened Cabinet and renewed influence of the Cabinet form of 
government. By so doing he naturally directed his most trenchant criti­
cism against what he saw as a damaging system of White House staff domi­
nance. Two things can be said of Hickel: namely, that his line of 
argument correctly identified the friction between his views and those 
of his President; and that in the ensuing confrontation the President
won hands down.
If Hickel represented one extreme of the Nixon Cabinet then perhaps it 
could be argued that Elliot Richardson represented another - that of 
the Cabinet officer who did everything possible to work with, rather 
than against, the President's White House. Richardson was prepared to 
accept what this involved (until Watergate) , as he made clear in an 
interview with the present writer.133 Yet his published book The Creative 
Balance 134 did not deal with any of these questions in detail but was 
more a work of political philosophy.
Other writings by former Cabinet officers which are of use would include
the Diaries135 of Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior, and
Cordell Hull's Memoirs136 w h ich  r e c o r d e d  h i s  s e r v i c e  u n d e r  t h e  same
President as Secretary of State. Even more stately were Dean Ache
137
memoirs, ostentatiously titled Present At the Creation. It is note 
worthy that these date from earlier Presidencies than from later ones.
presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson produced no outpouring of literary 
or political writing by Cabinet officials comparable to that of thei 
^fts. Adam Yarmolinsky, a Deputy Secretary of Defense, had something
132
dd not enjoy the confidence of the President and that the feeling was 
mutual For his part, Hickel has much to say on the way he feels 
government should be conducted at the centre and he argues strongly for 
a strengthened Cabinet and renewed influence of the Cabinet form of 
government. By so doing he naturally directed his most trenchant criti­
cism against what he saw as a damaging system of White House staff domi­
nance. Two things can be said of Hickel: namely, that his line of 
argument correctly identified the friction between his views and those 
of his President; and that in the ensuing confrontation the President
won hands down.
If Hickel represented one extreme of the Nixon Cabinet then perhaps it 
could be argued that Elliot Richardson represented another - that of 
the Cabinet officer who did everything possible to work with, rather 
than against, the President's White House. Richardson was prepared to 
accept what this involved (until Watergate) , as he made clear in an 
interview with the present writer.133 Yet his published book The Creative 
Balance 134 did not deal with any of these questions in detail but was 
more a work of political philosophy.
Other writings by former Cabinet officers which are of use would include
the Diaries135 of Harold Ickes, Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior, and
Cordell H u l l ’ s M em oirs136 w h ich  r e c o r d e d  h i s  s e r v i c e  u n d e r  t h e  same
President as Secretary of State. Even more stately were Dean Acheso
137memoirs, ostentatiously titled Present At the Creation. It is note
»°rthy that these date from earlier Presidencies than from later ones.
The Presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson produced no outpouring of literary 
°r political writing by Cabinet officials comparable to that of their 
st»«s. Adam Yarmolinsky, a Deputy Secretary of Defense, had something
133
138to say about his experience of government, while his former chief 
Robert McNamara produced a rather dry 'memoir' called The Essence of 
Security139 which was really no more than a collection of some of his 
speeches and other public statements dating from the 1960s. A more sub­
stantial work was produced by George Ball, a former Under Secretary of 
State, entitled Democracy in a Crowded World. B u t  neither dealt with 
the White House staff in any detail.
In conclusion, there is a paucity of information on the White House staff 
from Cabinet members. Despite the still influential aspects of certain 
Cabinet posts, and that they are often well placed to observe the operation 
of the staff, the fact is that very few members of any President's Cabinet 
have committed themselves to print. Moreover, contributions from this 
source have deteriorated as the staff have grown and developed.
C O N G R E S S
Although very separate from the Cabinet, members of Congress should be 
included here in recognition of their importance. In the course of day- 
to-day affairs they generally do not come into contact with the White 
House staff - with the exception of the congressional relations staff. 
But Congress is the only body constitutionally capable of calling the 
White House staff to account. We should therefore consider what contri­
bution members of Congress have made towards our understanding of the 
staff.
For very many years the only institutional point of contact between 
Congress and the staff lay in the former’s responsibility for the
134
propriations lor The White House Office and other items of staff support
to the President. To get any idea of recent congressional attitudes or
opinions thus involves an examination of the subcommittee chairmanships
141of men like Congressman Tom Steed in the House or Senators Ralph 
Yarborough142 and Joseph Montoya143 in the Senate. The years of succes­
sive Hearings144 which these men and their predecessors conducted annually 
have produced a corpus of raw material which has progressively become indis­
pensable as a guide to the outward form, structure and resources of the 
White House staff. This is not to say that such raw material has been 
exhaustive - certainly not - nor even that it has been regularly provided; 
only that it must be regarded as prime information for this study.
In recent years Congress has taken more of an interest in the White House
staff and this has led to greater congressional enquiry and activity on
the subject. One result has been a widening range of available information
For example, Congressman Udall's 1972 Report on The Growth of the Executive
Office 1955-1973.145 Udall has also been closely involved with legislation
to put the White House staff on a proper legal and authorized basis, and
these congressional efforts have spawned a variety of congressional views
on the staff. These include the views expressed by Congressmen Howard W.
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Robison,146 Tom Steed,147 Thaddeus J. Dulski,148 James R. Jones,
Herbert E. Harris II,150 Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder,151 and Morris K. 
Mall himself.152
Other forms in which congressional interest has been made manifest 
the preparation by the Congressional Research Service of such volumes as 
Sg«L_Can The Federal Political System Be Improved?153 And Resolved: That 
the_Powers of the Presidency should be Curtailed. More specialised is
^Siitng in the Whtte House Office155 prepared by Harold C. Relyea.
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The GAO have also contributed in the form of a Report of the Comptroller
General entitled Improvements Needed In Accounting System Operations156
regarding the White House Office. Examples of helpful background material
157would include Bernard Rosen's The Merit System in the US Civil Service.
Occasionally there has been a perceptive contribution by a congressional
158staff assistant: for example from Howard Shuman - Administrative 
Assistant successively to two distinguished Senators, Douglas and Proxmire.
\ihile some Congressmen but hinted at their contact with the staff, as in
159Senator Hubert Humphrey’s The Education of a Public Man, others have
consciously devoted more attention to it. Walter Mondale, for example,
160while still a Senator, published The Accountability of Power in which 
he specifically addressed himself to the unconstitutional transference 
of power from the Cabinet to the White House staff and what should be done 
to remedy the situation. His contribution stands as one of the most 
deeply felt statements ever to emanate from Congress.
In conclusion we can point to one development in recent years that has had 
its impact on the literature. The greater interest that Congress has taken 
in the White House staff has flushed into the open sharp divergences of 
opinion which have enriched our understanding of the staff as a 
body not susceptible to precise accountability. On the other han , 
writings on the staff by members of Congress tend to be closely tied to 
instances of noticeable abuse; or are governed by the prevaili g 
to the President. For both reasons the flow of literature from members of 
Congress is uneven.
136 -
The next most immediate group in our progression away from the White House 
must be the Press and media. Not only are both close to the scene of the 
action but they are themselves the means whereby the action is relayed to 
the wider public. Certainly it comes into more frequent contact with the 
White House staff than any other single political group.
Despite their close proximity to the White House the Press claim to main­
tain an objective perspective in their work. This claim is very much a 
matter for argument, nor can it be judged except in a relative way. For 
example, by the very nature of their work their criteria for objectivity 
must differ markedly from that of academic historians. But discussions 
about their degree of objectivity tend to bypass the single most important 
contribution that the Press and media have made to the study of the White 
House staff: they have publicized it. In some respects it was the Press 
which first recognised, sometimes intuitively, the growing importance of 
the staff. Partly this is explained by the simple fact that the Press 
came to realise how useful the staff were as political sources of inform­
ation about a Presidential Administration. Knowledge is power - especially 
in Washington D.C. It should not be surprising that the Press should have 
come to regard the hand that fed them the more important knowledge as the 
more important power. Partly this came about because of the very emphasis 
that the Press naturally place on the short-term and the sense of 
immediacy - an emphasis which both explains the great contribution the 
Press have made to understanding the White House staff and simultaneously 
describes its limitations.
Press interest in the White House staff, which had always existed with 
respect to certain individuals, took on a new form with the advent of the
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Kennedy Administration. Attention began to be focused on how the staff 
operated as a collective entity and how this related to the President him­
self. From their position of privileged observer the Press searched for 
clues of all kinds which they thought might prove useful in constructing 
this picture. As a result they collected and recorded information about 
the way the White House was run under successive Presidents that no-one 
else was collecting. Much of this is highly useful and valid evidence.
But there are difficulties. First, this process of collection tends to 
be unsystematic. Second, the Press and media tend to concentrate on the 
"immediate" rather than the "analytical" angle. They are dominated by the 
day to day march of events. But one major effect of this attitude is a 
decided emphasis on personalities, the small day-to-day conflicts between 
personalities, and the clash of situations. The Press are dominated by 
their desire to explain the political process in terms of the individual 
personalities that happen at any one time to occupy the political stage. 
Presidential choices and political conflicts, their resolution or esca­
lation, are presented as the outcome of personality struggles, often be­
tween different members of the White House staff. Naturally the result 
can be sterile political comment. Fortunately this is not always the case.
This category of Press and media should rightfully be divided between the 
Press proper and the media. Although the transmitted image of the latter 
can be more powerful than the written word of the former, the Press have 
contributed the overwhelming majority share of the total output on the 
White House staff. Within that heading of 'the Press' we can distinguish 
lurther subdivisions. For example, the primary subdivision from our point 
of view consists of the White House Press Corps. This is the body of men 
a»d women whose lives are specifically devoted to a study of everything 
that m°ves in the White House. They are not geared to regard policy
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decisions, administrative procedures, political options, personality 
clashes or presidential schedules as separate categories of political 
reporting. They see their job as discovering what links them all together. 
Their daily routine is completely circumscribed by the Press briefings 
given by the Press Secretary. It is principally through the White House 
Press Corps that information about the White House and its staff are 
channelled. This is also where the relationship between Press and staff 
can be at its most incestuous. The result is a stream of information and 
comment - some more trivial than the rest. The Press Corps are capable of 
paying the strictest attention to whose White House Office is where; how 
far it is from the Oval Office; who is in favour; who has the greatest 
access to the President; between whom on the staff does the tension really 
lie; what battles are waged for the President's ear; how the staff is 
organized; and which staffers are the most senior and influential.
The best example of a journalist in recent years who has both recognised
that these matters can be important and yet has combined them with serious
political analysis is John Osborne of The New Republic. His work took the
161form of a continuous series of reports which he entitled The Nixon Watch.
They appeared almost weekly during the Nixon Presidency and have survived
beyond it. During those years, despite the fact that the staff was at its
“lost inaccessible, Osborne produced a steady stream of reports which sought
to analyse the way in which President Nixon was organizing his White House
162 c a  163staff. These reports included A Faithful Servant, Kicking Sand,
SSSSlSta«,164 Discipline and Order,165 Who's Who,166 Henry's Wonderful
j?*ghlne,167 White House Staff.168 Daddy Dick,169 Games With T°Rg£ ■ and
¿tjdng With Henry 17 1 Osborne also dealt with the relationship between
172the staff and Cabinet officials, as in Secretary Richardson, and
jjjssinger and t w » ™  173 Having amassed considerable skill in deciphering
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the
White House scene, Osborne continued his series of investigations 
President Ford. Examples of his work in this period includedunder
175 X 76settling In,174 Ford's Image Machine, and And So To Bed. It re­
mains to be seen whether the special expertise which Osborne acquired 
during the years of Republican Administration is necessary in the new
atmosphere of the Carter White House, although he (Osborne) made a start
177 178with such pieces as Would-Be Transition, and Changing The Guard.
At all events he has been invaluable as a guide to the Nixon White House
as seen through journalistic eyes and was among the first to recognise
the importance of the way Nixon organized his staff to an understanding
179of the way decisions were made.
Apart from those members of the Press that primarily concentrate on the
White House come a special group of journalists that might be termed the
Washington ' h e a v i e s ' :  t h e  m a jo r  s y n d i c a t e d  c o l u m n i s t s .  They d e s e r v e
mention because in the world of the Press, where there is an undeniable
herd instinct (well described in Drury's Capable of Honour, see below),
the major columnists are allowed to become very influential leaders of
general Press opinion. For example, James Reston is one that comes to
mind although his book The Artillery of the Press180 only marginally refers
to the staff. Reston was once described by another well-known Washington
reporter, Joseph Kraft, in a chapter entitled Washington's Most Powerful
ffSBorter. from Kraft’s book Profiles in Power.181 Kraft himself is
another example. He has shown a sensibility to questions of White House
182
organization in such articles as Kennedy and the Intellectuals^ The
I* o Worlds of McGeorge Bundy, 183 and Presidential Politics In— LBJ 
¿iZie-184 Kraft was one of the first journalists ever to write 
specifically about the way in which a President organized his White House 
staff, as in his article Kennedy's Working Staff. He continued
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place importance on this subject, and his treatment of the Ford staff
system played a prominent part in his analysis of President Ford’s first
186
full year in office, entitled The Rising of Lowered Expectations.
Hugh Sidey has been another journalist who has made a particular living
from a study of the Presidency. His two major books, JFK: Portrait of a
188
President187 and A Very Personal Presidency: LBJ in the White House,
both exhibit an awareness of the way in which each President sought to
maintain their grip on the staff. Indeed Sidey asserted that Johnson’s
political decline could be mirrored in the decline of his staff. Press
heavyweights do not always write singly, and Rowland Evans and Robert D.
Novak must stand as an example of one of the most successful writing
partnerships of recent years. In addition to their books on Johnson and
Nixon, LBJ: The Exercise of Power (subtitled "A Political Biography )
190
and Nixon in the White House: The Frustration of Power, Evans and 
Novak occasionally devoted their attention to the staff situation in the 
White House. This sometimes appeared to have an effect. For example, in 
their feature article entitled Mr. Ford's Advisers: General Haig Must 
Go,181 they reflected a strand of thinking which was shortly to prevail.
Another figure in this group is Theodore H. White, who achieved his 
reputation on the basis of a series of books chronicling successive 
presidential campaigns. In The Making of the President series there 
can be detected a growing emphasis on the way the staff, usually the cam 
Paign staff, worked with the candidate. With the tendency for any 
President's campaign staff to form the nucleus of his subsequent White 
»ouse staff White’s emphasis on this area assumed greater importance. But 
the breakthrough in White’s awareness finally came with his book on 
President Nixon’s demise, The Fal1 °f R1Ch-~-
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Nixon 193 The organization of the White House played a crucial part in 
his unravelling of the Watergate story and his own ideas of how it all 
came about.
This does not complete the list of senior Press figures as the boundaries
between 'regular* journalists and the 'heavyweights' are blurred. Up and
coming political journalists in the latter category might include Anthony
Lewis. He too devoted some attention to the staff, as in his 1976
194'transition' articles, of which Faces Old and New was an example.
Another emerging contender in this group is Robert B. Semple Jr. , a lead­
ing political writer for The New York Times. His credentials for inclusion
here are a reflection of articles such as "Nixon 1: Major Reshuffle At 
195White House".
Apart from the individual heavyweights another subdivision should be made 
to account for the collective heavyweights of the Press: namely, the 
political weekly magazines and other political periodicals of note. Such 
publications include TIME, NEWSWEEK, US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, the NATIONAL JOURNAL and WASHINGTON MONTHLY.
Space does not permit a full listing of the articles printed in these
political magazines on the White House staff. But some examples should b
mentioned. At the outset it should be noted that coverage of White House
affairs began to climb sharply during the Watergate period. Thus US NEWS
AND world REPORT ran articles entitled Watergate Fallout - Government in
Hjarrajr,196 What's Ahead for the White House,197 New Battles Inside The —---------------- —
jfafte House.198 Inside The White House: How Nixon Runs things Now, 
llgU h e  White Hnnae Is Being Run After The Big Shake-Up, and Who_s
¿Lghgrge At The ^  House?201 US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT did not
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confine its coverage to the impact of Watergate, To its credit it was
among the earliest of political magazines to print serious articles on
the subject of the staff. For example, Nixon's Top Command: Expanding 
202in Size, Power, was written well before the Watergate era had begun.
So too did it devote attention to the Nixon second-term reorganization
203
proposals, with articles such as Behind Nixon's Reorganization and
204
Nixon Names His Take-Over Team.
The pattern is broadly repeated for TIME and NEWSWEEK. For example,
during Watergate TIME ran stories entitled The White House: Who's In
205Charge There? while NEWSWEEK reciprocated with articles on the
206 207 . .. . ...'Berlin Wall' Inside The Nixon White House, and even on the staff s
208staff as in Henry's Little Kissingers. Once these magazines had
developed their taste for political writing on the staff during the Nixon 
Presidency they continued to indulge it in their treatment of his suc­
cessors. While US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT published How Ford Runs The
White House.209 and After Six Months - The Team in Power at the White 
210House. TIME and NEWSWEEK were also producing their own accounts.
It has been noted that the vast majority of such articles date from the 
Nixon Presidency but not prior to it. The only political journal to have 
devoted any real attention to the White House staff before Nixon’s arrival 
in office was the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, and its sister (annually pro­
duced) publication the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC. As far back as
211 t h
1961, under the heading President Kennedy's Major Appointments, lc
ALMANAC listed the top White House staff together with brief biographies 
nnd job descriptions. This process was repeated on an annual basis be 
ginning with President Johnson. In 1964, for example, the senior staff 
*ere named, with special reference to the changeover between Kennedy's
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213and Johnson's men.212 In succeeding years the ALMANAC monitored the 
^ite House staff and its turnover, taking upon itself a responsibility 
to identify the senior staff. Information as to their job descriptions 
was often more elucidating than the official version.
By 1967, as evidenced in the article Turnover of White House Staff Aides
is High,214 the staff was firmly on the agenda of the ALMANAC'S political
roundup. The following year's article, 43 Top Aides Served President 
215Johnson Since 1963, was accompanied by the first ’post-mortem' analysis
of a President’s White House staff. Shortly after the Nixon Administration
had got under way the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY Weekly Report produced an
introductory article entitled White House Staff Covers Broad Range of
Views. w h i l e  the Almanac of that year was headlined Nixon Calls On
217Specialists To Help Make Up Staff. The attempt (not very successful
in hindsight) to analyse the organization of the staff, not just to des-
218cribe it, was carried on year by year. Nixon's resignation did not
219end this process.
There were also occasional articles in the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY GUIDE,
a special publication on American Government. For example, during the
Watergate p e r i o d ,  t h e  m a ga zin e  made i t s  f i r s t  a t t e m p t  a t  a s e r i o u s
analysis of the position and power of the White House staff. This was
220
entitled Watergate Spurs Moves To Curb White House Powers. This was
sometimes supplemented by in-depth articles on certain sections of the
staff, most notably (and obviously) on the congressional liaison side:
221
for example, The White House Persuaders: Timmons And His Team. How"
ever, this is not to say that it did not also produce articles of the 
®ore Personalised TIME and NEWSWEEK variety, such as In The Wake of 
^tgrgate: A New Whit.« House Staff.222 But at least CONGRESSIONAL
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QUARTERLY usually made the attempt to treat the White House staff
223
seriously, as in Reorganization: A Super Cabinet and Super Assistants, 
even if its analysis of what was going on was not always accurate.
Other serious political magazines have gradually begun to take an 
interest in the White House staff. For example, the NATIONAL JOURNAL pro­
duced an excellent analysis of Nixon’s congressional relations policy in
224
June 1970 entitled Nixon Deals Cautiously With Hostile Congress. It
was also responsible for in-depth profiles, such as Charles W. Colson:
225
President’s Liaison With The Outside World, written in August of that
same year. The magazine WASHINGTON MONTHLY is another example, with
226 ,
such articles as Collecting Merit Badges: The White House Fellows and
Tying The Imperial Purse Strings.227 This latter reflected a growing
Press awareness of the financial aspects and implications of staff growth.
228
FORTUNE magazine's The Management Problem In Ford's White House was 
another serious study - in its own business-oriented manner.
There has been one particular kind of contribution that the Press have
made to our understanding of the White House: the occasional record made
of a President's working day. This is good raw material around which to
build up our picture of a President's routine and working methods.
Examples of this kind of journalistic enterprise include John Hersey's
Forty-eight Hours.229 which took two days in the life of President Truman.
(Hersey was himself a Staff Assistant to Charles Murphy, Truman s Special
Counsel on the White House staff.) Hersey made something of a speciality
of this technique, for nearly a quarter of a century later he repeated the
230
same idea in President At Work: Sitting In With Ford. Other examp 
°f the genre include Ten O'clock Meeting,231 (also about Truman), 
gggsidential D«v 232 which took Eisenhower as its subject; Working at
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Night
Courage
233 which formed part of a study of Nixon's working methods, as did 
234 _ .................„ . . .. 235And Hesitation; The Working White House, A Day in the
T.ife of the President,236 based around Ford; and A Day in the Life of
President Carter.237 A s im ila r approach, but a rrived  at in a very
238
different manner, was provided by Alexander Butterfield’s Testimony 
before the House Judiciary Committee in the summer of 1974. But surely 
the unbeatable record to end all records is that stored away in the endless 
reels of tape recording made in the Nixon White House.
Turning now to other Press contributions on the White House staff we will 
take first those journalistic books and articles that primarily concern a 
particular President or Presidency, and leave till later those that pri­
marily concern a particular political issue. Comment on individual
Presidents tends to date only from the Truman period. Comment on the staff 
as individuals tends to predominate over the staff as a collective unit.
In this connexion, two pieces on Truman should be mentioned. The first, by
239
Elmer Davis entitled Harry S. Truman and the Verdict of Histoi^r, was
something of a general roundup on his presidential years. The second was
more personal and somewhat more useful in assessing the nature of the
organizing those around him. W ritten  by E r ic  Severeid , i t  was ca lled
The Man In The White House.240 From the Eisenhower years there was Charles
J-V. Murphy’s Eisenhower's White House,241 James Reston's interesting
investigation e n t it le d  The Presidency: The E f fect o f Eisenhower s Illn ess
°5_the Functioning of the Executive Branch,241& and William V. Shannon s
242
gigenhower As President: A C r it ic a l  Appraisal o f the Record. Somt
243
thing can even be gleaned from Drew Pearson 's D iaries 1949 1959.
The upsurge o f Press comment on the Presidency and the White House dated 
effective ly  from the accession to  power o f President Kennedy. A whole host
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of articles began to appear purporting to bear, in whole or in part, on 
the way Kennedy was thought to be running the White House. Great empha­
sis was laid, too, on the style of the man, and on the interaction of
this style with the staff around him. For example, among the many early
244articles were those by Douglass Cater, A New Style, A New Tempo, How
245 ,Mr. Kennedy Gets the Answers by Sidney Hyman, and The Men Around
JFK246 by Karl E. Meyer. After Kennedy's assassination it was not long
before the Kennedy Myth began to take hold. This prompted a steady flow
of journalistic comment and analysis-by-hindsight, some complimentary and
some rather less so. These included Benjamin C. Bradlee's Conversations
With Kennedy.247 The Kennedy Promise'*'*” by Henry Fairlie, Jack Newfield’s248
Bread And Roses Too,249 and William M a n c h e s t e r ’ s Portrait o f  a President. 250
When President Johnson succeeded Kennedy Press attention, naturally enough,
turned towards the President's relationship with Congress and the methods
he employed to keep their attitude favourable. For example, LBJj— The
Exercise of Power251 by Evans and Novak, William Chapman's LBJ's— Way.:
Tears. Not Arm-Twists .252 Alan L. Otten's By Courting Congress Assiduously.
Johnson Furthers His Program,253 or his later article Criticism of Presi-
254
dent's Style, Methods Mounts Among Small But Important Group. Attention 
was focused on Johnson's sometimes overbearing personality, as in James 
Reston's What's He Like? And How Will He Do?255 or Carrol Kilpatrick's 
Often Moody. Defensive.256 Not least, the Press exhibited their pre­
datory interest in the way Johnson 'used' those staff around him. For
M.257example, Tom Wicker's Johnson's Men: "Valuable Hunks of Humanity ;
Ihe_"Inner, Inner Circle" Around Johnson258 by Ben H. Bagdikian, West 
HSfi_Story,259 Presidential Politics in LBJ Style,259Sand The Two Worlds 
°f_McGeorge Bundy 260 The latter three were among Joseph Kraft s 
collected articles reproduced in Profiles in Power.261 Douglass Cater's
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262Pnwfty in Washington followed a similar format.
Whatever interest the Press had begun to develop in the White House 
staff per se since the Kennedy era now experienced, paradoxically, both 
a setback and a quantum leap forward with the arrival of President Nixon. 
The former was largely accounted for by the atmosphere - both real and 
apparent - of inaccessibility to the workings of the Nixon White House. 
The latter can be explained to a degree by the same reason when added to 
the challenge of realising that the President really did prefer to run 
the government from the White House and hide his policy-making processes 
from public view. This gradual realisation, although in time it might 
have prompted a wide and serious debate on the role of the White House 
staff, was overtaken by the explosion of Watergate. Watergate had the 
effect of propelling the White House staff to the forefront of public 
attention. The Press now treated the staff as the subject of legitimate 
and regular coverage, both as regards individuals but more important y 
regards its organization by the President.
To give some examples, early Press comment on the Nixon Administrat'
quickly reflected the atmosphere of inaccessibility, although this
at first more politely referred to as privacy: thus Robert B. Se p
A Passion For Order And Privacy, Don Oberdorfer s The Presidency
Still Very Private After First Year,264 and John Pierson's Presidential
Isolation Is Part of the Job. 265 The tone of such articles was
generally respectful, as were books on the "new" Nixon such as Jules
Witcover's The Resurrection of Richard Nixon,26 or William Safire s
268
g£_e on Nixon .267 others were serious, such as Nixon Agonistes >V 
Garry Wills, Nixon in the White House269 (subtitled "The Frustration
Power") by Evans and Novak, or Nixon's Head270 by Arthur Woodstone
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The latter two began to recognise the real importance of Nixon’s staff 
to his Presidency.
Hand in hand went an appreciation that the new President wanted an
orderly process of decision-making: for example, The Nixon Style:
271
President Seeks Order in his Decision-Making But Events Intrude. His
decided preference was first noticed on the foreign affairs side where 
the Kissinger machine adopted very orderly working methods. This was duly 
reflected in such articles as Robert B. Semple's Nixon Staff Had Central 
Role in Missile Decision.272 During the later part of the pre-Watergate 
Presidency it fell to the major political weekly magazines to develop 
this interest further, although they could not match the single-handed 
efforts of John Osborne.
With the experience of the Nixon years under their belt, Press treatment 
of the Ford Administration, after the initial euphoria had worn off with 
the Nixon Pardon, betrayed a greater maturity of judgement where White House 
staff matters were concerned. This derived from a much better understand 
ing of the workings of the White House staff developed during Watergate.
It also benefited from the fact that, while Ford strove to release him­
self from the harness of the Nixon White House staff system, vestiges of 
that system remained in place, virtually intact, for the remainder o 
Ford Presidency. The Press were therefore familiar with the basic com 
ponent parts of the Ford White House and did not have to go through the 
Process of unlearning and rediscovery which usually accompanies a change 
of Presidency. This they have had to do since the arrival of 
Carter.
This new-found maturity of judgement generally found expression in a
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growing concentration on the problems of managing the White House. But 
the trivial personalised approach to the White House staff did not dis­
appear. One need only glance, for example, at the "Washington Whispers" 
column in US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT to see that there was still a steady 
stream of political comment devoted to interpreting the President's 
political options merely in terms of a battle of personalities between 
staff members. But higher standards existed elsewhere. The regular
White House specialists continued to write, such as John Osborne. Whether
273it was his regular column White House Watch, or particular pieces such 
as Ford’s Image Machine,274 or the relationship between President and 
Vice President in More About Rocky,275 Osborne was consistently intelli­
gent in his writing. The major weekly news and political magazines con­
ducted periodic surveys into the Ford staff system, such as US NEWS AND
276WORLD REPORT’S After 6 Months - The Team in Power at the White House.
The influence of the Nixon Administration and its practices was perhaps 
nowhere more clearly felt than in the belief that at the heart of the 
Ford White House staff system must stand an all-important "Chief of Staff" 
who could be regarded as primus inter pares, if not primus alone. There 
was some substance to this notion as we shall see in later chapters. The 
first indication of Press treatment along these lines came nine months 
after Ford took office. This was in itself significant compared to the 
pattern of reassessment after the first nine months of other presidencies, 
including Kennedy's and Nixon’s. A good example here was a series of 
articles written by Lou Cannon, a respected political writer and columnist 
for the Washington Post, the first of which appeared in May 1975 entitled 
jugsfeld - 2nd Most. Powerful Man In Capital.277 This was a reference to
D°nald Rumsfeld, the then Chief of Staff.
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provincial newspapers tended to take the more exotic angle, such as a
hv the Cincinnati Enquirer headed CIA Infiltration of White House, piece Dy
» oncies Charge,278 or the more homespun, as that by Jennifer Schwertman
—* 279
,r11-, P W .  Woman Is Smoothing A Path For the President in the same
paper. By contrast, from the specialist fields, such as Science, emanated
the occasional serious article on the staff from a specialist point of
view, refreshingly devoid of personalities. For example, Toward a Science
Adviser: Round One,280 which appeared in Science News in June 1975.
One other feature of Press comment on Ford's staff must be mentioned as it 
pervaded so much of what was written. It was generally acknowledged that 
President Ford personally was a decent straightforward human being who 
tried to make the Presidency and the White House staff somewhat more open 
and accessible. Opinions as to Ford's competence or clearness of thinking 
and objectives were another matter. These varied from commentator to 
commentator.281 But whether or not anyone could have done equally as 
well, given the "national nightmare" which Nixon had created, should not 
detract from the fact that Ford brought a much needed breath of fresh air 
to the White House for which he was given appropriate credit.
We turn now to particular issues that have prompted Press comment on the
White House staff: primarily Vietnam and Watergate. In one respect they
are complimentary. The former involved the organization of 6
affairs at the White House while the latter concentrated our minds
primarily on the domestic scene. Among the most notable Press contri
282
butions to come out of the Vietnam period were The Pentagon Papers
283
(as prepared by the New York Times) and The Best and the Brightes_t y 
David Halberstam. Their functions were mutually complementary in that 
the former provided raw material essential to the analysis of the
151
Both shed light on the role played by the National Security Advisers on
the White House staff, and this helped to put the emergence and eventual
dominance of Dr. Henry Kissinger in its proper perspective. Kissinger
himself captured the attention of the Press to a considerable degree and
this made itself manifest in such books as Kissinger:— The Uses of_
Power284 by David Landau, and Kissinger by that brotherly pair of
journalists Marvin and Bernard Kalb. Another aspect of the Vietnam
28Gexperience was dealt with in The Politics of Lying and The American 
Police State287 by David Wise. The former concentrated on the White 
House Press Office.
Watergate placed the spotlight on the White House staff as never before, 
and it did so with a great avalanche of Press comment, analysis and criti­
cism which far outweighed anything that had gone before. Among the many
investigative books were those by Lewis Chester and the Sunday Times
288
Insight Team entitled Watergate: The Full Inside Story., Frank
Mankiewicz's Nixon's Road to Watergate, Barry Sussman s The Great Covgr
up: Nixon and the Scandal of Watergate,290 J. Anthony Lukas Nightmare.
The Underside of the Nixon Year,291 Cohen and Witcover s A Heartbeat
Awa^ ,292 Theodore H. White's Breach of Faith,293 and the two books by
294 295
Woodward and Berstein, All The President's Men and The Final Days.
The thirst for instant books was satisfied by the competition between the 
New York Times's End of a Presidency296 and the Washington Post's The Fall 
°f a President.297
>o far we have dealt with journalists from the Press. We now turn to 
f Television journalists. The nature of their output makes discussi 
sre difficult, but we can mention items that have been published in 
sntional form by those whose work has primarily been with
152
Eric Sevareid is an example, although when he edited the book Candidates 
1960 298 he was not the 'heavyweight' anchorman and commentator that he 
later became. A possible anchorman of the 1980s, Dan Rather, co-authored 
one of the few books devoted to the White House staff. Entitled The 
Palace Guard,299 it concentrated mainly on the Nixon Administration. To a 
certain extent, Hugh Sidey and others like him have become TV journalists 
as much as print journalists. The many prime-time programs on TV such as 
"Issues and Answer*', "Face the Nation", "Meet the Press", "60 Minutes", 
or "Agronsky & Co." together represent the major contribution that TV 
journalists make towards political debate. Although these programs may 
well refer, and often do, to individual members of the White House staff 
they do not discuss the staff as a unit.
TV is capable of some things beyond the ability of the conventional Press. 
In this connexion mention must be made of the TV drama "Washington Behind 
Closed Doors" which was produced by the ABC TV network and screened o 
the first time in the autumn of 1977. Its relevance here, besides being 
loosely based on John Erlichman's thinly-veiled book The Company lay 
in its representation of the attitudes, organization and working methods 
of the "Monckton" White House. Insofar as it captured some of the 
essential elements of the Nixon years, this TV dramatization will educate 
more people about the 1970s White House than a whole host of books can 
Possibly hope to do.
Before concluding this section on the Press and media the impact of Jimmy 
Carter's election to the Presidency should be assessed in this 
Candidate Carter specifically made an election and campaign issue out of 
^  size and power of the White House staff and the Press reciprocated by 
regularly monitoring and analysing the structure of the group operating
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und Carter.30 *^ This was made easier because Carter at first went 
out of his way to strip the White House of the restrictive and protective 
atmosphere which characterized the previous years of Republican rule.
Early examples of this greater Press monitoring included the following
301articles: Carter Reviewing Memo on Selecting Top Aides by Edward
302Walsh; Carter Aide Chosen to Guide Transition by James T. Wooten;
Henry F a i r l i e ' s  TrapEings^Power; 303 Ex-Aide To Nixon Advising Carter 
On Executive Reoreanization304 by Robert G. Kaiser, also the author of 
Clash Shakes Carter Transition Team : 305 Concerns About Carter - And His 
Chief Courtier, 306 by Charles Peters, (who had previously co-authored 
Inside The System307) ; and a US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT feature article 
entitled White House Insiders: How They'll Run Things. Magazines
like CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY were to devote considerable attention to 
Carter's White House set-up, as in Carter's Staff: Mondale Near The 
Hub-309 and many other articles. TIME magazine ran cover stories like 
The President's Boys; 310 US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT conducted a survey 
entitled Who's Riding High At The White House? while the WASHINGTON
POST investigated the activities of individuals, as in Carter Image Being
312 All this coverage suggested that the White House staffRemolded
would never stray far from the attention of the Press, and th 
coverage would reflect a more mature understanding of the extent 
the organizational structure of the staff reflected the processes of 
decision-making in the new Carter Administration.
Finally, to underscore the strength (and the limitations) of the Press 
and media's contribution to the study of the White House staff, two publi­
cations deserve special mention: Patrick Anderson's The Presidentas 
Men.313 t, „„o314 edited by Charles Roberts, and Has The President Too Much Power?
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Anderson's book, although mainly descriptive, was the first to be devoted 
to the White House staff alone. The latter book was derived from a sym­
posium on the subject organized by the Washington Journalism Center. At 
that stage it is fair to say the Press were taking the lead in subjecting 
the staff to serious scrutiny. For this pioneering work the Press 
deserve due credit. Certainly it was far ahead of most of the academic 
community in this respect. But this general advantage was matched by a 
corresponding disadvantage. By and large it lacked the capacity for sus­
tained analysis. For this we must look elsewhere and turn our attention 
to the academic community's record.
THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY
The third major category of literature to consider is that emanating from 
the academic community. The amount of writing produced on the American 
political system over the last forty years has been mountainous. But 
relatively little has had any bearing on the White House staff. We will 
examine both those writers who have ignored the staff and those that 
have fully recognised its importance. Of the remaining literature, which 
forms a majority overall, much still tends towards the former attitude 
rather than the latter.
The academic study of politics is conducted at greater remove from that 
of the Press and media. It claims a more rigorous and objective basis. 
Its influence on the prevailing attitudes to politics is very strong 
indeed and for this reason we should consider very carefully what the 
academic community has had to say about the broad question of staff 
support for the President. In order to make this task more manageable
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it is necessary to draw distinctions between students of political science, 
students of public administration and students of political history.
These three groups represent different strains of modern political analy­
sis Their perspectives are also very different. Yet is is precisely 
because the White House unites questions of politics, of administration, 
and of history, that we should consider all these schools of academic
writing.
POLITICAL SCIENCE
By and large political scientists did not take any real interest in the 
White House staff until the Nixon years. Only then, as Watergate unfolded, 
did political scientists rediscover critical faculties which had not yet 
been applied in this area of political life. With literally only a hand­
ful of exceptions their general attitude can be summarized in thi y 
recognition of the staff's existence but not of its significance.
Undoubtedly one reason for this relative lack of interest can be 
to the difficulties of obtaining consistent and reliable information on 
the subject. The systematic analysis that can be applied to most 
tutions of modern American government cannot so easily be applied to the 
often amorphous intangible inaccessible and ever-changing world of the 
White House staff. We have discussed the difficulties encountered 
arriving at a workable definition of the staff. Confirmation of this 
dilemma is reflected in those few political scientists whose forebod g 
about the staff were buttressed by little more than a general hunch 
Prescient though that may have been. The general tendency among the 
Political science community, with inadequate information at their
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disposal was to ignore the staff as unworthy of more than Press
comment.
But beneath this excuse there lay a deeper and a broader explanation for 
this academic laissez-faire. From the time the Presidency was propelled 
to its modern ascendancy by the Depression and World War II the majority 
among the academic community endorsed the need for the presidential estab­
lishment to grow in proportion to the new responsibilities placed upon 
it. This endorsement reflected their belief that a strong central 
government was good for the country and that a strong Presidency was good 
for a strong central government.
There were many factors that led to the formation of this view and its 
subsequent confirmation as conviction. One of these sprang from their 
liberal pessimism thaï no institution save the Presidency was capable of 
forging the social progress that was necessary. As students of g 
in the 1940s or 1950s they could readily see the obstacles, if not the 
dangers, of placing their faith in that quarter. Congress, with its con­
servative organizational hierarchy and its susceptibility to McCarthyite 
lapses, could not be trusted. Neither, for a considerable time, was the 
US Supreme Court (that liberal bete noire of the 1930s) the focus of 
hopes. The answer lay elsewhere.
The impact of the Roosevelt Presidency cannot be over emphasized.
Roosevelt, the White House became the focus of all government 
fountainhead of ideas, the initiator of action, the representative of the 
national interest", wrote the historian Leuchtenberg. 7116
world was very much brought into government during this time 
Profound impact on their future thinking. The Presidency was seen as the
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national interest", wrote the historian Leuchtenberg.
*orld was very much brought into government during this time and
Profound impact on their future thinking. The Presidency was seen as
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legitimate centre of action and the President as pre-eminent in his 
capacity for moral and political leadership. This view was reinforced 
by the Press and heavily influenced, especially in the 1960s, by the 
power of the media in portraying the political process in terms of 
personalities with the President as the biggest celebrity of all.
Lionizing the strong Presidency necessitated approval of the presidential 
apparatus brought in its wake. By and large this was silently given. One 
result was that, as the White House staff grew and became established as 
an important political component of the Presidency, it escaped the criti­
cal attention it deserved.
One of the clearest illustrations of this was to be found in the way the
staff were treated in standard political science textbooks. For example,
316
in William Bennett Munro's The Government of the United States there is
no mention whatsoever of the existence of The White House Office, although
by 1947 (the date of the 5th edition) that Office had seen eight years'
service and was on the point of the first significant increase in personnel
since its inception. Written in the same year was The American Problem of
Government317 by Chester C. Maxey. Although omitting to mention the
White House staff by name he nevertheless did refer to the need for it an
the necessity of setting up an organization along functional lines.
Scarcely more informative was the way in which Frederic A. Ogg and P. Ormai
Ray dismissed the White House staff in one sentence in their Introduction
^American Government318 published in 1948. A year later things had not
improved, for the same one-line  treatment was given to  the Administrative
Assistants (pa r t  o f  the o r i g i n a l  White House O f f i c e  in  1939) by W il f r ed  E.
319
Rinkley and Malcolm C. Moos in A Grammar of American Politics
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Sinkley and Malcolm C. Moos in A Grammar of American Politics.
By 1951 there was some sign that The White House Office was at least 
granted recognition. In The Theory and Practice of American National 
Government320 Carl Brent Swisher was not only aware of the growth of 
the staff but also was prepared to entertain a mild doubt lest they be­
came a hindrance rather than a help on account of this increasing size.
But in general he endorsed its role and performance. Slightly more neutral
321was Edward S. Corwin's tome The President: Office and Powers, while
Sidney Hyman, writing in 1954, somehow managed to say nothing at all
322about the staff in his book The American Presidency. Another text­
book author, of high standard, was Clinton Rossiter, whose book The 
American Presidency323 was published in 1960. He recognised that the 
staff was taking on an air of permanence in certain functional areas, but 
could point to no serious drawbacks in that development.
By the 1960s raw material on the staff and its operation was beginning to
grow, and references to the staff in textbooks accordingly took on a basic
shape: for example, in Elmer E. Cornwell’s The American Presidency: Vital
Center. 324 By 1964, the editors of The Dynamics of the American
Presidency. 325 Donald Bruce Johnson and Jack L. Walker, thought worthwhile
326 „  . 327the inclusion of contributions from Joseph Kraft and Louis Koenig 
on the subject of staff support to the President. Yet it was still
328
possible for a major textbook, such as The American_Chief Executive
by Joseph E. Kallenbach, published in 1966, to virtually ignore the 
growing political importance of the staff. Four years later, references 
to the staff were still descriptive rather than analytical, as in The 
National Executive Branch329 by James W. Davis Jr., or The Presidential  
° by Sidney Wise and Richard Schier.
By the end of the 1960s there were signs at last that standard textbooks
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were taking greater note of the staff, to the extent that they provided 
a preliminary analysis of staff functions: for example, in American
901
r.nvernment Institutions by Aaron Wildavsky and Nelson Polsby, and the 
volume „„ The Presidency332 edited in 1969 by Wildavsky. By 1971, com­
parisons were beginning to be drawn between Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon
333in their use of staff, as in Essentials of American Democracy by Robert
Kenneth Carr, and in Contemporary American Government: Problems and
Prospects, 334 by Jay A. Sigler and Robert S. Getz. More wide-ranging were
335
the comparisons drawn in Laws and Men: The Challenge of American Politics_ 
by Daniel M. Berman and Louis S. Loeb.
But however slow the textbooks were in devoting serious attention to the
staff the position has recently been altered and rectified albeit more a
result of Nixon and Watergate than any other single factor. One need look
no further, for example, than the third edition of Louis W. Koenig s well
known textbook The American Chief Executive (published in 1975) to see
that the White House staff has now won for itself a significant and perma-
337
nent place in any exposition of American national politics.
Turning now to the literature produced by academics who have had some 
form of political experience themselves, we find that this group has pr 
duced by far the best work on the staff that has emanated from the politi­
cal science wing of the academic community • This in itself is an 
illustrative fact, for the forces at work in the atmosphere of the White 
House are often inadequately grasped by those who have not had such 
experience themselves.
the oldest of this group,
Rexford G. Tugwell, who served President
and also one o f  t h e  most p r o l i f i c ,  stands 
R o o s e v e l t  as o n e  o f  t h e  original
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'Brains Trusters' of the 1930s. His acute perception of the modern
Presidency was already evident from his book The Enlargement of the
Presidency,338 published in 1960. Further books such as The Brains
340Trust, 339 Off Course: From Truman to Nixon, and The Presidency 
Reappraised341 (edited with Thomas E. Cronin) have similarly helped to 
promote an awareness of staff developments since the Roosevelt era.
Another professor to combine academic writing with a measure of political 
experience was Richard Neustadt. He worked for a time as a junior aide in 
Truman's Administration. In 1954 he wrote an important article entitled
0 4 A
The Growth of Central Clearance which bore partially on the White
House staff, and he subsequently enlarged on the staff's function in 
Approaches To Staffing The Presidency343 in 1963. His knowledge of the
344
Kennedy years was reflected in The JFK Presidency: A Premature Appraisal_
345and in a later edition of his classic work Presidential_Power. The most
well-known professor from the Kennedy period was Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., 
the historian, who worked on Kennedy's staff as a Special Assistant. In 
his book 1000 Days348 he included a short section on the staff. Althoigh
Schlesinger had previously written about White House life in the Roosevelt 
Presidency, in The Evolution of the Presidency, 348 he was able to write
349
about the staff in his influentially titled book The Imperial Presidency 
with rather more personal experience.
While Schlesinger wrote a history of the Kennedy Presidency in 1965, two 
years earlier Emmet John Hughes had written The Ordeal of Powerj— A 
Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years. Hughes had served on 
Eisenhower's White House staff, and this experience undoubtedly explains 
why Hughes was later able to produce his interesting book on the Pres y 
«-titled The Living Presidency, 351 (subtitled: ''The Resources and Dilemmas 
of the American Presidential Office"). He gave special emphasis
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staff by including a lengthy appendix section devoted to the views of a 
or go eminent former staff members. Hughes continued his contri-
a o zc ii v *
352
button to understanding the staff in The Presidency After Watergate.
In more recent years the conjunction between political experience in
government (whether on the White House staff or in close proximity to
it) and academic writing has been enriched by a select group. They in-
353
elude Richard Tanner Johnson, whose book Managing The White House
(1974) drew on his experience as a White House Fellow in the late 1960s
under both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations . Another White House
Fellow, Thomas E. Cronin, has produced a stream of useful writing on the
staff. This has included Political Science and Executive Advisory.
Systems,354 The Presidential Advisory System,355 (edited with Sanford
356D. Greenberg) , New Perspectives on the Presidency? White— House— -
358
Department Relations,357 The Textbook Presidency and Political Science,
359
The Swelling of the Presidency and its Impact on Congress, and The
State of the Presidency.360 Yet another White House Fellow was Dons
361
Kearns, whose book Lyndon Johnson and The American Dream, while no
exclusively on the staff, nevertheless had much to say about the work' g 
of the Johnson White House. Similarly, H.G. Nicholas, in "The Insulation 
of the Presidency", (which was his contribution to a volume entitled 
American Political Institutions in the 1970s 362 edited by Max Beloff 
and Vivian Vale), dealt largely with the situation in the White House.
Another source or patron of research besides the White House Fellows p
gram has been the Brookings Institution. In particular, it has helped
sponsor research into the Presidency's decision-making staff appara
^is has resulted in the publication of two highly important wo
«a«. The more specifically directed is that by John H. Kessel entitled
363 whilelili Domestic Pt-phI denev: Decision-Making in the White House
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nyjranizing t.hR Presidency, by Stephen Hess, is the more general in 
cope Hess served on the White House staffs of both Eisenhower and
Nixon, and without this experience his book could not have been as influ- 
365ential as it has become.
On the foreign affairs side of the staff's activity, former members of the 
National Security Council staff, such as Richard M. Moose, have written on
e • * 366its development in The President and the Management of National Security.
Finally, we should not forget the man responsible for the original report
that led to the setting up of The White House Office. Louis Brownlow him-
367
self wrote several books , among them The President and The Presidency., 
and his autobiography A Passion for Anonymity.368 Nor should we overlook 
one other academic with political experience, though this time of Br"
369
politics: Harold Laski. In his notable book The American Presi ency 
he identified some of the major problems of the modern American Presidency 
and strongly advocated a staff system of some kind. Thus it was not on y 
the American academic community that endorsed the continued growth of th 
White House staff.
The vast majority of those who have written on the subject of Amer’ 
politics at the Presidential level have not themselves had direct personal 
experience of the political environment which is the subject of their work. 
It is all the more interesting, therefore, to come across certain authors 
who have demonstrated a perceptive grasp of the role of the White 
staff in the modern Presidency. Moreover those who did so without the 
benefit of the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon years deserve greater credit for 
having pointed to the important potential of the staff, as in the
*4 370
tor example, of Francis H. Heller's The Presidency: A Modern Perspec ve. 
Another important book published that same year, in 1960, The Presi £ 
¿ a sis And Revener-atinn371 by Herman Finer, explored aspects of the
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Presidency and its staff the appositeness of which subsequent experience 
has confirmed.
There are other categories of writing, besides those already dealt with, 
into which the remaining contributions from political scientists can be 
placed. For example, such categories would include work on the Cabinet; 
the transition between one Administration and the next; individual 
Presidencies; particular aspects of the Presidency; Watergate; and works 
on the Presidency in general.
Writing on the Cabinet has declined in recent years in accordance with a 
generally perceived decline in its political importance as a cohesive poli­
tical force. The standard work on the Cabinet is still The President s 
Cabinet372 by Richard F. Fenno Jr. Yet it was clear by the time he wrote 
The Cabinet: Index to the Kennedy Way3 that the very reasons why the 
Cabinet was in decline were those which in part accounted for the rise of 
the White House staff. By the time of the Nixon Administration, what
little attention was devoted to the Cabinet, as in Alan L. Otten s The
_ 374
Scorecard: President's Cabinet Gets Mixed Reviews for Efforts To Date, 
was meted out on an individual, rather than a collective, basis.
Writing on the transition between Administrations only got underway with 
the changeover from Eisenhower to Kennedy in 1961. A Brookings study in 
that year, edited by Paul T. David, entitled Presidential Election and 
Transition.375 included an article by Laurin L. Henry on The Transition:
The New Administration376 in which the role of the staff was central. As 
regards the transition from Ford to Carter, a series of articles appeared 
tn the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, such as Carter's Guidelines: New Stringent 
$Hies377 and Delay On Top Jobs: Good Or Bad?378 Once again the position
the staff was uppermost in these articles.
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A y political science writing on individual presidencies since FDR is now
bound to say something about the White House staff, even if it is confined
to treatment of the staff as individuals rather than as members of an
id en tifiab le  and operational unit. The former approach is most evident in
379such books as The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practice
380edited by Louis W. Koeing, The Politics of JFK edited by Edmund Ions,
381Eisenhower - The Inside Story by Robert J. Donovan, and Arthur M.
382Schlesinger's trilogy on the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The
latter approach - treating the staff as an entity in itself - has yet to 
find full expression in any work on an individual Presidency.
There has been a great variety of writing that has dealt with particular
aspects of the Presidency. Many, in their own way, have cast some light
on the way the White House Office operates. For example, one of those
tasks that every incoming President faces - filling appointments - was the
subject of Outlawing The Spoils382^ y  Ari Hoogenboom. Relations with the
383Press have been dealt with in The Presidents and the Press by J.E. Pollard,
The President and Public Opinion384 by M. Landecker, Presidential Leadership
of Public Opinion385 by Elmer E. Cornwall Jr., Public Opinion and the
387
President386 by John E. Mueller, and The Presidents and The Press by
Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Congressional relations has been covered in
Legislative Liaison: Executive Leadership in Congress387aby Abraham
Doltzman. The important question of executive privilege has been exclusive
388
ly treated in Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth by Raoul Berger.
Another key area concerns the work of the President’s National Security
Adviser in the conduct of foreign affairs. This has been dealt with in The
g g H tive and Forelvn PoUcv389 by Francis 0. Wilcox, and extremely well by
390
I-M- Destler in Presidents. Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy. General
relations with Congress were the subject of Kenneth Schlossberg's The 
^S5lMenJn_CongreM 391 (which had something interesting to say about
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j hnson's treatment of his staff), and a book edited by Ronald C. Moe
392tied Congress and the President - Allies and Adversaries. Con­
sidering that several Presidents have had a congressional background
393the study Recent Trends in Congressional Staffing by Harrison Fox
and Susan Hammond has much to say on the way congressional staffs have
been handled in the last two decades. Finally, as to the question of
presidential systems of advice in general, a collection of articles were
394published in The Institutionalised Presidency edited by Norman C.
Thomas and Hans W. Baade, which included Presidential Advice and
Information395 by Norman C. Thomas. Further light was shed on the staff
as a by-product of John Hart's Executive Reorganization in the USA and the
396Growth of Presidential Power.
Since 1973 Watergate has pervaded everything written on the Presidency.
Some academics have written expressly on Watergate, as for example in The
Unlearned Lesson of Watergate^ ^  by Philip B. Kurland. Others have not.
But among general works on the Presidency published in recent years the
attention devoted to the White House staff has undoubtedly been prompted
by Watergate in some measure. Examples have included The Contemporary
Presidency *^** by Dorothy Buckton James, Presidential Power and
Accountability399 by Charles M. Hardin, The Modem Presidency400 edited
401*>y Nelson Polsby, The Presidency in Contemporary Context edited by
Norman C. Thomas, The Power of the Modern Presidency402 by Erwin C.
403
Hargrove, (together with several of his book reviews, ) and Is 
¿residential Power Poison?404 by Richard M. Pious.
analysis would not be complete without reference to those works on 
the Presidency not so far mentioned, which, although not always dealing 
Wlth the White House staff to any great degree, nevertheless have remained 
inP o r t a n t  guides to the Presidency. Among these would be included The
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Invisible Presidency by Louis W. Koenig, The Splendid Misery by
John Bell (subtitled "The Story of the Presidency and Power Politics at
407Close Range"), Presidential Government: The Crucible of Leadership by
James MacGregor Burns, Presidential Greatness408 by Thomas A. Bailey,
409Pr-ogiripntial Leadership: Personality and Political Style by Erwin C.
410 . dllHargrove, The Policy Makers by Robert J. Donovan, The Presidency
412edited by Aaron Wildavsky, and The Presidential Character by James 
David Barber.
This concludes the analysis of literature produced by political scientists 
which bear upon the subject of the White House staff. However it does not 
exhaust that produced by the academic community. We now turn to consider 
the contribution made by students of public administration.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
The literature produced by students of public administration has run in 
parallel to that from other sources. Rarely has it achieved wide publicity 
in its own right. It has always appeared to be less applicable to the 
operation of the Presidency. But we have elsewhere noted that at the 
highest level of the Executive Branch - the Presidency - what may appear 
to be separate matters of politics and administration are actually two 
sides of the same coin. The President is constantly called upon to take 
Political and managerial decisions. What is political affects the way 
things are managed and what is managed affects the way things are politi­
cly decided. In terms of the literature on public administration we 
should bear in mind that what may seem a dry subject has in fact consider- 
sble political meaning.
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Before detailing the literature we should make clear the meaning of the 
very word "staff" in the context of public administration. Especially in 
the years before the 1960s, the term "staff" tended to be used in a some­
what ubiquitous sense and was intended to include anyone working within 
the Executive Office of the President. The explanation for this can be 
readily found in the traditional distinction drawn between "staff" and 
"line" functions in theories of management. This is in turn derived from 
the classic division of the function of government into "politics" and 
"administration" - a dividing line dear to the hearts of all students of 
public administration. Indeed it has almost the dimensions of an article 
of faith. One reflection of this attitude, and its entrenchment, has been 
the progressive anxiety that the growth of the White House staff has 
threatened these distinctions.
\ ' '
Among the early works to identify the new place of management in the
412a
American political system was James Burnham's The Managerial Revo u ion,
published in 1941. A year earlier, Herman Finer had addressed himself to
the questions, raised for public administration by the notion of responsi-
. 413 T
bility in Administrative Responsibility In Democratic Government. in
1944 appeared an article by Norman M. Pearson entitled A General Adminis_
trative Staff to Aid The President414 which explored the area of executive
415
management. Louis Brownlow’s The President and the Presidency pro 
vided early confirmation that public administration was an inherently 
political process at the presidential level. More came (also in 194 ) 
with an article by Avery Leiserson entitled Political Limitations on 
Executive Reorganization.416 Two years later Norton E. Long followed up 
the same point in Power and Administration417 and was one of the first 
compare the Presidency to the operation of a medieval court. So y
years later still, in-his Reflections On Presidential Powgr, publis
168
n the public Administration Review in 1969, Long was even more firmly 
convinced that the real struggle lay between the President and the Bureau- 
Here was a student of public administration with a keen politicalcracy
sense
Perhaps the first writing ever to concentrate on a particular President’s
Administration came with an article by Edward H. Hobbs in  the Public
Administration Review in the autumn of 1958 entitled The President and
Admin is tra tio n : Eisenhower.419 Hobbs had already authored Behind The
President420 in 1954 which detailed the additions to the White House staff
since 1939. Also published in 1958 was a short article by the Public
. . 421
Administration Review entitled simply Staff Work For The President.
422Less specific was The Bureaucracy In Pressure Politics by J. Leiper 
Freeman.
Certain studies in the 1950s were directed at the types of people involved
in public administration, and among the most useful from the point of view
423
of the White House staff were Executives For Government by Paul T. 424David and Ross Pollock (1957) , The Growth Of The Federal Personnel— ys em
425
by Herbert Kaufman (1954) and Who Are The Career Executives? by Earl H. 
DeLong (1959.)
Although the growth of the staff was acknowledged in writing on public 
administration, the emphasis on the Cabinet and orthodox Cabinet departments 
as the proper focus of attention was still strong in the 1960s, as 
»oil’s book American Bureaucracy.426 Less sanguine on the Cabinet’s future 
»as Avery Leiserson in the article he contributed to a symposium on "Present 
Trends in American National Government" entitled American National 
^ S l s t m i o n . 427 other books of note in the 1960s Included Administrative
SSi£rm428 by Gerald E. Caiden, Administrative Frontiers by James
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Landis (which was originally a task force report for President Kennedy 
1961)> Bureaucratic Power In National Politics430 by Francis E. Rourke 
(again, a certain emphasis on the Cabinet), and Bureaucratic Behaviour in
tl- rvpi-iitive Branch431 by Louis C. Gawthrop ,
More recent comment dated from the beginning of the Nixon Administration, 
by which time the cumulative experience of different Administrations since 
the war provided better clues to the nature of the challenge public admin­
istration faced on the political front. In 1969, for example, William D. 
Carey wrote an article in the Public Administration Review entitled 
Presidential Staffing in the 60s & 70s,432 which explored the difficulties 
of a Presidency which was losing its ability to stay on top of its many 
responsibilities. Hard on its heels came two classic works. Firstly, in 
1970, came Politics. Position and Power: The Dynamics of Federal 
Organization,433 by Harold Seidman. Secondly, a year later, came Federal 
Organization and Administrative Management434 by Herbert Emmerich. Both 
authors entertained serious doubts about the use to which the Wh" 
staff was being put by Presidents since Kennedy.
Further material on the historical background to the growth of the staff 
and the bureaucracy came with Reorganizing The Federal Executive Branch:.The 
Limits of Institutionalisation435 by Harvey C. Mansfield. By contrast, 
light-hearted touch was offered by Robert N . Kharasch in The Institutional
iSEerative.436 By the 1970s it was clear that the Cabinet was suffering
437 this trend wasa decline that was more permanent than temporary,
chronicled vis-a-vis the old Bureau of the Budget by Allen Sch'
Budget Bureau That Was438 fcubtitled "Thoughts on the Rise, Decline, and 
future of a Presidential Agency"). After it had been r e s u r r e c t e d  as 
Office of Management and Budget it was soon subject to close scru 
students of public administration, such as Louis Fisher in his book
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439P ^ Hontial Spending Power, or the focus of symposia such as the one 
held in 1971 called The Federal Management Improvement Conference.
The Nixon Administration, fo r  a number of reasons, spurred much w riting  on
its methods of administration. The direct influence of Watergate was felt
in a specially convened panel of public administrators which produced a
440report entitled Watergate: Implications For Responsible Government.
Apart from that, the managerial tendency of the Nixon years was analysed in
441a perceptive study by Richard P. Nathan entitled The Plot That Failed.
More generally the experience of the Nixon Administration was reflected in
442
such books as Presidential Advisory Commissions: Truman to Nixon by 
Thomas R. Wolanin. This experience also prompted a reinterpretation of 
the post-war Presidency, one such example being the article by Peri E.
443
Arnold called The First Hoover Commission and the Managerial Presidency.
Finally, as a testament to the widespread recognition of the importance of 
administration and management to the modem Presidency, mention should be 
made of Managing Presidential Objectives444 and The President: A Chief But 
Not An Executive.445 both by Richard Rose. Although a political scientist, 
do had nonetheless accepted the crucial nature of the management function. 
Students of political history, however, have yet to incorporate this line 
of argument into their work.
POLITICAL HISTORY
In terms of our progression of immediacy the last group from the 
community with which we must deal are the students of political history. 
They write at the greatest distance from the subject. The White House 
have never been the sole subject of any historical work. No such study
171
Indeed even in the context of a particular Presidency, thereexists. *
has never been a separate treatment of its White House staff. The work 
of historians in dealing with Presidents or their presidencies is inevit­
ably concerned with the content of policy and the making of events rather 
than with the intricacies of style or of day-to-day working methods. 
Rightly, when writing from an historical perspective, (if such a thing is 
truly possible with all the Presidents since Franklin Roosevelt) , the 
primary purpose is to place the President or Presidency into a context of 
wider significance. In this perspective the place of the White House 
staff has hitherto been considered largely inappropriate. While there is 
some justification for this attitude as regards Presidents Roosevelt, 
Truman and Eisenhower, there is much less with Kennedy and Johnson. It 
is indefensible when you reach the Nixon Presidency. It will not be 
possible to write the history of the Nixon Administration without serious 
and extensive discussion of his White House staff.
In historical writing references to the staff occur in three contexts. 
These are concomitant upon the following divisions. Firstly, writing on 
a particular President; secondly, writing on a particular Presidency; 
and thirdly, writing on a particular issue, or era, or matter of policy. 
We will take these in turn.
Personal biographies of recent Presidents have occasionally been hard to
distinguish from what one might call political biographies or biog p
accounts of their presidencies . Examples of biographies of the mo
446 rf
tional kind have included Joseph P. Lash's Eleanor and Franklin
even Booth Mooney's The Lyndon Johnson Story. Conventional in concept
but not in form was Merle Miller’s Plain Speaking:--An Oral Biography_of
SSIBLS, Truman.447 Another attempt was furnished by Alfred Steinberg's 
¿SS_Johnson's Roy,448 even though it was a little folksy in style.
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rommon form has become the political biography or historicalThe more
cord of a Presidency. The examples are more numerous. Among the best
449are Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.’s 1000 Days and his trilogy on the known v
N w Deal 450 Also on the Roosevelt Presidency was Franklin Roosevelt and
the New Deal451 by William E. Leuchtenburg, James McGregor Burns' The Lion
— ~------- 453
and The Fox,452 and Charles Hurd's When The New Deal Was Young And Gay.
453aA chronological listing would include The Truman Presidency by Cabell
... 455
Phillipsi Eisenhower - Captive Hero_454 by Marquis Childs. Eisenhowe r
_ 456
by Arthur Larson, the collected articles entitled The Eisenhower Era, 
edited by Paul S. Holbo and Robert W. Sellen, another edited collection 
Elsenhower As President457 by Dean Albertson, The Ordeal .of 
Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years458 by Emmet John Hughes. 
William Manchester’s Portrait of a President, William S. White s The 
Professional: LBJ,460 and The Tragedy of LBJ461 by Eric Goldman.
Historical writing primarily directed towards a single issue or matter of
policy can often involve more than one Presidency, such as Jim F. Heath s
Decade of Disillusionment.462 On the other hand, it can stay within the
463
bounds of a single Presidency, such as The Politics of Loyalty by Alan
D. Harper, or The Missile Crisis464 by Elie Abel. More comprehensive are
465such classics as James Bryce's The American Commonwealth, general survey466such as Marcus Cunliffe’s American Presidents and the Presidency, <>i 467grand critiques such as Arthur M. Schlesinger's The Imperial Presi ency.
Most of these refer to the White House staff or to close advisers of the
President, b u t  w h a te v e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h e y  h a v e  t o  o f f e r  comes i n  p ' g
in the form of asides or sketches. In 1943, historian Fred W. Shipman,
Director of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, did prepare a short paper468ontitled The White House Executive Office: Its Functions_ang-gS£gSS£- 
«owever, by that time the Office had hardly been in official existence 
iow years. In any event - as the title itself made clear - this
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ounted to no more than a study of the deposition of records and was not 
a work of political, much less historical, analysis. Shipman was less an 
historian than an archivist. But even archivists of the White House staff 
have been non-existent since then.
OTHER LITERATURE
Apart from the major categories of literature so far discussed, which are 
relatively straightforward to identify, there are other kinds of literature 
of relevance to the subject in hand. They may not all deal directly with 
the White House staff per se, but in their varying degrees have much to 
contribute indirectly towards a fuller understanding of the nature of the 
staff.
We will take five groups of writings in this section, arranged in no 
particular order. Firstly, the political writing not so far touched upon, 
dealing with a President's prior political career. Secondly, non-political 
writings or particularly personal writings, often by members of a 
President's family. Thirdly, sociological and psychological literature, 
taking questions of leadership in groups, the work situation, and the 
various factors that play a significant part in such activity. Fourthly, 
literature on the Medieval period of European history, describing the 
nature and operation of the feudal system of kingship and the relationship 
between the medieval monarch and his advisers at court. Fifthly, po 
novels and other works of fiction which, although not dealing with precise 
historical fact, nevertheless explore, highlight, and help define the often 
delicate relationship between the adviser and the advised.
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pnrTTICAL WRITING
We can divide this group into two principal divisions. The first deals 
with the political life of Presidents prior to their assumption of office.
In recent times, most Presidents have had some experience in Congress, as 
have the majority of presidential aspirants. Others, notably Presidents 
Roosevelt, Eisenhower and Carter have enjoyed different backgrounds. But 
in all cases, whatever has been written about a man who later became 
President has importance for what it tells us about his character and his 
p o lit ic a l style and working methods .
Of the last eight Presidents there have been few who merited serious study 
independent of their presidential aspirations. There was little reason to 
write about the political careers of Presidents Truman, Kennedy, Ford and 
Carter before they became potential Presidents. With others, however, 
there were specific reasons for so doing. President Eisenhower, for 
example, had a full and distinguished military career behind him before 
coming to the Presidency, and much has been written on the career of Gene 
Eisenhower. President Johnson enjoyed a most distinguished career in th 
Senate, which fact formed the basis of political biographies such as 
Mooney's The Lyndon Johnson Storyf^9 published shortly after Johnson 
assumed the Presidency. President Nixon presents a unique case. He wrote 
a political autobiography of sorts entitled Six Crises which ce y
revealed a great deal about the formation of his political character 
shed light on his political style. His years as Vice Presiden 
referred to in many books on the Eisenhower years. Among them, Eisenhower: 
p r e sident Nobody Knew471 by Arthur Larson. Besides Nixon, only Jimmy 
Carter wrote a personal account of his life before reaching the Presidency.
second division concerns what we might term 'campaign literature'. 
Presidential campaigns have increasingly become divorced from the national
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pa r t y  campaign. P r e s i d e n t i a l  c a n d i d a t e s  h a v e  c o m e  t o  r e l y  o n  t h a t  g r o u p
and women around them who are personally loyal and compaigning mostfy0 X IQv u u
on that basis. A political campaign for the Presidency is a transitional 
phase in any politician's life. In recent years it has afforded valuable 
insights into the future President’s organization of the staff around him.
As a result, the White House staffs of recent times, certainly from the 
Kennedy Presidency onwards, have been built around a central core of staff 
campaigners. It is clear, therefore, that political writing about 
presidential campaigns has much to tell us about the relationships formed 
between candidate and staff and the way in which the future President est­
ablishes a style and working methods which he is likely to continue inside 
the White House. This relationship is emphasized as the length of 
presidential campaigns gets longer and longer.
472In this connexion Martin Schram's Running For President (subtitled A
Journal of the Carter Campaign") said much about a presidential candidate
with whom in any case many people were very unfamiliar. An opposite case
was the 1968 presidential election where Richard Nixon was anything but the
unknown c a n d i d a t e .  Out o f  t h a t  c a m e  Joe M c G i n n i s s ' s  b e s t - s e l l i n g  b o o k  The
Selling of the President.473 which confirmed many people in their opinion
of Nixon's campaign. Another Nixon campaigner, Richard J. Whalen, w
Catch The Falling Flag474 (subtitled "A Republican's Challenge To His
Party"), Four years later came a new style of campaign reporting exemp
475
by Hunter Thompson's Fear And Loathing On The Campaign Trail and nmothy 
Crouse's The Bovs On The Bus?76 A more conventional attempt to discuss the 
e*perience was published as Campaign 1972 which took the 
a*ries of discussions between the leading participants on b 
Campaign literature will continue to grow and develop in the foreseeable
future.
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am-POLITICAL and personal wr it i n g s
The most obvious group of people who could contribute such material are 
the members of a President's family. However, as with Presidents them­
selves, their families have written relatively little. President Roosevelt's
478son James Roosevelt wrote Affectionately FDR (in cooperation with Sidney
Shalett) in which he had something to say about working at the White House 
as one of the Presidential Secretaries. Another family book from the 
Roosevelt years was Eleanor Roosevelt's The Autobiography of Eleanor 
Roosevelt479 which commented on the relationship between President Roosevelt 
and several of his closest aides, among them Louis Howe and Harry Hopkins. 
Turning to his successor, Harry S. Truman480 was written by his daughter 
Margaret, which dealt with his political as well as personal life. A more 
personal story was told by Lady Bird Johnson in her book A White House 
Diary.481 Although it did not discuss political issues, it said some­
thing about the routine of life at the White House and the working schedule.
In the same vein, J. Bernard West, who served as Chief Usher at the White
482
House for many many years , wrote Upstairs At The White House , describi g
the working methods and routines of the Presidents he knew. Si
483
information was provided in Ruth Montgomery's Hail—To The—Cliie 
titled: "My Life and Times with Six Presidents"). It has been said that 
a President's life is a process of constant decision-making. Literature 
of this kind helps to round out what we know of this process.
SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE
Although the Presidency of the United States is a unique position
Politics and therefore without direct comparison, there is a body
ature deriving principally from the discipline of sociology which seeks
analyse any situation involving the leadership of a group and
of groups in that position. The President has virtually complete contro
over the White House staff, who are in turn completely dependent p
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f r their work and advancement. Given these circumstances there is 
omething of value to be gleaned from the appropriate sociological and 
psychological literature.
For example, in the late 1940s J.K. Hemphill, in The Leader and His
Group484 reached some tentative conclusions about the characteristics of
groups and their view of what constituted successful leadership. Many
of the characteristics which he identified - such as Size, Viscidity,
Homogeneity, Flexibility, Polarization - have definite political meaning
in the White House context, though they appear to be couched in academic
jargon. Other academic terms, such as the concept of turnover, used by
E.A. Fleishman and E.F. Harris in their paper Patterns of Leadership
485 ,Behaviour Related To Employee Grievances and Turnover are more re a any 
understandable in political terms. Turnover is certainly pertinent to the 
White House staff. On a more general level, the work of Victor H. Vroom, 
as exemplified in his book Work and Motivation,486 has dealt with such con­
cepts as the motivational bases of work, the determinants of job satis
faction, and such matters as supervision and supervisory behaviour. Again,
487
much of this can be related to the White House staff. Men Who Manage, 
by Melville Dalton, has discussed the relations between staff and line 
management, a division which is of the essence of presidential organization 
of the Executive Branch and White House. One of the founding fathers of 
the study of organizational behaviour was Max Weber. His major work , 
such as Economy and S o c i e t y and Essays in Sociology, brought 
fore models of organization and their historical roots. His identification 
°f what he called 'Patrimonial' versus 'Bureaucratic' officialdom, for 
example, made clear that although outward political institutions may ch g 
there were certain continuing forms of human organization which tended to 
transcend any particular historical period.
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MEDIEVAL LITERATURE
One historical period will, however, retain its special relevance. Perhaps
the best way to introduce this body of literature is to refer to one of its
490most famous works, The Prince by Niccolo Machiavelli. In a work that 
has proved a milestone in the development of political analysis, it should 
also be recognised as having much of relevance to the contemporary 
Presidency. For example, insights that Machiavelli pinpointed into the 
human character and the role played by advisers remain insights today in 
the context of the President and his staff.
Apart from other such writings to come directly out of the Medieval period 
of history there is a wealth of analytical historical writing which should 
be considered part of this group. For example, J.E.A. Jolliffe's Angevin 
Kingship.491 Jolliffe provides us with a picture of life at court which 
resembles the White House not only in terms of the complete dependency on 
the king of his courtiers but also in matters of administration. Then again, 
in the more specialised study by Sir Fredericke Maurice Powicke, Henry III 
and The Lord Edward.492 we find an analysis of the motives of kings toward 
their courtiers that compares with those of modern Presidents towards their 
staff. This relevance has been heightened by the experience of presidential 
Administrations in the 1970s. Whether or not there exists an absolute 
obligation on the staff to follow a presidential order is but one more 
example of a question that first emerged in the medieval era, according to 
Ewart Lewis in Medieval Political Ideas?93 A further similarity is to be 
found in the principle of 'Theocratic Royal Grace' dealt with by Walter 
Ellmann in his book Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle 
S^es-494 This concept adequately describes the behaviour of President 
Johnson toward his staff.
T° conclude, there is perhaps no body of historical literature more pre-
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ely applicable to a discussion °f the White House staff than that 
emanating from the Medieval Age. The difference of hundreds of years 
does not detract from the essential similarity of position between a 
medieval king and his advisers and a modern President and his White House 
staff.
POLITICAL FICTION
When discussing or appraising the political structure of a state in terms 
of its tangible outward form the use of political fiction in helping to 
further understand this definite political structure is almost non-existent. 
However, when one comes to consider the intangible factors that convert the 
outward structure into a living organism, works of political fiction immedi­
ately assume a greater importance. For example, when trying to analyse the 
relationship between a President and his closest senior staff, the dry 
academic description may well not have as much to offer as the sharp in­
sight offered by a political writer. This is especially the case when 
the writers of political fiction have themselves had at least some acquaint- 
ance with the political system.
One who had a great deal was John D. Ehrlichman, a former Assistant to
President Nixon for Domestic Affairs and one of the men closest to President
495
Nixon in the 1970s. Ehrlichman's fictional book The Company (although 
its fictional aspects were thinly-veiled496) is important in this context 
aot for its plot but for the way he described relationships between the 
President and the staff around him.497 Obviously this was shaped in large 
neasure by the experiences Ehrlichman encountered while himself working in 
the White House. Also guided by his own experience, but to less effect,
*as Hie Canfield Decision498 by former Vice President Spiro Agnew.
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Various journalists have written novels of political fiction. In many
respects these are the most valuable fictional works of their kind,
especially so as some had their journalistic sense enriched by actual
experience in the White House itself. Good examples would include the books
499by Douglass Cater, especially Dana: The Irrelevant Man, which was built 
around the relationship between the President and a very influential adviser 
and all-round Washington figure. Cater spent many years in the White House 
as a Special Assistant to President Johnson. Allen Drury's Capable of 
Honour500 explored similar themes. Another journalist, Patrick Anderson, 
went to work as a speech-writer in the Carter White House. His first novel 
published in 1970 was The Approach to Kings501 which traced the progress of 
a bright young speech-writer on a President's staff. Anderson freely ad­
mitted that this book grew out of his experience in the Kennedy-Johnson 
years and his subsequent study of White House assistants. It grasped the 
essential fact that you cannot be "your own man" for very long inside the 
White House "pressure cooker" (as George Reedy once characterized it). His 
second novel The President's Mistress502 was especially interesting for its 
recognition of a "layered" White House staff. William Safire, who served 
as a Special Assistant under Nixon and was one of his senior speech 
writers, incorporated a great deal of his White House experience in Full 
Disclosure:50 0 including characterizations of senior staff types , and 
nany interesting incidental details about the working White House.
Professional writers, as distinct from journalists who also write fiction, 
have tended not to be so successful. For example, although Gore Vidal s 
Political novel Washington DC504 is undoubtedly well written it suffers, 
in this context, from the distance it deliberately keeps from its subject. 
Not that Vidal has been the least political of authors, having written 
^JgjLgower in the White House505 to celebrate the arrival in office 
President Kennedy in 1961. Others, such as Upton Sinclair, who pro
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c n c
the novel Presidential Agent, have also drawn on the political mood of 
their times.
The world of the White House staff is not one that is susceptible to pre­
cise measurement in tangible terms. Fiction can therefore play an important 
role by stepping in where conventional research cannot tread. While the 
American political system continues to provide for a Presidency that can 
organize its immediate staff at will then the contribution of political 
fiction to our understanding of the way that White House works will always 
be of some value.
CONCLUSION
We have now examined the body of literature on the White House staff and 
found it useful to distinguish between various categories of writing accord 
ing to the relationship of the writer to the ’scene of the action , i.e. 
the White House staff. Some of the points made would not suffer from 
further emphasis.
tint, the volume of writing. This analysis of literature has not been 
compiled from a chronological viewpoint but the reader will have not' 
the more recent the year the greater the amount that has been written on 
subject. Indeed, were the numbers of books and articles on the 
h«ve appeared over the last forty years to be plotted on a graph, the curve 
upwards in the 1970s has been almost exponential. It may not continue up 
»ards at this rate but it will nevertheless remain at a much highe 
than that which obtained in any previous period.
Am°ng the various categories we have identified this growth in 
ot Siting has been unevenly distributed. Presidents, for example have
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t noticeably had more to say about their White House staffs than their 
predecessors a decade or two ago. On the other hand, the contribution of 
the press, taken as a whole, to understanding the nature and work of the 
staff has grown enormously and has often been of a valuable kind. By con­
trast, the academic community, and especially its political science branch, 
has been slow in treating the White House staff as a serious and legitimate 
subject of study. As for the staff themselves, there has been an increasing 
output, whether sponsored by financial considerations (as in the case of 
many of the Nixon staff) or otherwise. This is both reflected in, and 
bolstered by, their collective sense of self-confidence, born of their 
privileged position at the centre of the Presidency and their White 
House perspective". Their passion for anonymity has been overtaken by 
their passion for publication. It remains to be seen what approach his­
torians for the 1970s will take, but they will certainly have to take great 
account of the staff system of the Presidents about whom they write. As 
regards political fiction, for which we do not need to wait so long, we can 
already discern that the experience of the last few years has proved fruit 
ful for writers of fiction as well as those who seek to veil their memoirs 
with fictional veneer.
Second, the quality of writing. There is no doubt that this has improved 
over the years, especially in the 1970s. This is partly a function of 
having more to write about on the subject. The effect of a large White 
House staff has been to force examination of the system under which the 
staff operates and the various factors involved in its management. The 
general trend has been towards a better and more mature understanding. But 
Parallel to this trend has been the continuance of the trivial superficial 
Personalised 'analysis’. It would be naive to think that this will ever 
disappear.
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Apportioning the quality of writing to the different categories is a 
d ifficu lt  exercise because it can depend more on the individual than the 
category in question. The quality of writing by certain of the Press 
deserves special mention, especially during the Nixon years when they 
operated with the disadvantages of Administration secrecy. Writers on 
public administration also deserve recognition. They have fostered much 
discussion on issues and problems relevant to the ways in which the staff 
can (and should) be organized. The one disadvantage for the general reader 
is the terminology employed. The dry impersonal approach which (albeit 
refresh ingly) characterizes their discussion needs to be translated into 
'p o lit ic a l language' to readily appreciate the impact of what is being 
said.
Third, there is a definite relationship between the kind of writing pro­
duced and the position of the writer in relation to the 'scene of the 
action'. Those who are direct participants, the Presidents and White House 
staff, provide us with source material which is indispensable. Yet this 
is rarely accompanied by an analysis to match the description. The Press 
stand outside this inner circle, but are in constant contact with it. The 
Press produce writing that is often highly personalised and directional, 
and lacks the ability to take the wider view. This is natural given the 
high-pressured and fast-moving world in which political commentators are 
attuned to the daily rush of events. In the absence of a more open policy 
by successive Administrations the Press have performed a considerable ser- 
vice by their constant search for information pertinent to the President s
relationship to his staff.
The academic establishment has not had a very satisfactory record 
respect but its analytical discipline offers the prospect of worthwhile 
contributions, some of which are already apparent. Its main drawback is
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lack o f practical experience of the unique situation of the White House. 
Historians, writing from great distance, have not yet comprehensively re­
interpreted contemporary presidencies in the light of the importance now 
accorded to White House management, but it is perhaps too soon to make a 
final judgement. Certainly they are in a better position to examine the 
importance of personal relationships (one thinks here of Robert E. Sherwood's 
Roosevelt and Hopkins) . Finally, as regards that motley assortment of 
literature - including political fiction, sociological and psychological 
writing, and Medieval literature - their contribution lies in the insights 
they g ive into the human relationships involved and an understanding of the 
unchanging aspects of human behaviour.
One caveat must be entered at this point. Namely, that proper account 
must be taken of the various hierarchical divisions that exist within each 
category. This subtlety somewhat complicates matters. For example, there 
can be a considerable difference of perspective between senior and junior­
ranking members of the White House staff. Neither can the Press be lumped 
together entirely in one bundle. Journalists that specialise in White 
House affairs (such as John Osborne of The New Republic) have something 
different to offer from nationally-syndicated columnists or departmentalised 
political reporters. It can be argued that these categories occasionally 
overlap. A journalist may be in a position to know more than a member of
staff. The more hierarchically the staff is organized the more likely this507is to occur. One is mindful that John Dean wrote in Blind Ambition 1J
Ms best policy was "to keep my mouth shut"508 and not to ask questions
„509
about what went on. "The loyal soldier is silent, and he does not pry.
For a while, therefore, some journalists knew more about the Nixon staff 
system than did John Dean, although eventually Dean was in a position to 
know things which no amount of 'digging' by any journalist could reveal.
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Fourth the motive of the writer. This is another subtle consideration 
when assessing the overall value of any contribution on the White House 
staff As a general rule one's motive for writing is dependent upon 
one's situation (i.e. into which category one falls). The journalist 
writing next day's newspaper has a different motive from the political 
scientist writing next year’s treatise. The motive of a President answer­
ing questions about his staff in a Press Conference can be different from 
his referring to them in his memoirs. Sometimes these varying motives 
affect what each say; almost always it affects the way that they say it. 
Five brief examples will suffice.
Consider firstly the case of an off-the-record press interview with a 
staff member. Academic writers like Thomas E. Cronin and John H. Kessel 
have made good use of the background interview. Here, in the safety 
of non—attributable quotations, the staff have greater freedom to say what 
they really think without too much regard for the consequences - even if 
(or especially if) it reflects on another staff member in which case the 
consequences may be the point of the exercise. Infighting among the sta 
is often conducted in this way.
Secondly, take the case of the on-the-record Press interview. These have 
traditionally only been granted for the simple purpose of presenting an 
Administration or a President in the best possible light, including the 
very fact of its being accessible to the Press. The motive for what is 
said is thus governed by the motive in holding the interview at 
good example here was Courage and Hesitation511 by Allen Drury. He was 
considered friendly enough to the Nixon Administration to be given 
blanche to roam around interviewing staff members. They, in 
Drury to talk about their work in a way that reflected best on them
and the P resident.
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Thirdly there is the matter of appearing before Congress in the course of 
the regular round of appropriations hearings. Such staff as have appeared 
before either the House or the Senate subcommittees concerned have shared 
one particular motive: to do their best to ensure that Congress appro­
priated whatever money the Administration has claimed it needed for its 
staff. This objective has necessarily coloured every aspect of their 
testimony. It has involved, for example, their presenting a distorted 
picture of the activity of the Domestic Council and the Vice Presidential 
role in government. Certainly they have at all times sought to reveal as 
little as possible about the true structure and operation of the staff.
Fourthly, there is the different world of the televised congressional
inquiry. The two obvious examples here are the Ervin Committee hearings
in 1973 and the House Judiciary Committee hearings on Impeachment in 1974.
Members, past and present, of the Nixon White House staff were summoned
before both of these congressional committees. The purpose of their
appearances was vastly different from that of a routine congressional h
„ 512
ing. "I do not need to stress again the importance of our undertaking , 
said Chairman Rodino in the summer of 1974 to his Committee, with unus 
understatement for a member of Congress. Whether or not it was o 
personal good, the White House staff were on oath to tell the truth. In 
this case their motive was further encouraged by a sense of history and 
high drama.
Fifthly, there is the question of memoirs. Here again can be discerned a 
different shade of motive. The passing of time tends to have a sobe g 
e«ect on a former member of staff for the simple reason that a period of 
adjustment is necessary after such a high-powered existence. Barely can 
anything else in life match the heady days of life in the White 
Staff reminiscences convey, almost by definition, a more mature approach
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to their staff experience. For example, the books by George E. Reedy,
Theodore C. Sorensen and Emmet John Hughes, were all the richer for the 
backward look at their former employment. Particularly valuable in this 
context was the Appendix of Hughes’ book, in which were contained a dozen 
or so concise reminiscences of former members of the staff. This reassess­
ment of their experience occasionally reflected a motive not present in 
any other situation. For example, Sorensen argued against the growth and 
organization of the staff in the 1970s in a way which he did not in the 
1960s. What may be harder to separate is how far it was intended to create 
a favourable comparison between the Kennedy and Nixon years (in Kennedy’s 
favour) and how far it reflected a genuine change of heart. In such cases 
the motive may be the message.
It should be clear enough by now that the motive of the staff member 
writer has to be carefully taken into account when considering their 
writing. This is no less true in any other of our delineated categories. 
For instance, part of the reason that much Press writing tends to the s 
sational and personalised is because their motive for writing (or thei 
editor's motive for editing and presenting) is determined by such an 
approach. Similar motives predominate in the writing of political fiction. 
Writers on public administration may be motivated more by the need 
appeal to fellow members of their discipline than to the lay r y
contrast, Machiavelli intended that his work should be readily understood 
by the general reader, in which task he manifestly succeeded.
How then are we to judge the most valuable writing on the Whi
staff? The short answer is that those who have produced the best writing
have been those with experience in two or more of the categories
Have identified. Paramount must be some experience on the White
staff it s e lf  for the author. Without d irec t  personal experience of what
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the White House is actually like in practice no writer can place the staff 
in its proper context. The position of an adviser to a President on whom 
that adviser is dependent is not susceptible to dry mathematical analysis 
alone With such a subject there is no substitute for experience. The 
best appreciation can come from those who have both seen it from the inside 
and are capable of subsequently subjecting it to critical analysis.
Few have combined personal experience on the staff with such writing at a 
later stage. Among these have been Stephen Hess, John H. Kessel, Thomas 
E. Cronin, Richard P. Nathan, Richard Tanner Johnson, and Patrick Anderson.
All have had experience as a participant (the first category) and all except 
Anderson have been academics (the third category). Anderson's background 
was journalism (the second category). Hess served on the Nixon staff, as 
did Tanner Johnson and Kessel; Cronin worked on Johnson's domestic policy 
staff; and Nathan was on the Nixon OMB staff as Assistant Director. Anderson 
served in staff capacities under both Kennedy and Johnson and joined the White 
House staff of President Carter as a speech-writer. By taking their ex­
perience and reflecting widely upon it, always cognizant of the real forces 
at work inside the White House, they have made a valuable contribution to our
understanding.
This analysis would not be complete without a definite indication of the gaps 
that yet need to be filled. These can be summarised simply enough under 
t*° headings: firstly, hard facts; secondly, the attitude of Congress.
As to the first, the dearth of hard fact on which to base any study of the 
staff is apparent in almost everything written. Writers may have 
gre»ter or lesaer access to past or present White House staff in the course 
of their work, but none has ever compiled (or attempted to compile)
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onably accurate and comprehensive array of basic evidence on the sub­
ject Elementary statistics - such as the names of all those serving on 
the staff of a particular President; between which dates; with what 
title and/or job description; with what salary; with what staff of their 
own- funded with what resources; from which Budget item; whether detailed 
and if so from where - have not been comprehensively researched. Neither 
has there been constructed a clear record as to the organization of a staff; 
e.g. who reported to whom; which staff covered which areas; and other such 
relevant information. Discussion has continued in the absence of firm 
knowledge of the basis of the White House staff in law and in ignorance of 
many other facets of its existence, whether de jure or de facto. Cb all these 
matters no comprehensive attempt was made in forty years to rectify these 
elementary omissions.
Secondly, extraordinarily little attention has been focused on the attitude 
of Congress despite its being entrusted with the constitutional responsibility 
to provide funds for the White House staff. As Watergate unfolded people 
questioned how it was possible that the abuse of power which then appeared 
to characterize the White House could have remained hidden for so long. How 
and why had the staff been allowed to develop in such a way without Cong 
taking an effective interest in their growth or exerting effective checks 
where necessary? But even by the end of Ford's Presidency no research 
ever had been published on these crucial aspects of the congressional
T»is analysis of the literature leaves us better able to understan 
evaluate the two most obvious and serious omissions in the corpus of 
»ture on the White House staff. The original research conducted 
thesis will rectify both such omissions (particularly in ChaEtersJV and VII 
respectively). This chapter has brought us to the threshold of the major part 
oi our study of the White House staff. Our first task is to place them in 
their . .
CHAPTEt III
THE 0R1GIHS AID ESTABLISHHEHT 
OF THE HHITE HOOSE STAFF
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tmTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the origins and establishment of the White House 
staff Staff assistance for the President, of one kind or another, was 
available long before the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. To this 
extent, some of the features of the White House staff system that we know 
today are not new. An historical perspective is necessary for a proper 
understanding of this fact. It is therefore important to examine the
origins of staff assistance in order to appreciate what has been new and 
distinctive about the growth of the White House staff since 1939.
This chapter divides into two parts. In the first part the origins of staff 
assistance are traced from their roots in American political history to the 
accession to power of President Franklin Roosevelt. In the second part we 
examine the years 1933 to 1939, which formed a transition period, at the end 
of which The White House Office was created by Roosevelt and the White House 
staff were officially established.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Two approaches are taken in this discussion of the origins of the White 
House staff. The first part of this section is primarily descriptive.
It briefly demonstrates the level of staff assistance made available to 
the President in the period to 1933. The second approach is more analytic. 
Of primary concern here is the nature of the relationship between 
and advisers. The mere existence of a single executive in itself engen­
dered a relationship which embodied certain recurring features. y
still present today. Such nascent features of the White House staf 
considered in the second part of this section.
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THE pTQTnBTCAL GROWTH OF STAFF ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT
It was not until 1857 that Congress first appropriated any money whatsoever
for any kind of assistance to the President. By its action in that year
the President was finally allowed one Private Secretary, one White House
Steward, and one Messenger.1 Until then some Presidents had had to hire
relatives or friends to perform some of the necessary clerical duties, often
2having to pay them out of their personal presidential salary. This prac­
tice began with George Washington himself, who employed his nephew as an 
assistant.23 President Jefferson was another whose messenger-cum-secretary
had to be paid for out of his own pocket.3 President Monroe at different
3a
times retained his brother and two sons-in-law in a similar capacity. He
was also the first President to openly state the need for paid assistance 
from public funds. Shortly before leaving office he sent Congress "a few 
remarks.... founded on my own experience, in this office" in which he com 
plained that petty household details were forced upon the Chief Executive at 
the cost of his ability to attend to matters of higher importance. Thus
Presidents Adams and John Quincy Adams (of necessity) made a point of handling 
their correspondence themselves.4 But Quincy Adams suffered so many 
visitors, mostly total strangers, that he became "an object of attention 
the exhibits in the Patent Office" , about which his Private Secretary (his 
son) could do nothing.43 President Jackson continued this family tradition 
by employing his son, and before that, his wife's nephew. President Tyler s 
son worked as his Private Secretary and Presidents Polk and Buchanan both 
Ployed their nephews.40
F°r those early Presidents who maintained a high work rate, such as Presiden 
Polk, there was little official help available, and none of a personal 
Polk’s diary records the existence of a "porter" who vainly trie 
visitors out of his office; a solitary clerk provided by Congress to sign 
^  Patents on behalf of the President; and the occasional servicesof other
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lerks to make their fair copies in duplicate of the President’s annual 
4d Polk functioned both as President and at the same timemessages.
managed two or three of the executive departments during the summer months
when the members of his Cabinet felt they had to leave Washington because
of the heat.5 President Taylor, on the other hand, who was known neither
for his work rate nor his workload, was said to have managed with the aid
of two assistants (one of whom was his son-in-law employed to improve Taylor’s
grammar6) and a couple of clerks.7 His successor, Millard Fillmore, also
made extensive use of an amanuensis,8 while at the same time complaining
9
about the volume of mail he received.
But even the congressional contribution in 1857 of a Private Secretary and 
two others (at a combined cost of $5,35010> was no guarantee that the 
Presidency would thereafter function in a more orderly administrative 
fashion. President Lincoln provides us with a good example here. He ope 
ated in such a personal manner, and with so little direct help, that he be 
queathed only a small executive staff organization to his successor, 
can be partly explained by the fact that he himself was in the habit 
writing most of his correspondence in longhand. Moreover, his pa
Idiosyncratic approach to the administrative problems of the P y
apparently entailed the use of his famous stovepipe hat as a portable g
cabinet for important papers.13 This may or may not be the origin of that 
brand of political analysis which differentiates between the various politi 
tal 'hats’ that the President wears.
Tbe first hard evidence of staff assistance for the President in the p
bellum
for
Grant
r h P Q o
-  years (if one discounts the ’’rubber-stamp signature machine" invented 
President Johnson, who had hurt his arm)14 came with the Grant Presi y 
was appropriated the sum of $13,800 p.a. to pay for six assistants.
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Steward, and one Messenger. Curiously, despite this official assis-
16
tance he seems to have handled most of his correspondence himself. Yet, 
in other respects, even this doubling of assistants within a space of twelve 
years was not enough for Grant felt bound to borrow three Generals from the 
War Department to help him.17 This stands as an early example of the prac­
tice which has come to be known in modern government as 'detailing'.
Although this level of assistance was maintained for all the succeeding 
Presidents in the nineteenth century, some of them complained that it was 
not enough. President Hayes, for example, felt that he was so overburdened 
that he didn't get enough exercise.18 President Garfield was dissatisfied 
that his time was frittered away,19 which in part may be explained by his 
lack of adequate staff assistance. His successor, President Arthur, sought 
to modernize the staff and was responsible for having introduced the type­
writer to the White House.20 By the time of the presidencies of Garfield 
and Arthur, the complement of presidential clerks had been increased 
include one Executive Agent and Disbursing Clerk, two Private Secreta , 
and one Assistant Private Secretary. Garfield had tried at first
write by hand all his own correspondence (as President Carter similarly
to attempt to sign all of his by hand nearly 100 years later) but was obliged
22to turn this burden over to his staff.
B«t if there were Presidents who seemed to need more staff assistance 
were others who did not appear either to wish or require 
Cleveland, for example, seems to have managed most of the time without 
a Secretary.23 He answered most of his mail in longhand, and refused to 
use the newly-invented typewriter.25 He is also said to have answered all
White House t.pl pnhnno
26 nerhaps tells us more
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about the numbers of telephones in those days than anything else. At
all events, such administrative self-reliance proved in his case, however
quaint, to be misdirected. It was said that Grover Cleveland "fell prey
to the tyranny of the trivial".27 Had he wished to delegate some of
these trivial matters, President Cleveland would have had to hand a modest
group of nine clerical assistants: one Secretary, two Assistant Secretaries,
two Executive Clerks, and four other Clerks.28 As Bryce remarked, at about
„ 29
this time, the President had not the means "to maintain a Court .
The new century brought not only the f i r s t  signs o f the modern Presidency
30
but also the f i r s t  signs o f the a cce le ra tin g  growth o f p res id en tia l s t a f f .
There is a difference of opinion over the exact size of President McKinley’s
staff support. It has been recorded that McKinley had to manage with the
aid of only eight or ten persons, and that a small s ec re ta r ia l s ta f f
care of all his personal and official correspondence. Another so ,
however, records that McKinley was appropriated no less than $44,
cover the cost o f a s t a f f  o f twenty-seven employees. While these
accounts need not n ecessarily  be incom patible ( fo r  example, the
figure may have included household as w e ll as c le r ic a l  s t a f f )  the
does nevertheless in d ica te  the emergence o f  a more s ig n ific a n t le v e l
staff support for the President. Either way, working arrangements for
the President were by t h is  time becoming d iso rgan ized . Six rooms
dilapidated East Wing of the White House comprised the executive
“ere a handful o f c le rk s , aided by a telephone and severa l typewriters,
. 33 MrKinlev encountered
assisted the President and h is P r iva te  Secreta y. ^
d ifficu lties  in  try in g  to  find  someone who would serve as his Secretary, 
vhich indicates that the Dost was hardly considered very
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President Theodore Roosevelt, who succeeded to  the Presidency upon the
35
assassination o f McKinley, was reported to have had a s ta f f  o f  fo r ty . 
Nevertheless, James Bryce, that important and respected B r it is h  commen­
tator on the American commonwealth, observed that the President "had no
36military guard, chamberlain, or grooms-in-waiting". Teddy Roosevelt's
daughter, Alice Roosevelt Longworth, has confirmed this in private conver­
sation with the present writer.37 Apparently there were no secret service 
guards, and entry into the White House itself presented no problems for 
even the casual caller. Residents at the White House were left to fend 
for themselves and there was none of the atmosphere of reverence about the 
place, or the office, that has grown up in more recent times. Indeed, on 
one occasion, it is related that a junior reporter from the Washington Post
once wandered into the White House and walked around for some time looking
38
for someone at home u n til he f in a l ly  bumped in to  Roosevelt h im self.
Bryce's observation proved to be a misleading indication of the new demand 
that the twentieth century was to place upon Presidents. One was the 
to travel, and the first funds for presidential travel were appropriated in 
1906.39 But the pressure of work was also beginning to tell. For example, 
Roosevelt's arrival in the White House created a dramatic increase in the 
volume of mail. The popular Teddy began to get as many as 1,500 lette 
day. A special department had to be created of the Washington post office 
Just to handle White House mail. In 1905 the Postmaster General authorized 
the detail of a registry clerk to the White House to help with the workload. 
This was the first properly recorded instance of detailing staff to the 
White House,40 despite the fact that the Attorney General subsequently ruled 
against this action. Any reference to the workload at the White Ho 
during this period should not pass over its more bizarre asp 
sample, one activity that took up a good deal of time in the early years
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President Theodore R ooseve lt, who succeeded to  the Presidency upon the
35
assassination of McKinley, was reported to have had a staff of forty. 
Nevertheless, James Bryce, that important and respected British commen­
tator on the American commonwealth, observed that the President "had no
36military guard, chamberlain, or grooms-in-waiting". Teddy Roosevelt's
daughter, Alice Roosevelt Longworth, has confirmed this in private conver­
sation with the present writer.37 Apparently there were no secret service 
guards, and entry into the White House itself presented no problems for 
even the casual caller. Residents at the White House were left to fend 
for themselves and there was none of the atmosphere of reverence about the 
place, or the office, that has grown up in more recent times. Indeed, on 
one occasion, it is related that a junior reporter from the Washington Post
once wandered into the White House and walked around for some time looking
38
for someone at home u n t il he f in a l ly  bumped in to  Roosevelt h im self.
Bryce's observation proved to be a misleading indication of the new demand 
that the twentieth century was to place upon Presidents. One was the need 
to travel, and the first funds for presidential travel were appropriated in 
1906.39 But the pressure of work was also beginning to tell. For example, 
Roosevelt's arrival in the White House created a dramatic increase in the 
volume of mail. The popular Teddy began to get as many as 1,500 letters
A special department had to be created of the Washington post office 
Just to handle White House mail. In 1905 the Postmaster General authorized 
the detail of a registry clerk to the White House to help with the workload. 
This was the first properly recorded instance of detailing staff to the 
"hite House,40 despite the fact that the Attorney General subsequently ruled 
against this action. Any reference to the workload at the White House 
during this period should not pass over its more bizarre aspects. For 
«ample, one activity that took up a good deal of time in the early years
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of the century was the procurement and preparation of an adequate supply 
of sheepskins. In those days all Commissions had by tradition to be 
written on sheepskin, and with the steadily increasing number of Commissions
being
House
issued visitors were sometimes greeted with the sight of the White
bedecked with numerous sheepskins being dried out before use. 41
A more serious sign o f the times, and porten t fo r  the future, is  a fforded
by the transfer during these years of the President's working quarters
from the second floor of the White House to the newly-built office wing
added to the west.42 This new West Wing was certainly needed just to
handle the growing volume of mail received at the White House, which by
the Taft Presidency was already considerable.43 A contemporary observer
stated that a large slice of the annual appropriation for the upkeep of
the White House (for which Congress in 1909 voted funds to pay for ser-
.. 44
vants), some $86,000, went towards dealing with the mail.
Turning to other staff positions we find that with the advent of President 
Wilson there was an official White House Physician on the payroll. Indeed 
he and Wilson often played golf together on Sunday afternoons and other 
days when the going was slow.43 Wilson, whatever his other 
tainly made enough time for himself to draft personally some of 
important state papers.46 If he may not always have appeared busy, his 
Private Secretary (at a salary of $7,500 p.a.47) certainly was,48 although 
Wilson's dependence on him did not preclude at least one attempt to do 
without him altogether.49 By the time of President Harding we find that 
there had been added to the presidential entourage a Military Aide, which 
in Harding's case was considered a post to reward his friends, and Con- ^  
at last helped defray the cost of official presidential entertaining. 
** this additional help was not of much comfort. "I *>ew that this Job
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would be too much ior me", wailed President Harding. It is doubtful 
whether any amount of assistants would have made Harding any happier. He 
did enjoy one labour-saving advantage, however, for he was the first
53
President to use the s e c r e ta r ia l proxy signature fo r  h is correspondence.
Of all the Presidents this century, the one least noted for succumbing to 
the strains of presidential office was surely President Coolidge. Yet he 
maintained a larger staff than his predecessors. By this time a Social 
Secretary had been added to the staff complement, and a Naval Aide, although 
this latter was a routine placement rather than a personal presidential 
appointment.54 Altogether his staff assistance amounted to some forty- 
six employees (of which twenty-seven were domestic staff ), with an annual 
operating budget in the region of $93,500. President Coolidge repre
sented the last of an administrative tradition that began in earnest after 
the Civil War with the succession of relatively passive Presidents. Despite 
such feats of social activity as shaking hands with nineteen hundred people 
in the space of thirty-four minutes,5 Coolidge was not noted for any 
corresponding amount of political activity. Indeed his particular contri­
bution to that post-Civil War administrative tradition was best summed up 
in a remark he once made to his secret serviceman (at that time detailed 
to the White House). "I don't work at night", said President Coolidge.
t.58
"If a man ca n 't  f in is h  h is  jo b  in  the daytim e, h e 's  not smart.
Presidents were not to  be a ffo rd ed  the luxury o f the uninterrupted twelve 
or fourteen-hour nights to which Coolidge was accustomed.
Finally we come to the Presidency of Herbert Hoover, the last b 
'’toite House staff emerged as an organized body in the 1930s.
“»til President Hoover came to office that Congress in 1929 grudgingly
59
agreed to give the President th ree P r iva te  Secretaries instead o f one.
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Thus °n the eve o£ President Roosevelt's arrival, the following staff 
positions were in existence: three Private Secretaries, at least one
Executive Clerk and two Assistant Clerks, a Military Aide, a Naval Aide, 
a Physician, a Social Secretary, several Stenographers, and other secre­
tarial assistance and mail-handlers.60 In terms of its institutional 
resources the Presidency in 1933 was still in the stone age by comparison 
to its needs.
These assistants really played no direct political or partisan role: they 
were managers of files, appointments, and correspondence. Although privy 
to the President's thinking and decisions their advice on policy and direct 
involvement in the business of government was only sought in the case of a 
very few exceptional personalities.
EMERGING CONCEPTS IN STAFF ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT
The second kind of historical evidence relates to emerging patterns or
concepts which have since come to  characterize  the White Ho
We can identify several whose historical origins can be traced back be
yond 1933. Each can be seen to have laid part of the groundwork
the quickened pace of development of staff assistance that beg
Roosevelt in the 1930s. These concepts may be summarized here as
the development o f  rou tine; the emergence o f s t a f f  functions,
structural organization of s t a f f ;  the sta ff -P res ident  relationship; the
job qualifications of staff; and the Kitchen Cabinet, or unofficia
group.
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THr nKVELOPMENT OF ROUTINE
The first element concerns the development of presidential routine and 
the organization of the presidential day. The problems of such organi­
zation are to a degree independent of the level of technology at the 
disposal of the President to help him in this task. Nearly one hundred 
years ago, for example, President Garfield articulated a feeling that has 
never been far from any President since: "I am feeling greatly dissatis­
fied with my lack of opportunity of study", he wrote. "My day is frittered 
away... What ought not a vigorous thinker to do, if he could be allowed
M61to use the opportunities of a Presidential term in vital useful activity?" 
President Nixon, for one, was later to feel so strongly on this subject 
that he began his own Presidency with the firm intention of keeping 
Wednesdays free of all appointments in order to have the time to think
, t 62about the major issues with which he wanted to deal.
The burden o f routine work f e l l  on the s t a f f  as w e ll as the President.
During President Arthur's term one commentator observed of the presidential 
clerks that "the routine office work of the White House constantly in 
creases.. .often they are busy until late at night bringing up the day s 
work".63 Routine was also becoming evident at the other end of the day.
By the time of President Hayes it was normal practice for the President 
to set aside the hour between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. to write and arrange 
business prepared for him by his Private Secretary. Froln Clevel 
Presidency we have a similar account: "From 9 a.m. to 10 a.m. 
himself to his able and accomplished private secretary, Dan Lamont who 
understood, far better than did his Chief, the art of disposing of 
Piles of letters important enough to require the President's personal
attention".65
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p esident Cleveland remains the classic example of a President incapable 
of coming to terms with a proper routine and a proper use of his presi­
dential time. For example, Cleveland spent hours and hours of his time 
personally supervising literally hundreds and hundreds of private pension 
bills, often staying up late into the night writing individual veto 
messages detailing his objections. His biographer related another
example of this total inability to delegate: "When the first of each 
month came, the President insisted upon performing in person the unneces­
sary labour of making out checks for personal and household expenses, and
going over the accounts___'I guess I have to take time to pay my bills'
he would remark".67 Attention to detail can be very important to a 
President,68 or can occasionally play a very important part in a particular 
presidential process,68 but equally it can be destructive. Cleveland s
sense of priorities may be compared with President Johnson's immersion in
70
the preparation of bombing targets during the Vietnam War as an example 
of a misdirected use of presidential time.
One aspect of the presidential routine that had become standard well be 
the arrival of Franklin Roosevelt concerned the handling of the mai y
the end of the first decade of the twentieth century the volume of mail 
entering the White House had reached such a level that a solidly o r g a n i z e  
-ail system was required under the direction of a clerk working full-time 
on its classification. A contemporary account from the Taft P r e s i d e n  y 
set out the procedures that had by then been adopted to d 
daily arrival of 500 to 2,000 letters, of which "less than a hundred 
r©quired the personal attention of the President.
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"A card-index system of all correspondence 
is maintained with a complete filing sys­
tem in connection. Probably a hundred 
letters of a day's mail may be answered 
by a single form letter, without even en­
gaging the attention of the Secretary to 
the President. Several hundred of the 
remainder will be distributed to the 
various departments and perhaps less than 
half will reach the Secretary to the 
President. Of those which do, the Secre­
tary makes a digest and when the President 
has a moment of leisure his Secretary 
gives him their substance and receives ?1 
instructions as to the replies to be made".
Since then little in essence has changed except the scale of the mail
handling operation. Today's daily total on an average day is more like
72
12,500 (although at special times it can be hugely increased ) ; instead 
of a solitary clerk there are now about one hundred staff involved, inclu 
ding highly experienced mail analysts; and letters are stored on comput 
rather than on a card index.73 What has not changed is that most of the 
replies take the form of standard coded replies printed and signed 
matically; that mail is still forwarded to the departments where applicable, 
and that the President, or his staff, see but a tiny fraction of the gross 
total.74
Other aspects of the modern apparatus of the Presidency for whi p 
cursors can be found before FDR's time include the daily preparation 
news summary for the President. During Woodrow Wilson's Presidency 
Private Secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, was charged with this task.
Public opinion polls to guide him", wrote Wilson's distinguished political 
biographer Arthur S. Link, "(Tumulty) pored over newspapers, kep 
President informed of the drift of press sentiment on leading issu 
Provided a wide-ranging news briefing. Under Wilson's predecessor,
President Taft, the practice had developed that whenever
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ntured out of the White House a stenographer always went with him to
76take down his speeches exactly as they were delivered. This has
carried down to the present day as an essential element of the presidential
routine, to which has been added the extra dimension of a photographer to
record every possible presidential moment together with the ubiquitous tape
recorder 77 Finally, there are precedents for today's natural concern
With the state of a President's health and fitness. Long before the
turn of the century some Presidents, for example President Hayes, com-
79
plained that there wasn't enough time or opportunity for exercise.
THE EMERGENCE OF STAFF FUNCTIONS
The second principal element of historical perspective concerns the evolving 
political functions of the personal staff around the President. Functional 
divisions of responsibility among the staff developed in a hapha y
appearing, disappearing, merging and re-emerging under different Presidents 
over a period of many years. But each development laid part of the ground­
work for the more established functional divisions that have characterize 
the White House staff since 1939.
One of the first of these to appear, unsurprisingly, was the sch 
appointments function. By the time of President Arthur an
Private Secretary kept "with the aid of two clerks, the record o pp 
“ents... .in formidable leather-bound volumes like the ledgers 
house".80 one observer commented that "what is practically a Bureau of
Appointments has grown up. I n c l u d i n g  the private secretary there ^
, n-ir nlaces are no sinecures' . seven persons attached to this bureau and their p
This function was allied to the overseeing of patronage matters,
„ ^  . W e l l  b e f o r e  Lawrence O 'B r i e n
goes under t h e  t i t l e  o f  P e r s o n n e l  A f f a i r s .
_ „r. the White House staff for 
Performed the role of chief patronage overseer
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both Kennedy and Johnson, Joseph Tumulty was doing essentially the same
job for President Wilson. That was not all. He not only "worked closely
with the professionals in the Democratic National Committee and had a
82decisive voice in patronage matters", but also worked as Press Secretary,
83
and served Wilson in the embryonic role of congressional liaison. This
latter job had still not established itself in its own right by the time 
of President Hoover. In his Administration congressional liaison and res­
ponsibility for Cabinet business were combined with the work of the 
84Appointments Secretary.
Another major staff function eventually to emerge in its own right was that 
of Press Secretary. It was not always known by that title, nor of course 
did it have anything to do with radio or TV in the early days, but it was 
discernible as early as President Theodore Roosevelt's time. His Private
Secretary, William Loeb, enjoyed a formidable reputation. Dealing with 
newspapermen and their editors was one of his functions. By contrast
one of his more light-hearted duties was his self-appointed responsibility 
to ensure that Roosevelt's spelling was correct. This was necess 
by several incidents consequent upon Roosevelt's professed inten 
quently discarded in the face of ridicule and protest, to update the spe g 
of the English language in a manner he thought more appropriate to the mod­
ern age.86 During the Wilson Presidency Tumulty took on board the j 
"chief liaison"87 with newspapermen, a function which was considered 
important at the time. Being in actual charge of the Administrati 
Press relations, Tumulty was often in a position to repair the 
created by Wilson's aloofness. Tumulty was affectionate and generous in
his dealings with the Press and they in turn "responded with
88 fin some respects a
accounts of Wilson, his program, and his purpose .
s i m i l a r  c h a l l e n g e  fell to P r e s i d e n t  Nixon’s P r e s s  s p o k e s m e n
204 -
Calvin Coolidge, too, considered that the overall responsibility for news-
89paper relations was "considerable". Finally, we find that President
Hoover had firmly delineated the Press as an area of jurisdiction for one
90of his Assistant Secretaries.
Another functional division identified by Hoover was dealt with by a second
91
Assistant Secretary: correspondence. In the nineteenth century this
had been the principal duty of each Private Secretary, but by the twentieth
century it had become merely one part of an ever-increasing array of
functional divisions. We have referred already to the role that President
. 92
Taft's Secretary had in the arrangement and disposal of correspondence,
and t h is  was c o n t i n u e d  i n  s u b s e q u e n t  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  i n c l u d i n g ,  f o r  e x a m p le ,
93the Coolidge Presidency.
The combination of several functions by one man reveals one of the more 
interesting features of the pre-1933 age. Precisely because the level 
help given to Presidents was so small it was possible, and sometimes 
necessary, for the Private Secretary to coordinate the President s work on 
his behalf. In this sense they were early prototypes of the role within 
the White House staff that has since come to be played by the Chief of 
Staff. William Loeb appeared to fit this category while working for 
President Theodore Roosevelt.94 To the extent that this role implies 
mastery of the administrative organization of the White House then J p 
Tumulty must also be considered an important prototype, 
him that in his position as Secretary Tumulty "was burdened with more 
numerous tasks than any other man near Wilson". of a11 those 
President Tumulty was "the one totally political functionary
*">up” . 96 His p o l i t i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e  was more than a d e q u a t e l y  u n d e r l i n e d  by  
his c o n tr o l  o v e r  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ’ s  t i m e  and h i s  a c c e s s  t o  th e  P r e s
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all times. This was a political advantage of the first order, and the
key component of every Chief of Staff’s position since. The corollary
applied with equal force: he was intensely jealous of anyone else who
97was close to the President.
The terms in which Tumulty's position were described show a marked similarity 
to later descriptions of senior White House staff. "No man, not even a 
Cabinet member", it was said, "got the President's ear except by an appoint­
ment approved by Tumulty".98 His control was so strict that even Congress­
men and Senators who arrived late were sent away without an audience with 
the President.99 Tumulty's biographer wrote that "Tumulty alone enjoyed
free access to his chief___All callers had to reach him through Tumulty.
The red rug in Tumulty's office was worn thin by the thousands who carried 
their hopes and their troubles to the highest authority in the land. . . .Only 
when he could not solve their problems himself did he refer them to his 
chief".100 In many respects the same function was in turn performed by 
Sherman Adams for President Eisenhower; by H.R. Haldeman and Alexander 
Haig for President Nixon; and by Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney for 
President Ford.
In common with these others came attacks from one quarter or another to 
the effect that they were usurping power. One of President Taft 
Private Secretaries (he went through no less than four in four ye 
"unfortunately for Taft he found no one who could even approximate 
technical or political skills of Roosevelt's Private Secretary William 
Loeb Jr."101) was a former Chicago journalist named Charles Dyer Norton. 
From descriptions of his behaviour he clearly exemplified the potenti 
abuse of power always inherent in the Chief of Staff position, as 
this Passage from Taft’s biography makes clear:
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"(Norton) was young, enthusiastic, and 
eager - especially to build an empire 
for himself. Taft spoke more freely 
to him than he did to some of his Cabi­
net members, but Norton was as out of 
place as a raw oyster in a cup of tea. 
He^lid not understand his job or the 
people he dealt with and knew less about 
politics and politicians than Taft did. 
Calling himself assistant to the Presi­
dent, he wanted to build his office in­
to a permanent group of career officials, 
and even tried to change Taft's personal 
work habits and to reorganize the 
Republican Party...(but came under heavy 
criticism) Taft first cautioned him to 
stop acting like an 'under-president' 
and finally let him go". 102
Tumulty was criticized in even stronger terms as "this monstrous and
103fiendish political plunderbund, and enemy of mankind". At one point
President Wilson felt compelled to intervene and state publicly "that the 
impression that any part of my correspondence is withheld from me by my 
Secretary. .. .is absurdly and utterly false".104 (Wilson usually con­
ferred with his Cabinet by correspondence.105) Such charges directly 
anticipate those later levelled at the Nixon White House staff and 
H.R. Haldeman in particular.100 Sometimes the charges were weathered, 
sometimes not. Calvin Coolidge was another President who had to come to 
terms with the ambitions of his Private Secretary, a man with the dis­
tinctly Dickensian name of C. Bascom Slemp. Although Coolidge praised 
his "wide acquaintance with public men and the workings of the leg' 
machinery"107 his ambition to achieve Cabinet office eventually became
blatant that Coolidge was obliged to freeze him out of the staff and re
, 108
Place him with a more diplomatic Secretary.
Another interesting early example of the Chief of Staff function was fur- 
nished about one hundred years earlier. President Andrew Jackson's 
Administration was famous for its 'Kitchen Cabinet' of which his Private
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Secretary, Amos Kendall, was a key figure. The following extract from 
contemporary view of the role that Kendall undertook provides an inter­
esting parallel with contemporary circumstances. Kendal was described as
"one of the most remarkable men in 
America. He is supposed to be the 
moving spirit of the whole Adminis­
tration; the thinker, planner, and 
doer; but it is all done in the 
dark. Documents are issued of an 
excellence which prevents their being 
attributed to persons who take the 
responsibility of them; a corres­
pondence is kept up all over the 
country for which no—one seems to be 
answerable; work is done, of a gob­
lin extent and with goblin speed, 
which makes men look about them with 
a superstitious wonder; and the 
invisible Amos Kendall has the credit 
of it all". 109
Here we can detect the suspicions which are quickly aroused by a presi­
dential adviser acting with "a passion for anonymity , whether he b 
charge of Documents, an early form of the modern-day practice of sp 
writing; or whether he be in overall administrative charge of operations 
at the White House, which is a key part of today’s Chief of Staff function
THE STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF STAFF
A third element which is coupled with the development of functional divi­
sions, relates to early prototypes of staff organization, 
of significance again relates to the Jackson Presidency. For example, 
the Jackson Kitchen Cabinet was described in terms that closely 
staff organization of some recent Presidents, in that the 
the organization chief (Jackson) was more important than any 
the absence of bureaucratic rules, the chief's personality and imagination
„  „  110 L i k e  the staff of President
g a v e  his enterprise form and direction .
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Lyndon J o h n s o n ,  J a c k s o n ' s  s u b o r d i n a t e s  w e r e  t i e d  t o  t h e i r  P r e s i d e n t
by particular demands on their personal loyalty. By conscious choice,
not natural chance, Jackson's White House establishment was "an adjunct
o f  J a c k s o n ' s  p e r s o n a l i t y ,  i n t e n d e d  t o  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  h i s  p e r s o n a l
deficiencies and to extend his personal influence".111 George Reedy said
112
much t h e  s a m e  o f  t h e  J o h n s o n  s t a f f ,  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  i s  a  f e a t u r e  t o  s o m e  
e x t e n t  t r u e  o f  e v e r y  m o d e r n  p r e s i d e n t i a l  s t a f f .
The absence of a proper staff has not historically prevented certain 
Presidents from gathering around them a loose group of unofficial advisers 
in whom the President may place great reliance and trust. Jackson's 
'Kitchen Cabinet' is a good example here. Echoes of that practice still 
exist, despite the modern apparatus of the White House staff. Franklin 
Roosevelt's 'Brain Trust' in its original form was one modern example. 
Similarly, Presidents Johnson, Ford and Carter were known to confer wi 
a 'group' of 'unofficial' advisers. Their hallmark has usually been th 
they held no Cabinet or official government appointment in the Adminis 
tration. Such advisers render their advice from a standpoint unencum­
bered by the intricacies of day-to-day affairs.
At no time in the pre-1933 age did the group of advisers around the 
President ever grow to a large enough size to be described as either 
loosely structured or formally hierarchical. Some Presidents appeared 
to be against such growth. President Coolidge, for example, exp 
a firm preference in his autobiography for 'official advice, 
been my policy", he wrote, "to seek information and advice whe 
could find it. I have never relied on any particular person to be y 
official adviser. I have let the merits of each case and the sou 
all advice speak for themselves. My counsellors have been those provi
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By the 1920s some Presidents were prepared to try out new ways. Indeed, 
despite his apparent sentiments to the contrary, Coolidge was one of 
thelB But in widening his circle of advisers Coolidge still opted for 
a deliberate organized format, as this contemporary extract describing 
the Coolidge White House at work in 1924 shows:
"An innovation in the day's work is just 
now being introduced. The President 
wishes not merely to dispose of business 
as it arises. He wishes in addition to 
make an organized study of all the great 
national problems. For this purpose he 
has made out a list of the subjects he 
wishes to investigate, and Mr. Slemp (the 
Secretary to the President) has allotted 
certain days to each, upon which the best 
informed men in these subjects are sum­
moned to Washington from all parts of the 
country, arriving at scheduled hours at 
the White House for intensive discussion, 
at the request of the President. In a 
few months this system will put him in 
possession of the best information and 
opinion of the country on current prob- 
lems that organized effort can provide .
We can detect here early precedents, in intention i f  not in f o r  ,
task forces t h a t  w e r e  s e t  to w o r k  b y  P r e s i d e n t s  K e n n e d y  a n d  J o h n s o n  i n
the 1960s to deal with a wide variety of domestic problems. Coolidge
i n n o v a t i o n  a l s o  p r e s a g e d  t h e  m o r e  o r g a n i z e d  a p p r o a c h  o f  t h e  D o m e s t i c
Council fifty years later, if not more precisely the celebrated Camp
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David "Summits" of President Jimmy Carter.
One further feature of staff organization deserves special 
historical precedents clearly exist for it: the need to deleg 
others. To a certain extent, this ability (or inability) - crucial 
Residents - is independent of the exact workload that a President
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r example both Presidents Cleveland and Carter, despite vast differ­
ences in the scope of their responsibilities, have been criticized for 
concentrating on the trivial tasks of their time. Cleveland, in parti­
cular mistakenly preferred to do something poorly himself rather than 
delegate it to someone else to do well. By contrast, 'Silent Cal',
whose burdens of office were not noted for their weight, acted on his 
own simple words of wisdom. He once wrote that "in the discharge of 
the duties of the office there is one rule of action more important than 
all others. It consists in never doing anything that someone else can 
do for you".117 In retrospect this advice almost matched Truman's blunt 
commonsense approach, with the proviso that in Coolidge's case he extended 
this philosophy to his conception of the role of the federal government and 
the Presidency itself. Yet in the narrow sense it remains good advice to­
day more than ever. Moreover presidential decisions about the orga 
zation of the White House staff have been in no small measure decisions 
about the delegation of work - and power.
THE STAFF-PRESIDENT RELATIONSHIP
l fourth element to arise out of this historical examination concerns the
personal relationship forged between President and staff, as
from the political relationship. Central to an understanding of the
personal relationship is the concept of dependency - whether
one-way. The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson provides the most
precedent. It does so, firstly, in respect of mutual dependency.
* * t  term the alter ego relationship is an apt characterization of the 
relations between President Wilson and Colonel Edward House, 
forrofui
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himself who once wrote: "Mr. House is my second personality. He is my
independent self. His thoughts and mine are one. If I were in his
118
place I would do just as he suggested". That is a remarkable state­
ment by any standards. This sense of rapport was reciprocated in 
House's own observation that "nine times out of ten we reached the same 
conclusions".119 House did not appear to go quite as far as the 
President in claiming a fusion of their personalities but was equally 
fo rth righ t. "I did not", wrote House at a later date, "in the long 
course of our friendship, attempt to superimpose my personality upon his. 
Somehow our two souls merged, yet I always remained what I was, and he
always remained Woodrow Wilson" 120
This was a personal relationship marked by total trust on both sides, and 
of a kind which was obviously impossible with any member of his Cabinet or 
others around him. Wilson's biographer has explained that the President 
"needed a friend above the struggle for place and power, to whom he could 
turn for advice and spiritual support. Indeed, without such friendsh'p 
the President was emotionally bereft".121 The key phrase here is "above 
the struggle". It was an essential part of House s relationship
ego that he had no political ambitions of his own and could thus put him-
, j . t4- 4 a clesr thst from th 6  self t o t a l l y  a t  t h e  d i s p o s a l  of t h e  P r e s i d e n t .
outset he preferred to operate in an advisory capacity to
office. When asked why he himself never wanted to hold political
House replied: "Because I prefer the intellectual pleasure wit
responsibility".122 This is a straight answer, although he
. _ 4-uqt "i was like a dis~
to use his physical handicaps as an excuse, say
embodied spirit seeking a corporeal form. I found my opportunity in 
Woodrow Wilson".123
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Thus 'equipped' House could put at his patron’s disposal a genius for
political strategy, and a rare ability to detach himself from the heat
124of any particular political battle. His self-discipline prevented
his aspiring to any more influential role than that of adviser - which 
in itself was influential enough. Wilson once wrote in an academic work 
that "argument and an unobstructed interchange of views upon a ground of
absolute equality are essential parts of the substance of genuine consul­
tation".125 In one obvious sense this is an impossible ideal for any 
President to put into practice. But the alter ego relationship between 
Wilson and House, as in other such cases since, rested on the generation 
and maintenance of an artificial atmosphere of equality between President 
and adviser. It was maintained on the one hand by the subtle judgement of 
the adviser and on the other by the continuing confidence of the President 
that the adviser had only the President's best interests at heart. Thus 
Wilson could say of House: "What I like about House is that he is the most 
self-effacing man that ever lived. All he wants to do is serve the common 
cause and to help me and others".126 Franklin Roosevelt was later to say
much the same thing about Harry Hopkins, a member of his White House
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The concept of 'the man behind the throne’ was resurrected - in the context 
of the American Presidency - by the role of Colonel House. What did 
role involve in practice? To give some substance to his status as confi 
dant, House was Wilson's acknowledged "spokesman and liaison with the 
world. Re talked with practically everyone prominent in the Democratic 
Party in state and nation. Most of the Wilson entourage turned to 
the man closest to the throne, for support in the unending strugg 
Preferment. Furthermore, House was Wilson’s chief link with
°f the business and banking communities". This was 8 str8 8
comparison to Tumulty's tactical involvement in daily administ
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House's main practical contribution involved a constant stream of good
judgement. As Wilson's biographer has noted: "It would be more accurate,
perhaps, to evaluate him (House) as an exceedingly keen judge of what types
of behaviour on his part were required to keep him in good standing with
Wilson".129 This is one brand of loyalty. But House supplemented this
with help of another kind. He recounted his technique with Wilson thus:
"I nearly always praise at first", wrote House, referring to proposals put
forward by the President, "in order to strengthen the President's confidence
130in himself which, strangely enough, is often lacking". It was said that
131Wilson especially needed House on emotional issues. This is a second
brand of loyalty: emotional loyalty. Generally speaking it is only mani­
fested in the alter ego relationship, although it has been an undercurrent 
in more recent Administrations.
The second precedent of the Wilson years highlights the relationship of
complete one-way dependence that can exist on the part of the adviser p
his President. It did so in the case of Joseph Tumulty and President Wilson.
Tumulty clearly exhibited a third brand of loyalty to Wilson - best expressed
in practical terms - but was far more dependent on him than was House.
real foundation on which Tumulty's relationship with Wilson rested was
where more clearly expressed than in a letter he wrote to the Presi
it appeared that Wilson was attempting to relinquish his services.
letter was a study in anguish and sense of rejection: I had hoped wi
®y heart that I might remain in close association with you, wrote y,
"that I might be permitted to continue as your Secretary, a position
Rave me the fullest opportunity to serve you and the country. To think of
leaving you at this time... .wounds me more deeply than I
o mnn I am heart-sick
401 grateful for having been associated with so gre
« «  ..d should b .  llh. , h l . " . 132 This - o s .  «h .u  « M - t . l ,  “ *
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one-way dependency that has since characterized the position of many a 
member of the White House staff.
THF. JOB QUALIFICATIONS OF STAFF
There is one respect in which an historical feature of several presidencies
did not develop, indeed has all but died out in the contemporary Presidency.
This relates to what one might term the job qualifications of staff assistants
to the President. It was not uncommon for a number of Presidents' Private
Secretaries either to have had personal experience of political office prior
to undertaking the job of Secretary or to seriously aspire to political office
afterwards. Several examples come to mind. President Cleveland s Private
133
Secretary, Mr. Lamont, later became Secretary for War in the Cabinet.
President Lincoln's Secretary John Hay, later became Secretary of State under
President Theodore Roosevelt.134 President Wilson at one stage asked Newton
Baker to be his Private Secretary, but Baker, who was at that time Mayor of
Cleveland, refused.135 Coolidge's Private Secretary, C. Bascom Slemp had
once served in the House. The fact that Slemp aspired to Cabinet office
was itself less a crime (or considered an improper ambition) than the blatant
way in which he tried to promote his chances. replacement as
137
tary, Mr. Sanders, was also a former member of the House. Othe 
taries, such as Theodore Roosevelt's William Loeb, were judged in ter 
appropriate for a man with personal political experience and concommitant 
Political skills.138 Their abilities were only emphasized by those 
Presidents, like Taft, who felt that they were lacking in those about 
Not all those about them, however, needed necessarily to have any 
Salifications at all. There was another route to the Presi
confidence.
139
*
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thf. KITCHEN cabinet
a continuing theme of American political history has been the occasional 
existence during a Presidency of a so-called "Kitchen Cabinet”. The his­
torical roots of such an informal advisory group can be traced back to the 
earliest days of the Republic: to the development of the relationship 
between the President and his proper Cabinet. This relationship has not 
always been fruitful. For this reason, presidential experience of the 
Cabinet - whose existence is nowhere officially acknowledged in the United 
States Constitution - has proved to have a significant historical bearing 
on the origins of the White House staff.
The idea of providing the President with formal advisers first arose in 
the Constitutional Convention and was championed in various forms by those 
who opposed a strong executive power. The purpose of creating an advisory 
council of some kind was to impose consultation upon presidential decisi 
making. But there were others, notably Alexander Hamilton, who saw in 
such advisers and assistants for the President the means to bette 
ister the government. In the Federalist Paper No. 72 Hamilton accurately 
predicted, and George Washington’s subsequent behaviour confirmed, that the 
departmental secretaries would comprise a Cabinet whose advi
140
larly sought - both individually and collectively: orally and in writing.
. . led him at firstsbington's belief that "advice should be competiti
. .. „ TiiHiciarv. However, bothconsult directly with both Congress and the dual y
. . , 142 ™
mues
uf fed
** «■' u i i c v i i i y  it i i  uu in - —
were soon to be foreclosed by the decisions of each bo y
cabinet (although the
Washington was obliged to rely more ^
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s the nineteenth century dawned the real weakness of the Cabinet as an 
instrument of advice soon manifested itself. Forming a Cabinet, in the 
new era of party politics, became dominated by the process of building 
successful political coalitions - both to gain office and to maintain 
power. The criteria of Cabinet membership - politics, geography, ability - 
militated against a relationship of confidence and trust with the President. 
Presidents soon began to turn away from the Cabinet in search of the poli­
tical advice they desired. President Jackson's cultivation of a clique 
of personal advisers led to the coining of that celebrated phrase the 
"Kitchen Cabinet". At the time, this clique was widely thought to have
displaced its legitimate namesake
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The notion of a Kitchen Cabinet has survived to the present day, although 
it is now most applied to a more organized group. Despite vast differences 
in the job of President between the early nineteenth century and the later 
twentieth, a Rip Van Winkle President awakened today would understan 
appreciate the value of the White House staff far more easily than he would 
other features of the modern Presidency. Successive Presidents 
an informal grouping of political advisers was the continuing sign of a 
presidential need unmet by the existing scale of assistance provi 
was said of Jackson's Presidency that "probably the Kitchen 
strongest underlying characteristic was the closeness of all 
to Jackson".145 His innovation spawned countless imitations wh 
served to demonstrate the same point. President John Tyle
"Virginia Schoolmasters"; Grover Cleveland maintained a "Fishing Cabinet , 
Warren Harding encouraged a "Poker Cabinet"; and Herbert Hoove 
a "Medicine Ball Cabinet". It is instructive that such nicknames have, 
since Franklin Roosevelt, ceased to be applied to Cabinets b 
instead for the characterization of a President's White House staff.
»as most certainly true in the case of Franklin Roosevelt's Presidency.
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PERIOD OF TRANSITION 1933 - 1939
The period between Franklin D. Roosevelt's assumption of power in 1933 
and the creation of The White House Office in 1939 marked a transitional 
phase in the development of adequate staff assistance for the President 
of the United States. Roosevelt’s Presidency spanned two eras. When he 
arrived in the White House he was at once aware that the physical arrange­
ments necessary for his work as President were inadequate and that he had 
insufficient staff assistance. He could do little about this initially, 
but the experience of these years provided Roosevelt not only with the 
occasion for experimenting with an embryonic White House staff but also the 
excuse for finally establishing them.
OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT
During this period President Roosevelt continued, like his predecessors,
to enjoy a certain, but limited, amount of officially recognized p
(i.e. from persons whose salaries were paid from public funds for p y
that purpose). At its most senior level, as listed in the biann
tions of the CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY, this comprised six persons whose
names and titles were regularly published under the simple (b g y
heading of "The White House". Louis Howe, a longstanding confi
R o o s e v e l t 's ,  was accorded t h e  sole post of Secretary, t o  which
tenaciously, thus depriving Marvin H. McIntyre and Stephen Ear y
status.146 They were technically only assistant secretaries until Howe's
death in 1936, after which they were each upgraded to that of
to the President. From January 1937 to November 1938 they were joined by
147
Soc r n f  n ' O C nn «J £
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A1S0 officially listed was the President's Personal Secretary, Missy 
LeHand (who continued to hold this position until serious illness in 
December 1942 forced her departure, to be replaced by her deputy Grace 
G Tully). Tw° other persons officially listed were both non-political 
staff: Maurice Latta held the title of Executive Clerk, and his senior 
colleague, Rudolph Forster, was named Executive Clerk in charge of the 
White House Executive Offices.148 Between them they were responsible 
for the supervision and coordination of the clerical and administrative 
functions of the White House. For example, Forster would remind the 
President that a bill must be acted upon in a certain amount of time, or 
that by law he must fill a vacancy within a definite period. In his ser­
vice under no less than eight Presidents he had acquired such a notable 
reputation for impartiality that when, in October 1944 prior to a campaign 
foray, he quietly took Roosevelt's hand to wish him luck the President was 
completely taken aback. "That's practically the first time in all thes 
years that Rudolph has ever stepped out of character and spoken to me as
I were a human being instead of just another President.
.149
UNOFFICIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PRESIDENT
his meagre amount of official assistance was endowed, however, with a
neater number of clerical and staff personnel. Most were a c q u i r e d  un
'fficially by means of the device known as detailing, and their g g
lumbers were an important factor in the physical need for an expan
'eat Wing at the White House. An interesting glimpse of this grow
1Qo7 Under the
>rovided by a specially commissioned Wall Char n
fading of the "White House Executive Offices” this chart
fche traditional pyramid-shaped structure. The Executive Clerk was
tte Director of White House office staff, and beneath him were ranged the
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various functional offices: the Telegraph, Telephone and Travel Service; 
the Office of Chief of Records; the Office of Chief of Files; the Office 
of Chief of Mails; the Office of Chief of Correspondence; the Office of 
Chief of Messenger and Miscellaneous Services; the Office of Chief of 
Accounts; Purchases and Personnel; and two offices primarily concerned 
with the First Lady. This listing alone betrayed the existence of a con­
siderable number of support staff working in the White House.
The Wall Chart also revealed the extent to which the political staff were 
developing their own small staff offices. The three Secretaries to the 
President - the Press Secretary, the appointments Secretary, the congress 
ional liaison Secretary - had staffs of four, five, and seven. Each was 
listed as having a Private Secretary; one enjoyed the services of an 
Assistant; and another that of a Special Assistant. Their names were no­
where officially acknowledged. For example, William D. Hassett, w 
name only surfaced officially in 1944 (when promoted to Secreta y 
President) had in fact been working at the Roosevelt White House continuo s y
since September 1935 when, on Marvin McIntyre's recommendation, he
151work as an assistant to Press Secretary Early.
What was more significant was the extent of the detailing of many of these 
personnel from elsewhere in government. The 1937 Wall Chart contai 
names in all, of which no fewer than 107 were detailed personnel: a percen­
tage figure of 85%. Even in respect of the political staff
the S ecretaries and t h e ir  sm all s t a f f s )  the p attern  was
„  . This additional staff help,
Political staff, 17 (or 71%) were on detail.
su rrep titiou sly  acq u ired , was undoubtedly o f  grea
. mn r e  White H o u s e  h e l p
b e g i n n i n g  of his s e c o n d  term, R o o s e v e l t ' s  n e e d
-vide it. This was
bad evidently far outstripped any official capaci y
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various functional offices: the Telegraph, Telephone and Travel Service; 
the Office of Chief of Records; the Office of Chief of Files; the Office 
of Chief of Mails; the Office of Chief of Correspondence; the Office of 
Chief of Messenger and Miscellaneous Services; the Office of Chief of 
Accounts; Purchases and Personnel; and two offices primarily concerned 
with the First Lady. This listing alone betrayed the existence of a con­
siderable number of support staff working in the White House.
The Wall Chart also revealed the extent to which the political staff were 
developing their own small staff offices. The three Secretaries to the 
President - the Press Secretary, the appointments Secretary, the congress­
ional liaison Secretary - had staffs of four, five, and seven. Each was 
listed as having a Private Secretary; one enjoyed the services of an 
Assistant; and another that of a Special Assistant. Their names were no 
where officially acknowledged. For example, William D. Hassett, whose 
name only surfaced officially in 1944 (when promoted to Secretary to the 
President) had in fact been working at the Roosevelt White House continuously
since September 1935 when, on Marvin McIntyre's recommendation, he went to
, 151work as an assistant to Press Secretary Early.
What was more significant was the extent of the detailing of many of these 
personnel from elsewhere in government. The 1937 Wall Chart contained 
names in all, of which no fewer than 107 were detailed personnel: a percen 
tage figure of 85%. Even in respect of the political staff alone (e g 
the Secretaries and their small staffs) the pattern was the same.
Political staff, 17 (or 71%) were on detail. This additional staff h p,
aurreptitiously acquired, was undoubtedly of great value.
beginning of his second term, Roosevelt's need for more White House P
had evidently far outstripped any official capacity to provide
nowhere more apparent than in his need for political advice.
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What President Roosevelt found deficient in his official resources he
endeavoured to make up for in other ways, the most notable of which was
made manifest in the celebrated "Brain Trust" which he gathered about him.
In point of fact the origin of the Brain Trust lay in Roosevelt's campaign
for the Presidency in 1932. Initially they were a small group of (mostly)
university professors, gathered together by Sam Rosenman on Roosevelt's
behalf, to brief the Democratic candidate on a variety of issues and help
152him "get away from all the old fuzzy thinking on many subjects". It
included men like Raymond Moley (who acted as unofficial leader of the
153group), Guy Tugwell, Adolf Berle, Jr., and several others. Roosevelt
referred privately to this group as his "privy council", but they were 
later dubbed the "Brains Trust" by New York Times journalist James Kieran,
and it was this name (subsequently shortened when the 's' was dropped) that
154caught on in the public imagination.
Apart from their professional qualities, other qualities were envisaged 
which were distinct precursors of those that would later be applied to the 
White House staff. In the words of Sam Rosenman, "the people we use must 
be strongly for Roosevelt. They must be discreet, and not talk to people 
about what they are doing."155 Moreover, being advisory only, Roosevelt 
made sure they did not pre-empt any of the crucial decisions necessary 
during the campaign (although they wrangled endlessly over drafts of 
campaign speeches156). The experiment proved a notable success. As one 
colleague commented: "Out of it his own (Roosevelt’s) thinking was brought
into sharper focus. Sometimes it knocked down newly formed ideas of his
sometimes it opened up entirely new avenues which would later broaden 
into action."16^
»r
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With the election over and the transition begun Roosevelt was faced with 
the question of what to do with the Brain Trust members. He canvassed 
several of his associates and advisers for their opinion. Rosenman's 
own advice was to keep the group intact for the purpose for which it had 
been organized: namely "as a staff to gather materials for study and for 
speeches, as a group with whom the President could, as formerly, 'bat 
around' ideas from time to time, and who could 'bat around' ideas among 
themselves".158 We do not know exactly what factors counted with Roose­
velt as he weighed this option but in the end he rejected it. One factor 
which must have played a vital part was the absence of any official frame­
work within which these advisers could be located and allowed to continue 
their work. During the campaign it had been frankly conceded by Rosen , 
in his discussions with Raymond Moley, that their work for Roosevelt wo 
have to be on a voluntary basis only. There was no money to pay the 
and it had to be undertaken on the basis of a willingness to promote 
progressive policies of the candidate. But what had been accepte 
a political campaign was no longer acceptable with the launch of the new 
Administration. Money was a problem.
it was this problem which Roosevelt solved when he decided to give 
of the Brain Trust administrative jobs in Washington. Thus, for e p 
Moley was appointed Assistant Secretary of State; Tugwell became 
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture; Berle worked with the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, and later became an Assistant Secretary 
and Hugh Johnson became the NRA administrator. This decision, 
solved one problem, created others. Roosevelt had their services at his 
disposal but each had a major job to which they had to devote the j 
pan Of their time and attention. This, in turn, raised the possibility 
Justifiably as it turned out - that they would be diverted into worrying
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about the trees at the expense of their ability to help the President 
in his wider concerns for the forest.
The original Brain Trust was thus gradually broken up as the Roosevelt 
Adm inistration  got underway. But the descriptive term proved more durable
than its original membership. It was given a new lease of life. It was 
retained by the Press and applied to many of the New Dealers that came to 
Washington in the 1930s to join the crusade: men like Harry Hopkins, Dean 
Acheson, Bernard Baruch, Tom Corcoran, Ben Cohen, William Woodin, Joseph 
P, Kennedy, Felix Frankfurter (before he was appointed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court), and many others. Soon anyone not in government service upon whom 
the President relied for advice or assistance, or those who were in govern­
ment and enjoyed frequent access to the President, came to be labelled a 
member of the Brain Trust.
ORGANIZING THE STAFF ASSISTANCE
Roosevelt's handling and organization of these Mark II brain truste 
clearly presaged his subsequent treatment of his White House sta 
years 1933-1939 firmly established his personal political style and working 
“ethods. Much has been written about his administrative ability, however 
unorthodox that was considered to be. His success was more than 
triumph o f  technique, although there is no question that Roosevelt 
very skilful political operator. No-one could ever be sure where he stood 
He kept his cards close to his chest. "You won't talk frankly even with ^  
People who are loyal to you and of whose loyalty you are fully convinced , 
complained Harold Ickes, his Secretary of the Interior, in a remark 
surely held true of Roosevelt's relations with all his advisers. 
leadership depended to a great extent on an incomparable ability
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information, handle people, and inspire. His Secretary of Labor, Frances 
Perkins, once commented: "His capacity to inspire and encourage those who 
bad to do tough, confused, and practically impossible jobs was beyond dis­
pute. I, and everyone else, came away from an interview with the Presi-
dent feeling better. ,160
Although the White House staff did not officially exist during these years 
of the 1930s Roosevelt regarded his advisers as later Presidents were to do 
their staff. He organized them in the manner best suited to his own needs. 
For example, in his determination to protect himself from White House insu­
lation, Roosevelt encouraged a diversity of information sources and channels 
deliberately designed to orientate the administrative machinery away from 
routine and towards innovation. In delegating his authority he was at 
pains to adopt the same technique. He kept grants of authority to his 
advisers incomplete. He let them get on with the job but its jurisdictions 
remained uncertain. He was careful to ensure that their areas overlapped 
one with another. Roosevelt's methods were similarly evident in th p p 
ration of his speeches. He made extensive use of a variety of Brain 
Trusters and other advisers. Speechwriting proved to be one of the most 
fought-over areas between them, precisely because it represented an important 
means of access to, and influence with, the President. 0ne not
Truster, Rexford G. Tugwell, observed that "Franklin allowed no-one to dis­
cover the governing principle.”162 Whether true or not, the competitive 
atmosphere thereby engendered was Roosevelt's administrative insura p
th»t "in a large bureaucracy filled with ambitious men eager for power the
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decisions, and the power to make them, would remain with the President.
h i s t o r i a n  A r t h u r  M.
t was c l e a r  t h a t  R o o s e v e l t  w a n t e d ,  i n  t h e  w o r  s  ^
g __tr o m v e r n m e n t . '
chlesineer "on -i nvnnt-) ffftVArnment ra th e r
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B t that is not to say that Roosevelt did not keenly appreciate the need 
for some more organized element of coordination amid the burgeoning 
departments and agencies of the New Deal. Indeed from an early stage he 
searched for the person(s) or structure(s) that could best satisfy this 
need. Without a proper White House staff to hand he was obliged to con­
duct this search in a rather haphazard fashion. His first attempt at a 
structural instrument of coordination was a body known as the Executive 
Council, established in July 1933, and composed of the heads of departments 
and agencies.165 Its weekly meetings supposedly superceded those of the 
Cabinet, indeed it functioned more or less as an enlarged Cabinet, but 
combined lack of an agenda and aggressive leadership led Rooseve 
further forward.166 In November 1933 he tried again with the establishment 
of the National Emergency Council, a less inclusive body designe 
ordinate the recovery agencies. But its growing size preclude
, . . , 166apotential use.
One conclusion that R ooseve lt reached from th is  experience was 
such bodies to  be firm ly  guided, on h is b eh a lf, by someone personally 
accountable to him. By them selves, without an e f f ic ie n t  secreta  
bodies were unwieldy and unworkable. R ooseve lt ’ s experience in  tack lin g  
this problem c le a r ly  in flu enced  h is  la t e r  determination to  crea 
tutional s ta f f  apparatus to  help  the Presidency. F ir s t ,  he decided in  
favour of a vigorous ex ecu tive  sec re ta ry  to  manage the business 
bodies. in mid-1934 he th e re fo re  entrusted both jobs to  
Seoond, he decided to  con so lid a te  the Executive Council and the Nation 
Urgency Council. 1 6 7  In  October 1934 Richberg was duly appointed execu­
tive secretary o f  th is  new body. Th ird, under R ichberg’ s d irec tion  the
“ e w l y  r e c o n s t i t u t e d  N a t i o n a l  E m e r g e n c y  C o u n c i l  w a s  a l l o w e d  g
, a  qet o f d iv is ion s
buUd up a considerable s tru ctu re  o f  i t s  own, develop ! g
225
.169
t0 service its field operations.168 Fourth, Roosevelt deliberately 
used it to gain administrative control over the legislative programme.
In pursuing what has become known as "the growth of central clearance''^ 
Roosevelt directed that all requests for appropriations should be channelled 
through the Bureau of the Budget, and all requests for legislation through
the National Emergency Council. "If you are going to ask for any legis-
„ . . j -1 nod "it has got to come through Donald Richberglative action” , he said in 1934, it nas guu
170and up to me if necessary.'
Richberg's position thus clearly foreshadowed that of later White House
staff assistants for domestic affairs - and in more ways than
example, he personally was soon subject to the kind of publicity
attendant upon prominent White House aides. Newspaper stories spoke of
Richberg as "Assistant President" or "Now No. 1 Man . Indeed,
to Richberg himself, Roosevelt at one time even contemplated appointing
him to a newly-titled position of Assistant to the President. But such
treatment of Richberg by the Press undoubtedly influenced Roos
such a step, and the continuing Press comment made a lasting impression on
him. After the emergence of the new National Emergency Council in 1934,
newspaper headlines were as quick to claim that R i c h b e r g
e s t a b l i s h e d  a s  s e n i o r  t o  t h e  C a b i n e t  a s  R o o s e v e l t  w a s  a t  p a i n s
Don exalted mess-
h i s  a l a r m e d  Cabinet c o l l e a g u e s  that R i c h b e r g  w a s  m e
«gar bo,-.1,1 I„ tb. «vent, Roosevelt'» C.bln.t need not b.v. -ortled. 
Mchberg departed «roe govern».« In 193b, and tb. ».tlon.l E..««««, 
Council <„,b Frank ».Iter recalled to bis old Job> gradually .Itb.r.d^
away * mi o tru c tu ra l co ord in atio nes a serious presidential instrumen
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1, bad l . „  1 , .  .a rk . F t r . t  and « o r . » . «  «  — t b.  g r c l . g
.._A.k^nAt members
endence o f the Pres iden t c
. _  _  4- « - f  -f
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(«hose departmental duties were already sufficient to fully occupy their 
tiM and attention) working exceedingly close to the President’s own 
sphere of daily operation. One problem was exactly how this staff should 
work. "Ideally speaking they executed the President's will without poss­
essing direct authority of their own; but it was difficult to say where
173the line was to be drawn", was one comment made.
Roosevelt absorbed the lessons of this experience, and others which forced
themselves upon him. By the end of his first term Roosevelt discerned
that he was in danger of being snowed under by the sprawling executive
establishment that the outpourings of the New Deal had very largely created.
How was he to maintain adequate presidential control over the new agencies
, 174
that were springing up on every side? It was "humanly impossible , as 
he himself admitted, to handle personally the numerous contacts 
of detail that daily confronted him. Over one hundred agencies,
now reported directly to the President. The sphere of the feder g
, . to regulate the economy but alsoment had been vastly increased, not only to reg
to forge its recovery and future development.
On . , , „ < ,» .1 level, too, «oo.evel, was » « « > .  * 8l“ P"
what this meant in practice was the tact, incredible to the
tut almost a hundred p.r.on. could g.« through to hi. b„ telephone .»h-
«  Hr., «.ting their bu.ln.aa to a .«=.•*«• lvl.
encountered little difficulty in procuring appointments 
The flow of official memoranda (rarely the one-page
ig congressional
encourage), State Department cables, government repo
, „„„ nf all kinds was over- 
sports, hearings, and debates, and correspon e
., m he reported, "that I am
whelming. "The oldsters around here tell •
n°w forced to handle. . .approximately a hundred times as ma y P P
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any of my predecessors".175 Under such pressure, the presidential work 
ing day was transformed into a pattern that - in its essentials - has 
Usted ever since. For example, tightly scheduled appointments replaced 
leisurely chats; news summaries and samples of correspondence were pre­
pared for the President to skim through; lunch was usually taken at his 
desk; and dinner was often followed by more late-night paper work.
In the continued absence of official help to deal with this massive work­
load President Roosevelt turned to individuals to provide the degree of co­
ordination necessary. As early as November 1933 he had voiced his opinion 
that the time had come "when I have got to have somebody to act as sort of 
alter ego for me during the congressional session, going round and acting 
as my legs and ears and eyes".176 In truth his need for an alter^go 
relationship extended well beyond the sphere of his relations with Congress. 
From the time that Louis Howe, arguably the adviser closest to Roosevelt 
when he arrived in office, faded from the scene through ill health and a 
failing grasp of New Deal issues, Roosevelt seemed to many, not least his
wife, to be in search of an adequate replacement. "For one reason or
filled the void which
a n o t h e r " ,  c o m m e n t e d  E l e a n o r  R o o s e v e l t ,  " n o - o n e  q 
» c o n s c i o u s l y  he ... seeking to «111; « *
iron the scene, occasionally with a bitterness which
177 a. Kiswvi ahe was referring (with thealways regretted.”1 Among those to which
exception oi Harry Hopkins) were Raymond Holey, whose hey
Roosevelt co.lld.nt ... in 1933-1934; and »»«ord 0. Tugw.ll. -hose
■Pell a. Holey's successor in 1934-1933 hrought an end to any . « « *  «
a coherent philosophy of coordination.
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T1gPDgtTTON OF THE WHI_TO O U S E  STAFF 1939
We have seen that during the 1930s President Roosevelt managed to circum­
vent the official restrictions placed on the direct employment of staff 
under which the Presidency laboured. He recruited such persons as he 
wanted to advise him by a variety of means. He either borrowed people 
from other departments and agencies of government; or, by the manner in 
which he conducted his Presidency, and his use of patronage in government 
appointments, he managed to acquire the stream of advice that he wanted. 
Throughout this period he was able to call on the services of a growing 
number of political advisers. But he also recognised that a more system­
atic system had to be devised to replace the adjroc brain truster methods 
that characterized his early years in office. Clearly someth! g 
be done.
THE BROWNLOW COMMITTEE 1936-1937
i this qerious problem when he 
Roosevelt signalled his intention to tackle t
■ w- ’’The President * s
announced, on 22nd March 1936, the appointmen
Committee on A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  M a n a g e m e n t "  u n d e r  t h e  d ire c t
Rrownlow.
„ r. i -ffnrt in 1933 working underBrownlow had first joined the New Deal eff
J recruited Charles Merriam,
Interior S e cre ta ry  Harold Ick e s  , and had hi
an academic, whose previous work on p o l i t i c a l  planning [
tion 178 The thirdfor Planning" (1934)] had caught Roosevelt's atten
•_j 4. 4 «  u/h 1 ch the
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three-m a n Committee undertook its task was reflected in the broad view
that they adopted of their mission. It was also in keeping with their
„jjgjgy awareness of the historical context of the 1930s. To their
H a m i l t o n i a n  v i e w  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n c y ,  w h i c h  t h e y  r e g a r d e d  a s  " o n e  o f  t h e
very greatest contributions made by our Nation to the development of
modern democracy,"179 they attached this warning: "Those who waiver
at the sight of needed power are false friends of modern democracy.
Strong executive leadership is essential to democratic government today.
Our choice is not between power and no power, but between responsib
„180
but capable popular government and irresponsible autocracy.
, f  the Presidency they betrayed aIn spotlighting th is  p a r t ic u la r  aspect of t
concern that democratic government itself was on trial. For them the
American Executive was an institution which "stands across the path of
those who mistakenly assert that democracy must fail because
„lSi
neither decide promptly nor act vigorously.
Across the sea, Hitler defiantly taunted the democracies as impotent. 
Nearer home there was even a certain amount of guarded praise in some 
quarters for the "efficiency" of the fascist dictatorships. In the 
United States there was a degree of self-doubt as to the 
presidential system to supply the bold dynamic leadership required for 
the solution of the problems of modern government. The question was 
even raised as to whether efficiency and democracy were compatib
President Roosevelt r e f le c t e d  such concern when he
, "Will i t  be sa id , -Democracy
rather over-dram atic rh e to r ic a l f lo u r ish .
f „182
was a great dream, but it could not do the job?
.. to act that was specifically 
was, therefore, the President's capaci y
_ o  T h . m n i i f4 up . th©
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Committee claimed, was foremost among other democratic execu tives  pre­
cisely because i t  combined "th e  elements o f  popular control and the means 
for vigorous action  and le a d e rs h ip . " 1 8 3  In i t s  p o l i t ic a l  expression  th is  
question was thought to  re vo lv e  around "adm in istra tive  management", which 
the Committee defined as "th e  o rgan iza tion  fo r  the performance o f the 
duties imposed upon the P res id en t in exerc is in g  the execu tive power vested 
in him. " 1 8 4  in  more d e ta i l ,  th is  requ ired the Committee to  concern i t ­
self with "the execu tive  and h is  du ties, w ith managerial and s t a f f  aides,
„185
with organization, w ith  personnel, and w ith the f is c a l  system.
The problem, as the Committee saw it, was simply one of management - of
correcting 'bad' management and replacing it with good . In sh
, • „ „ „ 4- " 1 8 6  Viewed in th is  mechanistic
modernising o f our managerial equipment.
light, the problem of good administrative management would thus go hand in 
hand with the concept of -efficiency . The two were seen to be intimately 
connected. For efficiency was what made democracy work. In the Commit 
tee's Report this concept was translated as -effectiveness' . The situ­
ation thus necessitated "the establishment of a responsible 
chief executive as the centre of energy, direction, and administrative 
management. " 187 Politics was seen in essentially business terms, and
the survival of political institutions depended upon the successful incor-
. • "The forward march of
poration of business practices into governmen
American democracy a t t h is  p o in t in  our h is to ry  depends
it 188 It was precisely
ive management than upon any o th e r  s in g le  fac
this effectiveness that the Committee felt was impaired by the existing 
framework, "in spite of the clear intent of the Constitution to the
contrary".189 Like any piece of productive machinery, the equipment for
. 4.4 n— and modernizing to be 
Proper administrative management needed up a
„ 190
"abreast of the trend of our American times’ .
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introductory ro.ork, .or. .oil of l.ngu.ge of this kind.
It is self-evident that their whole approach was business-like and »ana- 
gerial in the sense that these terms are understood in the private sector.
Even as experts in their field they were more familiar with the operation 
of cities and states than with the Federal Government. Rexford G. Tugwell, 
a member of the Roosevelt Brain Trust. has written of the Committee mem­
bers that "it is impossible to escape the impression that they saw the 
Presidency as an enlarged Mayoralty.... they had in mind the picture of a 
big businessman, master of his organisation, served by an efficient staff, 
running a taut organization, and getting well-defined Jobs done in good
time".191
However, this approach was not without its political attractions, 
it very much appealed to President Roosevelt. There is no doubt that he 
was well aware of the real political significance of the changes the 
Committee advocated. He instinctively appreciated that when the Commit­
tee spoke of "the systematic organization of all activities in the hands 
of a qualified personnel under the direction of the chief executive" and
"the establishment of appropriate managerial and staff age
Pi-ffciselv for this reason
represented a fundamental shift of power.
Roosevelt was happy to acquiesce in any approach that masked its tr
„otHnn if the phrase
intent or lessened its potential to arouse opp
•c-t-ort it would have been
"administrative management" had not alrea y 
necessary to invent it.
. Hose eve on the way in which the 
Throughout this period he maintained a
» -revealing glimpse of his
Committee’s deliberations were proceeding.
«-ration of a meeting between 
»ind at work is available from a diary reconstructio
, 4-v, Maiority Leaders of the House and 
the President, the Committee, and the M j
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Senate. The President was quoted as having remarked: "I like that
It 1. popular .»d thl. thing 1. going to b. popul.r. 
,.lh of . good ho«so.lf« .. a 'good ..nag.r' and .h.n th.^.th.n 
„.big family runs things ..11 he 1. called a 'good manager'".19
Uil, ,r„„lo. himself, 1» hi. memoirs, also record. Roosevelt's
at this approach. For ..»pie, hoo.ev.1. approved the very 
,„1. of the Brownlow Committee precisely because it did not Include the
i - 194 He felt that if it was included it might worryword "reorganization . He xeir
a lot of people unnecessarily; including his own White House advisers,
who themselves were nervous at the prospect of being reorganized.195 In
this way President Roosevelt sought to defuse potential oppos
i a t-icallv neutral administrative
more it could all be presented as a p 
change the better.
,. The creation of the White
Nothing was in fact further from the truth.
, . with the implementation of the
House staff was a definite political a
■ e e+aff assistance the Presi-
Brownlow Committee Report and its advocacy o
... .,11 .„d truly brought l»«o the «„»tleth century and give» mod-
.hinties The Report,
ern means commensurate with its modern responsibiliti
. »».hpd as "a classic paper on 
issued on 12th January, 1937, has been es
t+ came to dominate poli-
American Administration” . But At was Inore•
tical thinking on the Presidency for a generation.
THE BROWNLOW REPORT 1937
"The President needs h e lp " was the Brownlow Committee Report s
197 recommended the creation of The Wh
celebrated single sentence. *
. _____tuff assistance that he
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needed These W h ite  H ouse  s t a f f  w o u ld  h a v e  d i r e c t  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  
President. From t h i s  a c o r n  g r e w  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  t r e e .
in describing the characteristics of the proposed new White House staff 
thereby created, the Report laid down that the staff were to be subject to 
three specific limitations. These can best be expressed in practical, 
personal, and political terms. (Appendix 3.2 provides the full text.)
First, in practical terms the staff were to be small in number:
"(The P re s id en t ) should be given a small
number of executive assistants....   ^198
p r o b a b l y  n o t  e x c e e d i n g  s i x  i n  number".
They were «0 be i „  . d d l . i o h  t o  t h e  P r e . l d e . f s  « l . t l «  . i d e s ,  o f  w h ic h  . t  
that time t h e r e  w e r e  t h r e e  S e c r e t a r i e s  t o  t h e  P r e s i
. . . to nhide bv the following:
Second, in personal terms the staff were enjo
"They should be possessed of high compe 
tence, great physical vigour, and a 
passion for anonymity".199
Third, in political terms their limitations were clearly set out.
"These aides would have no power to 
make decisions or issue instruct ions 
in their own right. They would not 
be interposed between the President 
and the heads of the departments.
They would not be assistant resi 
in any sense". 200
. above three extracts concisely convey the intention of the Brownlow
.. . the white House staff. But in
fcroittee in recommending the creation
ch area some further commentary is required.
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Xhere was no magic in the precise number of six assistants that it was 
proposed the President should have. President Roosevelt initially chose 
only to appoint three Administrative Assistants to the President in 
September 1939. Between then and his death there was only one relatively 
short period, between 1943 and early 1944, when The White House Office con- 
tained the full complement to which he was entitled. Nor did the
Report forbid a President the benefit of other forms of additional help.
For example, it specifically called for "a contingent fund” to enable the 
President "to bring in from time to time particular persons possessed of 
particular competency for a particular purpose” whose services he might 
usefully employ "for short periods of time".202 Moreover, the Resort was 
equally cognizant of the President's need for "a greater number of.... 
regular office staff" to provide the back-up services essenti 
Presidency. Mindful of the experience of the 1930s, with FDR's recourse 
to detailing personnel to the White House on an ever-increasing scale, the
Report encouraged this larger official office staff precisely in order to
„„„„•n rp Some freedom of curtail what it considered an unsavoury p
+0 caii on departments
manouevre was reta ined . The President was
_ ,„v,n after a tour of duty 
from time to time for the assignment of persons .
. 203 But this
as his aides, might be restored to their old posi
meant to be a definite limitation
aside, it was quite clear that there was
~ thp White House staff
°n the number of staff. The size and the purpos 
were held to be two sides of the same coin.
fhe * the «.taff were similarly thought to be not *  personal characteristics of the sta
That they should be highly
Ithout relation to their political purpose.
»»...« ... 1. «.put., T».< th.y .xmld b. e " - * "
o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t
>ysical vigour" merely reflected the physical xncapa
....... .. t o  be  t h e  " e y e s  and
hey
Lt-ai vigour merely reiiet'icu r *
.... .. ...... u  . ...y ...1 — . «..V —  -  -  *“  “ *
.I.. others. Whi
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their 204
personal and political characteristics merged was in the statement 
tb8t "they should be men in whom the President has personal confidence"
,twas this which vitally distinguished the White House staff from a high- 
powered civil service. Women, incidentally, went quite unmentioned.
The Brownlow Re£ort described in some detail the extent to which the poli­
tical r o le  of the White House staff was to be circumscribed. Their job 
was only to simplify executive contacts, clearance, and guidance. They were 
to ass ist the President in obtaining "quickly and without delay all pertinent 
in form ation"; and when the decisions had been made they were to "assist him 
in seeing to it that every administrative department and agency affected" was 
properly informed. To this end it was thought that their effectiveness would 
be "directly proportional to their ability to discharge their functions with 
restraint".205 The White House staff were specifically enjoined to "remain 
la th e  background, issue no orders, make no decisions, emit no public 
statements".205 Such were the limitations.
The Brownlow Committee had in mind the establishment in
Executive Branch of a piece of machinery akin to the British Civil Service
Cabinet Office; a buckle that would jo in  the President to his government.
It is instructive to r e c a l l  that the Committee sp ec ia lly  asked fo r a re
. RrMtish Cabinet Secretariat
port on the organization and procedures o
»36-37.207 »<>..<. -«I. B.o„lo.
self later recorded (what in retrospect should come as no undue su p
„eat physical vigour, and
that the very phrase, "a man of high competence, gre P V
, . 4._ Vi-fm bv ft B ritish
8 Passion for anonymity", had in fact been sugges e
■»titles required.208 The staff 
Civil servant friend as portraying the very qualities
*».<»+ "all matters coming
»ere not to play a political role, but only insure
to the President have been examined from the over-all managerial poi
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„ 209 The Committee thought tha t, w ith the r ig h t b lu ep r in t, 
view .
■ efficiency’ could be b u ilt  in  to  the machinery l ik e  some p rec is ion  part.
This intention is  equ a lly  ev id en t from some o f  the Committee’ s o r ig in a l 
proposals which never saw the l ig h t  o f  day, because they were vetoed by 
Roosevelt. For example, in  a memorandum to the Committee (which Roosevelt 
had requested be w r itten  to  g iv e  him an advance look at th e  l ik e ly  content 
of the final re p o r t ),  Louis Brownlow proposed that the White House secre­
tariat should operate under ’’ an execu tive  secretary (who would) estab lish  
direct lines o f communication w ith  a l l  the s t a f f  agencies except the 
Budget" . 2 10  R oosevelt immediately put a stop to  any such idea. He did 
not want any organ ization  under the con tro l o f "one man" . "You can t 
have just one Executive S ec re ta ry ", sa id  R oosevelt. "The damn columnists 
would never le t  him alone " . 2 1 1  Brownlow argued that th e re  would be some 
confusion, a lack o f  coord in ation , and much wasted time i f  the President 
did not appoint someone as "primus in te r  pares” to  deal w ith  p
personnel. R oosevelt was le s s  adamant about appointing
■t" 212 But Roosevelt
nan as long as " th a t 's  the fe l lo w  who never goes
„ e+o ff member would report
firmly vetoed any suggestion  that only on 
directly to the P res iden t.
ood ■>««« « “  “ • Br“ ”10’ “ *
extent to which the P resident would re ly  on personal con fi
„ _ hasis o f expertise
staff, as d is t in c t from confidence accruing mere y
„ another Committee proposal, about in a particular field. For this reason another
. i „  the way that the Report^  
detailing, came not to  be implemented in  p rec is  y
attention had been
had intended. Louis Brownlow re la ted  that Rooseve
. . ^ S e c r e t a r i a t
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£roffl the va rious departments. He agreed and sa id  that they could be 
tried out and sent back i f  necessary" . 2 1 3  The Refiort thus suggested 
that the President "should be fr e e  to  c a l l  on departments from time to 
tiBe for the assignments o f  persons who, a f t e r  a tour o f duty as h is  aides, 
Bight be restored to th e ir  o ld  p o s it ion s " . 2 1 4  But i t  never happened in 
this way. On the con trary , Presiden ts wished to have th e ir  -own' advisers 
around them (at the sen io r l e v e l )  ; none ever were prepared to work 
closely with seconded ca re e r  personnel from elsewhere in  government.
Paradoxically, the p ra c t ic e  o f d e ta i l in g  personnel from the departments 
and agencies to work in  the White House was given a leg itim acy  that opened 
the door to la te r  abuse. S im ila r ly , the suggestion o f a contingent fund 
to secure the advice o f  experts fo r  a lim ited  time was not s u f f ic ie n t ly  
restrictive in language to  fo r e s ta l l  la te r  abuse by the h ir in g  o 
experts for unlim ited periods o f tim e.
I. 1939, however, ,hi. ... far 1. .he future. ™
sizeable are., where the supposed rb.tri.tlo». on tu. •“ «  “ tiVlty P~ V*“ 
l«.r be „ „ „ . 1 1 ,  non-.wl.t.nt bad »o . « « *  »  * «  Initial establish-
14- viaH ciicc6 ©d©ci in  bringing
»ent. What mattered was that President Rooseve
_ »ipws He immediately set about
about a report that accorded w ith h is ow
214a The jo in t  e f fo r ts  o f  Brownlow 
translating i t s  recommendations in to  act on.
„  * i Q39 when the President
and Roosevelt came f in a l l y  to  fru it io n  in  Septembe
brought The White House Office formally into existenc
#
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T11I> rnrtTTON OF THE WHITE OFFICE OFFICE 1939
,There shall be within the Executive Office of the President the following
215
principal divisions, namely: CD The White House Office". With these
WOrds the White House staff were thereby officially created when President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 8248 on 8th September 1939. 
(It was to come into force three days later on 11th September 1939). This 
document set out the functions and duties of The White House Office, and 
its major constituent parts, and thus provided an outline of its intended 
internal organization. (Extracts from this Executive Order appear as 
Appendix 3.1).
n. general porpo.e of The «hi». Hone. Office -«■ te <h. Pr..!-»«
■1. an intimate capacity on the performance of the many I«*“ 1*6 “ “ ’l«1“
Incident to hie Immediate office".216 ».fleeting • «“ *” • °* ““  pr‘°‘
.1« and „ „  there ..re to he three principal sohdlvl.io.s accorded their
. ^ d-i»* The first consisted of the Secre- own particular functions and duties. ln
n a is e  with Congress, Cabinet,
taries to the President, whose task it was
tl) The second embraced the purely admin-
Press, Radio and the general public. The
. ¡ „ h  Ht was t o  o r g a n i z e  and
i s t r a t iv e  functions of t h e  E x e c u t i v e  Clerk w ose
o ta ff .  including the
supervise a l l  c le r ic a l  back-up to the p o lit
•«erly handling of document.. The third .»bdl.i.l«» ... « • <  p“ *” *“
._ +he President. They 
for the newly-created Administrative Assistants
were to "a ss is t  the President in such matters as he may
"personal a ides” , mainly to "get inform ation and to condense
ft for his u s e " .217 S p ec ific  reference was made to thei
"interposed" between the President and anyone e lse .
„I,, that designating one of 
°f the other sections of the Executive Order, o y
_ . . nfflrp for
thft Ari™ 4 -  j  ^ . __ _
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» » < — - *  U  v „ s t i g.  o f  B , - n l o . ' .  o r l . i u . l  notion o f «  " P " - " *  
re la ted  e x c lu s iv e ly  to  the » h i t .  House s t a f f  as d is t in c t  
other part, o f t h e  BOP. Reference .a s  -ad . to  » » .  in ten tion  to  h oc ,. 
» 1 , ,  House O ff ic e  e n t ir e ly  in  The m it e  House, hut fo r  the t in .  being 
the Administrative A ss is tan ts  had to  make do w ith o f f i c e s  in  the S ta te , War 
and Navy Building next door ( la t e r  to  he renamed the Executive O ff ic e
Building or EOB) .
One vital point was briefly touched upon. The President alone was to
"prescribe regu lations governing the conduct o f the business o f the d iv is ion
„ 218 thi end Koosevelt later appended a
of The White House Office . To tnis
,h . Executive Order . 2 1 9  I t  ~  — >« * °  “ *  Pr* “ ‘,1” l‘
„ „  o f f ic ia l  language . l « h  a ~ r .  personal c o e n t . r y  on .h a . he hoped he
»as achieving. Form ally re-emphasising that h is s t a f f  had no p
» » th_ ex ten t o f th e ir  in fluence
formulate decisions" he nevertheless revea
. »tori that their relationship was "a very in several ways. Firstly, he admitted that tnei
* ft ,»  irrea test b en e fits " to  be that 
close one". Secondly, he found "one o f the g
_ . . „ t „ T h ird ly , he c le a r ly  appreciated
they shared h is p re s id e n t ia l "standpoi
their flexibility as a group, freed from "any definite functional patterns11
or "hard-and-fast a llo c a t io n s "  o f pa rticu la r fu n ction s. Despite procla
ing that they were not in terposed between h im self and his government,
isxri the degree to which the in fant
R oosevelt ’ s re m a rk s  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  r e v e a
i n l i t i c a l  or personal 
staff dealt with Congress, Cabinet, financia  , P
knew f u l l  w e l l  t h e  v a l u e
interests on his b e h a lf. President Rooseve
u a the White House s ta f f .  But even he 
and purpose fo r  which he had crea te
■ » Id  sb.cE » y  i « s  — —  ‘ ™ * * B * ”d
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CONCLUSION
This review o f the o r ig in s  and establishm ent o f  the White House leads us 
to summarize severa l genera l conclusions. Firstly, the h is to r ic a l  le v e l 
of staff assistance to  the Pres iden t was always sm all, i f  i t  ex isted  at 
all. By 1933 i t  d id  not amount o f f i c i a l l y  to  more than a dozen, o f which 
but a tiny handful were th ere  to  o f fe r  p o l i t i c a l  advice, w h ile  the rest 
provided merely c le r ic a l  support. Secondly, there appeared at various 
tines in embryonic form severa l fea tu res la te r  to  play a prominent part in 
the development o f  the White House s t a f f .  The underlying nature o f the re­
lationship between P res iden t and adviser can be as w e ll demonstrated h is ­
torically as i t  can in  the modern day. Thirdly, the White House s ta f f  
unofficially began to  take shape, as a p ra c t ic a l fa c t o f l i f e ,  
early years o f the R oosevelt Presidency in  the 1930s. Franklin  Roosevelt 
was the f i r s t  o f the modern Presiden ts to  recognise the re a l
devise the o rgan ization  o f ,  s t a f f  assistance o f an enlarged kind. Fourthly, 
Roosevelt created The White House O ff ic e ,  and i t s  s t a f f ,  as
political act. Although he did h is  best to  camouflage th is  fa c t with neutral
administrative language, R oosevelt firm ly  intended that the s t a f f  serve
definite p o l i t ic a l  purpose. Finally, upon th e ir  o f f i c i a l  establishmen
1939, the White House staff were originally made subject to three sp
, nolitical character-
limitations regarding th e ir  ph ysica l, personal,
Istica. They to b. . . . U  1 »  “
interposed between the President and anyone e s
^  true s ign ific an ce  o f  these s p e c if ic  lim ita t ion s , to which
„  „  1939 led , is  nowhere more c le a r ly  demon-
and establishment o f  the s t a f f  had by
“ rated than in that staff's subsequent growth and deve p
CHAPTER IV
GROWTH OF THE TOITS HOUSE STAFF
tvTRODUCTIQN
The W h ite  H o u s e  s t a f f  a r e  n o w  r e c o g n i s e d  a s  a n  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p a r t  o f  the Presidency a n d  a n  i n t e g r a l  f e a t u r e  o f  p r e s i d e n t i a l  g o v e r n m e n t  a t  
the h i g h e s t  l e v e l .  B u t  t h e  f a c t s  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  r i s e  t o  
this p o s i t i o n  h a v e  y e t  t o  b e  h i s t o r i c a l l y  e x a m i n e d  i n  d e p t h .
This c h a p t e r  t h e r e f o r e  t r a c e s  i n  d e t a i l  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  t h e  W h i t e  H o u s e  
staff -  p r i m a r i l y  u n d e r  t h e  s i x  p r e s i d e n c i e s  f r o m  R o o s e v e l t  i n  t h e  1930’s 
to Nixon i n  t h e  1970’s. S p a n n i n g  f i v e  d e c a d e s  t h i s  g r o w t h  c a n  e s s e n t i a l l y  
he r e d u c e d  t o  t w o  b r o a d  c a t e g o r i e s :  g r o w t h  i n  t h e  n u m b e r s  o f  s t a f f ;  a n d  
growth i n  t h e i r  c o s t .  V a r i e t i e s  w i t h i n  b o t h  c a t e g o r i e s  a r e  d i s c e r n i b l e
r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  m a j o r  s u b - h e a d i n g s
and these several subsidiary areas are
T i t l e s -  T u r n o v e r ;  C o s t ;  S a l a r i e s ;  a n d  
o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r :  N u m b e r s ;  J o b  T i t l e s ,
Support Services.
+ h  n f  t h e  W h i t e  H o u s e  s t a f f  h a s  b e e n
A comprehensive examination of the grow
a notable o m i s s i o n  i n  w r i t i n g s  o n  t h e  s t a f f  d u r i n g  t h i s  p
W d « ,  owed .uoh «. the coo.id.r.bl. dlKlcultie. of
fact which was established in
©ven t h e  m o s t  e l e m e n t a r y  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  a
O . Q , 1 , to .„«.e, , b «  thl. ch.p.er b»Ud. upoo <»• d.«,«i«o» 
of the inner core White House staff discussed in ChaEter_I 
flesh to the bones revealed in that earlier c p
^  nrovides the factual basis
The importance of this chapter is that 1 P
. t h a t  t h e  w h i t e  H o u s e  s t a f f  h a v e  b e c o m e  
uPon w h i c h  t h e  a r g u m e n t  i s  a d v a n c e d
* of «residential government.
a formidable part of the machinery of pr
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IIITjlTTT uni ire STAFF: NUMBERS
House Office  Commissioned Staff
*  White House Office commissioned staff are the tip of the White House 
Tb.y ar. tbc. .h... »—  ™ >  « * «  b" n
„«„rted i. .m  »»»*i l i s t * «  of * o .«.« o„ to. jsitsim m .
----- dr,.nlz.ti.n Manual , « 0  « »  r ^ fr.o.lo.,1 Dl^cto g  <■"* “
„,M r public documents and private publication. i Pr.cis.ly
„„.us. of .01. visibility «0. f . k  of tr.ci« tb.it gto.tb .inc. 1939 is 
,t. Tabl. 4.1 provide» ... bar. outline of tbi. gro.t» over .
35-year period. (Appendix 4._1 fills in this outline with detailed figures 
e.C year be,...» 1939 aod 1979.> Tbbre are « »  « W » .  9"“
..c Presidency, t.ken fro. the fir.« -  1 - t  >“  «  ° ,I1C' °'
President.
TABLE 4.1
NUMBERS OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1974 
The Growth of WHO Commissioned Staff
Presidency USGOM CDa
CSD
9t> _
Roosevelt 1939 8
1945 14 15
Truman 1946 17 13
1952 19 14
Eisenhower 1953 29 27
1960 49 50
Kennedy 1961 29 29
1963 28 26
Johnson 1964 29 30
21
1968 27 24
24
Nixon 1969 46 42
43
1974 43C 52
53
a Figures include Military Aides [1945(H) to
1964].
b 1940 figure (no figure for 1939 published).
c 1973 figure (no figure for 1974 published).
Sources : United States Government Organization
Manual
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..„ u ,  1 ,1 shows, the overall picture has hear. on. cf undoubted growth.
iisenkower and Ninon, had -ark.dly h igher nuaher o, WHO coissloned eta« 
than any o f the four Democratic P res id en ts .
The first WHO commissioned staff numbered only a handful. After the formal 
..„bU.b— t Of The White H.uee Office in 1900 Pre.ld.n, Roo.ev.l« at
only . . . l i e d  h i— »  »  th ree o f  the . 1 »  new ly-created « d a ln la t r . t i v .
which he ... entitled. Thee, three, together with the three 
Secretaries to the Pre.ident, his P.r.on.l Secretary, and the non-poll,id 
Iterative Clerk, made up the total of eight listed •**«• »1 “ • “ “  0<
hi, death Roosevelt had nearly doubled this — « •  *da*a
pest. including the flr.t Special Aa.is.»t, Harr, Hopkins. -  the
first Special Counsel, Sam Rosenman.
As was to be expected, Presiden t Truman gradually brought his own s t a f f  in to
v. j nhprited from Roosevelt (only a few ofthe White House to replace those inherite
whom stayed on, like Bill Hassett, Sam Rosenman, and David
first listings of the Truman WHO staff, in the latter part of 1945, gave
the totals variously as 14 (the Govgrnment Organj^ationJlanuaJ
Congressional Directory). By the end of his Presidency Tr
had risen by about h a lf  as much again  (accord ing to  each so
. ow-Hv to Truman's fu l l  use 
14 respective ly . This modest increase owe p
nartlv  to  h is creation
of the complement of six Administrative Assistan , P
, Tmhn steelman, and p a rt ly  to the 
of new s ta f f  p os ition s  fo r  aides l ik e
s( csl personnel
addition to WHO staff lists of military aides and n P
< the C h ief Usher, and the Secretary to 
(such as the P res id en t ’ s Physic ian , tne
the Wife of the President ).
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Tbe Eisenhower Presidency brought the f i r s t  dramatic change. In 1953 the 
numbers of WHO commissioned s t a f f  jumped immediately in to  the 20's; by 
195 4 had reached the 30's ; by 1955 were firm ly  entrenched in  the 40's;
*  by 1960 were approaching the BO'.. A whole new range of staff titles 
.ere invented (as we shall later see). Other changes were equally notice-
able. Among the most important was the fact that for the first time the 
President could no longer deal with all the members of his WHO commissioned 
staff on a one-to-one basis. There were too many of them to allow such 
personal direction, even had the President wished to provide it (which 
Eisenhower didn't). Managing the White House staff was delegated to 
Sherman Adams, The Assistant to the President.
The Kennedy and Johnson years marked a step back from this gro
commissioned staff. Throughout the Democratic years of
level remained stable and hovered around the middle or lat
was a size that enabled both P residen ts to maintain -  i f  need be a pe
relationship with each of their staff members, given that about half-a-dozen
of the listed WHO commissioned staff were non-political,
. the Kennedy-Johnson years gave little
dential personnel. On the face of it,
+ «,oq in fact well under
sign that the renewed growth of the White House 
way, (as we shall shortly discover).
J dramatic change, akin to
The arrival of President Nixon produced ano
The numbers of WHO commissioned
that of Eisenhower's two decades earlier.
-t-hree regu lar sources
staff took another leap  upwards. F igures from a ^
show that Nixon’s incoming staff was almost double t ^  ^
two immediate predecessors. The Nixon WHO staff remained ov
fu e lle d  critic ism  o f the
“ore often than not. It was partly this size
oithoueh at this level
Nixon o v n o n o n  of White House power,
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Hixon’s staff were only slightly more numerous than Eisenhower's had
fc n . and considerably less than Ford's or Carter's were to be. * been
jjgjpite this increase the number of senior staff (e.g. Haldeman. Ehrlichman. 
Kissinger, Timmons, Colson, Zeigler, Harlow and others - those whose names 
were generally well known in political circles) did not significantly out­
number their equivalents in the Kennedy-Johnson years (such as Sorensen, 
O'Donnell, Salinger, Bundy, O'Brien, Moyers, Califano, and Valenti) . Bather 
it was the ranks of middle-level commissioned White House Office staff 
(featuring the likes of Chapin, Higby, Cole, Dent, Morgan, Clawson, Fielding, 
Butterfield and Kehrli) that were noticeably expanded during the Nixon 
Presidency.
The White House Office: Budgeted Staff
«  «  charting th. growth of the .«•« W  *“  1Uag,t*ry
«Ming of "The mite Ho«.. Offic. - S.lari.. •»<*— ” “  1" *
i t  . .  » . v .  already « « « d  <*• « «
ire. United State. Budget, .u.t be treated with con.id.r.bl. caution, 
figures themselves are given in .Table
* It is interesting that, despite the adverse criti should all have en- 
President Nixon's White House staff, his succe staff support,
joyed significantly greater numbers of commissione in 1975 (total:
President Ford had over 50% more commissioned to the U.S.
66) than Nixon had had in 1973 (total: ), a rter's staff was almost
Government Organization Manual. Presiden a . , . 65w Thus Carter,
25% up in 1977 (total: 80) on Ford's last ye®^ ( q£ the white House 
*ho campaigned in 1976 specifically against t level. In
staff, had almost double the number that Nixon had £  ^
1981 President Reagan made further ^ e^ ® Snumbers of commissioned 
Congressional Staff Directory show that the a wider range of
™° staff had reached 90. Reagan's sta£f Hntl_e staff had ever known
job titles and staff functions than any Whi ®_5 1 7  as an illustration
before. The Reagan WHO staff are listed in _PP nJdern White House staff
°f the continuing? increases in size and scope
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miMBEKS ilit: 
Tho (irowth o f WHO Budgeted S ta f f
USBA&
_CSC
Presidency
Roosevelt 1939 45
3 7
1945 49 4 9
Truman 1946 52
52
1952 267 261
Eisenhower 1953 287
279
1960 276 268
Kennedy 1961 276
270
1963 279 270
Johnson 1964 278
270
1968 260 250
Nixon 1969 255
250
1974 519 505
CR-H
45
48
51
252
262
275
270
270
270
250
250
505
Figures given are the Total Numb  ^ are a combination 
for the years 1939-1950, after w m<1 the "Full-time
of "Total Number of Permanent Positions 19 5 1-19 7 4. All
Equivalent of Other Positions" f°* . * 1 0 7 4  figure is taken 
figures are actual figures, i.e. 
from the FY 1976 U.S. Budget.
Figures given ere the "To,.! » - > • ' P°*ltl0°
throughout the period 1939-1974. ^
Figures given are the "Aver*JJ employees 1963-1974.
years 1939-1962, and those F u ll-t im
/ F Y  1 9 4 9  -  F T  1 9 7 6 )Sources: United States Budget Appendices ± ( 1 9 5 9 )
H o u s e  A p p r o p r i a t i o n s  S u b c o m m i t t e e  H e a r i n g
U.S. Civil Service Commission <
Congressional Record - House (
, is reflected here in two obvious 
rhe caution that has been previously urge .
0„h of the three sources listed
»ays. Firstly, the figures available from e These dif-
by no means always tally with one another for any given y dif£erent
f 4 . aliBht and mostly accounted to
ferences (which are relatively aligns
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definitions of .ho. is » . 1 «  counted) d° “ « *»— •1” ' “ * * "  B” ‘tly 
,1.«« fh.y only represent the starting *>**“ • ** " » *  “ « d~ P"
surface layer to u n d e r s t a n d  .»at ataff gro.th ... really taking place.
secoad obvious feature of » 1 . »  »• *»** t M  Brmt1' *"°
appears to bar. proceeded 1» three di.tiuct .tag.., — d by t.o
sudden end drau.tic sbift. fro. cue plateau to the neat. fh.se « 0  , « « « .  
leaps upwards appeared to occur under Truman in 1947 and under Nixon in
. \ Between 1946 and 1947 the
(Appendix 4.1 gives figures for each year.)
rose from 52 to 210 employees; 
official budgetary size of the White House staff rose
between 1970 and 1971 it rose from 250 to 533 employees.
The suddenness and size of the apparent increases on both occasions were
entirely ulsloadlug. The ne. higher figure, -rely represented, o. both
—  tv,p real size of the budgetary 
occasions, an attempt more honestly to presen
g-vid. re su lt  was undoubtedly
TOO staff. It is fair to say that on both occasion
r that slue this « “ »*• “PPar“ *a more accurate picture of that size.
jump in size should be completely ignored in favour of what the resu
figure proved to be. This new honest approach can best be appreciated from
a breakdown of the 1970 and 1971 figures as published 
which is given in Table 4.3.
4.3
The Extent of Detailing 1970
Personnel 1970 & 1971
%
TOite House Office 208 36 548
100
Special Projects 95 16
Detailed Personnel 273 48 — —
total 576 100 548
100
Source: United States Budget 1971
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This Table shows the ex ten t to  which, by 1970, the o f f i c i a l  s iz e  o f 
The «h it .  House O ff ic e  s t a f f  had shrunk to  l i t t l e  more than a th ird  
the size o f the t o ta l  White House s t a f f  (according to  the Nixon 
Administration's d e f in i t io n  at that tim e ). The other near tw o-th irds 
were accounted fo r  by S pec ia l P ro je c ts  s t a f f  (pa id  from the Specia l 
Projects appropria tion ) and the numbers o f  d e ta iled  personnel (who 
themselves accounted fo r  n early  h a lf  the t o t a l ) .  T a b l e t s  shows how
the Nixon Adm inistration  merged these three groups toge th er in  1971
^ „-f Daid from The White House
with the resu lt that the numbers o f  s t a f f  pai
Office appropriation jumped upwards.
w m u ia  a  9 figu res  must take i t s  d is - 
Given that any ana lys is  o f  the Table— 8“
._ tiint the White House s t a f f  grew 
tortions in to  account, what emerges is
„ There were no sudden and dramatic
steadily over a period of years.
...p. ....... ......... — —  * »  «  * — 01 * ■  **”
being included under .b e  budge.nry he.d lng H° U' °
i i„n is that it demolishes the legitimacy 
One by-product of this conclusio
, , . .  ,bv press and academics a lik e ) against the
of the charges popu larly la id  (by
»run Presidency .... »iron 1 «  • »  “
. . .  Hbl.u House . . . « •  »  »  ~  — «  -  —  * “  “
uiu.d by «be ..... - .»dougb «». » n »  “o'“ * “
was quick to claim credit
sensitive to them. Indeed, at the t ,
. from 576 to  548,
,  ^ .ho t o ta l numbers o f s ta fx ,
for having a c tu a lly  reduced the
. off any criticism that this new 
which it was hoped would take the e g
1 i „  i t s  wake. in  th is  respect i t  
honest budgetary approach might bring
nut i t  a lso  fa i le d
obviously fa i le d .  I t  only fu e lled  the c r i t i c  sm.
in a less obvious
unMnve its stated objective.
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Giving credit to the Nixon White House (and to the Truman White House 
for a comparable display of honest budgeting in 1947) should not obscure 
the continuing déficiences that characterized official figures. As 
Chapter I again made clear the new 'honest• figures cannot be accepted 
as the true size of the White House staff. The detailing of personnel 
continued unabated and, as we shall see, there xs evidence from other 
sources that not inconsiderable extra numbers need to be added each 
,o obtain . «ru.r picture of the overall . 1 »  and the 
year to year.
The White House Office- Detailed Staff
Reliable and regular information on the numbers of personne 
to work for The White House Office has never been aval 
presidencies b.twe.a Hoo..velt end Ninon. Such intor-etlon .. »  *• 
po.s.bl, obtain ran v.rp, « - * —  depend!« on the
source. Table 4,4 iilu.tr.«.. the predic.n. .act« «he researcher 
1. thl. field who trie, to reconcile the differ.« »sure, obtained bp
the four source, utilised here. Fipure. avail.«. —
ducted bp the relvant House and Sen.«. appropriation. subco»itt..s
have been I n t e r m e n t .  ~  1939'1959 " "
produced at on. hearing3 while ««•• “ » »*“ * 19,°-1974 ” ”
4 Figures fo r  the
made available at the hearings of successive years.
House floor during a
years 1961-1969 were taken from a speech on
t i , 1975 5 Such figures were
debate on an appropriation bill in Ju y»
those which were subsequently
obviously derived from the same source
4 n thp oeriod 1939—1974)4 „oi Record (covering the peripresented in the Con^ressional_Heco—  6
taff authorization bill in April, 1978. 
during debate on a White House staff aurno
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TABLE 4.4
umroflRS OF WH1 TE HOUSE STAFF 1939- 1974
Tho Growth of WHO Detailed Staff
HAS/SASa LoCb c s c G CR-HdPresidency
Roosevelt 1939 112 NA
112 112
1945 167 NA
167 167
Truman 1946 161 NA
161 162
1952 NA NA NA
31
Eisenhower 1953 NA NA
NA 28
1960 NA 174
NA 33
Kennedy 1961 134 138
NA 134
1963 111 118
NA 111
Johnson 1964 125 79
NA 125
1968 206 23
NA 206
Nixon 1969 232 78
NA 232
34 47
1974 52
riations Subcommittee
a Figures obtained from House and Senate PP g6g obtained from a 
Hearings are intermittent, figures for 1961
speech in the House in 1975 (see below).  ^ ^
b Figures obtained by deducting " ^ ““ “ oJrission "employee totalS
White House Office from Civil each year. This deduction
for The White House Office' as o detailed employees .
"in « « « — . * tlon,
• Figures in, 1839-1949 t.*.» « J i  S ' S i i ' w ’i'»
Hearing (1949). Figures fo r l 05^ « “ for 1970-1974 are taken from
Commission to be Not Availab ® 'subcommittee Hearings.
House and Senate Appropriat June of
nf detailed employees as
4 Figures given are the numbers 
each year.
NA Figures not available. __________________
------------------- ---------- -----^ ^ ¡ ^ b M M i t t ^ e H e a r i n g s
Sources: House and Senate Appropria ° (1975)
House Debate on Appropriation Bill
Library of Congress (19 (1978)
U.S. Civil Service Commiss g)
Congressional Record - House (
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authority ot th... llgure. »«■ »ever boon .uh.tnu.l..ed. They .u.t
„  «  all other purported figure., uo »or. . » »  . guide to the
detailing in the before »70. The
^ „ l o ,  acknowledged a. »uoh in it. .d»l..ion that figure. *>r th.
^ ^ 0- » S 9 were .»ply «o. available.7 * U brary of Congr... .«udy
U 1973 agreed that " i t  i .  v ir tu a lly  i . p o e . i b l .  to obtain  in fo m a t io .
,h. number of govern-,.. « P » , - .  defiled to the « t e  Hou.e
Office". I f  own listing of figure« for th. year. 1934-1971, it admitted,
8
were "a very poor substitute for such information1 .
,„i.g to ,h. figure, themselves .. can see that to . large .«ten. they
c— plement tho.e given earlier for «he budgeted total, of »»0 .«aff. for
- i- 4-vio official budgeted totals were low 
example, in the years 1939-1946, when
. Hotnilees were correspondingly high (only a few dozen) , the numbers of detaile
.. 1947 when WHO budgeted totals were re­sell over one hundred). After 194/,
- a- omitted from official figures, 
adjusted upwards to include detailees hitherto omitted
. thP White House consequently dropped 
the numbers of personnel on detail to
back sharply. (Appendix 4.1 gives figures for each year.)
By the 1960s the numbers of detailees had begun to grow upwards
ficant level once again. Detailed personnel in no small part powered the
Of the many examples that
White House staffs of both Kennedy and Johnson.
. c-oree McGovern was
could be given, the experience of Special Ass s
b on his WHO staff, and
typical. Kennedy had grandly talked him in
arrived to find that he
made him Director of Food-For-Peace, but McGover
h . H t His solution was to borrow people from
bad no offices, staff or budget. His s
1 1  A ss i s t a n t  was pa id  f o r  from 
elsewhere in governm ent. McGovern’ s own SPe Mc(Jovern,
W ,  ol Agriculture Aund.. » »  « » « .  « “  S’"‘l',S,“
C + otfl Department. By
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establishing W  “  * 'l0"
O H  Executive Office Building McGovern ensured «... hi, »« . »  P * «
for Thus it „en. on thronghoo. th. I960., .he —
repeated in other White House staff offices.
„  th. ,.d Of th. 1960. eight » . » .  o* “  « ™ * 11 ‘“ r" ” 4
of th. »hite House stuff »hile at the « -  the offici.l
budgetary figure, .heed the ...» to he ef ...tic . 1 ~  Ü S U J  “ “  
deoonstrates ths, .hi. level of defiling -  decid-dlf higher t h -  « « .  »< 
the later 1910.. After 1971, -hen —
l„e official budgetary totals, the level of detailing d - PPed greatly- ™  
,.,1, 1970. also witnessed a greater congre.slen.l interest m  the nunb.r. 
of detailees, which had the beneficial effect of eliciting the fxrst reliable 
for -aey years.1» » V »  these shewed that a no, inconsiderable nu-b.r
da,.11.0 personnel still worh.d for »hi,. House, —  «  “  —
cut ted Sometimes it was
four dozen annually, depending on the source consulted.
i the White House revealed that there had been 
higher. In 1974, for example, the White
the orevious ten months (and a
52 detailees to The White House Office ove
* 4-v,» White House either for the 
further 12 on top of that who worked at th
. the White House
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board 
Fellows Program11).
to the White House staff. They help provide 
There will always be detail©©© to t
r back-up servicing.
the White House with valuable additional exper is
M t lv add to the ability of the White 
They constitute a resource that can gre
of the President. On this
House staff to fulfil the expectations upon em
♦ he felt and their numbers legitimately 
basis their influence will continue o «n.i4.A HmisG stall in
added
nei  mxiue  m  w ------- . „«
i i  s i z e  of t h e  W h i t e  H o u s e  s t a f f  i n  
to t h e  total f i g u r e  f o r  t h e  o v e r a  i f t r e e
r e a c h e d  l a r g e- mVion
ailV  n a n
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^  ... proo,. ... it pro™, no !... « . » " » *  •» *»•
m , „  ... «... «»•» ironic, i« vie. of critici» « «  •*
» ! » .  .or n i3 . - s o  t n «  “  B,V<i
.... greater iev.!. «  *  *0. » 0  «  « -  '
„ „ « c , .  .or .r»Pi.. o v r  200 p.r.ccn.l ..r. det.il«. «° -
. . . .  O ffice, . O  a .vera l d e » .  < «  < > «» -  P « «  « '  “ «  ” “ **
_  ...f,12 Clearly, detailing -  oontinued to 0e »  i— «
. . .  « n i -  H o c .  By c o c t r . . .  tde coatridution  —  m  * —
, .+v, atR formal abolition as a separate
Projects faded and then disappeared with 1
nnd 1974 was not inconsiderable, 
entity in 1974. But its impact between 1956 and
The Special Projects Staff
, .th the appearance of separateness during its 
"Special Projects" was graced with the pp
_ + thP truth was different. Special 
existence between 1956 and 1974. Bu
. „„hcidiary of The White House Office. 
Projects was in fact a wholly owned
. j +-h#» White House staff.
Special Projects staff were thus de_facto me ers
. , rhanter I.) This was more openly (This synonymity has been establishe n ---E_
1956 and 1965,
acknowledged during the first half of its existence, between
„ of the numbers of staff employed under 
when the U.S. Budget provided figures o
tiv such figures mysteriously dis
the Special Projects heading. Subsequen
. . . . . i f  was techn ically
1974 Special P ro jects i t s e l  
appeared from U.S. Budgets. I n p
abolished, and subsumed within The White House
, of the effects of the secrecy surrounding 
Special Projects is a good examp e figures to go on,
the White House staff. With a restricted range o outllne
it is only possible to gauge the outline 
tor a restricted numbers of years, ^
of the
•estri t  ber  i  » * * ,  a v a i l a b l e
T a b le J u l  provides the a 
growth o f Specia l P ro jec ts  s • - "
f 1 P U p o c
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Presidency
Roosevelt
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Numbers of Staff 
Special Projects
USBA CR-H
The White House Office 
combined with
Projects Staff
USBA° LoCd CSC® CR-Hf
45 NA 224 45
49 NA 66 48
52 NA 216 51
252 NA 248 252
262 NA 247 262
445 446 416 355
409 411 439 342
388 388 376 318
255 349 328 306
202 273 261 250
220 328 337 314
500 - 560 506
Figures are the "Average Number" of employeesFigures are the g „Average Number" of WHO employees
Figures obtained by subtracting , projects employees
from the "Total" numbers of WHO and Sp Record for the years 1939- 
(combined), as given by the ^  re obtained by subtracting
1962. Figures for the years 1963-19 total for WHO and Special
the "Permanent Positions" from the combined total
Pr°3eCtS- . wjjo "permanent Positions".
Figures for the years 1939-1946 are "Average Number" of
Figures for the years 1947-1955 are o are numbers "At The En
employees. Figures for the years proiects (combined). Figures
of Each Year" for both WHO and ®P®C„“verage Numbers". 
for the years 1964-1974 are o itions" plus the numbers of
Figures are the number of "Permanent °s fflC0
"detailed personnel" in The White ou the Bureau o f
Figures are fo r  WHO "Actual Manpower" (as all "end o f calendar
Personnel Management Information Systems) and
year totals as of 31st December- o ^  lnclude8 both WHO
 ^ Figures not available.
aurces: United States Budget Appendices 
Congressional Record -
Library of Congress (1973) il978)
U.S. Civil Service Commission
254 -
TABLE 4.5
nF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1974 
r.rnwth of Spedai Projects Staff
Numbers o f  S ta f f  
Specia l P ro je c ts
The White House Office 
combined with
Projects Staff
Presidency
Roosevelt
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
USBA CR-H
1939
1945
1946
1952
1953
1960
1961
1963
1964
1968
1969 
1974
120
115
105
105
NA
NA
NA
80
72
48
36
0
64
1
USBAC LoCd CSC® CR-Hf
45 NA 224 45
49 NA 66 48
52 NA 216 51
252 NA 248 252
262 NA 247 262
445 446 416 355
409 411 439 342
388 388 376 318
255 349 328 306
202 273 261 250
220 328 337 314
500 - 560 506
Fieures are the "Average Number" of employees*Figures are the g ,,Average Number" of WHO employees
Figures obtained by subtracting . , Proiects employees
from the "Total" numbers of WHO and p peCord for the years 1939- 
(combined), as given by the ^ “j^®8 8 ^““^  obtained by subtracting 
1962. Figures for the years 1963-197 totai for WHO and Special
the "Permanent Positions" from the combined total
Pr° JeCtS- ^  - mjjo "Permanent P o s it ion s".
Figures for the years 1939-1946 are "Average Number" of
Figures for the years 1947-1955 are °fi_1963 are numbers "At The En 
employees. Figures for the years proiects (combined). Figures
of Each Year" for both WHO and , ge Numbers",
for the years 1964-1974 are of WHO Ave « ^  numbers of
Figures are the number of "Permanent osoffice.
"detailed personnel" in The White ous the Bureau of
Figures are for WHO "Actual Manpower" (as all >.end of calendar
Personnel Management Information ys vear.
year totals as of 31st December’ o ^  inciudea both *
■ i s ™  r .
 ^ Figures not available._________ ______________ —*----------
Purees: United States Budget Appendices 
Congressional Record -
Library of Congress (1973) ,,978)
U.S. Civil Service Commission
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The disparity between the two columns on the left-hand side is marked.
Those taken from the U.S. Budgets take precedence over those drawn from 
^  recessional Record for the period 1956-1964, in terms of their 
legitimacy, but speculation is inevitable for the years until 1974.
Special Projects did not grow in size from -infancy' to -adulthood-. It 
was bom almost full-sized. By the end of 1956, in the year of its 
creation, there were already an average 93 staff on the payroll. (See 
Appendix 4,1 for detailed figures.) Thereafter the staff grew to well 
over 100, at which level it remained until 1965 (the last year in which 
figures were published) with the noted exception of 1962 when the average 
number increased almost half as much again to 150 staff. It is immediately 
obvious that this level of staff was quite considerable. Moreover 
"average" figures give an understated picture. Under the b g 
classification of "numbers at the end of each year Specia j
staff grew to 166 by the end of Eisenhower’s Presidency, subsided in 
Kennedy’s first year to 143, only to rise to their highest recorded peak
of 206 staff by the end of 1962.
Although figures for the numbers of Special Projects staff
fro. ii.g. after FY 1966 i. *° “ “ “ * *’“ * *h*
average „a*,., of over 100 ...« contim»* <">->**- , M  196°='
. o .hot the Nixon White House in 1970 
We have already seen, in Table 4._3>
.«...6 96 .taff ..re Oe.ag paid for by «be
Prlatlon. . 1 «  the disparity that 1 «  • » . . *  » • »  *h°'" *°
„ „ h vear" totals the real number of 
between "average" figures and end of y
c of 1970 could well have been higher.
Special Projects staff by the end of
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Thus far the evidence clearly shows that a significant proportion of the 
White House staff was provided under the Special Projects heading during 
the second half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s. The official WHO 
staff were swelled by at least another hundred persons each year (and 
often considerably more) . The next stage is therefore to consider the 
combined size of WHO and Special Projects staff. The four columns on the 
right-hand side of Table 4.5 provide the available figures for such a 
combination.
The discrepancies between the figures obtained from varying sources may 
present a somewhat confusing picture. (As before, these are partly ex­
plained by varying definitions of what is being measured by each source; 
partly by the incomplete nature of any official records. See: Appendix U . 
But the fact that no overall trend can easily be discerned is simply 
explained by the unavailability of complete figures for large periods of 
time. The real significance of the figures in the four columns lies 
rather in what they reveal about the real size of combined WHO and Special 
Projects staff between 1956 and 1964 (when official records were at their 
most complete). Allowing for the (relatively minor) discrepancies between
- rvmeress and the U.S. Civil 
figures from the U.S. Budgets, the Library of----6.----- >
w,, the end of Eisenhower's Service Commission, Table 4.5 shows that by
n  increase, although by his 
staff. The Kennedy Presidency saw a small
death the combined total had dropped, and it subsided slightly
a *  ... *..«»
<U1„ .h„ p ly t o n , but 1. lUi«. I - 1 « « “ "* »<>
..HI “ * b“‘ ‘
large proportion were no longer officially co
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If we compare what we now know about the size of the White House staff in
the Eisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson years with the official totals for The 
White House Office alone, then it is clear that all three Presidents 
enjoyed a much larger level of staff support than has previously been 
acknowledged. Insofar as the 'responsibility' for this can be usefully 
apportioned, it was President Eisenhower who first created this extra arm 
of staff support. But it is equally clear that, it having been created, 
neither Presidents Kennedy nor Johnson took steps either to abolish or 
drastically reduce it. Indeed the highest total of combined WHO and 
Special Projects staff recorded between 1956 and 1964 was that in 1962 
under President Kennedy. In 1962 the 'official' size of the White House 
staff was defined as being the 270 full-time permanent positions provided 
for in the appropriation for The White House Office. But if we ad 
■ A n  of Special Project, staff ». got a ««oh l.rg.r figure. Different
sources ear, Du. the uo.t uu.Dorlta.lv. P «  t°"‘1 *'
over 450 staff in 1962. 13
. these figures for combined
; is the real political meaning be
ils? Firstly, they support the analysis of a White House staff
3e overall size was greater than it apparently appeared or was offic-
ly admitted. Secondly, precisely because of this, the appearance of
den growth in the early 1970s can be put into its proper pe
r a number of years the White House staff actually grew fairly steadily.
AUp parlv 1970s that
rdly, the consequent impression curren n
nna-ible for the huge size of the
sident Nixon was single-handedly resp
. tan to be founded on a serious 
te House staff can, once again, be s o
, ,D. .tuff «DUUUg»-* « “  196°* <“— r»interpretation of the size of
t„ the late 1950s (under the benign
3 Democratic Presidents) and even
*■
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Any criticism of President Nixon for enjoying a high level of White House 
staff support, on the basis of combined WHO and Special Projects staff 
totals, should be equally directed at his three immediate predecessors.
The proliferation of staff support for the President was just as much a 
feature of the Eisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson years. That is not to say that 
Nixon is immune from all responsibility for the growth of the White House 
staff. On the contrary, if critics of Nixon were to concentrate their 
fire on those areas where he is most vulnerable they need only have con­
sidered the more persuasive prima facie evidence of the proliferation of 
the National Security and Domestic Affairs staff.
The NSC and nomastic Council Staff
argued in Chapter I tor a dati-i«!» °< *’“ *
i..!«,.. t„o ot th. .or. important - » 0  ohviou. - ott.hoota o, Th. «hit-
t m .  Office: th. foreign affair. • « «  -  “««.tic .flair,
A. former ar. know. a. th. H.tion.l S“ " 1«  ‘”SC> ” ”
e.^al and informal. In
latter have been known by many different name ,
, h president Nixon as a separate and 
1970 they were formally established by
, the Domestic Council. The
identifiable part of the White House staff.
domestic affairs staff continued under that heading for the durati
the Hi,o. .pd p.rd pre.id.nci... « . • - «  C*'*" r" “ ” 4 “ “
hn e president Reagan established an
the Domestic Policy Staff (DPS) t
title of his domestic affairs
Office of Policy Development (OPD) as the 
staff.
t - the NSC in 1947, the
from the dates of their respective establishmen
the staff working under
Domestic Council in 1970 - the senior figures
i„r White House staff, paid *°r
e*ch heading have been listed as sen
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rjkg white House Office appropriation. The staffs over which they pre­
y e d  were accorded separate budgetary status within the EOF. This pro­
vides us with the starting point from which to consider how and in what 
way the NSC and Domestic Council staffs grew over time. TableJ^. 
provides the available figures.
TABLE 4,6
NUMBERS OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1 9 3 9 ^ 1 ^
The Growtn OI
NSC Staff
Budgeteda Detailed
Roosevelt 1939 - -
1945 - -
Truman 1946 - “
1952 23 NA
Eisenhower 1953 27 NA
1960 76 NA
Kennedy 1961 75 NA
1963 48 NA
Johnson 1964 50 NA
1968 49 NA
Nixon 1970d 77 58
1974 87 42
a Figures are "Total Number of
DC Staff
Combined
NSC & DC Staff
Budgeted &
Budgeted3 Detailed1» Detailed0
"Full-time Equivalent of Other +,nns sub-committee
»  „gur.s „ t l - d  fro. »O U ..  » 1  so«*» APP™-'1*“ “ ’
Hearings. . a and b above.c Figures are the combination of a council.
- Pirur.. are giv.„ for « 7 0  »  “ “
* Estimated figure.
NA Figures Not Available.
United States Budget Appendices
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The Ngc was established by President Truman who from the first envisaged 
it as the President's Council.14 He thus insisted that its (initially 
ither small) staff were to be housed near the White House under the 
direction of a National Security Adviser who would serve as a senior member 
of The White House Office staff. From 1947 to 1957, under both Presidents 
Truman and Eisenhower, the strength of the NSC staff was maintained at just 
over two dozen. In 1958, however, its complement of personnel was sub­
stantially increased. (AEEendix^l provides full details.) The NSC staff 
grew to about 75, the level that was bequeathed to the incoming President 
Kennedy in 1961. Kennedy’s reorganization of national secun y 
machinery, which itself represented a reaction against what was thought to 
have been the excessively bureaucratic and cumbersome system of the 
Eisenhower years, was reflected in the reduced size of the NSC staff.
President Johnson thus inherited an NSC staff of about four dozen. This 
budgetary staff level was maintained for the rest of the decade.
■ i o f  President Nixon brought an unmistakable
Table 4.6 shows that the arrival of Presin
q level not seen since
increase in the size of the NSC staff. It rose
. « it By 1970 the budgeted size of 
the Eisenhower days, and soon exceeded it. >
„ 1974 it had formally reached 87.* Neither
the NSC staff was 77 persons; by 1»'*
for National Security Affairs Henry 
President Nixon, nor his Assistant fo
„  , , of th.lr «» °v"  *“  Kissinger, made any s e c re t  o f  t h e i r
from in side the White House in
foreign p o licy  decision-m aking p ro c e ss
„ . « . r e a c .  t o  «  «  «  «  “ d  ~
b .ra .u cracy .15 To ach ieve « h i. . W « -  ' ' “ t  *“  *“ "  ”
,,oi in s ize  and c a l ib r e  K is s in g e r  be equal in  s i*
available to the President through
of State. ( T a b l e s  shows how this was
to that surrounding the Secretary
—  po..,hl. 10.0«., a. the o m . 1 . 1  -------
T i ie 'p r o p o r t lo ir ^ i- p ^ o fe a .io n a T T ^ c'T ta « «  «° c l e r ic a l  
K iss in g e r's  team i s  estim ated  in  — -—
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just as significant, therefore, as the numbers of staff formally on the 
NSC payroll were the numbers of other personnel detailed to work on the 
NSC staff. On entering office in 1969 Kissinger hired a greatly increased 
number of consultants: 38 in that first year alone.16 (These figures were
later obtained by congressional appropriation subcommittees and are in­
cluded in Appendix 4.1.) In the following year no less than 58 personnel 
»ere on detail. This in itself represented another 75% of the official 
staff total. For the remainder of the Nixon Presidency the level of 
detailees ranged between the middle 40s and 50s. In any evaluation of the 
real size of the NSC staff working under Kissinger it is clear that he 
consistently able to call upon the resources of more than 120 NSC staff.
A similar pattern, though on a smaller scale, characterized the Domestic 
Council and its staff. The Council's first regular appropriate 
provided for 61 staff. The following year this had dipped to 52 but in 
1972-73, when the Domestic Council was at its height, under Ass 
the President John Ehrlichman, its official payroll numbered 80 persons. To 
these yearly totals must be added those additional personnel on detail from 
other departments and agencies. Information gleaned by congressional appro­
priation subcommittees during the Watergate period showed
tim e  t o  th e  D o m estic  Council
usually about 10 persons on detail at any o ^
staff (of which some were part-time or temporary consultants)
S B U J ,  In c o x » .  coaibines -  b°*h
~  » 0  Domestic Cornell ■ » «  Fr°’
»1. column it is clear that the Nixon presidency did repress»
not a break in the pattern of presi-
break from its predecessors. This was
break in terms of the
dential staffing in previous presidencies; more
. . It iB entirely likely that both
sheer size of the staffs concerned. ^
. of persons detail^
Henna rfa
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just as significant, therefore, as the numbers of staff formally on the 
HSC payroll were the numbers of other personnel detailed to work on the 
NSC staff. On entering office in 1969 Kissinger hired a greatly increased 
number of consultants: 38 in that first year alone.16 (These figures were 
later obtained by congressional appropriation subcommittees and are in­
cluded in Appendix 4.1.) In the following year no less than 58 personnel 
were on detail. This in itself represented another 75% of the official 
staff total. For the remainder of the Nixon Presidency the level of 
detailees ranged between the middle 40s and 50s. In any evaluation of the 
real size of the NSC staff working under Kissinger it is clear that he 
consistently able to call upon the resources of more than 120 NSC staff.
A similar pattern, though on a smaller scale, characterized the Domestic 
Council and its staff. The Council's first regular appropriation 
provided for 61 staff. The following year this had dipped to 
1972-73, when the Domestic Council was at its height, under Ass 
the President John Ehrlichman, its official payroll numbered 80 persons. To 
these yearly totals must be added those additional personnel on detail from 
other departments and agencies. Information gleaned by congressional appro­
priation subcommittees during the Watergate period showed that there were
„„„ time to  th e  D o m estic  Council
usually about 10 persons on detail at any o ^
staff (of which some were part-time or temporary consultants)
^  C O » .  —  -  — *”  **“
. o nrf detailed. From
e 4,6. in its right-hand column, --
M  „,0, » — ,1. c — 1 ..*«■ *•“  ” dde“ ll*a ' " * *
l t < » . » « -  al a ‘ c1’ “
not a break in the pattern of presi­
de from its predecessors. This was
„ hrpak in terms of the
:ial staffing in previous presidencies; more
d it is entirely likely that both 
*r size of the staffs concerned. iv
_____ w. n p rso n s d e t a i l e d
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to work on their NSC staffs. Indeed, in Johnson's case, there is already
18evidence that its size was swelling beyond its official budgetary levels.
But precise figures of the numbers of detailees were never revealed, most 
likely never kept, and certainly never asked for. In terms of staff num­
bers the Nixon White House made apparently substantial and unprecedented 
increases. They can legitimately be said to be the responsibility of 
President Nixon. They could also be expected to have a noticeable effect 
on any cumulative total of the overall size of the Nixon White House staff. 
This expectation is not misplaced, as we shall see in turning now to con­
sider the cumulative growth of the White House staff.
The White House Staff
We have hitherto dealt separately with the major constituent parts of the 
White House staff. We must now turn to consider the whole. The task of 
constructing a clear and accurate and comprehensive picture of the growth 
of the White House staff is more difficult than piecing together a jigsaw 
puzzle. Unlike the latter where, no matter how intricate, there is only 
one piece for each slot, this task is greatly complicated by all the over­
lapping pieces of information. These often give conflicting evidence of 
the size of the staff at any one time. Sometimes these are hard to finally 
reconcile one with another.
But the argument advanced in this chapter does not rest on the assumption of 
the cut-and-dried precision of figures that in many respects have never been 
Properly kept. The evidence is already sufficient to dismantle the mis­
conceptions widely held about the manner in which the White House staff 
have grown in size in the last forty years. Seen in this context the 
variations between different sets of figures can for the most par 
as of secondary concern. The broad outline, revealed by the accumulated
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weight of the figures, shines through most of the discrepancies. It is in 
this frame of mind that Table 4.7, which brings together what has previously 
been considered in separate doses, should be approached.
TABLE 4.7
NUMBERS OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1974 
The Growth of The White House StaffPresidency
Roosevelt
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
c s c a CR-Hb USB(l) c USBA(2)
224 157 45 45
66 215 49 49
216 213 52 52
248 283 273 290
247 290 285 314
416 388 458 516
439 476 458 494
376 429 396 461
328 431 401 433
261 456 240 309
491 632 323 390
560 553 611 637
"Actual Manpowe r" (as recorded by
Combination
Total of WHSe
Personnel Management Information bysT-ews, 
year totals as of 31st December" of each year.
u Real Total" which includes both WHOFigures are for "White House Staff. detailed
and Special Projects "full-time employees , and 
employees "as of 30th June of each year .
Figures are the "Average Number" of (i956-Ï964) ,°the NSC
White House Office (1947-1974), Spec -1974) Appropriations Sub-
(1948-1974), and the Domestic Council (1970 197*). PP
committee Hearing provided WHO figures
__________ « + Dnaltions"
time Equivalent of 0ther„sc® (194^1974) ^ d  «^Domestic Council (1970- 
Office (1947-1974), the NSC (1948 197 ), are ..numbers At the End
1974). Figures for Special ' ¿¿5®?966). WHO figures for the
of the Year", and "Average Number ( _nnriations Subcommittee Hearing
« 3 « , - » «  —  * » 7 *  ~ —
Figures are th e  com bination o f  d a ove Ders0n n el.
in  each yea r f o r  d e ta ile d  WHO, NSC, an
F igures are g iven  fo r  1970 om itted.
A lte rn ate  f ig u r e  fo r  1964 i s  453 i f  P
(See Appendix 4.1). ____________________
Sources: U.S. Civil Service Commission (19^8)
Congressional Record - House
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_ Some comment must be made on the different sources from which these 
N<>t have been drawn. The first four columns are not a direct straight 
figures haveJ* between like and like. The U.S. Civil Service Commission
forwar f --Actual Manpower", a concept which is nowhere defined.
“ ‘Z I Z . m O  b„£l««ry tot.l. Jut .h.t .1=. i. unclear. JudEl«g Ire. 
in in the latter part of Eisenhower’s Presidency and the sub-
the riaeJ ® C°n the figures after 1964 the CSC totals may well include Special 
Tweets between 1956 and 1964. (Curiously, however, the increase in CS£ 
S r f s  c L s  in 1955 which is one year before Special Projects was formally
established.)
convey a more gradated picture of staff growth than those derived 
CSC the authority for them is not established.
». « .  columns of fl8ur.s d.rlved fro.
enjoy unquestioned authority, but on Y ff USBA(1) is based on
elude figures for the NSC and Domestic Council staff. gtaff.
the "Average Number" of employees for each par ° the uSBA; nor neces- 
This is not the only unit of «»“ «remeJ is based on“ Sther units. For
sarily the best guide to real size. ---- i—  „„„hination of the "Total
the majority of years the figures ‘’^ li-time Equivalent of Other
Number of Permanent Positions and the r in respect of each
Positions". But these are not were ever available from USBA
part of the staff. No such combinatio t is instead "Numbers
for Special Projects, for which the unit o mea tilizing the alternative
At the End of Each Year". The principal effect more
units of measurement is USBA(2) is to present a larger an 
realistic, picture of th^ l i i T o f  the White House staff.
„ „ -toff is based on USBA(2) to which
The "Combination Total" of White Hous for the number of detailees in
have been added the highest recorded ■ g esents the most accurate
each year (as given in Table 4-5). information made publicly
picture of the size of the staff - based upon the intorm
available. ________ ___________ ___ -_______ _ _______
Table 4 ,7  presents four columns of figures for the overall growth
size of the White House staff. Those taken from the U^_^ivij^Ser^xe
Commission and the Congressional Record are included here primarily for
Purposes of comparison with those derived from the U n i t e d _ S t a t ^ ^
Appendices (USBA). As a yardstick by which to Judge USBA figures they
are both useful although, for the reasons given in the Note to T a h i t i -
neither the CSC or Record figures can be accepted as pre emin
the columns headed USBA(l) and USBM 2 )  are founded on the most authoritative
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basis of ascertainable fact. The differences arise because USBA figures 
provide different units of measurement. USBA(l). is based on the most con­
stant unit. USBA(2) is based on a combination of other units. USBA(2)_ 
aay be considered the principal of the two because it errs on the side of 
caution, which in this context suggests that the real size of the White 
House staff has always been minimized in official figures.
The "Combination Total" on the right-hand side is based upon the figures 
from USBA(2) to which have been added the highest recorded figures of the 
number of detailees in each year (as given in Table 4-j>) ■ This final 
cumulative column represents the most comprehensive picture of the 
the White House staff based upon the information made publicly available.
The first - and most significant - conclusion to be drawn from the cumu­
lative figures of Table 4,7 is that they portray the irresistible trend of 
broad upward growth. Nearly every President from Roosevelt to Nixon has 
bequeathed to his successor an obviously expanded White House staff. Cer­
tainly not one President took any action seriously to reduce its size.
i o f  erowth can be d iscern ed
Secondly, w ith in  t h is  broad upward p a tte r n  o g
.mo.U v  owe to the further establishment 
periods of uneven growth. These pn m a  y
,aff For example, Truman bequeathed 
of a new part of the White House sta
to Eisenhower a staff strenghened by the addition of the NSC staff.
Eisenhower, in turn, established the Special Projects staff whose numbers 
greatly increased the total complement of White House staff. While neither 
Kennedy nor Johnson generated any formal restructuring or enlargement 
the staff, Johnson relinquished the Presidency with the White House 
overrun with detailees than at any previous time. Nixon built upon the 
existing trend of staff growth, to which he added both the Domes 
«  . ...1, po.po».»t » 1  . »SC M y  '“V
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Kennedy Presidency gives the impression that the steady growth was halted, 
but a closer examination reveals that if some parts (e.g. the NSC staff) 
were reduced others (e.g. the Special Projects staff) were increased. While 
the rate of increase in overall size may have been temporarily halted it was 
certainly not put into reverse.
Thirdly, the figures indicate the considerable size of the White House 
support staff who provide the clerical and administrative back-up to the 
political White House staff. Even in 1939 the support staff formed a 
sizable pyramid at the top of which were placed Roosevelt's original Admin­
istrative Assistants. Even thirty-five years later under Nixon, when the 
political staff had grown so much that it had expanded to form a layered 
nose cone, the base of this pyramid still consisted of some hundreds of non
political support staff.
A fourth conclusion concerns the meaning that these figures have for the 
modern Presidency. By the close of the Nixon Presidency there were well 
over 700 members of the White House staff. That was by any standards 
considerable size for a President's personal (as distinct from institutional) 
staff. Since the Truman years the sheer numbers of White House staff have 
been so large (irrespective of the pattern of their continued growth) that 
every President has had the problem of how best to manage them. But before 
we reach that stage (which is discussed in ^ t e r V )  there are other 
facets of the growth of the staff that merit attention. These go beyond
the mere numbers involved. We know how many senior WHO staff there
To answer such a question we
been. We need now to ask what they did.
must firat eonaHder what we have been told they did.
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TV* WHTTE HOUSE STAFFj--JOB TITLES
examination of the job titles given to the White House staff over a 
period of forty years reflects both the increase in their numbers, the ex­
pansion of their role, and the method of their organization.
Job ,1,1.. for the senior com.,,sinned »1,. House OHlce . . . »  ere » . « « » d  
W  President per.on.ll,. «... beg.» a. » str.lgh«lor..rd .nd r.th.r 
colourless exercise In 1939 has long since ceased to be so. 1« »*» “  
blessed into an l.por.an, symbolic . . . t « » t  b, « .  President. It b.s 
provided the President, and sueoes.lv. Presidents have com. to realise » 1 »  
eve, nare strongly. - 1 «  an opportunity to establish 1. «be public M o d  .be 
bind ol Presidency that be vlsbes to project. It ha. beoo.e a .«eh publi­
cized exercise In i.ag.-bulldl.g, •» opportunity to signal the — > 1» 
which he would like it thought he hopes to run both his White House and 
Administration. But there is now enough accumulated evidence that at the 
very least a President's original intentions conceal the forces that are 
later brought to bear upon him in the White House. Job titles are an
important ingredient both in projecting those original intentions, and as
unlike the celebrated
a reflection of subsequent experience.
Krenlioologlsts .. cab derive H o .  * 1 «  House . 1 . «  1 «  titles <»*•
.re minutely, H o .  tbelr ranting In published llstlugs. • "*•“  *“  
prying loose the real meaning beneath the symbol'
The principal sources of information on which the research
Chapter 1 identified, those regularly published l i s t i n g  WHO staff. By
virtue of the fact that their basis for inclusion of names and job titles has
remained c o n s i s t  (from 1*3* to date), their listings afford a valid com-
This is reflected by the inclusion of 
parison between presidencies. 1
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Tables 4.9 to 4.14 in the text. Further information, of specific rele­
vance only to a particular Presidency, appears in Appendices 4.2 to 4JÎ.
Thp Increase in Number
The growing size of WHO commissioned staff is clearly evident from the 
generally increasing number of different job titles that were in use during 
each Presidency. Table 4.8 gives the number in use at the beginning and 
„„ri nf each Presidencv from Roosevelt to Nixon.
When the White House staff were first established in 1939 there were only 
two titles in use: Secretary to the President (which had been in use for
many decades) , and Administrative Assistant to the President (the new title 
given to the extra staff help that Brownlow had proposed). By the time 
of Roosevelt's death, seven titles were in use (according to one source), 
reflecting the small but noticeable increase in the complement of senior
staff.
Thereafter the trend was upwards; markedly so on occasion. P
of increases, according to the various special sources available, was
nStines But in most presidencies similar to that obtained from regular listings.
the numbers of staff titles recorded were generally higher.
accounted for by tb. greater p^oi.loa, » d  variety. ■ » *
•taf fJob title, provided by tb. .pecial .ounce.. A great amdi.r of
different Job title, bar. never «.c.e.arily Indicated greater mnrt..r. of
...«f per ,e; neither bar. a f »  title- n.ce...rily «an. » •  •«*«•
a. a rule of thu»b, «be « r e  title. 1» u.e during • Pre.id.ncy «be »ore
a+o-P-P 4-i______
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TABLE 4.8
the WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939- 1974
tJnmher of Job Titles
Presidency Year USGOM
Roosevelt 1939 2
1945 7
Total: 1939-1945 7
Truman 1945 5
1952 5
Total: 1945-1952 8
Eisenhower 1953 14
1960 26
Total: 1953-1960 35
Kennedy 1961 9
1963 9
Total: 1961-1963 9
Johnson 1964 9
1968 10
Total: 1964-1968 14
Nixon 1969 19
1974 16a
Total: 1969-1974 26
CD CSD Special Sources
2 - 1933-1943: 12b
6 -
7 - (USGOM/CD Total: 8)
4 1945-1953: 10° (List A)
19c (List B)
6 -
9 - (USGOM/CD Total: 10)
11 - 1953-1961: 48d
26 -
36 - (USGOM/CD Total: 41)
9 - 1961: 16e
9 -
9 - (USGOM/CD Total : 9)
10 9 1964-1968: 16e (List A)5e (List B)
9 9
14 15 (USGOM/CD/CSD Total: 21)
17 16 1971: 45f
17 17
26 26 (USGOM/CD/CSD Total: 42)
NB
1973 figure 
in 1974).
All figures 
residential
(No WHO Staff listing for Nixon Presidency was
issued
exclude the number of job titles applying only to 
and non-political staff.
Sources :
b
c
d
e
f
United States Government Organization Manual
Congressional Directory 
Congressional Staff Directory 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library 
Harry S. Truman Library 
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library 
Congressional Quarterly 
Office of the White House Press Secretary
(1939-1974)
(1939-1974)
(1964-1974)
(1939-1943)
(1945-1953)
(1953-1961)
(1961-1968)
(1971)
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The number of different job titles in use under President Truman was less 
important than the steady rise in the numbers of staff endowed with them. 
Eisenhower, in marked contrast, deliberately assigned to a bigger staff a 
wider variety of different job titles. He was succeeded by a President 
who dismantled such variety in favour of a simpler and less specific array 
of job titles. Johnson, in turn, affected the same approach. But, as 
the special sources make clear, both the Kennedy and Johnson staff were 
ascribed more specific job titles than officially was admitted. Nixon 
restored a more strictly defined approach, in that his senior staff were 
obviously differentiated by job title. When the Nixon White House itself 
issued a list of staff in 1971 its size was openly reflected in the large 
number of job titles in use, many of which had not been published before.
But staff job titles did not merely point to the increasing quantity of 
staff. They also registered significant developments that grew out of this
increasing number. Among the most important for the future of the staff
. staff 'layers'. For example, by the Truman was the appearance of different sta y
.OT. WHO staff had developed their own small Presidency several of the senior WH
„ .riant John r Steelman utilized the services 
staffs. Assistant to the President John
o. ao 1... than Th persons altogether; Sped.! *•“ « “ * 4’">"U  
could „ 1 1  on . dozen; Personal Representative. »nald «. »•!•»
Edwin *. U.C., dr., .».red their o.» « 1 1  »* 18 ''B11<'
Special Assistant Cordon Crap supervised t.o »« 14 «  IT - H *
_ _  , 19respectively.
tte Eisenhower WHO .tail l l s t l « —  P” » 1 tB* haa
grown to the point oi dividing into very clearly -.*»4 1 « . » .  » -  The
Assistant to ,h. President ... ~  “ “ “  “
Assist,., to  The A ss is tan t, a Special Assistant to The
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Assistants in  The White House O f f ic e .  (See Table 4 .11 .) The d i f f e r ­
entiation between the most s en io r  s t a f f  and th e ir  deputies was c le a r ; as 
was that between both groups and the general run o f  adm in istra tive a ides.
Despite Kennedy's e g a lita r ia n ism  even he could not avoid  o f f i c i a l  d is ­
tinctions between the posts o f  S p ec ia l Counsel, A ss istan t to  the Specia l 
Counsel, and Deputy S p ec ia l Counsel. Johnson's s t a f f  l i s t s  contained the 
occasional Associate p o s it io n , and he in troduced the formal post o f  Deputy 
Special A ssistan t fo r  N ationa l S ecu rity  A f fa ir s  which was an ob lique 
re flection  o f  the growing s iz e  o f  the NSC s t a f f  apparatus.
Nixon White House s t a f f  l i s t in g s ,  in c lu d ing the one l i s t  re leased  by his
White House Press O ff ic e ,  were rem iniscent o f  the Eisenhower years. (See 
Appendix 4 .7 .) For almost every s t a f f  p o s it ion  named one can d iscover
,b . position  o f Deputy • T h . d o » in .n , • « • «  « « 1 .  *> r  l u ~ « « * i w  P °“ « -  
= .i s t . i ,  . . .  merely S t . «  A s s is t . » «  < - » « - «  * °  *h’  ^  “
■fhsm q ize  o f  the commissioned WHO s t a f f  
WHO). By N ixon 's tim e, th e re fo re , the
. . .  g r o «  so la rg e  t h . ,  .  degree o i  M . r . r o h io . l  l i s t in g  ™
. . . .  public . -  t ru e  tor » « »  remained true ,o r  P res id en t. Pord
. .  Carter, both o< .b u s .  o « , c l . l  « * >  l l t “ ” d ’ ' 1“
evidence o f a layered  White House s t a f f .
The Expansion o f  Role
u tin  a studv is  p r im arily  concerned is  an 
The expansion o f  r o le  w ith  which
, * the White House s t a f f .  They so dominate
expansion o f the p o l i t i c a l  ro le  o
. . of the President that they have become 
the daily working life and schedule of
the medium through which n early  every contact tha t he has w ith the world
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outside the Oval Office is effected. To achieve this dominance within so 
relatively short a period as four decades necessitated a considerable ex­
pansion in their political role.
This expansion is probably nowhere more immediately visible than in the 
job titles that Presidents have bestowed upon their senior WHO staff. While 
it would not be correct precisely to equate ’job title' with ’job descrip 
tion- - for many job titles have in fact proved to be anything but 
informative as to the real work performed - this expansion has been 
impossible to hide from view. Evidence from many sources powerfully rein- 
forcesthe broad outline already discernible from official staff listings.
Taken together, Tables 4,9 to 4 0 4  and Appendices 4 0  to 4,8 present a 
myriad mixture of prosaic colourful misleading and pertinent staff job 
titles. We need at the start to identify two major elements in the pattern 
of such titles. Firstly, certain core areas, or functional areas, of staff
resp on s ib ility  rea d ily  emerge in  most p res id en c ies . Ind ividual job
. nne presidency and another, often reflectingmay vary in minor ways between one Fresi y
no „ r e  than stylistic differences, or th. urge to ...» Innovative, or the 
perceived need to „peer to break . « h  the nouenclatnr. of . predecessor. 
But these fenc.iee.l erees, « •  developed, b... been . re.erb.bl, c.e.«en« 
lecture o, every W O  steii. B.coedly, .. etc tree, the . »  the. Pre.ldeut. 
gredu.ll, beg«. to use tb.lr (expending) «.«* »«»=• ***« ** V,hlCl"  * "
conveying . » „ e g .  to . f e l l  1 « . ™ «  group.. *'“ * * *
. rv-f «residential concern that their titles were intended to become proof o p
g e. c the White House decision-making process,
views would be represented in  the White
U . , 1 .  . „ . u t l o .  . . .  give. »  the lob  title. »1 the B e o .e v .lt  Wit. -ou .e
.«..1 1„ 1939. Tb. Brownlee C— it... bed «»•»» of «be «-■> *“**
teruod "executive ..el.tent." but Pre.id.ut Roosevelt preferred the .or.
neutral t i t l e  o f  Administrative Assistant.
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outside the Oval Office is effected. To achieve this dominance within so 
relatively short a period as four decades necessitated a considerable ex­
pansion in their political role.
This expansion is probably nowhere more immediately visible than in the 
job titles that Presidents have bestowed upon their senior WHO staff. While 
it would not be correct precisely to equate 'job title' with 'job descrip 
tion' - for many job titles have in fact proved to be anything but 
informative as to the real work performed - this expansion has been 
impossible to hide from view. Evidence from many sources powerfully rein- 
forcesthe broad outline already discernible from official staff listings.
Taken together, Tables 4.9 to 4 0 4  and Appendices ± 2  to 4^8 present a 
myriad mixture of prosaic colourful misleading and pertinent staff job 
titles. We need at the start to identify two major elements in the pattern 
of such titles. Firstly, certain core areas, or functional areas, of staff 
responsibility readily emerge in most presidencies. Individual job 
may vary in minor ways between one Presidency and another, often reflecting 
no more than stylistic differences, or the urge to seem innovativ 
perceived need to appear to break with the nomenclature of a predecessor. 
But these functional areas, once developed, have been a remarkably constant 
feature of every WHO staff. Secondly, we can trace the way that Presi 
gradually began to use their (expanding) White House staff as vehicles for 
conveying a message to special interest groups. In this context staff job 
titles were intended to become proof of presidential concern that their
i t t l e  a tten tion  was given to the job t i t l e s  o f  the Roosevelt White House 
t a f f  in  1939. The Brownlow Committee had spoken o f  the need fo
_____J f km mnrfi
armed "executive assistants" but President Roosevelt preferred the more
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TABLE 4.9
pnnSEVELT PRESIDENCY 1939-1945
WHO Staff Job Titles
Job Titles
Secretary
Administrative Assistant 
Special Assistant 
Special Executive Assistant 
Special Counsel 
Personal Representative 
Special Representative 
Military Aide 
Other a
TOTAL Number of Job Titles b
Numbers of WHO Staff 
Holding Each Job Title
USGOM
1939 1945
3 3
3 4
0 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
NL NL
0 1
2 2
1939 1945
3 3
3 5
0 1
0 1
0 1
NL NL
0 1
0 o
3 3
7 2
TABLE 4.10
TRUMAN PRESIDENCY 1945-1952 
WHO Staff Job Titles
Job Titles
Secretary
the Assistant
Assistant
Special Counsel
Special Executive Assistant
Special Assistant
Administrative Assistant c
Legislative Assistant
Service Aides
Other a
TOTAL Number of Job Titles
Numbers of WHO Staff
Holding Each Job Title
USGOM CD
1939 1945 1939 1945
3 3 3 3
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3 6 3 3
NL NL 0 1
2 3 1 3
4 5 2 2
5 5 4 6
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Table 4.9 shows that by 1945 Roosevelt had discarded these previous inhi­
bitions by appointing staff members whose job titles were already beginning, 
however faintly, to reflect a widening range of staff work for the 
President. The positions of Special Counsel and Special Assistant, for 
example, were created for Sam Rosenman and Harry Hopkins respectively. Both 
were early examples of the wide-ranging political adviser that subsequent 
Presidents have rarely done without. Appendix 4,2 more clearly illustrates 
the emerging division of staff functions, with specific responsibility for 
appointments, for congressional liaison, and for personnel, vested in 
specific staff members.
Table 4.10 by itself only partially confirms this emerging trend with the 
appearance for the first time of a Legislative Assistant in official list­
ings. More substantial confirmation is provided by A p p e n d i x ^ ,  based 
on listings of staff prepared by the Harry S. Truman Library, 
identified a growing range of functional staff areas. an app 
function, a Press function, a legislative function, a nascent national
s e c u r i t y  function ( i n  the Executive Secretary  o f  the N S C ) ,  and an early
_  „ Hr, the Assistant to the President,form of White House operations function (l
. , ™ \ Perta in  areas began to
with the Adm inistrative A ssistan ts as back - p> .
develop .u b . ld i . r y  . « . b o o t . .  For « „ p i . .  « »
.x l . t .n c .  o f  an In form ation  and E d i t o r i . l  S p . c l . l i . « .  -o rb in g  1 « « »  « «
office. On. new ... th. .p p . - —
»... For example, P » . l * » «  Truman aPPOl«.* * Telecommunication.
Adviser, and entru.t.d .or. ,ban on. P « . » -  • 1“ ' *
. one other feature was con-
task, such as the Liqu idation  o f War Agencies.
, . . to the President now became a
solidated. The inclusion of military a
regular feature of staff lists.
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President Eisenhower was the f i r s t  P res iden t openly to  confirm the 
expansion in  the ro le  o f  the s t a f f .  He more c lo s e ly  approximated 
their job t i t l e s  w ith  th e ir  job  d escrip tion s . Table 4 . 1 1  shows 
the resu lt. The core o f  s t a f f  functions was more c le a r ly  v is ib le  
than before: fo r  example, the P re s id en t 's  fo re ig n  p o licy  adviser,
(the Special A ss istan t fo r  National S ecu rity  A f fa i r s )  was endowed w ith 
the t i t l e  that has s in ce more o r le ss  remained unchanged. The co­
ordinative function o f  White House operations was incorporated in  a 
whole range o f obvious ly  graded job t i t l e s :  (The Assistan t, Assistant
t o  T h e  A s s i s t a n t ,  The D e p u t y  A s s i s t a n t ,  and the Special A s s i s t a n t s  i n
The White House Office). One subsidiary offshoot, relating to the
_ j fn .  the f i r s t  time (S t a f f  Secretary, Assistant 
flow o f paperwork, surfaced fo r  the t i r s
. o4-o-f-P Qpri’etarv) . Among "the more to the Staff Secretary, and Assistant S
, . _ -a.n r-icenhower’s Presidency,noticeable new staff functions, peculiar to E
_ S e c r e t a r y  t o  t h e  C a b i n e t ,  C a b i n e t
w e r e  t h o s e  o f  s e r v i c i n g  t h e  C a b i n e  (
» ' . t o  Counsel and o th er a id es ), and lia is o n  
Operations O ff ic e r  and Associa te Counse ,
, . f o r in terdepartm ental A f fa i r s ) . *
within government (Deputy A ss is ta  _____ _____ ____________ _ __
These were p ecu lia r  to  Eisenhower’ s P^ ® ^ ® ^ t i r d r o p p e d  by the incoming 
had not been known h ith e r to  and were t Z t  Eisenhower's more
jnnedy Adm in istration . Yet we can see . to  be 0f  g rea ter long-term
irmalized approach to  s t a f f  struc immediate successors. This was
ifluence than the in form al s ty le  o f  h House g ta f f  t l t l e s  fo r  the
Dwhere more ev id en t than in  respec pres iden t to  resurrect some o f
entral core o f  s t a f f  functions. ® because h is  experience o f  the Eisen- 
hem was Nixon. This was no acc*de“ * °  in flu enced  h is own approach as 
ower years as V ice  Presiden t un ou „ - „o in te d  a Secretary to  the Cabinet, 
resident. For example, in  1969, he a p p o in t e d ^  ^  q£ Halde_
lthough th is  post subsequently san W1prGS-ident Ford, in 1975, and was 
an and E h r licL a n  i t  resurfaced 1977, when i t  was combined
urther upgraded in  status by P re8 if  ^ ^ e r n i e n t a l  A f fa ir s .  President 
ith  the p os ition  o f  A ssistan t fo r  In g f  functi0ns but re -d iv id ed
teagan, in  1981, r e - t i t l e d  broadly s i ” i ^  p res iden t and D irector o f th e
;hem in to  two posts : Deputy Assis an Qtant fo r  Intergovernmental
> ffice o f Cabinet Adm in istration ; an iven  Qf  the same process including
If fa ir s . Several o ther examples could B k p o l i t ic a l  pos ition  in th e  
that in vo lv ing  the post o f  S ta f f  S ecretary, a key P 
Ifhite House O ff ic e  operations machinery.
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TABLE 4.11
EISENHOWER PRESIDENCY 1953-1960
who Staff Job Titles
The Assistant
Assistant to The Assistant 
Special Assistant to The Assistant 
The Deputy Assistant 
Assistant to The Deputy Assistant 
Special Assistant 
Deputy Special Assistant 
Special Assistant in The White House 0 
Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs .
Special Assistant for Personnel Management 
Presidential Advisor for Personnel 
Management 
Counsel
Special Counsel
Assistant to the Special Counsel 
Acting Special Counsel 
Associate Special Counsel 
Assistant Special Counsel 
Press Secretary 
Associate Press Secretary 
Assistant Press Secretary 
Consultant 
Special Consultant 
Secretary to the Cabinet 
Assistant to the Secretary 
Staff Secretary
Assistant to the Staff Secretary 
Assistant Staff Secretary 
Secretary
Administrative Assistant
Deputy Assistant for Congressional a 
Assistant to the Deputy Assistant 
Administrative Officer for Special Projec 
Economic AdvisorDeputy Assistant for Interdepartmental
Affairs .
Cabinet Operations Officer and Associate
Counsel
S ta ff  A s s is ta n t  
Service Aides 
Other d
TOTAL Number of Job Titles e
to the Cabinet
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
3
0
0
0
1
0
0
3
5
14
1
0
0
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
0
0
1
3
5
26
Numbe rs of WHO
Holding E ach Job
USGOM CD
1953 I960 1953
1 1 1
1 0 1
2 0 1
0 1 0
0 0 0
3 8a 2
0 1 0
e 4 5 6
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
NL NL 0
1 1 1
0 0 0
NL NL 1
0 1 0
0 1 0
1 1 1
Staff
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
NL
1960
1
0
0
1
0
8
1
6
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
NL
0
0
4°
5
11
0
1
3
5
26
ro les__________ __________ _______ —  — -
Includes M i n i s t  rati« Assistant
in certain intervening years this J ^ ^ r l L e n t a l  Relations, and one 
serving as a Deputy Assistan Administrative Liaison,
other serving as a Deputy Assistant for a
Includes a Military Liaison , staff.
Includes r e s id e n t ia l  and n o n - p o l it ic a l  s ta  
Excludes th e  'Other' ca te g o ry .
Job title not listed in this source----- --¡¡T— J
Sources: United States Government Organisa
c
d
e
NL A
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Yet the full scope of Eisenhower's specialist subject staff was not
visible from official lists. Appendix 4.4 reveals the extent of the
omissions. What the official lists most concealed were the more precise
titles for the Special Assistants. Specialist subjects assigned to
Eisenhower staff member included Public Works Planning, Aviation, Security
Operations Coordination, Science and Technology, Atomic Energy, Agricultural
Surplus Disposal, and Personnel Management. Another functional area began
to develop in the economic field (Special Assistants for Economic Affairs,
and for Foreign Economic Policy). Highlighting the formal linkage between
The White House Office and Special Projects was the position of Adminis-
2°
trative Officer for the Special Projects Group.
President Kenned, con.dou.ly «vented to « -or. e.o»y»u. collection ol 
,eb title, for .1= senior » 1 « .  Ho», et.ff 1» offici.l lists- 
she., the result. For reason, of .ppcren* « - d » !  “ <■ «.Ability the 
najorlty of bis *  staff .«re d —  d l e d - l y  .,..1 I»» **«•
j j. Thp Press function alone retained of Special Assistant to the President. Th
o and Associate Press Secretary). Another
an obvious identity (Press Secretary,
. n o  affairs - fell mainly within the developing functional area - domesti
* o+.ff titles (the Special Counsel, Deputy province of a special series of staff
_ «Such iob titles were thusSpecial Counsel, and Assistant Special Counsel). Such job
, . _ __I matters (as had long been
freed from any residual connexion wit g
1,11.« . 0.. exception ,o «be S » . ™ !  ~ “ “ “ 4 ”“ 1”8
C r g .  McGovern .. . Special assist.« •»« Director of the Food-For-P..c.
a. i . .M-n lend the office more prestige" - 
Program. This was done deliberately
, . titles to emphasize presidential
a good example of the use of staff j
concern.
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TABLE 4.12
KENNEDY PRESIDENCY 1961-1963 
iimn Staff Job Titles
Special Counsel
Deputy Special Counsel
Assistant Special Counsel
Press Secretary
Associate Press Secretary
Special Assistant
Deputy Special Assistant
Administrative Assistant
Service Aides
Other a
TOTAL Number of Job Titles*5
Numbers of WHO Staff 
Holding Each Job Title
USGOM
1961 1963
CD
1961 1963
TABLE 4.13
JOHNSON PRESIDENCY 1964-1968 
WHO Staff Job Titles
Counsel
Special Counsel 
Deputy Special Counsel 
Associate Special Counsel 
Assistant Special Counsel 
Legislative Counsel 
Associate Counsel 
Press Secretary 
Deputy Press Secretary c 
Special Assistant 
Deputy Special Assistant 
Administrative Assistant 
Special Consultant 
Counsellor
Secretary to the Cabinet 
Advisor for National Capital 
Affairs
Military Aide ^
Service Aides 
Other a
Numbers
Holding
USGOM
1964 1968
o f WHO
Job
Staff
Title
3
364 1968
CSD
1964
'JL NL 0
1 2 0
1 1 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 0
NL NL NL
1 0 1
1 1 0
12 7 5
0 0 1
2 1 2
1 2 1
NL NL NL
NL NL 0
1 0 NL
0 1 1
3 0 3
6 6 5
10 9 9
O) 
O
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That Kennedy's genera l emphasis on bland job t i t l e s  d id  not ser iou s ly  imply 
^  d ilu tion  o f  the expansion o f  the ro le  o f  the s t a f f  is  shown by 
Appendix 4 .5 . Job t i t l e s  that the o f f i c i a l  l is t in g s  d id  not a llude to  in  
print nevertheless s t i l l  e x is te d  in  a very re a l sense. Most notable were 
the functional s t a f f  r e s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  r e la t in g  to  Congress (S pec ia l 
Assistant fo r  Personnel and Congressional R ela tions, and the Adm in istrative 
Assistants fo r  l ia is o n  w ith  both the House and S en a te ). The domestic 
a ffa irs  function was broadened (Deputy Specia l Counsel fo r  Budget and 
Programming), and c e r ta in  specia lism s survived (S p ec ia l Assistan ts fo r  
Science and Technology, and fo r  Regulatory A gen cies ).
The discrepancies between job t i t l e s  published in  o f f i c i a l  l i s t s  and those 
published elsewhere continued during the Johnson years . T a b le jL M  shows 
that job t i t l e s  in  o f f i c i a l  use b a re ly  id e n t i f ie d  the Press function . A fte r  
George Reedy's departure from the White House Johnson form ally discontinued 
the t i t l e  o f  Press S ecretary in  the b e l i e f  tha t i t  r e s t r ic te d  h is  freedom 
of manoeuvre.22 N e ith er  d id  o f f i c i a l  l is t in g s  o v e r t ly  r e fe r  to  congres, 
sional re la t io n s  (L e g is la t iv e  Counsel being the only obvious job t i t l e )  
which was another area that Johnson thought too  important to  be l e f t  to  his
. 14at sub 1ect area consciously added was l ia is o n  
s ta f f  alone. The one s p e c ia l is t  subje
,  A-Pfni]— '
. « „ „ „  o o n „ ™  « . «  *»« ^  ,ltl"  °“ ,r’
i o „  o, .... — . °< « -  —  ■**'1 ” ”  tQ
.,n +he Johnson White House
be found. S p e c ia lis t  sub ject areas were co
by a wide range o f  S pec ia l Assistan ts ( f o r  Science and Techn gy,
Consumer A ffa ir s ,  H ealth , Education and in te rn a tion a l A f fa ir s ,  R e c o n s t r u c t
. Tnhnson also estab lish ed  a
in  Vietnam, and Urban A f fa ir s  and Conservatio ) .
the academic community), and o ther
post o f  Consultant ( f o r  l ia is o n  wi ._ ovpn ’foi*
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Physical Fitness). Among the regular functional areas, the job of con­
gressional relations was clearly performed by the Administrative Assistants 
under the overall leadership of the Legislative Counsel or the Special 
Assistant for Congressional Relations. In the area of foreign policy 
there emerged for the first time a Deputy Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs. A further development in the domestic policy area was 
the appearance of a Special Assistant for Legislative Programs.
We have seen that the arrival of President Nixon brought a noticeable 
increase in the numbers of senior White House staff listed in official WHO 
lists. It also brought a noticeable increase in the numbers of different 
job titles and an upgrading of staff status. TablejLii makes this clear. 
Nixon created several new job titles, hitherto unknown, such as the senior 
position of Counsellor to the President, which unprecedently carried with 
it Cabinet rank.23 The domestic affairs function underwent changes in
„ V. Affairs and was subsequently overhauled job title. It started as Urban Affairs
to become Domestic Affairs. The congressional liaison function broadened 
over time (from Congressional Relations to Legislative Affairs), 
function was split (between the Press Secretary and his deputy, and the
,. Executive Branch and his deputy). The 
Director of Communications for the
crucial task of White House operations was hidden behind bland titles (H.R.
Haideman occupied the po.iti.» ol ...1.«.* «• " • ■ * « * •  “ “ " n
a, Specialist .abject .tail introduced by »W o n  
staff went largely unnamed). Sp
served under the headings of Special Consultant (on Aging (sic), Systems 
Analysis, and Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs), and Special Assistant (for
ifh Former Presidents). Assorted others
Consumer Affairs, and Liaison wit
K.uj i 4 rro + i nn .
N IX O IT P Œ S ID E N C T ---------------- 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 4
staff Job Titles».
Counsellor for Domestic Affairs
fssllmt for National Security Affairs 
Deputy Assistant for National Security
Affairs .
Assistant for Urban Affairs 
Deputy Assistant for Urban Affairs 
Assistant for Domestic Affairs 
Assistant for International Economic 
Affairs „ _ ,Counsel for Congressional Relations 
Assistant for Congressional Relations 
Deputy Assistant for Congressional 
Relations
Deputy Assistant (Senate Relations)
Deputy Assistant (House Relations)
Assistant for Legislative Affairs 
Deputy Assistant for Legislative Affair 
Special Assistant for Legislative Affairs 
Press Secretary 
Deputy Press Secretary-
Director of Communications: Executive 
Branch
Deputy Director of Communications.
Executive Branch 
Special Assistant 
Deputy Assistant 
Counsel
Deputy Counsel 
Special Counsel 
Special Consultant 
Special Consultant for Aging 
Special Consultant for Systems Analysis 
Special Consultant for Narcotics ana 
Dangerous Drugs 
Secretary to the Cabinet 
Special Assistant (Liaison with Former 
Presidents) .
Special Assistant (Consumer Affairs) 
Executive Director (Consumer Affairs) 
Congressional Liaison (Consumer Affairs) 
Science Advisor 
Special Advisor
Advisor on Manpower Mobilization 
Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisers 
Military Aide 
Other a
Total Number of Job Titles ^
USGOM
1
0
4
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
0
NL
0
0
0
1
1
0
12
2
1
5
0
2
0
0
0
1
1
1
NL
NL
1
0
0
NL
1
6
19
Numbers of WHO Staff 
Holding each Job Title
CD CSD
1973c 1969 1974 1969 1974
2 1 2 1 2
1 0 1 - -
3 3 5 4 5
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 2 0
o 0 0 0 0
NL 0 0 NL NL
1 0 1 0 1
2 0 2 0 2
3 0 3 0 3
le 0 le 0 le
3 1 3 1 2
0 1 0 1 1
o 0 0 0 1
12
1
14
1
17
2
15
1
16
2
1 1 1 1 1
1 4 1 4 0
2 0 1 0 3
3 1 3 0 3
o NL NL NL NL
0 NL NL NL NL
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0
0
NL
NL
0
1
0
NL
1
16
1
0
NL
NL
1
NL
0
0
1
6
17
0
0
NL
NL
0
NL
0
1
1
17
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
NL
1
6
16
Includes residential and non-political s 
Excludes the 'Other' category.
Figures never published for Nixon WHO Staff t _
Includes one Executive Assistant and Persona 
Ret it led Assistant and Press Secretary.
L Job Title is not listed in this source._____________ _
ources: United States Government Organization Vanua
Congressional Directory
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
NL
1
17
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The range of job titles in official use for the Nixon staff was slightly 
extended by the list issued by the Nixon White House itself in April, 1971. 
^ pendix 4.7 is based on that Press release. It illustrates that the 
majority of the junior-level staff, whether working in the domestic or 
foreign affairs area, or in White House operations, were collectively 
labelled Staff Assistants. By and large all the principal functional 
areas were immediately recognisable from job titles alone. Other staff 
positions whose job titles were nowhere else revealed included the Official 
White House Photographer (which itself was a newly-established part of the
White House scene) .
The pattern of past presidencies was carried well beyond the Nixon years 
and into the 1980s by both Presidents Ford and Carter. Firstly, reflected
in the job titles accorded their respective WHO senior staffs were the
_. domestic affairs,
essential functional areas of staff resp
. _ offalrs congressional relations, and 
national security affairs, economic affairs,
Presidents sought to send a
Press and media relations. Secondly,
«-hot their Presidency would be
signal to certain outside constituencies
„„„ Thus for example, President 
sensitive to particular problems or groups. . ^
lord latroduc.d . now S.rle. 0« Spadal “1,P“ ‘C
lll.lra, Maori,, » « . 1 » ,  ‘ 'hlle C'r,'r
.o»gh, ,o .„.guard »I- a-» — SP•01,,1 
(lor Health laauaa. and lor Modi, «id Puhlio Allalr.) and lull S.alatant
(lor Reorganization, » .  lor Puhllc Ll.,a»>. «  1"  h“
11., „ 1  priori,,.. and, 1» an age -her. «  — • -  P°11’1“
Presidents have come to appreciate the
groups is thought to be increasing,
«nt least in White House
value that their WHO staff job titles can have
a f The role of the White House staff
dealings with special-interest lobbyists.
_— ~ 4-Vi xx 4 T» Hob titl©S
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alone are now considered to embody sufficient evidence that certain 
issues are permanently on the President's agenda. Reagan now carries
this tradition forwards.
The Method of Organization
An examination of the Job titles bestowed by successive Presidents on their 
White House Office staff yields corroborative evidence of its method of 
organization. As the nunfcer of staff increased over time the need for 
some method of organization also increased.
Over ,h. yeer. there ... . develop™»* •*
which any President - n»d there*», »very m l . .  Hons. . . . »  - »*d to 
b. concerned. Bn. we hnve 1 . 0  seen noticeable difference. ot nppro.ch 
between President.. Bone h... deliberately identified .hich - r e
entrusted .l.h .hich nre.. Other, h.ve d.lih.r.tel, 1 . «  * 1 « .  » < " > "
vague cr nndelined. Pre.ld.nt. Ei.enho.er and Mson, for **“ P1* ’ »
, *, q „enerally itemized by job title the
Table 4.11 and Table 4.14 make clear, g
their staff. President Kennedy, on the
work done by particular members
V. „ officially to withhold the impression 
other hand, as Table 4.12 shows, chose officially
entlv or primarily engaged in any one area. (The that his staff were permanently or p
exception con.cn to .11 three - »  the Pros Secretary.)
that Kennedy regarded hi, -hit. »on.. ...» -  - »  “  ** “ *
. nf those two Republican Presidents,
to him, by comparison with the appro 
seems a fair one.
The greater precision o, Job title. « « •  »P Bi.enh^.r and »1» »  for their 
«.it. Hons, staff, inpli.d both a gr.nt.r c.r.nln.y of • « «  “ *• *
greater e.nh.sl. upon the « - 1  ™  ‘
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I2512 J L U  clearly shows that the hierarchical nature of staff organization 
^ T ^ I t e d  in the heirarchical character of the job titles employed.
Eisenhower presided over a staff led by The Assistant to the President, the 
Assistant to The Assistant, the Special Assistant to The Assistant, followed 
by The Deputy Assistant, and the Assistant to The Deputy Assistant. No 
„ore obviously hierarchical pattern of job titles could exist. T a b l ^ M  
similarly makes clear that Nixon routinely alloted deputies to those of his 
senior staff working in the domestic affairs, foreign affairs, and congres­
sional relations functional areas.
Official listings of Jog title. « « -  «>• * * “ »  '•*"
a method of staff organization somewhere between the two kinds.
President esn te ..id to t.tr.P . —  '°” al
.. .t.f, organization, to lodge fro. lot title, alone. But, -  i U S f i i i S
neither President went so far as to leave and Appendix 4,6 also suggest, neither
~-r s t a f f  work. Presidententirely undelineated certain important areas of staff w
, fen us to reach firm conclusions from 
Roosevelt's staff numbered too few fo
, _  But the discussion in Chapter III 
the evidence supplied by job titles a on
, the 1930s gives adequate grounds to suppose 
of the Roosevelt Presidency in the 1930s g
iripntial working methods were unaffected by, and that like Kennedy his presidential worxix *
iob titles that he chose for his White House staff, 
thus not reflected in, the job t
The Changes in Job Title
u „ on this discussion by considering the
An important sidelight is throw
„ „ the 8taff by the President. Research shows
changes in job titles bestowed on
feature of certain presidencies.
that such changes have been a mar . 4« Hnh titles recorded
Table 4.15 gives full details of the number of changes
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TABLE 4.15
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1974 
Changes in Job Title
Number of Changes
Presidency Years
Number of 
Job Titles a
in WHO 
USGOM
job
CD
Titles
CSD
Roosevelt 1939-1945 8 1 1 -
Truman 1945-1952 10 5 4 -
Eisenhower 1953-1960 41 27 34 -
Kennedy 1961-1963 9 1 1 —
Johnson 1964-1968 21 3 5
7
Nixon 1969-1974 66 c 31 b 28
35
The figures given are each an aggregate number of *** d*ffer®“* 
WHO Staff Job Titles used in each Presideac^  eThey°exclude
the published sources listed as the
residential and non-political J°
ontorrmnr ^
Covers the period 1969-1973 only.
Includes ™ n y  Job Titles listed by so^ces.
Sources: United States Government Organization Manual
Congressional Directory 
Congressional Staff Directory
x * that Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon 
Table 4.15 shows the unmistakable fact tha
. number of changes in job
were each responsible for a large an g11
titles for .„.it respective » i t .  House at.«. » « • « “ ’ ~ ~  ».pousiPl.
for about 85% of all staff job title changes recorded on official listi g
other Presidents did not
between 1939 and 1974. That is not to say
ru-i, ataff. but the nature
from time to time allocate changing duties o
and allows a concentration on
of the evidence available both sugges
.nation of these changes, and the reasons
Eisenhower and Nixon. Closer ex
— +-r* pach president. The
for th„. t-o principal pr.occupation. 00— « to
=t nocture.
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n , preoccupation ,1th .tuff por.onnel ... -.inly « *• 01
promotion, or demotion, or .».filing eidcye. 4 not lnoon.id.rabl.
— ,r oi the change, in job title, recorded during the E i . e n h c r  and
pre.id.ncie. can be put d e n  to tbi. proce... Example, are not dittl- 
eult to find. During the Ei.enho.er Pre.idenoy M.X..11 »•»> changed job 
title, in three . u c c . i v .  year., 1953-55, fro. Aa.i.tant to The A..i.t.nt, 
« 1 » . «  Operation. Officer and A.aoei.te Ocun.el, •»» finally Eecr.t.ry 
the cabinet. »1 » «  E. P.r.on. joined the .t.ff in 1953 a. a Special
...Ltant, becoming The Deputy *..i.tan« 1» * .  » « - “ ■ »“ '■ ™
„.iataa, by 1959. The individual record for Job title change, -a. »eld 
by Gerald Morgan .ho, again in .uccee.lv. year. 1953-55, .t.rt.d a. a Social 
„.ietant in The «hit. Eoue. Office, b e e «  -  Adminietrativ. Aa.i.tant, and
the. Special Ooueel, before finally replacing D*P“W
Assistant.
Example, from the Nixon Pre.id.ncy tend to .ho. a mixture of actual . « «
promotion „ith a peuebeut for ti.Keri.g .i«h job title. ^
n Stines was that of William Timmons 
example, taken from the Directory >
, i the vears 1969-71 were Deputy Assistant for 
whose successive job titles in y
» inthit for House Relations, and Assistant 
Congressional Relations, Deputy Assis
. and finally Assistant for Legislative Affairs
for Congressional Relations, an
, . titles reflected his steady promotion. The 
(in 1973). The first three job ti
4-uo -inb he was actually doing 
fourth reflected less a substantial change in J
4.-#* inotieated at the start of
than a general re-titling of the senior s
,_ Tnhn Khrlichman and Henry Kissinger, 
Nixon’s second term. Similarly, both Joh
H . Affairs and National Security
who in 1970 were Assistants for Domes
_  . ,9 7 3 Each became simply an
Affairs respectively, were each re-tit e
Assistant to the President.
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m , outward aign. of .tall promotion were sometime. more apparent than real.
„  example ..a Preaid.nt Nixon’. Invention of Couna.llor. to the Pre.ldent,
..re deliberately endowed with the hitherto tmpr.c.dent.d arid prestigious 
equivalent of » m e t  ruth. The earliest snob appointment was that el 
Arthur Burns In 1969, followed the next year by those ot Daniel Patrick 
Hoynihan and Bryce Barlow <who bad begun a. Assist»., to the President).
Donald Rumsfeld, who also b e g »  a. »  Assistant 1» »69, was ,routed to
rank of Counsellor in 1971. However, the degree of promotion actually 
involved <or even intended) is a matter for debate. The change in Job «1.1. 
to Counsellor In reality signalled «he removal of that staff — her 
operational command chain of the «bit. -ouse staff ’upwards' » « e  «be 
„„.led atmosphere of advisory status alone. Sore though, it the e,u,v.l.n, 
of being "booted upstairs". Kxreple. «« straightforward promotion were 
furnished by Bixou’s long-.,.»dl.g sp.ecb.rlt.r Hay Price, whose initial 
staff title ... merely Special Assistant before »iron upgraded hi. to a 
Special Consultant in 19,3) Bon Bi.gl.r, promoted <ro. Special Assist..« 
in 1969 Press Secretary In 1970 to Ass,.«», « d  Pres, Secretary
(combined, in 1973) and Kenneth Clawson, -ho Joined the •= - P - «
^ the Executive Branch in 1972, becoming Deputy 
Director of Communications for t
Pres. Secretary in 1973, red Director of Communications 1. »74.
4 1th the structure and organization of his White
A President's preoccupation with
e-vwr, nnncems of managing the
House staff is now accepted as foremost among
.. atructure of their Y/HO
Presidency. Decisions by a President to change
Tn certain presidencies this is
staff can be reflected in various ways.
rest readily apparent from «he co„se,uen, 1.1 change. 1» J -  * « * •  “
staff members. The Ri.euhre.r red Nlxe. < - .  <° * “ ,“ t '
nature, best betray .«oh structural 
presidencies, by their very hierarchical n.tur
changes in job title changes.
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in both the Eisenhower and Nixon presidencies there is definite evidence 
of some structural change in their WHO staff organization after their first 
year in office. A large number of job title changes were recorded after 
that first year. (Appendix 4.9 gives the figures year by year.) For the 
Eisenhower Presidency, figures from the Government Organization Manual show 
8 job title changes in 1954 (over the previous year) , out of a total of 27 
changes during the whole period 1953-1961; the Director* figures were 12 
out of 34. Thus one third of all the job title changes that Eisenhower 
made during his Presidency were made after his first year. This proporti 
was similar in respect of President Nixon’s first year. The Staff 
Directory figures show 10 job title changes in 1970 out of an overall total 
of 35 between 1969 and 1974. The experience of running the White House 
for a year either invited, or compelled, each President to reconsider the
structure of his staff.*
Both Presidents Eisenhower nod Nlxou h.d on. com*» „tl.stlon (or such 
reorganization. Both Initiated, ..rip 1» their p,.sid.nol..,.tudle. ol 
the Executive Branch .ho., r.co-ends.lous pro.pt.d certain ...» changes. 
For example, parti, a. a result o. the e.co.d Hoover Co-l.slou, President
E l . e n h o . e r  e s t a h l i s h e d  c e r t a i n  n e .  » 1 . .  H o u s e  . . . »  P » « .  «  “ * *  » '
S e c r e t a r y  t o  t h e  C a b i n e t ,  S , . «  S e c r e t a r y ,  • »  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  A . . » « . » «
. * Tntereovernmental Relations, and a
serving as a Deputy Assistant for I E
President Nixon, in follow
Presidential Advisor for Personnel Management.
a.1 Council on Executive Organization
ing both the advice of the Ash Adv ry
. Eisenhower, established a new Domestic
and his own experience of life un
, *« _u 4-4 + igc to match th©
A ffa irs  office in the White House, with new s a
newly-defined areas of staff responsibility______ _________ — ------ - ~
— --------------------- ----------7--- ¡hmit iudeing a Prince from seeing the
* Machiavelli’s celebrated aphorism in this context to the effect
brains he has about him can be parap ra to the organization of
that you can judge a President’8 <*ang chooses to bestow upon them.
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Other changes in job titles were occasioned by the expansion of the role 
of the White House staff. The formal designation of one Special Assistant 
t0 the President as being responsible for National Security Affairs came 
in 1954 under President Eisenhower. This title remains to this day. 
Similarly, after Special Projects had been established in 1956, Eisenhower 
created a supervisory staff post entitled Administrative Officer (Special 
Projects) . President Nixon, as we have noted, created a number of new con 
sultancy staff posts, such as the Special Consultants on Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs, on Systems Analysis, and on Aging.
For both Presidents the start of their second term acted as a catalyst for 
any rethinking and brought in its wake another round of staff j 
changes. Yet those in the Eisenhower White House were more the result of 
staff turnover than any structural alteration of staff duties.
members were moved to other jobs to fill vacancies that had arisen. By
* his second term to be marked by a radicalcontrast, President Nixon intended his
. -xjnn fond its relationship with restructuring of his White House organization (and
. j. + „ had seriously invaded his second 
the rest of government). Before Waterga
Nixon . M .  to pn« « » y  .« «».. l0t°
effect - at least, as they affected the White House. About one third of
. i C his Presidency occurred in the 1973 staff 
all the job title changes during his P
t h e  f i e u r e s  from  t h e  Government O r g a n i z a t i on 
l i s t i n g s .  (A p p e n d i x  4 . 9  g i v e s  t h e  f i g u r
Manual, Directory, and Staff_Di«Si2SL U s i n g s  as 12, 9, and 11, out of 31,
28, and 35, respectively.) One of the most interesting feat
. pd his senior staff with job titles that tended 
changes was that Nixon endowed h
rt scone of operational responsibilities.
to belie their greatly increased scope o p
„ staff job titles is the extent to 
One other general feature of changes in stall J
r of staff Once again, this is most clearly mani- 
which they reflect turnover of stair. _____Presidency
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demonstrated a noticeable cyclical pattern of changes in job title.
Apart from changes occurring after the first year, more changes were 
recorded after the first mid-term, the beginning of the second term, and 
the second mid-term of his Presidency than in other years. The Government 
Organization Manual figures are 4, 4, and 7 job titles changes at those 
times compared to the 1, 1, and 2 changes in the intervening years. As we 
have noted, Nixon's second term began with a significant number of job 
title changes. Moreover, both presidencies experienced political upheavals 
that precipitated staff turnover and consequently more such changes. In 
1958, the enforced resignation of The Assistant to the President Sherman 
Adams triggered off a small chain reaction of reshuffled staff. By mid- 
1973, Watergate had made such a noticeable impact on Nixon's staff, and 
enforced so many resignations, that there was a similar necessity to re­
shuffle staff and job titles.
Of the other presidencies under review none exhibited a high level of White 
House Office staff job titles changes. This was partly a reflection of a 
lower turnover among staff. Equally, it reflected a fundamentally different 
approach to staff organization. Compared to the Republican Presidents, the 
Democratic Presidents gave their WHO staff general job titles. Being less 
specific there was less need for them to be changed purely on grounds of 
reshuffled overlapping or reallocated responsibilities. Staff promotion, 
or reorganization, would not necessarily be evident from job title changes 
alone.
The Kennedy Presidency provides a good illustration of the one political 
advantage that a flexible organization has had over an hierarchical one.
The Job title of Special Assistant on the Kennedy WHO staff bespoke of no 
fixed political abode. The President could and did employ such assistants 
on a wide variety of different and overlapping assignments. Kennedy staff
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job titles were merely a convenient mask behind which they operated 
freely at the President's direction. When staff reorganization proved 
necessary, as was the case in the national security area after the Bay of 
Pigs, it was achieved without any obvious reflection in official WHO staff 
listings. Although McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's Special Assistant for 
National Security Affairs, was thereafter entrusted with a greatly in­
creased role this was accorded the minimum of official recognition. Thus 
the emerging influence of the White House staff was well shielded from 
public and congressional view. This helped to protect both Kennedy - and 
the Presidency.
The Johnson White House followed the same pattern. Job title changes were 
few and far between. There was the occasional promotion caused by a 
vacancy (as when Lee White moved up from Associate Counsel in 1964 to 
Special Counsel in 1965, while Harry McPherson was similarly upgraded to 
the same post in 1967 from his former status as Special Assistant); or the 
need to bestow an apparently higher status (as when George Reedy returned to 
the Johnson staff in 1968 as a Special Consultant); but little else.
In conclusion, we have seen that the job titles conferred by Presidents on 
their White House staff have not only highlighted their increasing numbers 
and, with varying degrees of specificity, their expansion of role, but also 
embody the broad outline of staff organization in each Presidency. Job 
titles, even if they have not been as informative as job descriptions would 
be, still reflect quite accurately a President's underlying approach 
Presidency - if you know what to look for. This is not always easy. For 
example, few at first realised that behind the short and mundane job title 
of Assistant to the President held by H.R. Haldeman under Nixon lay the 
enormous scope of White House operations and the development of 
day model of Chief of Staff.
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More prominent have been examples of the reverse. Presidents have deli­
berately manipulated staff job titles for political ends. The opportunity 
has been too good to miss. The EOP (not to mention the whole vast 
Executive Branch beyond) has grown far too big for special interest groups 
to be assuaged merely by an appointment here, or the establishment of an 
office there. They seek a more credible reassurance that their consti­
tuency has a voice - where it counts - in the councils of the Adminis­
tration. Proximity to the President is the only currency that some of the 
more important special interest groups will trade and do business in. 
Presidents can most easily manufacture that currency by promising (while 
still a presidential candidate) or establishing (while in office or running 
for re-election) positions on their White House staff whose job titles give 
both clear notice that certain issues have a built-in feed to the White House 
policy machine, and give reassurance of access to presidential think g
Job titles are a most flexible presidential tool. As a result their use 
more directly indicates the President's philosophy towards his managerial 
White House role than a whole host of other governmental appointments, over 
the descriptive content of which his hands are tied by comparison. In the 
continued absence of any requirement for a standard, regular, full and
public l i s t in g  o f a l l  members o f  the White House s t a f f  the President w i l l
, „ r.* discretion. He may choose to be
continue to enjoy a considerable degree
, disingenuous i f  he considers i t
specific where i t  s u it s  him; and sim il y
„hie freedom of manoeuvre can be
necessary. But to the well-trained ey
n Exnerience shows that White House s t a f f  
made more apparent than r e a l . hxpe
4 as a barometer of the development of
job titles are revealing; not leas
_ shall now discover, in respect of
the staff. This is no less true, as w
staff turnover.
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■np. whttF. HOUSE STAFF: TURNOVER
As a by-product of the annual publication of official listings of senior 
commissioned White House Office staff it is possible to gauge the turnover 
of staff from one year to the next. To do so is to do more than a mere 
exercise. Behind the figures of its computation lie an insight into the 
atmosphere of each White House - and into the possible connexion between 
staff organization and staff turnover. In many areas of life, loyalty and 
commitment are key factors that affect the level of staff turnover in any 
organization. Working at the White House is no exception. Among the 
senior staff there is an especially strong sense of loyalty to the job t y 
do simply because of the obviously strong sense of loyalty to the President 
they serve. This loyalty is one of the important reasons of their being 
there at all. Countless numbers have testified that their period of service 
on the White House staff was the high point of their lives. Very few have 
deliberately relinquished their moment on centre stage unless they had very 
special reasons.25 The interpretation of staff turnover must therefore 
be seen against this background and judged accordingly.
4 . „ n t ln  t h is  exam ination o f  s t a f f  turn over.
So too must the limitations inherent
*he se n io r  commissioned WHO
F irs tly , our a n a ly s is  can only be app
„„h U s hed (the vast majority of the staff. Only they have their names published it
v -Ithmit a re g u la r  p u b lic a tio n  o f  names
White House s t a f f  are  unnamed), and w it
c . . n. d l v  in  the absence o f
it is impossible to know what turnover occurs.
- etaff turnover we must rely on a combi-
any one authoriatative definition o 
nation of definitions.
bv which to  measure the prop ortion
No standard definition of turnover ex
4 nn office whose size itself varies from year 
of persons arriving or leaving an
f  r\ _  __1__I _ . .  ____  rv-P-P-1 o o
__ does. In mathematical
294 -
terms one can distinguish between three different versions of turnover in 
The White House Office, each of which is calculated on a different basis.
First: the numbers of incoming WHO staff can be expressed as a proportion
of the total WHO staff in that year. Second: the numbers of outgoing WHO 
staff can be expressed as a proportion of the total WHO staff in the previous 
year. Third: the numbers of WHO staff who remain from one year to the next 
can be expressed as a proportion of the total WHO staff in both the present - 
and the previous - year. These three different bases for calculating turn­
over and expressing it as a percentage can be termed respectively the 
"arrival turnover", the "departure turnover", and the "constant ratio". Each 
definition contributes towards an understanding of the overall pi 
w n  rto-f-p t n m n v p r  d u r i n e  each P r e s i d e n c y .
TABLE 4.16
TURNOVER IN THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1974
Total WHO Staff Turnover
Presidency
USGOM
Dep-Arr
Roosevelt 8-14
Truman 16-21
Eisenhower 44-64
Kennedy 10-9
Johnson 30-28
Nixon 69-66a
CD
bTotal Dep-Arr Total'
22 6-12 18
37 16-20 36
108 41-64 105
19 7-4 11
58 33-27 60
135 74-84 158
CSD
Pen-Arr Total
26-29 55
78-88 166
a Covers the period 1969-1973 only. ^  ag having
b The figures given are t h e / / ^ W u r i n g  each Presidency 
departed (Dep) and arrived (Arr) during
c Figures include Armed Forces Aides (between 1945(ii>
Dep Numbers of staff who departed from The WHO during eac
Arr Numbers of staff who a r r i v e d  to Join The WHO d u r i n g  e a c h  P r e s i d e
NB: Figures refer only to  senior commissioned WHO staff.
S o u r c e s :  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  G overn m en t O r g a n i z a t i o n  Manual
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  D i r e c t o r y
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terms one can distinguish between three different versions of turnover in 
The White House Office, each of which is calculated on a different basis.
First: the numbers of incoming WHO staff can be expressed as a proportion
of the total WHO staff in that year. Second: the numbers of outgoing WHO 
staff can be expressed as a proportion of the total WHO staff in the previous 
year. Third: the numbers of WHO staff who remain from one year to the next 
can be expressed as a proportion of the total WHO staff in both the present - 
and the previous - year. These three different bases for calculating turn­
over and expressing it as a percentage can be termed respectively the 
"arrival turnover". the "departure turnover", and the "constant ratio". Each 
definition contributes towards an understanding of the overall pict 
WHO staff turnover during each Presidency.
TABLE 4.16
TURNOVER IN THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1974 
Total WHO Staff Turnover
USGOM CD
Presidency Dep-Arr
,bTotal Dep-Arr Total
Roosevelt 8-14 22 6-12
18
Truman 16-21 37 16-20 36
Eisenhower 44-64 108 41-64
105
Kennedy 10-9 19 7-4
11
Johnson 30-28 58 33-27
60
Nixon 69-66a 135 74-84
158
CSD
Dep-Arr
26-29
78-88
Total
55
166
a Covers the period 1969-1973 only. havine
b The figures given are the^ ^ ^ ^ i n g ^ a c h ^ r e s i d e n c y  
departed (Dep) and arrived (Arr) during ea
c Ptgur.. ^  »—  * » -  «■—  1 M M l l >
Dep of ,t.ff who departed fro» The dorlng •«=
. The WHO during each presiueucy.
Arr Numbers of staff who arrived to joi
NB: Figures refer only to senior commissioned WHO staff.
S o u r c e s :  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  G overnm ent O r g a n i z a t i o n  Manual
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  D i r e c t o r y  
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  S t a f f  D i r e c t o r y A
295
Before turning to any detailed analysis we should first consider the broad 
outline. Table 4.16 provides the aggregate totals for WHO staff turnover 
arranged Presidency by Presidency. (Appendix 4,10 gives annual figures 
for the period 1939-1974.) As Table 4.16 shows, the crude extent of 
aggregate turnover broadly corresponded with the size of the senior WHO 
staff that served each President. For example, President Nixon's WHO staff 
which was the largest yet seen, also produced the largest overall turnover 
figures. President Eisenhower's WHO staff, second in size only to Nixon's 
was similarly second in recorded turnover figures.
of .«.«f » 0  “ * C°-
Where «he, h.v. no. add. .l«niflc„c. to the - » 1 «  °*
For example, da.plt. the «.=t .ha* » ■ « » *  *B*
smallest WHO senior .«.« of w  President he did not achieve the low... 
staff turnover. Kennedy's Pre.ld.ncy enjoyed that distinction, and yet the
. . hv the fact that Kennedy was in the White
This can partly be accounted for by
which did not give so great an opportunity House less than three years, which did no
But it also reflected the relative stability of 
for turnover to occur. But it ais
„ h Johnson's Presidency provided a contrast-
the senior team around Kennedy.
no time his senior WHO staff numbered no 
ing example. Although at any one time ni
„ „„ experienced a much higher turnover of
more than had Kennedy's, Johnso P
- office Indeed, measurements of departure
staff throughout his time in off
. . the le v e l of the Eisenhower
turnover fo r  Johnson's s t a f f  almost reached the
r taking m t o  account minor deviations, the 
years. In general, however, tak g
t of the patterns within each individual
broad outline still holds. Wl*a 
Presidency?
Roosevelt Presidency, as
The figures for actual turnover during
point to the increasing size of the WHO sen o 
Table 4.16 clearly shows, point to
— --------  ^___ „4 cation Manual
staff. According to
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14 persons joined the Roosevelt staff between 1939 and 1945, while only
8 left. A closer inspection shows that only three persons both joined
and left during that time. All three held the position of Administrative
26
Assistant and none were among the most senior aides to Roosevelt. K» 
the rest, several departures were occasioned by deaths; while those that 
joined all stayed until the end. The prevailing picture, suggested by the 
figures both for departure and arrival turnover, was of a settled staff,
slowly growing.
Hoticeebly higher figures for actual «.»over produced b, the Truman
Presidency. Both the Orga.lz.tlon Man»! and the
showed that departure turnover at least doubled over the year. « « - « • * •
Th. two year, of most change were 1946 and 1948. Departure and arrival 
turnover figure, for those two year, were higher t h »  for any ««hers. Of 
th. approximately 20 staff -ho .olned th. «hit. House during Trumans 
Presidency, only on. third subsequently left before hi. ter. of off.ce 
finished. With only on. not»., exception (Special Counsel 0 1 «  Clifford,
the turnover among Trumn... staff • »  - — *» “  ,S°=e
did not conn, among the President's K»o» closest advise™. ■» — « ■
« who qt&ff would hence
Truman's Presidency demonstrated that the turnover of «*> 
forth be a regular feature of the modem Presidency.
The sub.equ.nt Hl.enho.er Presidency .»ply « * * —  “ “  S**''
turnover in real term. -a. higher than ever before, «cording to .»•
Organization Manual. 44 person. 1 . «  «»• —  «  “ * “
1960, while 64 loined. «... —  — «*** ** “  “ “  “
s , . ™  ended. Only three of those »ho 
Eisenhower staff before his second t
1.,, later returned to serve »other spell- —  < "
the President); Robert Cutler (Special A s s i s t » « * «  S* ’
ott.- enm( fications Of the
297
Sherman Adams affair were reflected in the fact that Eisenhower suffered 
a greater proportion of staff turnover among his closest aides than any 
previous President. Of the top 21 staff listed by the Organization Manual 
in 1953 (excluding the President’s Physician, but including his Personal 
Secretary) only 9 were left by I960.
The Eisenhower years also brought one feature of staff turnover into more 
„„sinence. There ... . distinctly cyclic.! pattern »< •«*« '“»over
tween 1953 and 1961. It rose every two years, after the first mid-term,
after the „..inning of the ...end ter« .«ter second -id-ter-. In
th. intervening year, it noticeably f U -  » 6 " ™ .  for departure turnover 
from the Cnnereasional Directory show the following progression during
years 1954-1960 , 4%, 17%, M .  7». 2» ’ 6‘ ‘
Organization Manual figure, for arrival turnover during the ■ »
similarly ezhihlt this cyclical pattern, 24%, 34%, 18%, 26%, 17%, 22%, and
6%. Factor, that contribute to such a P * « . »  are varied. Those
members for whom government service represented too great a «i"-»“ *1
flee found ,h. occasion of Eisenhower’s second , e „  a natural — ‘ *“
leave. Similarly those who benefited from their connexion with the Whxte
House in terms of increased Job opportunities outside saw the mid-term as
the appropriate point to move on. The political patter, of biennial
...slon. of Congress . 1 »  provided opportunities to " 1 —  reermt
. „toff than to those 
ugart less to Eisenhower's senior staff, although this applied less
lower down the pecking order.
President Kennedy’s term may ~  ‘
« gem.., «  whether such trend, also — “  “ * ™ y
see. to do so. hnlih. any previous Presidency, the —  °* *.. ____ was small in real terms.
staff remained almost constant
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During Kennedy's 1000 days only 10 persons left, and 9 joined, the senior 
WHO staff, according to the Government Organization Manual (although the 
rnnfrressional Directory put the numbers even lower, at 7 and 4 respectively.)
The impression gained is of a stable senior WHO staff. Such turnover as 
did take place was not among the most senior of Kennedy's advisers, but 
affected those of decidedly middle rank. There were also some special 
factors at work. The Special Assistant James Landis had been brought on 
bo.rd ..inly for th. transition and the .«rly months only. Special
for civil right., Harris »offord, left to Join th. Peace Corp.i 
vhlle George McGovern, Special As.ist.nt and Director of th. Food-for-P..c. 
program, left th. «hit. Hen., to ran tor the Senate. Of the other departure, 
recorded three were occasioned by Kennedy's reorganization 
Dep.rt.ent. ».It Bo.to. moved fro. hi. position a. a Deputy Special 
Assistant to b.co.e Counsellor and chief of the Policy Planning Council!
Fred Dutton r.lin,ui»h.d hi. post of Special Assistant to beco.e ».si«“ « 
Sectary for Congressional Relation.! and Richard Goodwin .... from being 
a. Assistant Special Counsel to Deputy A.si.t“ « S « ™ « “ « for Inter-American 
».«airs. These changes apart there were «•• departure.. Figure, for
arrival turnover fro. the G c r n m R h L ^ I S  ■ « *  “
fro. 12, to 21, between 1962 and 1963, indicating that there ... • . H R «
Chang, after ,h. firs, mid-ter. elections. « 1 .  « » . “ 1
long enough for hi. staff to have — * -  a cyclical pattern, the «
years were certainly ones of stability.
„ h» drawn from the White House of his 
The very opposite conclusion can
» wnn s t a f f  lik e  Kennedy's, numbered in  the 
successor. Johnson's sen ior WHO s >
. that in aggregate total, the turn-
later twenties. But Table shows that, in
___  „4-o-f-p members
Over nf ato-P-P
. times
299
leit and joined the Johnson WHO staff as had been the case under Kennedy.
The c o m m e n t  Organization Manual listings showed that 30 staff left 
Johnson’s service in the years 1964-1968, while 28 joined. The 
^ , - ^ n n a l  Directory figures were 33 and 27 respectively; while the newly- 
published Congressional Staff .Directory listed 26 and 29 respectively.
The year-by-year figures of staff turnover (see Appendix 4 0 0) reflect the
exceptional nature o f  the circumstances o f  the ea r ly  Johnson Presidency.
The lis t in g s  o f  s t a f f  com piled by the C on cess iona l D irec to ry  in  January,
1964, recorded the names of many Kennedy 'holdovers' still on the pay
Some were about to leave the White House. This was entirely natural for
they were Kennedy's -  not Johnson's -  men. Many i f  not most o f  those who
left for this reason alone had done so before the first listing of the
Johnson staff was compiled by the C o v e - m ^ ^  "
ill high, and this cannot be ascribed
1964. Yet subsequent turnover was s
Other fa c to rs  soon came
to the tra n s it io n  a f t e r  Kennedy's assassination .
into play.
* .  . m , *  _  - » '  -  — -  ”  “ “  “
applied ,o  h is  s e n io r  a d v ise r . -  —  -  »  ~  “  , l ° "
27 w h o staff listed by the Director* in
of middle-level rank. Of the
. k the same publication four years later. 
January, 1964, only 7 were listed by
t, 1 staff appointment, the rest being non- 
Of those 7  only o n e  was a politics
, man -  Administrative
political and residential s ta ff .  Thus on y
t had served Johnson throughout his Presidency;
n t .  «».to. - n0, darned
hi hi., bavin* been . « l - W  *
staffer This 1. the ».t dr-atle lllus-
th., he ... p,l.h.lly . * » —  • ^je evidence Is
. „„1 = sta ff  by turnover. in®
tration of the d ec ln .t lo n  o f  Johnson »  s « 11
c„  OT the 2» •«•« listed by «he
just as clear from other sour . were
later. Of those, only 4 were
in Jane, 1964, only 10 - r e  l U t -  *>>» year. J »
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left and joined the Johnson WHO staff as had been the case under Kennedy.
The r-nvamment Organization Manual listings showed that 30 staff left 
Johnson's service in the years 1964-1968, while 28 joined. The 
^ ^ . i n n a l  Directory figures were 33 and 27 respectively; while the newly- 
published Concessional S t a f Q irector^ listed 26 and 29 respectively.
The year-by-year figures of staff turnover (see Appendix 400) reflect the 
exceptional nature of the circumstances of the early Johnson Presidency.
The listings of staff compiled by the January,
1964, recorded the names o f  many Kennedy 'h o ld overs ' s t i l l  on the p a y ro ll.
Some were about to leave the White House. This was entirely natural for 
they were Kennedy's - not Johnson's - men. Many if not most of those who 
left for this reason alone had done so before the first listing of the
Johnson staff was compiled by the O o v e x ^ m e ^ ^  "
0+ 111 hieh and this cannot be ascribed 
1964. Yet subsequent turnover was st >
+4 Other factors soon came
to the transition after Kennedy's assassinati .
into play.
» .  striking • •* * •  « —  ',“'1 ”  ,h*‘ “
. „ 1 1 .6  to his . » i o r  — »  “  —  “  ~  ,0’ “ °S‘
„ of the 27 WHO s t a f f  l is t e d  by the Directory, in  
of m iddle-level rank. Of the
, listed by the same publication four years later.
January, 1964, only 7 were listed Dy
1 1 +1 ca l s t a f f  appointment, the res t being non- 
Of those 7 only o n e  was a p o l i t ic a
.. Thus only one man - Administrative 
political and residential staff.
,  had served Johnson throughout h is Presidency; and
Assistant I k .  «».to. - cl.i-d
M  hi., hsving » . »  originally a ’
s t a f fe r  This i s  the most dramatic i l l u s -  
that he was p rim arily  a Johnson ^  evidence is
tra tion  o f the decim ation o f Johnson's s t a f f  by turnove .
Of the 29 staff listed by the Manual
just as clear from other source . . were
OBTS later. Of those, only 4 were
in June, 1964, only 10 „.*> ll.««> ***”  ^
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political staff members, and one of them, (Special Consultant George 
Reedy, who had rejoined the staff near the end of Johnson's Presidency 
having left the White House at mid-term) had not served continuously.
figures are quite conclusive. Johnson suffered a greater degree of 
turnover among his most senior WHO staff than any previous President. That 
highly well-informed observer of congressional affairs, Congressional 
Quarterly, felt obliged to point to the high turnover.28 By the end of 
1967, eight of the nine Special Assistants with whom Johnson had begun his 
presidential term on 20th January, 1965, had left the White House. By the 
end of his Presidency it was calculated that 43 "top aides" had served 
Johnson altogether,29 at an average (and noticeably short) tenure of 
28 months. (The same average - applied to Kennedy - would mean that all
, white House before his death.)his initial WHO staff would have left the Wh
4 v s t a f f  resigned  from the Johnson White House At least h a lf-a -d ozen  sen io r s t a f f  res ign
each year. This steady flow seems to have overlaid any obvious repetition 
of the cyclical patterns of turnover previously identified, although figures
for arrival turnover from the ***”  1965'68
(33%, 25%, 31%, and 21%) do exhibit cyclical trends.
President Nixon enjoyed a large senior commissioned WHO staff, normally 
over 50 in each year. Over 110 persons served during his 5* years in
office. The aggregate totals of turnover, as * 6 ^  —  • ~  
larly large. The Government Org a n i z a t i o n ^  listings show that 69
t the years 1969-1973. (No list
persons left, and 66 joined, the s a
hushed by the Government 0jl anizaUon_Ma5ual in 
of Nixon's staff was published by m e  ------- -
fo r  the vears 1969-1974, put the
1974.) The Congressional Directory.»
, . _hile the r.onRressional_Staff_Dirgctory.
totals at 74 and 84 r e s p e c t iv e ly ,
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In analysing the distribution of this staff turnover allowance must of 
course be made for the impact that Watergate had on Nixon's White House 
Office staff. Without Watergate, more of Nixon's most senior advisers 
.night well have remained throughout his Presidency. But in the event 
Nixon suffered a significant degree of turnover among his most senior 
aides. For example, of the 46 staff listed by the G o v e r n m e n t _ ^ ^
Manual in 1969, only 14 appeared on the last G o y e r n m e n t _ 0 ^ ^  
listing in 1973. Of those, three were non-political staff and one other, 
Counsellor Bryce Harlow, had temporarily re-joined the White House staff 
after a long period away. Only ten, less than a quarter of the original
staff, had served Nixon throughout. The C o n g r e s s i o n a l ^ ^  
show that only 10 remained in 1974, of which only 8 were political staff 
and only 7 had served continuously: Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Henry Kissinger, Press Secretary Ron Ziegler and his deputy Gerald Warren, 
Assistant for Legislative Affairs William Timmons, the speechwriters 
Patrick Buchanan and Ray Price, and Personal Secretary Rose Mary Woods.
Beneath the s t a f f  turnover occasioned by Watergate, the cy c lic a l  
s ta f f  turnover decidedly reasserted  i t s e l f  during the Nixon Presi
example, the Government OrjSjSStiSSJfSSSl recorded the f o l l ° Wing ^
. mvrm White House in  the years 1970-1974: 
tota ls o f s t a f f  who l e f t  the Ni
. the peak periods of turnover were in the 
4, 25, 7, and 33. Once again, the p P
„  a of 1970 and the presidential re-election 
aftermath of the mid-term elections
„ WHO staff underwent considerable changes,
of 1972. After each the Nixon WH
especially among middle-level commissioned staff.
r may also be considered from another angle. We 
White House staff turnover may ais ot4.ern
we now turn to the individual pattern, 
have considered the overall pattern. ataff
fo r  the years 1939-1974.
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TABLE 4.17
turnover in t h e WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1974
Average Length of Service of WHO Staff®
USGOM CD CSD
Presidency
Years
Listed
Average
LoS
Years
Listed
Average
LoS
Years
Listed
Roosevelt 6 3.4 54 3.10 ”
Truman 74 3.8 74 3.10 ”
Eisenhower 8 3.8 8 3.8
Kennedy 3 2.2 3 2.5
Johnson 5 2.4 5 2.3
5
Nixon 5 2.3 6
2.3 6
Average
LoS
2.3
2.3
a Figures given in years and months
Sources: United  States Government O rgan ization  Manual
Congressional D irectory  
Congressional S ta f f  D irectory
x -r k i » 4 17 is that that the average length of 
The most obvious feature of Tab .e.— :--
. . „ i c ,  . . .  ©her,.© .©  o v „  ,he ,© —  « -  « ”  31
».O«,.», «. .... « -  r t V —  <—  — >• Y,t *“ * P” g” “ 10° “
. dencies fall into two groups. The average
not been gradual. The six pres
,o lt  Truman and Eisenhower presidencies  
figures recorded during the Rooseve ,
. . .  h igh© . « -  —  -  “ *  ■="“” * •  “ d B1” “ u
presidencies <.hich .h©-©»©. —  *“  **”  “  “ °h °,h'rt' f
. m i  closer eith.r to 4-y©*r ©> 2-y©©r P©'»°" 
speaking these figures are al
late with, and confirm, the cyclical pattern 
service. This tends to correl
4 „  lnlater presidencies). As measurements of staff
of turnover (especially in lat P
th of service figures must be weighe n 
turnover these average length
. . __ fleures for the
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Kennedy Presidency represent much less staff turnover than do the 
(su p e rfic ia lly  comparable) figures for a Nixon Presidency that in  fact 
lasted over twice as long.
What general conclusions can be drawn from this analysis? It is clear that 
turnover comprises several elements. Firstly, there is a broad relationship 
between the size of a staff and the rate of staff turnover: the smaller 
the staff the lower has been the turnover. Secondly, the larger staff 
normally entails a differentiated rate of turnover between two parts: the 
President's most senior aides, and the bulk of the middle- and junior-level 
staff. Turnover among the latter groups tends to be greater, 
tantamount to saying that the closer staff members are to the President the 
less they are subject to turnover. No rule would be complete without its 
partial exceptions. Both the Nixon staff (because of Watergate) and the 
Johnson staff (for different reasons) suffered a higher level 
among the most senior aides than did the staff of any other President. 
Thirdly, one other (submerged) relationship exists between a large staff and 
the tendency towards a cyclical pattern of turnover: rising and falling in 
successive years. The most notable examples have been the Eisenhower and 
Nixon presidencies. It was a submerged feature of the Johnson Presidency, 
a nascent feature of Roosevelt's and Truman's, while those of Kennedy (and 
Ford) were too short to allow it to surface.
»1«. , M .  variety ef .1— t. it 1. « «  “  -1« 1*
staff turnover can adequately encompass - 1» a single figure - such turn 
over as there was in each Presidency nor convey its full meaning.
. . . i i j i. .. a a ph
Presidency to WHO staff turnover.
Table 4.18 provides such a guide.
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TABLE 4,18
TURNOVER IN THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-
nondrt.ure Turnover for WHO Staff c
Presidency USGOM C D b CSD
Kennedy 26 21 - ))
Roosevelt 36 29 - )
Truman 46 48 - ))
Eisenhower 49 45 - )
Johnson 56 54 52 ))
Nixon 62 a 66 66 )
a Covers the period 1969--1973 only.
Least Turnover
Most Turnover
Figures “ ^ " ' . “ T o  «x is the number of WHO stan
durine  each Presidency» .
y i s  the to ta l number of WHO s t a n  
during  each Presidency.
Sources: United State. Oov.rn«nt Orgu.it.t i n  H » ”*1
Congressional Directory 
Congressional Staff Directory
_Tattle 4.18 places the six
On the basis of figures for departure turnove ,
, ton to bottom that reflects their degree of 
presidencies in an order from P
. THig order - from Kennedy to Nixon -
WHO staff turnover from least to mos
4 derived from other measurements available, 
represents the synthesis deri
. other such measurements which collectively
(Appendix 4.11 provides three o ^
Table 4 18.) Even more pronounced
confirm .ho v.lldi.y of < U  ord« given »  B t -------
dfancies into three groups. These
is the general division of the six pres
A B and C. Kennedy and Roosevelt, in Group A, 
are given here as Groups A, , ^  Nlxon> in Group C.
enjoyed the lowest senior WHO staff turnover.
t Group B, ranged between
recorded the highest. Truman and Eisenhower,
t.ho nthor
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THE WMTTF. HOUSE STAFF: COST
The first official budget for President Roosevelt's newly-created White 
House Office staff in 1939 provided $213,000. Forty years later in 
1979 the budget for the entire White House staff of President Carter was 
$31,694,000 - no less than 150 times greater. The nature and definition
of the White House staff changed and expanded during those forty years, as 
Chapter I has shown, and it may seem unjustified to claim direct compari­
sons. Even so, the budget in 1979 for The White House Office alone was 
$17,163,000 - about 80 times larger than for Roosevelt's WHO in 1939.
„ „  1. one » „ »  of the lucre... in «he coo. of «he »«.ft. *»»« • ~ ' 1“
„..1».. no. «„. co.« lucre...,. ov.r « « .  -  “  *°”  “et*11 *“
constituent parts of the overall picture.
the cost of the White House staff can be said The pattern of increase in the cost o
„co in -its size in three major
broadly to correspond with that of the mere
, „d in the light of the expanding 
respects. First, the cost must be considered in the
1939 the cost of the staff could validly be 
definition of the staff. *n ^ ’
, . The white House Office alone. By 1969, the
measured only in the budget for
t . bv adding together the budgets for The White 
cost could only be computed by
Hoc. Office, Spec«.« Project.. «he B-rf.ucy —  . -  «
Security Ccuncii. By
. d The white House Office, the Office 
of the staff, the total cost compri
_ Staff the National Security Council,
of Administration, the Domestic Po y
„ k „ds The second respect in which the
and the fund for Unanticipated Nee .
„ ,_4 -pa s*ant. increases in
pattern has corresponded  is
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cost has been as m is lead ing as the apparent sudden increases in  s iz e .  
F inally, the th ird  p a r a l le l  l i e s  in  the caveat that must be en tered  on the 
extent to which the published o f f i c i a l  figu res  convey the complete p icture
of the true c o s t .
This « . . m o t i o n  is  circum scribed by the degree o f  ia iorm atlon  „ v . i l a b l .  
from public sources. However, w h ile  f ig u r e .  io r  the s iz e  o f  parts  o f the 
•h it .  House s t a f f ,  such a . those Specia l P r o je c t ,  employees, hove mot 
. 1 . . , .  b e . »  a v a ila b le  a fig u re  fo r  cost ha. always been given, «h a t  Is  
impossible to  ob ta in  have been the various hinds o f  hidden .su b s id ie s ’ ; fo r  
example, the add ition  to  «be tru e cost o f  the s t a f f  o f  the persons d e ta iled  
to  work in  the « i t .  House f r o .  elsewhere, » a .  1 . o ften  . „ u . l l y  l . , » . s i b l .  
to „ c e r t a in  have been the f in a n c ia l breakdown, o f  s o .  . h i t .  House s ta f f  
budget i t —  Specia l P r o je c t ,  again provides a good example. Budget 
breakdowns disappeared f r o .  the FV 1967 Budge, onwards, a d e v e l o p « «  which
. f  this White House s t a f f  is  that given 
le  basic measure fo r  the cost o
a the aumifll United S tates Budgets fo r  various White House s t a f f  xtems.
he _ « »  appropriated fo r  each such 1 . «  1- * « 0 . »  “  “ • ^
« t h o r n y .  This - « .s u r e  can be used „  the b as is  «o r  comparison; 
he,her year by year , o r  Presidency by Presidency « «  the reserva tion
fo r  the Budget Authority o f  the f iv e  budgetary 
able 4.19 gives fig u re s  fo r  the B
and in  various combinations have made up the 
terns that at various times and in
f  fhP White House s t a f f  between 1939 and 1976. (See 
ore o f the cost o f  the Whi^e
1.0 .................. 4.12 and ± 1 3  fo r  d e t a i l « .  . « « 1  f ig u r e ,  o f Budge.
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TABLE 4.19
m.ST OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1976
Rnrijret Authority 
Presidency Year
(in $ 
WHO
' 000s) 
SP
Roosevelt 1939 213 -
1944 302 -
Truman 1945 354 -
1952 1,884 -
Eisenhower 1953 1,958 -
1960 2,221 1,500
Kennedy 1961 2,498 1,258
1963 2,545 1,500
Johnson 1964 2,730 1,500
1968 3,009 1,500
Nixon 1969 3,229 1,500
1974 11.260 414
Ford 1975 16,367 -
1976 16,766 '
Cumulative
1939-1976
Totals
126,977 27,508
EF/UN NSC DC TOTAL
_ - 213
1,000 - - 1,302
1,000 - - 1,354
1,000 160 - 3,044
1,000 155 - 3,113
1,000 792 - 5,513
1,000 817 - 5,573
1,000 550 - 5,595
1,000 575 - 5,805
1,000 664 - 6,173
1,000 811 l,500a 6,540b
1,000 2,802 1,100 16,576
500 2,900 1,250 21,017
1,000 3,052 1,646 22,464
36,414 28,183 11,327 230,409
the Domestic Council was not estab lish ed  u n til 
a 1970 figu re  (because  the Domes
197°). _n
* —  - - ~ — -NB: All figures are actual figure .
the FY 1977 Budget. in
WHO The White House Office
SP Special Projects Needs
EF/UN Emergency Fund/Unanticipa
NSC National Security Council
DC Domestic Council
Period in  
Existence
1939- 1976 
1956-1974
1940- 1976 
1948-1976 
1970-1976
Sources: United S ta te s  Budgets
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During the whole period 1939-1976 these items were coterminous only for 
a few years (in the 1970s) . None except for The White House Office 
itself has spanned the entire period. Figures are given for the first 
and last years of each Presidency. (Complete figures for each year are 
given in Appendix 4.12.)
The cost of The White House Office mirrored its size in one obvious 
respect: the pattern of apparent increase was the same. For example,
twice in the course of this period - in 1947 and in 1971 - there appeared
to be a sudden and dramatic increase in the cost of The White House Office,
in 1947 the cost rose to $884,000 from $343,000 the year before; an increase 
of over 150%. In 1971 the cost rose to $8,359,000 from $3,940,000 the year 
before; an increase of over 110%. However, as clear, both
such increases were more apparent than real. Both represented attempts to 
reveal more accurately the real cost of The White House Office. The 1971 
case is worth examining in more detail. In its K  1971 Budget the Nixon 
Administration presented to Congress breakdown figures for the cost of the 
White House staff in 1970, designed to illustrate that the 1971 increase in
. . . . Table 4.20 is based on these figurescost was actually not what it see • -----------
29b
for 1970 (and should be taken in conjunction with T a b l e t s  >•
TABLE 4.20
COST OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF 1939-1976 
The White House Staff: Breakdown of Cost in 1970
Budgetary Item
The White House Office 
Special Projects 
Personnel detailed to 
the White Houseb
SUB-TOTAL
National Security Council 
Domestic Council 
Emergency Fund
TOTAL
Budget a 
Authority %
Budget a 
Authority %
3,940
2,240
2,820
9,000
44
25
31
100 9.000
1,860
1,500
1 .0 0 0
13,360
67
14
11
8
100
a Figures in $ '000s. o+vntionb Figure calculated by the Nixon AdministraU --
Source: United States Budget FY 1971
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From this breakdown it is clear that the estimated cost of the detailees 
from elsewhere in government to the White House amounted to 71% of the 
official cost of The White House Office. Moreover, the total cost of 
$13,360,000 for the White House staff in 1970 does put the 1971 figure of 
$14,541,000 into better perspective.
qot a+ the time the Nixon White The rise in cost in cash terms was under 9«. At the tin
House even claimed a reduction in WHO costs. In 1970 its estimate
combined cost in 1971 of WHO and Special Projects was $8,550,000; but the
FY 1973 Budget l.t.r r.v.ul.d «... th. « « . 1  co-blued c . t  —  »9.859,000.
, ...11 degree of error 1. - » . «  budge»«, prediction. 1. »“*
was d e l i b e r a t e l y  made f o r  
t h i s  c a s e  t h e  c l a i m ,  h o w e v e r  u n r e a l i s t i c ,  was
to off-set unfavourable publicity resulting from presentational reasons, to off s
the large apparent increase of 1971 costs over 1970.
the interpretation of cost increases in the years For different reasons the interpret
. The cost of The White House
1974-1975 should also be treated with cau i
. * d-hme» »pars. But the appearance
Office did rise substantially in eac o
. mot of staff is misleading. In 1974, 
of casual connexion between size and cost of staff
.. ax it is true t h a t  t h e  Nixon A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
as W a t e r g a t e  n e a r e d  i t s  c l i m a x ,
in WHO s t a f f .  0MB D i r e c t o r  Roy Ash s t a t e d  a t  
r e q u e s t e d  a d e f i n i t e  i n c r e a s e  1
A+h Tune 1974, that another
a Senate appropriations subcommittee hearing on 4th June,
a, ereater workload that is imposed upon
30 staff were needed ”to handle
,, 31 « » « .  *“ • l“ ” “ e the White House" as a result of
,H  - the total increase in estimated costs be-
accounted for but a fraction
„„ Hue to nay increases.
, o ta *B67 700 of that increase was due P "tween 1973 and 1974. $667,/uu _ latter was
,H„d bv a continuing resolution.
Another $414,000 was provided by
d Pnolects (abolished in 1974). In 
the equivalent of what had been Spec a
, pi 500,000 was "restored
1975, the normal Special Projects sum
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re-appropriated to, or subsumed by, The White House Office. The conse­
quently swollen WHO budget thus largely reflected no more than the combined 
WHO and Special Projects cost, where before they had been separated budget-
32 The other main component of the 1975 cost increase wasary items.
really no more than a bookkeeping alteration which did not itself signify
33
any increase in the size of the White House staff.
An analysis of the cost of Special Projects is a much easier task. With 
few exceptions, the annual appropriation for Special Projects was $1,500,000.
On only one occasion was it higher, when another $1, was added to cover extra
costs occasioned by the incoming Nixon Presidency.34 Obviously
„ , . fell gradually downwards from 1956, andvalue of this $l4m appropriation fell g y
as a result of inf lation3.4“ Nevertheless,
somewhat faster in its last ten years, as a resu
. mflation-proof the appropriation. Upon itsno attempt was ever made to inliaiio y
. fund ln 1974 an amount was transferred to The White 
abolition as a separate fund in ,
the «Slim was subsumed within WHO costs.
House Office, after which in 1975 the $ i
of the erosion by inflation of the real value of 
An even more striking case of
. . . h, the Unanticipated Needs
funds for staff purposes has been provi
„ in 1975 from the Emergency Fund). Its
appropriation (whose name was chang
By 1980 this was worth in real terms 
regular annual appropriation is $ • 34b
a great deal less than the same cash amount 40 years earlie
extent successive Presidents have seen their financial freedom of action
greatly reduced by the eroded purchasing power of this $lm.
, * to suffer a cash reduction, when in 1975, as
Ford was the only President t
, „  „ r i » » r i l y  1» .  » 1 » »  « > 1 «  » « " “  1 0a result of moves aimed primari y
. v,oi t But the full $lmthe appropriation by half, of Watergate, Congress cut the app v
_ , , *■._ 4n 1940, however, was by
was restored in 1976. President Rooseve s
1980 only worth $171,000 to
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Compared to The White House Office budgetary appropriation, those for the
National Security  Council have more accurate ly  re flec ted  the o f f i c i a l  s iz e
of the staff serving on the NSC. For example, the cost increase between
1957 ($248,000) and 1958 ($711,000) was directly attributable to an in-
35
crease in the size of the NSC staff from 28 to 77 permanent positions.
When President Kennedy came to power in 1961 he deliberately dismantled 
the NSC machine that Eisenhower had built up. The reduction in NSC staff 
between 1961 and 1962 (from 75 to 47) was therefore directly mirrored in 
the reduced cost of the NSC staff, from $817,000 to $554,000.
When President Nixon arrived in the White House in January, 1969, he set 
about re-establishing the NSC staff as the foreign-policy arm of his White 
House staff. The cost jumped from $811,000 in 1969 (itself 
increase over 1968) to $1,860,000 in 1970.36 This 130% increase needs 
closer examination, as the size of staff rose (from 47 to 75) only by 60%.
The FY 1971 Budget gave the difference between actual expenditure in 1969 
and that estimated for 1970. This showed that the salary bill was to 
rise by 100% (from $610,000 to $1,246,000); the printing bill was also to
double (from $2,000 to $4,000); travel costs were to rise by nearly
* nther services was to increase
(from $11,000 to $60,000); and the cos
«144 000) 37 Subsequently, the official by well over 500% (from $23,000 to $1 4 4,000).
„  Mntlv throughout the 1970s, ascost of the NSC staff rose gently tnro g
. , at anV stage, was the extra cost of
indicates. But what was not reveal ,
, . Nqr otaff. One can only
the large numbers of personnel detailed to the NSC
, Tn 1Q70 for example» 58 
estimate the additional costs thus incurre .
„  + the NSC whose official size was then 75 permanent 
persons were on detail to th
Mflonted 44% of the total real size 
positions. Those 58 detailees thus represented
. ,„.ia extra amount for their
of Kissinger's staff. Adding a propor
1al NSC budget means possibly adding up to another 
salaries to the official NSC S
, t ot Kissinger's staff in 1970 - which 
$800,000 to get the total real cos
would then be $2 ,660,000.
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The cost of the Domestic Council, during its relatively short existence, 
varied - as did the NSC - according to its size. The increase in 1972 to 
$2,209,000 reflected an increased number of staff, from 52 to 79 permanent 
positions.38 Similarly, the reduction in 1974 to $1,100,000 owed to a 
reduction in staff (from 75 to 30). The increase in 1976 (over 1975) of 
a third in the cost of the Domestic Council matched a rise of a third in 
its personnel. Further rises in the Carter Presidency, to $2,711,000 in 
1980 (in its new guise as the Domestic Policy Staff), were accompanied by a 
one quarter increase in staff levels. None of these figures encompass the 
cost of any detailees, of which there were always more than a handful in 
39any one year.
demonstrates ooncln.iv.ly that the n i t .  «on,. . « «  » * «  
incurred a negligible cos, .be. considered in aggregate total. Cumulative 
totals for various staff items show that between 1939 and 1976 about 
$127 million had been allocated to The White House Office; $27i million to 
Special Projects; $36* million to Unanticipated Needs; $28 million to the
NSC; and over $11 million to the Domestic Council. This yields
, , , d.2o0 million. Moreover, by 1979 the annual levelcumulative total of over $230 miino
of expenditure for White House staff budgetary items was running at about 
$30 million p.a.*° If the cumulative total for these latter years 1976-
, iq39 1976 (already calculated at $230 million) the 
1979 is added to that for 1939-197b l
4 . Qf the staff for the forty years between 1939 and
combined cumulative cost of th
18,8 h„  been -ebb ever ,300 mbbbbon “  —  -  ~ ~  “ * “ “
budgets of the United States this aggregate cost cannot possibly
counted as marginal.
Fro. .be macrovbew .e no. burn bo —  bn —  ~
ob ,b... bnrg. budg.b.ry cos,.. T.o m.bor co.pon.nb. sb«.d on,. Fbrsbby.
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thk WHITE HOUSE STAFF: SALARIES
Top oi the «hit. House staff today «joy th. salary l.v.l
„  of Congress «u.cu.iv. level ID- That 1. not »  laconsldarahl.
p „  pachet. Only - * e r .  of the Cabinet, th. Chief Justice of th. U.S. 
6upr, »  Court, and th. President h i - . H  are on a higher govern«,« salary
grade. (Technically, the President doesn't count! he does not receive
f .nnl for each year in office.) At the a 'salary' as such but 'compensation for eac y
u 1 0 7 7 the salaries of the top dozen beginning of the Carter Presidency in 1977 t
+ f «*7 500 D a 42 At a time when the new White House staff were set at $57,500 p.
„  ,lv fulfilling his campaign promise to cut back on the President was allegedly fulfilling
t - the white House staff this salary level, and otherssize and importance of the wnixe
, + ff nromDted an embarrassing wave of criti-
for middle- and junior-level staff, P P
cism.43
. was one charge made.
"It's an abuse of taxpayers y >
t of such a comment can only be made in the historical proper assessment of sucn a
What were the principal trends in staff salary 
ight of past experience. Wha
ds? Interesting though these may be
.evels from the Roosevelt years on
_ here is to ask the question: what ligh
Ln themselves the primary purpos
,.v. hh... «eud. eh.d O. « — * "* “  S“ ‘"  ^
*  the .... „fth .»ff J O  « « .  ~  “ ,,f “  "  f;
they ..y he due, ,e « .  — -  -  ‘
It t . « . . .  •* m “ “ *' -  n ,
n usually be identified by the salaries 
that the most important employees can usual y
. t_ue of the White House staff? 
they receive. Has the same been true
. the galaries of senior WHO staff. Although 
Our prime focus of attention s
< of the staff has brought with it onto the pay 
the steadily increasing size of
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aost directly been felt. In addition, any discussion of staff salaries 
is limited by the range of evidence available. United States Budgets 
have provided, in varying degrees over time, information on the salaries 
paid to staff members in The White House Office. But no such information 
was ever provided in respect of Special Projects; or ungraded personnel; 
or detailees from other departments and agencies. Moreover, between 1947 
and 1977, the extent of the information given on salaries in U^_Budget 
Appendices was progressively curtailed.44 In 1947 precise figures were 
published for the individual salaries of each staff member (arranged accord-
. . . By 1977 spartan figures were printed merelying to his or her job title). oy
„ — ri at various salary levels whoseof the aggregate numbers of unnam
45 Since 1977 the curtailment has been even
dollar amounts were not given.
. 46greater.
Salary Levels From Roosevelt to Carter
w  of the main outlines of White House staff 
Table 4.21 provides a summary of t
1942 1977 * Appendix 4.14 amplifies this summary 
salaries for the years 1942 197/. — ----
, t»il the annual growth in senior WHO salary 
and chronicles in greater detail t
levels during the same period.
for the quinquennia between
Table 4.21 gives ^ tua\ sa^ yf^ gSfiation-adjusted figures _ These 
1942 and 1977. See Note__45_ staff, whether measured y
>w that since 1967 the m o s t ™  Grade (TSG), have enjoyed a 
? Salary Paid (TSP) or the Top Salary ^  thQse in the Truman 
gnificantly higher standard prices, however, th® Ni saiary
senhower and K.nn.dy y««»- *' ' an UUlM10»-«dJ>»«* •* »
« « .  «  th. top of th. ..l«y 1" eJ*.*1 (co.p.r.d to th. Carter ...ff
r the senior WHO staff ° $ , $54,500 p.a.).
7,500 p.a. and the Johnson staff > *
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TABLE 4.21
cat.artES OF SENIOR WHO STAFF 1 9 4 2 - 1 9 2 1  
rnmp ariso n  o f  S a l a r y  G ra d e s  f o r  WHO S t a f f ,
FDR HST HST Ike JFK LBJ
Nixon Carter
1942
NA
1947 
15,000e
1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977
Top Salary Paid 
to WHO Staff 20,000 22,500
21,000 30,000 42,500 57,500
Number of Staff 
Paid Top Salary 3 1 2 1 5
14 14 14
Senior WHO 
Salary Grade a NA 10,000 14,800 16,000
18,000 30,000 42,500 57,500
Number of Staff 
Paid at Senior 
WHO Salary Grade NA 9 8 11
14 14 14 14
6th Level of WHO 
Salary Grade b NA 7,100 11,600 16,000
16,500 20,600 24,400 NA
As a % of Top 
Salary NA 47% 58% 71%
79% 69% 57% NA
Average WHO 
Staff Salary b c 3,700 2,700 5,400
6,200 7,100 8, 700 14,200
24,300
As a % of Top 
Salary NA 18% 27% 28%
34% 29% 33% 42%
Total WHO 
Salary Costs d 178 772 1,446
1,672 2,003 2,271 7,721
11,801
As a % of Total 
WHO Budget 58% 87% 77% 89%
80% 77% 83% 67%
NA Not Available as a minimum, w h o salary grade was expressed as 
a From 1947-1966 the senior aaL J . Z  were usually higher.figure. Actual salaries^re ^  salaries at the
From 1967-1977 all 14 senior WHO s 
level shown.
b Figures given to the nearest $100. salary costs by the
c Crude Figures obtained by divi^ d °Full_time Equivalent of Other 
number of "Permanent Positions' and 
Positions" on the WHO payrol
d Figures given in $000s. in 1947) was not paid from
e This salary (budgeted for the . appropriation.
WHO funds but from the Emergency Fund »  ngures are obtained
All figures are actual figures, _____ _________
from the FY 1974 Budget.
NB:
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In 1939 the average salary of employees of The White House Office was
$3,100 p.a. It is likely that the salaries of the nascent WHO staff
members, the three Secretaries to the President (Stephen Early, Marvin
McIntyre and 'Pa' Watson) and the three Administrative Assistants (Lauchlin
Currie, William McReynolds and James Lowe), were above that average. The
evidence suggests that the newly-established Administrative Assistants were
all to be paid exactly the same salary, although they ranked behind the
three Secretaries in seniority, By 1945 that average had increased by over
25% to stand at $4,800 p.a., and there is evidence that the senior staff
46awere earning almost double that figure. But the salaries of two of the 
most important persons on Roosevelt's staff - Special Assistant Harry Hopkins 
and Special Counsel Judge Sam Rosenman - were paid not by The White House 
Office appropriation but by that of the Emergency Fund. Roosevelt was for­
bidden to pay them from WHO funds by the wording of the formal authorization 
that then existed for The White House Office appropriation. This referred 
only to "the Secretary to the President, and the six administrative assistants 
to the President as authorized by law, and the two additional secretaries to 
the President".^
It was not Roosevelt but Truman who was first freed from this restriction on
the nature of the staff that could be employed - and paid - from White House
Office funds. It took two stages. Firstly, on 2nd August, 1946, an act
48was passed which granted the President the flexibility he wanted. The
new wording, which has been enshrined in every appropriation act until FY 1980,
authorized expenditure "for expenses necessary... as the President may
49specify and (for) other personal services*'. By this time the minimum
salary level of the senior staff was $10,000 p.a. The senior White House 
Office salary grade was listed as General Schedule 16 (GS-16). In 1947 
nine Truman staff members were included in that grade. But this still did
m
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not enable President Truman to pay all his senior staff from White House 
Office funds. Assistant to the President John Steelman and Special Counsel 
Clark Clifford, for example, continued to be paid from the Emergency Fund 
appropriation.50 An act passed on 15th October, 1949, "to provide in­
creased compensation of secretaries, and executive, administrative, and 
staff assistants"51 boosted salaries all round but left untouched the
essential problem.
The second stage in its solution came in 1950 with the formal establishment
for the first time of a new salary level, set above the General Schedule
53
grades.52 The new level, expressed as a minimum, was $14,800 p.a.
The immediate effect was that President Truman could now include eleven 
of his staff in the new senior WHO salary grade. John Steelman and Clark 
Clifford, therefore, were listed in 1950 as being formally on the payroll
of The White House Office 54
At first the new salary grade was merely labelled "Positions at rates in 
excess of....", being changed in 1953 to "Special Positions at rates equal 
to or in excess of...". The dollar level was increased in 1956 to 
$16,000 p.a. but the number of staff qualifying at that top level was 
still limited to eleven. Notice of a change, however, was given in the 
FY 1958 Budget and the following year, 1958, saw the addition of three 
more staff members to the senior group eligible for the highest salary 
rates. Thus Secretary to the Cabinet Robert Gray and Associate Special 
Counsel Edward McCabe, for example, qualified for inclusion at the same 
salary grade as Eisenhower's top staff such as The Assistant to the 
President Sherman Adams, Special Counsel Gerald Morgan, and Secretary to
the President Thomas Stephens.
318 -
Despite an apparent equality of treatment of these 14 senior staff the 
actual salaries paid to each varied. A strictly graded system was intro­
duced to distinguish between the amounts that could be earned - even within 
this senior salary grade. A formula was instituted whereby not more than
two were to be paid the top salary; not more than three to be paid at the
next level down; not more than six at the level below that; and not more 
than three below that.56 This formula was tailor-made for an hierarchical 
organization of senior White House staff. That President Eisenhower adopted 
such a system says much about his attitude to his staff. Though he could 
have chosen to pay $22,500 to two top staff members, only one - The
57
Assistant to the President - qualified in his view for that salary. The 
Deputy Assistant to the President was paid $21,00058 The rest came lower 
down, graded like flour. Despite the fact that the minimum salary level 
for the senior WHO salary grade was increased, in 1960, to $17,500 p.a. 
this left the actual salaries of the senior Eisenhower staff unaffected.
The $17,500 p.a. was in fact reduced to $16,530 p.a. in 1961 when President 
Kennedy entered office, but this far from presaged a decline in the treat­
ment of senior staff. On the contrary, Kennedy did what he could to 
equalize the position of his top 14 WHO staff, within the graded system 
laid down by his predecessor. Five were paid at $21,000 p.a., such as 
Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen, Press Secretary Pierre Salinger, and 
Special Assistants Kenny O ’Donnell and McGeorge Bundy; while six were paid 
at the slightly lower level of $20,000 p.a., such as Deputy Special Counsel 
Myer Feldman, and Administrative Assistants Mike Manatos and Henry Hall 
Wilson.59 Kennedy was so concerned to minimize pay distinctions between
his top staff that he changed the law "to increase the compensation of
60
three assistants to the President from $17,500 to $18,500" p.a. This
helped to make Associated Press Secretary Andrew Hatcher, and Assistant
Snopi a  1 Pnunapl I.pp ____ less discriminated against.
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Meanwhile the minimum level for the senior WHO salary grade was raised 
in 1962 to $18,000 p.a.
While Kennedy strived for equality Johnson managed to realise it - at 
least on paper. The single most important act in respect of the equali­
zation of top White House staff salaries came in 1964 with President 
Johnson's promotion of legislation to repeal the pay distinctions that had 
up till then existed among them. His sponsorship of this measure owed 
something to his regard for staff assistance.61 On 14th August, 1964,
the old graded system was replaced by provision of a single salary rate
for the 14 senior staff.62 They were still labelled "Special Positions
The minimum salary level was increased to $21,445 p.a. (later to $22,217
p.a. and $22,750 p.a. in 1965 and 1966 respectively), and the maximum
level to $30,000 p.a., although the average salary actually paid to the
63
top staff was $27,500 p.a. in 1965 and $29,700 in 1967.
1»
It was a noteworthy feature of Johnson's attitude to his staff that he 
deliberately chose not to award the maximum salary to all of them. For 
two years, in 1965-19 6 6, he maintained a slightly lower salary level for 
all but one member: Lawrence O'Brien. ("It is the consensus of his 
colleagues and myself that no public servant in Washington is more 
deserving", said Johnson.64) In 1965 those in the Special Assistant cate­
gory received $28,500 p.a. On 16th January, 1965, at a News Conference, 
President Johnson briefly referred to staff salaries in the course of 
remarks he made about the turnover of staff in his White House. After
singling out O'Brien, he elucidated his general approach: he did not 
believe in starting his staff at the highest permitted salary level. "I 
will feel at liberty", said Johnson, "and will no doubt do so as
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move on, (to) promote some of these men to various salaries in keeping 
with their experience, their duties, and their requirements."65 Much 
better, in his own mind, to retain that small leeway with which to reward, 
or punish, his staff as he felt necessary.
Johnson was also responsible for one other important change. On 23rd 
December, 1967, the senior WHO salary grade underwent both a change in 
its very nature and also another change of name. Created and placed 
above the General Schedules were now established the Federal Executive 
Salary Schedules.66 Henceforth these were to be tied to congressional 
salary levels. They were themselves to be graded from Executive Level I 
down to Executive Level V. Each Executive Level was to have a fixed salary 
level. in 1967, for Johnson's top staff, this was fixed at $30,000 p.a.6 
(which represented only a slight increase over the previous average salary 
for 1966). This was the salary enjoyed by such top Johnson staffers as 
Special Assistants Jo Califano, Douglass Cater, Walt Rostow, James Jones, 
Mike Manatos, and Harry McPherson. President Johnson, who as Majority 
Leader in the Senate had known full well how much he relied upon congres-
. .onts 68 amply repaid his sense of debt by up- sional administrative assistants, amp y p
. . „p oaiarips for the senior White House 
grading both the status and security
staff.
alteration in the new system he inherited President Nixon made no major altera
He continued the practice, for example, of having from his predecessor. He continue v
t-an-t far National Security Affairs, Henry
the salary of the Special Assis
served as de facto director of
Kissinger, paid from WHO funds.
_ oil staff while for the years 1969-70 his the National Security Council staff,
d.pu„, Alexander Haig, . »  « “  *h* NSC “ “
oa„g.d 1» 1971 .1«» Haig'. f . ~ l  •«»*■**“ * “  *“ «  HO“”  ° " 1C*
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as the Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs. By contrast, the 
Assistant for Urban Affairs, Patrick Moynihan, and his deputy, were both 
paid from WHO funds right from the start in 1969. When John Ehrlichman 
replaced Moynihan in the autumn of 1969, and became Assistant for Domestic 
Affairs in 1970 with the additional operational job as Director of the newly- 
formed Domestic Council, both Ehrlichman and his six principal Deputy 
Assistants continued to be listed as WHO staff and paid as such. Ehrlichman 
himself, together with H.R. Haldeman, Kissinger, the Counsellors to the 
President, and certain others, enjoyed the Executive Level II salary.
Under President Nixon salaries were distinctly improved, although allowance 
for inflation was a factor to some extent. This improvement came in two 
stages. Firstly, the Executive Level II salary level was raised in 1970 
to a substantial $42,500 p.a., a rise of over 40%;69 and secondly, the 
staff qualified for certain overtime pay increases, thus prompting one 
Senator to ask the light-hearted rhetorical question "Do you think the
President is going to be able to get more overtime out of his staff than
70President Johnson did?”
1971 certain le.er salary grades ..re raised,”  d . . « «  un.t.eCed ... 
most senior staff). But this, together with the increases in the numbers 
of staff at those lower grades, began to cause some concern. Indeed as 
early as 1969 the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Treasury, Post Office, and Executive Office had drawn attention to the
. ijdii A staff requested at salary levelsdoubling of the number of middle-level s 4
/ivA+aH fll level”.72 The numbers of un- that were clearly ”not in the secretarial lev
. /although no information on thegraded personnel, too, began to
salaries paid —  ever pri.i.d «  the ..... Budge..) . »I -
that attracted the attention of congressman Morris K. Udall in 1972, when
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he undertook a study of the EOP, and many other members of Congress -
between 1974 and 1978 when White House authorization legislation was
under discussion. (See Chapter VII.) In 1974, the Acting Comptroller
General, Mr. R.F. Keller, estimated that "one quarter of the ungraded
73
positions ... are paid at rates in excess of $36,000 p.a." When one
considers the number of ungraded staff employed in 1972-1974 (76, 96, and 
94 respectively), and the projected total for 1975 (126), one can appreciate 
that large numbers of staff below the top level were earning considerable
salaries.
This can perhaps best be judged by some comparisons made in 1975 between 
certain White House staff salaries and those of other government officials. 
Kenneth Lazarus, Associated Counsel to the President, was paid a salary 
of $38,000 p.a. which compared with the Level V salaries of only $36,000 p.a. 
paid to the Administrator of the Farmers Home Administration, the Commis­
sioner of Fish and Wildlife at the Department of the Interior, and the 
Executive Director of the U.S. Civil Service Commission. Richard Cheney, 
the Deputy Assistant to the President, was paid $40,000 p.a., which was 
more than the Level IV appointments of members of the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, and the General Counsel of 
the National Labor Relations Board, all of whom were paid $38,000 p.a. 
Similarly, Robert Goldwin, the Special Consultant to the President, and 
Gerald Warren, one of the Deputy Press Secretaries, both earned more (at 
$39,000 p.a. each) than the Under Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air
_  , . „ o Tariff Commission, and members of theForce, the Chairman of the U.S. iarui
Civil Aeronautics Board (at $38,000 p.a. each).
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The range of comparisons at the most senior staff level truly indicated 
the rarefied atmosphere in which their salaries were located. For example, 
the Assistant to the President for Public Liaison, William Baroody, hardly 
top of the staff pecking order, was nevertheless paid more than the Deputy 
Attorney General of the United States and the Chairman of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, both of whom received the Level III salary of 
$40,000 p.a. Similarly, the Assistant to the President for Legislative 
Affairs, Max Friedersdorf, outearned the Chairman of the Federal Communi­
cations Commission by the same margin.
Finally, the most senior of President Ford's White House staff, such as 
John Marsh and Robert Hartmann, Counsellors to the President, Donald Rumsfeld, 
Assistant to the President, Philip Bucken, Counsel to the President, and 
Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President, were each paid at the Level II 
rate of $42,500 p.a. (raised later in 1975 to $44,600 p.a.). This was a
salary equal to that of the most important sub-Cabinet posts of Under 
Secretary of State, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and 
other senior government jobs such as the Administrator of the Federal 
Aviation Administration and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. 
In addition, this salary level was shared by every member of Congress.
Unlike most of the government positions here referred to, the precise nature 
of the pay scale for White House staff is not formally set by law. It is 
more tradition that has linked its top salary level to the pay of congress­
men and senators, a linkage which was firmly entrenched by the establishment
, j -in 10R7 Earlv in the new Carter Presidency, of the Executive Level grades in 1967. a y
therefore, when Congress approved itself a 29% pay raise to $57, p 
Robert Lipschutz, Counsel to the President, presented a similar plan of 
salary rises for the White House staff to Jimmy Carter. By all accounts
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the President "baulked at the generosity".75 This was less for its effect 
on his very top staff - such as Assistant to the President Hamilton 
Jordan, Press Secretary Jody Powell, domestic affairs adviser Stuart 
Eisenstadt, or Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski 
but what it meant for the middle-level White House staff.
Middle-level staff had received the benefit of a government-wide pay increase
signed into law by President Ford on 1st October, 1976, which was estimated
76
to add $632,000 to the salary bill for The White House Office in 1977. The 
impact of further increases, especially for those staff below top level, 
not unnaturally brought some critical publicity. This was fuelled by two 
additional factors: firstly, the comparisons that were easily made be­
tween the jobs, and salaries, that the new Carter staff were now to enjoy 
as compared with the Ford staff of only a few months previously; and
secondly, their age.
A few examples amply illustrate the point. In 1976 Richard Hutcheson had 
a job at the Democratic National Committee worth $6,000 p.a. In April, 
1977, while still only 25 years old, he now earned $42,500 p.a. as Staff 
Secretary to President Carter in charge of managing the White House paper 
flow. Only a few years earlier dozens of men and women of enormous 
political experience (and twice his age), like Senate Budget Committee 
Chairman Edmund Muskie, and every other member of Congress, had earned the 
same. Another staff aide, Rex Granum, aged 26, had deserted a $14,000 
p.a. reporter's job for the Carter presidential campaign in 1976, to be 
rewarded in 1977 with the title of Deputy Press Secretary and a salary of 
$48,500 p.a. to match. Yet another example was Elizabeth Rainwater, who 
at 30 was appointed to a Level V staff position as a deputy assistant for 
research under Hamilton Jordan at $42,500 p.a. Undeniably there are few
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75the President "baulked at the generosity". This was less for its effect
on his very top staff - such as Assistant to the President Hamilton 
Jordan, Press Secretary Jody Powell, domestic affairs adviser Stuart 
Eisenstadt, or Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski 
but what it meant for the middle-level White House staff.
Middle-level staff had received the benefit of a government-wide pay increase
signed into law by President Ford on 1st October, 1976, which was estimated
76
to add $632,000 to the salary bill for The White House Office in 1977. 
impact of further increases, especially for those staff below top level, 
not unnaturally brought some critical publicity. This was fuelled by two 
additional factors: firstly, the comparisons that were easily made be­
tween the jobs, and salaries, that the new Carter staff were now to enjoy 
as compared with the Ford staff of only a few months previously; and 
secondly, their age.
A few examples amply illustrate the point. In 1976 Richard Hutcheson had 
a job at the Democratic National Committee worth $6,000 p.a. In April, 
1977, while still only 25 years old, he now earned $42,500 p.a. as Staff 
Secretary to President Carter in charge of managing the White House paper 
flow. Only a few years earlier dozens of men and women of enormous 
political experience (and twice his age), like Senate Budget Committee 
Chairman Edmund Muskie, and every other member of Congress, had earned the 
same. Another staff aide, Rex Granum, aged 26, had deserted a $14,000 
p.a. reporter's job for the Carter presidential campaign in 1976, to be
rewarded in 1977 with the title of Deputy Press Secretary and a salary of
.. _ nv..„lp was Elizabeth Rainwater, who$48,500 p.a. to match. Yet another exa p
, i v nosition as a deputy assistant forat 30 was appointed to a Level V staff p
T  ^ «42 «00 d a. Undeniably there are fewresearch under Hamilton Jordan at $ >
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routes to so large a salary at such young an age in any field.
It was the media spotlight falling on such staff members as these which
sparked the comment about an abuse of taxpayers' money. The President
himself was reportedly not immune from a similar feeling. Look,
people are being overpaid’, he said, running his finger down the list of
staff salaries. 'What is this business?’ " White House Counsel
Lipschutz responded by trimming all salaries at all levels, except those
for the very top Level U .  In turn, Level II Carter staff voted themselves
78
a voluntary cut of $1,500 to $56,000 p.a., allegedly to "set an example". 
This enabled Lipshutz to claim that the additional cost to The White House 
Office salary bill ($400,000 p.a.) actually represented a $166,000 p.a. 
"saving" since the full increases had not been granted. One news magazine 
reported that "after all the controversy over the latest raise, one aide 
predicts it will be another eight years before White House employees get
another pay boost" ,79 But no-one needed to wait that long. In the FY 
1982 Budget the Executive Level II salaries were raised to $60,662 p.a. 
incoming senior WHO staff in the Reagan White House, like Counsellor Ed 
Meese, Chief of Staff James Baker, and his deputy Michael Deaver, all 
received this increased salary - four years ahead of schedule.
80
The Hierarchy of Staff Salary Levels,
i _ of the principal trends in White House staff Turning now to an analysis of tne prim-ip
. is a clear distinction between thosesalaries over four decades there is
Presidents .he her. .»Joyed . I . « .  - » » •
,h. top st.It salaries sod these President, -he h.v. net. The Johnson
our analysis must be considered
Presidency stands as the turning point. 
ur-M-fe-in a  framework.
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Of those Presidents enjoying such control all employed an hierarchical 
pattern of staff salaries to some degree. Appendix 4.14 clearly illustrates 
the point. Those White House staff paid at the top salary rate numbered 
between one and only five under Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower 
and Kennedy. After Johnson’s reform the top fourteen were paid at an equal 
level. President Eisenhower undoubtedly differentiated his senior staff in 
the most obvious manner. In 1957, for example, one man - The Assistant 
to the President Sherman Adams - stood out as receiving the highest salary 
($22,500 p.a.)81 while his deputy, Major General Wilton B. Persons, received 
the next highest ($21,750). Special Counsel Gerald D. Morgan, and two 
Secretaries to the President occupied the next level while six other staff 
members the next below that. The pattern of staff salaries resembled a 
pyramid, with the numbers of staff on each lower salary level increasing.
President Truman's apparently equal treatment of his top WHO staff (in 
the top nine were each paid $10,000 p.a.) is undermined by the fact that 
he rewarded two others with measurably higher salaries ($15,000 p.a. and 
$12,00 p.a.), paid for from a separate fund. Moreover, while by 1952 he 
equalised the position at the very top, having allowed both John Steelman 
and Clark Clifford to share the top salary level, he had by contras 
ferentiated the other senior WHO staff into two groups of three (at 
$18,000 p.a. and $15,000 p.a. respectively).
Within the restrictions laid down by Eisenhower (in 1957) of a formula for 
the grading of senior WHO salaries, President Kennedy sought the most equal 
treatment for his senior staff. Broadly speaking, as many as possible were 
paid the same salary, even if this meant - as it did - reducing the amount of 
top salary paid. Appendix 4.14 shows that five were paid at $21,000 p.a. ;
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the next six 'down' were paid $20,000 p.a. Thus eleven senior staff were 
accommodated on the top two salary rungs, by comparison with his predecessor's 
total of only two. Kennedy also successfully jacked up the salary level of 
the three staff at the next level down.
One trend links the presidencies from Roosevelt to Kennedy. This is borne 
out in Table 4.21. The gap between the top salary paid and that at the 
sixth salary level below the top consistently narrowed. Expressed as a 
percentage the 6th salary level as a proportion of the top salary level 
moved from 47% in 1947 (under Truman) to 58% in 1952 (also under Truman) 
to 71% in 1957 (under Eisenhower) and finally to 79% in 1962 (under Kennedy) . 
This progressive narrowing of the most senior WHO salary bands suggests a 
trend towards equalization for the senior staff. It is one of the apparent 
paradoxes that this trend reversed itself after the Kennedy Presidency and 
in the wake of the Johnson reform of 1964 which guaranteed a future equality 
of treatment for the top 14 WHO staff. Evidence for the widening gap 
(between the top and the sixth salary level) were the percentage figures 
of 69% in 1967 (under Johnson) and 57% in 1972 (under Nixon). Salaries for 
the senior WHO staff (i.e. those on Executive Level II) thus went up faster 
than those of middle-level staff. Overall, the WHO seemed subject to less 
equal treatment. However, as Table 4 ^ 1  makes clear, the average WHO 
salary level (a figure which includes that for political and support staff 
combined) gradually increased during 1947-1977 as a proportion of the top
salary level: from 18% in 1947 (under Truman) to 42% in 1977 (under
nnd re»dv guide, WHO staff as a whole could Carter). Therefore, as a rough and reaay g »
b .  . . I d  to have b . . a  b . t t . r  paid In 1977 than . . o r  b . f o r . .
»or. precise an .n.ly.i. 1» r.»d.r.d l.po.slbl. b„ tb. no.-pobllc.tlon .7
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most senior (dozen or so) WHO staff was unequal (although Kennedy best 
minimized the inequality); but since the Johnson Presidency these top 
staff have been both equally treated and highly paid (in government terms). 
Secondly, the reverse appears to have been the case immediately below the 
senior level. The salary band separating the senior from the middle-level 
WHO staff, having progressively narrowed from Roosevelt to Kennedy, has 
since widened (although the average WHO salary level has steadily continued 
to increase as a proportion of the top salary level)8.1® Thirdly, WHO staff 
salaries undoubtedly provide useful additional evidence by which to judge 
a President's staff organization and structure.
The most important White House staff are certainly paid the most. Yet the 
inducement to serve on a President's senior staff has never been primarily 
financial.82 Service in the White House places them beyond the reach of 
'normal' concerns over pay. In some cases persons have taken a considerable 
cut in salary by joining the staff: for example, Bryce Harlow in joining 
the Nixon staff in 1969, and re-joining it in 1973. To have been a member 
of the White House staff has undeniably (especially since Kennedy's day) 
added to one's earning potential upon leaving; even in the case of the 
'Watergate' staff.83 As to the view that the staff are overpaid, few 
outsiders have ever begrudged the most senior staff their salaries. When 
it was announced in 1977 that staff salaries were being raised President 
Carter was asked to justify such increases at a News Conference on 12th May. 
"These men and women on my staff, said Jimmy Carter, "are not overpaid... 
Their increase in salary, I think, was one that was justified, and I don't 
have any apology to make for it. They work extraordinarily long hours, as 
do some of you, and I think the people of our country are getting a good 
return on their salary investment in my staff."84 This reply could well
President of any staff.have been made by any
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THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF: SUPPORT SERVICES
The salary costs of the White House staff do not by themselves account for 
the total overall cost of the staff. Over the years the amount appropriated 
for support services, for administrative and secretarial back-up, has in­
creased to a significant level* In 1939 they accounted for over one quarter 
of The White House Office budget. This proportion declined (to between one 
tenth and about two fifths) during the years between the Truman and Nixon 
presidencies. But by 1976, under Ford, it had risen sharply. Under Carter 
it rose again and by 1979 support services accounted for a full third of the 
total WHO budget.
Table 4.22 gives Budget Authority figures for a selection of the more
important support services that have been provided for The White House
Office staff over the years: "Printing and Reproduction", "Equipment",
85
"Supplies and Materials", and "Travel and Transportation". Figures
are given for 1939, and for the last year in each succeeding Presidency. 
As Table 4.22 shows, expenditures on these categories have neither been 
steady in themselves nor in relation to one another. However, allowing 
for fairly large fluctuations from year to year, the broad trend has been
upwards.
* Any assessment of support services for the White House staff based only 
on the resources of The White House Office must convey understated con
elusions because this section does not include which
paid for from the Special Projects appropriation (detailed estimates for which 
disappeared°from U.S. Budgets in the mid-1960s). The law. of such support 
between 1956 and 1964 was much higher as a proportion of ithe tot a 1 budge t than 
that for The White House Office. While for the latter the f r a n g e d  be 
tween one seventh and one fifth, Special Projects recorded “  *V£aff falarj 
of one half for the cost of support *  t h o u g h
costs. Thus the highest salary bill, $880,000 m  .l u o*, ' fieure
figure of $480,000 in support services (and throughout
remained near $400,000). Under President Kennedy certain “ o 000 except^In 
The budget for "Travel and Transportation' (always ov $ > 1962
1956) reached $206,000 in 1962. The "Equipment" budget t r e b l e d b o t J
and 1963; the "Supplies and Materials" and "c“ ic^ ionslI<3^ d 1966 ) 
creased iwo-and-a-half times between 1961 and 1962. (See: USBA FY 1958 1966 )
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TABLE 4.22
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 1939-1979 
Cost of WHO Support Services
Selected Support Services
Presidency
Printing 
and Re­
production
Equip­
ment
Supplies Travel & 
and Trans- 
Materials portatioii5
TOTAL
SUPPORT
SERVICES0
As a 
% of 
Total 
WHO 
Budget
Roosevelt 1939 2 7 10 25 (25) 57 27%
Roosevelt 1945 8 0.7 10 30 (30) 69 19%
Truman 1952 18 19 24 50 (40) 164 9%
Eisenhower 1960 39 3 44 53 (40) 198 10%
Kennedy 1963 41 21 70 64 (40) 360 14%
Johnson 1968 113 12 40 58 (36) 323 11%
Nixon 1974 483 149 177 226 (56) 1,532 14%
Ford 1976 583 82 250 255 (100) 5,094 30%
Carter 1979 638 484 211 327 (100) 5,817 34%
a All figures in $000s.
b Figures given in brackets show the amount of each sum nominally 
allocated for the President's travel (see Chapter I note 106). 
From 1972 onwards figures include "Transportation of Things".
c Figures include several other categories of expenditure (not 
listed in this Table), including "Rent, Communications, and 
Utilities" (which underwent a 10-fold increase in 1975).
Sources: House Committee on Appropriations 1939 1946
United States Budgets 1947-1979
Budget allocations for equipment, as might be expected, have varied the 
most. At certain times, as in business offices everywhere, the West Wing 
has been refitted with up-to-date office equipment. In the 1970s, for 
example, more and more self-correctible IBM Selectric typewriters were 
introduced. Even so, the demand outstripped supply. Staff Secretary Jerry 
Jones explained to a House appropriations subcommittee in 1975 that "we have
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a running battle going on in our place whether to use the executive-type
typewriters or the Selectric-type typewriters---Everyone who comes to the
White House wants a Selectric".86 He also admitted that "we are under 
great pressure to replace, but we just have too big an inventory to do 
wholesale replacing". As it was, the Ford White House would have to re­
place their collators and offset printing equipment.
As the 1980s got underway more and more computer equipment began to appear 
at the White House. For example, the congressional liaison office had a 
computerized file installed containing basic information about every repre­
sentative and senator together with their voting records in current and past 
Congresses. Information on party affiliation, committee assignments, 
seniority, margin of victory in his/her last election, and ratings by 
various interest groups became available at the touch of a VDU button, 
saving the time of White House staff who would otherwise have compiled the 
information painstakingly by hand or in their heads.
The White House also arranged to be plugged in to two other Washington 
computerized information products: the LEGIS system, which tracks legis­
lation and gives the full legislative background of a given proposal; and 
the Library of Congress SCORPIO system, which produces issue briefs on a 
multitude of specific topics. Such information quickly proved its worth 
to the domestic affairs White House staff. One other facet of the new 
computerized age was the "Congressional Correspondence Summary and Retrieval 
System" which logged incoming mail in a computer, printing out a daily 
summary of letters received, reporting on the status of the follow-up, and 
providing an analysis of congressional sentiment. The costs
procuring such equipment have been far from negligible. The budgetary 
allocation in 1979 for equipment was $484,000.
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The cost of supplies and materials for the staff increased more steadily, 
although still subject to occasional fluctuation. There were noticeable 
percentage increases during the Eisenhower Presidency, the Nixon Presidency 
and even the Ford Presidency. This was not entirely coincidental. The 
effort made by those three Republican Presidents to ensure that they were 
properly briefed by their staff, a process that incurred much organized 
staff work and consequent paper flow, was reflected in the amount spent on
supplies and materials for The White House Office.
But perhaps the true measure of the degree of paperwork is now better re­
flected in the "Printing and Reproduction" item in The White House Office 
budget. Table 4,22 records steady increases under Roosevelt, Truman, and 
Eisenhower - roughly doubling from one to the next. The unmistakable 
increase in cost under Johnson was follows by a remarkable three-fold in­
crease in the Nixon Presidency. In 1974 alone the Nixon WHO staff were 
responsible for $483,000 in reproduction costs. This fact amply corroborates 
a remark by one of Nixon’s most politically astute WHO advisers, Bryce Harlow. 
In conversation with this writer Harlow related, apropros the relentlessly 
organized staff system presided over by Haldeman, that even the most "innocu­
ous paper" that was submitted to the President ended up, by the time it had
been circulated among the staff for comments to be made and appendices to
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be added, "weighing a pound by the time it was ready".
porations undoubtedly did well out of the Nixon Presidency, and the evidence 
is that they did even better out of both Ford and Carter. By 1979 the 
Carter WHO staff did nearly $650 thousand dollars worth of xeroxing and
nrintine.
*
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The item entitled "Travel and Transportation" has a curious history - and 
a no less curious application. Table 4.22 gives figures for the combined 
total of travel costs for the President and for his staff (with the figures 
for the President alone in brackets). From the Roosevelt Presidency until 
1950 these were synonymous. After 1950 separate funds were appropriated 
for the President’s travel and for other travel costs. From 1972 onwards a 
third item was separately budgeted for the travel and transportation of 
"things". Table 4.22 shows a clear division in scale between the costs 
of travel incurred during the presidencies of Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower 
Kennedy and Johnson on the one hand, and those of Nixon, Ford and Carter on 
the other. Throughout the 1970s the average annual travel cost for The 
White House office was running at over $250,000 - at least four times the 
level of a decade earlier.
The curious nature of this item derives from the fact that it is in no way 
supposed to cover the actual travel costs of the President. Its title is 
therefore completely misleading. The "travel" referred to has meant that 
undertaken by the White House staff. In a statement submitted for the 
record in 1974 to the House appropriations subcommittee the Nixon Adminis­
tration said that all "travel" funds were used "primarily to pay expenses
o f the P re s id en t’s s t a f f  which accompany him on t r ip s , "  adding that the
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staff "must always stay in close proximity to the President". However,
this has by no means always been the case. TVo years earlier, the equivalent 
Senate subcommittee had inquired about the costs of Henry Kissinger’s 
travels as an Assistant to the President. "How are Mr. Kissinger’s trips 
to China, Moscow, and Paris financed?" asked Senator Montoya. The Adminis­
tration witness, Mr. Caspar Weinberger, did not in fact himself know. He 
ventured the opinion (which was not subsequently challenged) that the NSC 
Defense Department, and State Department budgets were all contributors
1
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But he was sure the costs were not financed from WHO travel funds because
90their use was limited to travel "within the United States".
The increased level of travel costs in the 1970s did not pass unnoticed, nor 
without critical comment. The particular criticisms were that Presidents 
continually travelled in their capacity as Commander-in-Chief, thereby 
evading any restriction on travel expenses (i.e. for his accompanying staff) 
and that such trips seemed magically to increase during election periods.
The subject provoked no little discussion in 1975,91 and no little argument
in 1976.92
In the autumn of 1975, during the run-up to the primary season of early 
1976, Counsel to the President Philip W. Buchen was obliged to respond to 
a request from the Federal Election Commission to comment on presidential 
travel to a special senatorial election in New Hampshire. Buchen stated
that the Ford White House would adopt a policy in future that, when the 
President was travelling on a trip which entailed "only political stops ... 
we will identify those individuals who could be considered to be present 
for a political purpose".94 He cited some examples, whom, he said, would 
be paid for by "the appropriate political committee".95 But the fact re­
mained, as Buchen himself acknowledged, that "in most cases it is not 
possible to schedule the President’s travel in a manner that will allow 
trips to be solely official or solely political".96 In such cases the 
Department of Defense would calculate the "political" component of such a 
trip and charge it to the appropriate political committee. In regard to 
the White House staff he simply stated that "no precise dividing line now 
exists, nor is one likely to be drawn, which clearly indicates when such ^
employees are performing official duties and when those duties are political."
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The arguments would no doubt have re-surfaced in 1980 had President Carter 
not observed a self-denying (and, in the short term, beneficial) ordinance 
by not campaigning in person outside the White House during the primaries 
while the Iranian hostages remained captive.
The figures given in Table 4.22 for the total cost of WHO support services 
show that these totals dramatically increased under both Nixon and Ford.
This, in turn, had a marked effect on the total WHO budget. Such increases 
wrongly give the impression that back-up services for the White House staff 
went through the roof during this time. The explanation for a large slice 
of the increases actually lay less in the roof space than in the floor space 
of the White House. Beginning in 1975 a new law came into force which 
instituted "standard level user charges" for government buildings and office 
space (including the White House offices), in place of the previous system 
where the GSA took care of such matters from its own funding. Essentially 
this was a non-political change in accounting procedures. In the words of 
0MB Director James Lynn in 1975, "the idea is that each budget of each 
organization will show, on a fair basis hopefully, what it costs for space" 
For the White House this meant that between 1974 and 1976 the amount charged 
for "Rent, Communications, and Utilities" leapt into prominence as by far 
the biggest single item in the total WHO support services budget, going up 
ten-fold from $400,000 to $4,300,000 p.a.
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This increase has resulted in a decisive shift in the proportion of Tbe 
White House Office budget devoted to support services. But to some 
this increased proportion already existed in previous years. We have here 
only examined WHO support services, but between 1956 and 1974 Specia 
Projects provided additional back-up, and the NSC and Domestic Council
budgets similarly contributed their share. Detailed breakdowns of the
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average the proportion devoted to support services during 1956-1964 was 
about half its total annual cost. Moreover, the extent of detailing of 
staff to the White House during the 1960s (which in 1968 culminated in 
Johnson having more White House staff on detail than officially on the 
WHO payroll), also played its part in giving a false idea of the real 
cost of support services. Figures for the Johnson Presidency should on this 
account be treated with great circumspection.
Indirect Support for The White House
It would be naive to suppose that even these considerable costs incurred 
on White House staff support services truly account for the actual 'back-up 
costs either of the staff or of the President. Both benefit from the daily 
presence of a level of indirect support and assistance whose precise extent 
and cost can never be measured." But it is huge. The expense of this
indirect support is borne by cabinet departments and agencies; not least,
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by the Defense Department.
Th. Defense Department provides Indirect suppcrt 1» four ..In areas. Firstly, 
i, maintains the presidential retreat at Camp David in Maryland. In 1975 
there ..re 150 »aval personnel assigned to this retreat -  it. annual 
budge, exceeded »l.!-.1“  Secondly, i, provide, the mean, ef transport.«» 
tor ,h. President and hi. staff, done are the day. .hen this included a 
presidential train. In the mid-1970s th. * 1 « .  House ... accorded five Boeing 
,07. (including th. presidential plane Air Force 0»., later renamed^,,.. 
Spirit of '76"), and eleven smaller executive jets and helicopte 
cost of operating such aircraft cannot be separated out fro. budge, figures, 
hut it 1. also f i r  to point out that they ..re at th. disposal of cabin., 
officers and diplomatic personnel as well as the White House staff.
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Thirdly, the Pentagon budget includes items for the comfort of the
103presidential yacht (until its disposal by President Carter ); the cars 
and chauffeurs of the thirty White House limousines (which, contrary to 
initial expectation, were not all removed from service during the Carter 
years and were subsequently fully reinstated by President Reagan); and 
the celebrated White House Mess, which has long been famed as an exclusive 
luncheon venue.103 Fourthly, the White House Communications Agency pro­
vides the sophisticated array of communications equipment that services 
not only the Presidency but its national security appurtenances. Its cost 
is hidden but was believed in the mid-1970s to be running at over $35
million p.a. 104
The Treasury Department contributes indirect support for the Presidency by 
virtue of its traditional jurisdiction over the Secret Service and the off­
shoot Executive Protective Service.105 The National Par* Service takes 
responsibility for the domestic upkeep of the White House as a building. 
Funds for the Executive Residence are presented to Congress by the Director 
of the National Capital Parks. In 1975 the budget was $1.8m, double the 
amount only nine years previously.106 This provides for the dosens of 
engineers, housemen, butlers, carpenters, plumbers, painters, maids, 
florists and cooks that service the White House. There were about seventy- 
five such people on average during the 1970s. The Parks Service 
vide, for the ,.<*11.1.. a* C P  Ho—  <«. « »  o'
The « „ „ a .  S e rv ice . » d . l . i s « r . . l o a  ha. . 0«  * 2.  o r  * 3.  appropriated .0 
fu rn ish , r . -o d e l ,  and - a i n . . ! »  « —  and « “  H° “ ‘ '
The State Depart»«, foot, the »111 'or «* • -  ‘“ ” ™ d “
Inin* the acco»od..l.g vl.lt!« di-it.n... " »  exa.pl., 1« ~
i.burses the - 1 «  —  « ■  « •  -  ~  “ * “ “
____ i. C i m i  1 a r l  v
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the costs of foreign travel by the President or his staff. Taken together, 
these various extra items better illustrate the scale of indirect support 
made available, of which the President and his staff are undoubted bene­
ficiaries .
Finally there are the costs of running the White House as a building. These
have traditionally been accorded a separate budgetary heading, whether the
"Executive Mansion" or (as a result of de-imperializing the Nixon legacy)
the "Executive Residence at the White House". The personnel employed by
this appropriation have included the gardners, cooks, butlers, and general
handypersons who maintain the White House and grounds. As was noted in
Chapter I internal alterations to White House staff officers are so continual
as almost to compare with painting the Firth of Forth bridge - it’s never not
being done. For many years there have been dozens of staff employed, at a
107budget that by 1980 had reached over $3 million.
.hat 1. th. real significance of support service. for the »it. House st.fff 
I» tl.e-.lve. they ere of passing Interest, hut th. sheer scale that the, 
have no. reached has brought one factor Into prominent relief. The staff 
that serve a President, .ho provide hi. -1th political advice, infor..tion, 
day-to-d., assistance of all hinds, and facilities better to .«.age the 
Presidency, do not eri.« 1» isolation. They are th. beneficiaries of, and 
can the— elves direct on behalf of th. President, a for.id.bl. -chin., 
tti, provide, the. .1th a level of sophisticated technological, ad.lnletr.tiv* 
and secretarial bach-up that is «n.gu.lled - w h e r e  1» the - « * •  °*h'r
elected political leader ha. such personal access t. resources on the scale 
of those .« the disposal »1. » 1 «  House staff. *■*» » .  President 
choose, to entrust th... resource, to a Chief of Staff »  1-
to ... .hy «hat staff — v 1* •« P” - ’”“ *
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by Washington's extensive political community. Decades ago, the staff 
were merely a collection of individuals acting as the eyes and ears of 
the President. They have since been transformed into a body capable of 
taking comprehensive and sustained action on behalf of their President. 
Whether direct or indirect, support services for the White House staff 
provided the engine for such a transformation.
CONCLUSION
It is clear from this chapter that the growth of the White House staff has 
been broadly and steadily upwards throughout five decades. Across the board 
between 1939 and 1974 the numbers of staff dramatically increased, as did the 
variety of their job titles, their turnover, their collective cost, their 
individual salaries, and the range of support services at their disposal. 
Although there have been localised areas of faster (or lesser) growth within 
the overall pattern, the cumulative growth of the various entities that make 
up the inner White House staff has been truly impressive. From being merely 
a handful of 'eyes and ears' for the President they have grown to become his
political life support machine.
The essential political message conveyed by this chapter is reflected in the 
fact that every President added to the growth of the White House staff in at 
least one major respect during this period. Despite the occasional (and, upon 
detailed examination, wholly misleading) impression to the contrary, this 
growth has been sponsored, encouraged, nurtured, and sustained 
of Presidents - whatever their political party or political views. The under- 
iying theme of this chapter has been their shared responsibility - convincingly 
confirmed by the evidence - for the rise of a new American political insti­
tution. To what extent its development and organization has been determined 
by common factors or individual circumstances is a matter to which we now
turn.
